AD 67-29-03
Applicability
| Type | Manufacturer | Model | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| aircraft | Maryland Air Industries, Inc. | F-27J | Airworthiness Directives; Fairchild-Hiller Models F-27J and FH-227 Aircraft |
| aircraft | Maryland Air Industries, Inc. | FH-227 | Airworthiness Directives; Fairchild-Hiller Models F-27J and FH-227 Aircraft |
| aircraft | Maryland Air Industries, Inc. | FH-227B | Airworthiness Directives; Fairchild-Hiller Models F-27J and FH-227 Aircraft |
| aircraft | Maryland Air Industries, Inc. | FH-227C | Airworthiness Directives; Fairchild-Hiller Models F-27J and FH-227 Aircraft |
| aircraft | Maryland Air Industries, Inc. | FH-227D | Airworthiness Directives; Fairchild-Hiller Models F-27J and FH-227 Aircraft |
| aircraft | Maryland Air Industries, Inc. | FH-227E | Airworthiness Directives; Fairchild-Hiller Models F-27J and FH-227 Aircraft |
Unsafe Condition
The APU fire detection system may have inadequate reliability and sensitivity due to insufficient fire detectors and non-fire resistant wiring in the fire detection circuit.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Required Actions
Install an additional fire detector (Solar P/N 7447-2) within 100 operational APU hours. Install MIL-W-25038B fire resistant wire in the fire detection circuit within 100 operational APU hours. Replace existing 700 degree fire detectors (Solar P/N 7447-1) with 400+25 degree F detectors (Solar P/N 7447-2) within 200 operational APU hours.
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Compliance Time
Within the next 100 operational APU hours following the effective date of this AD (for paragraphs (a) and (b)), and within the next 200 operational APU hours for paragraph (c).
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Affected Aircraft
Fairchild-Hiller Models F-27J and FH-227 aircraft with installed Solar Auxiliary Power Unit Model T-62T-25, Serial Nos. S-408000 to S-408099 inclusive.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Federal Register Abstract
APU Fire Detection System
Applicability Source Text
Show captured applicability text from the source AD
AD Final Rules - DRS_67-29-03.html Copy URL Print/Save as PDF Document Versions Feedback Details AD Number: 67-29-03 Document Type: AD Final Rules Docket Number: Unknown Subject Heading: Airworthiness Directives; Fairchild-Hiller Models F-27J and FH-227 Aircraft Subject: APU Fire Detection System Status: Current Citation: This information is not available. Citation Publish Date: Effective Date: 10/27/1967 Make: Maryland Air Industries, Inc. Model: F-27J | FH-227 | FH-227B | FH-227C | FH-227D | FH-227E Product Type: Aircraft Product Subtype: Large Airplane Affected AD: Superseded AD: Affected By: Superseded By: Service/Office: Office of Primary Responsibility: CFR Part Reference: Part 39 Comments: AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES FINAL RULES: 67-29-03 CITATION: This information is not available. PAGE NUMBER: DOCKET NUMBER: Unknown AMENDMENT: 39-499 AD NUMBER: 67-29-03 SUBJECT HEADING: Airworthiness Directives; Fairchild-Hiller Models F-27J and FH-227 Aircraft ACTION: SUMMARY: DATES: Effective October 27, 1967. ADDRESSES: FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: REGULATORY TEXT: 67-29-03 FAIRCHILD-HILLER: Amdt. 39-499 Part 39 Federal Register October 25, 1967. Applies to all F-27J and FH-227 aircraft with installed Solar Auxiliary Power Unit Model T-62T-25, Serial Nos. S-408000 to S-408099 inclusive. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished, or unless APU is rendered electrically inoperative and APU controls are placarded to prohibit operation. To provide adequate APU fire detection system reliability and sensitivity, accomplish the following modifications: (a) Within the next 100 operational APU hours following the effective date of this AD, install an additional fire detector, Solar P/N 7447-2, (set at 400 25 degrees F) in accordance with Fairchild-Hiller Service Bulletin Nos. F-27-49-4 Revision 3, dated Sept. 25, 1967 or FH-227-49-4 Revision 3 dated Sept. 25, 1967 as applicable, or later FAA approved revision, or an equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. (b) Within the next 100 operational APU hours following the effective date of this AD, install MIL-W-25038B fire resistant wire in the fire detection circuit in accordance with Fairchild-Hiller Service Bulletin Nos. F27-49-6 dated July 10, 1967 or FH227-49-6 dated July 10, 1967 as applicable, or later FAA-approved revision, or an equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. (c) Within the next 200 operational APU hours following the effective date of this AD, replace the two existing 700 degree fire detectors, Solar P/N 7447-1 with two 400 + 25 degree F Fire detectors Solar P/N 7447-2. NOTE. - Compliance with paragraph (c) may be accomplished by arranging for the detector manufacturer, Fenwal, Inc. of 900 Main Street, Ashland, Massachusetts 01721, Solar P/N 7447-1 with two 400+25 degree F fire and reidentify the detector by P/N 7447-2. (d) Upon the effective date of this AD, APU operational hours will be logged until such time as the entire AD has been complied with. This amendment effective October 27, 1967. FOOTER:
Document Text
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AD Final Rules - DRS_67-29-03.html Copy URL Print/Save as PDF Document Versions Feedback Details AD Number: 67-29-03 Document Type: AD Final Rules Docket Number: Unknown Subject Heading: Airworthiness Directives; Fairchild-Hiller Models F-27J and FH-227 Aircraft Subject: APU Fire Detection System Status: Current Citation: This information is not available. Citation Publish Date: Effective Date: 10/27/1967 Make: Maryland Air Industries, Inc. Model: F-27J | FH-227 | FH-227B | FH-227C | FH-227D | FH-227E Product Type: Aircraft Product Subtype: Large Airplane Affected AD: Superseded AD: Affected By: Superseded By: Service/Office: Office of Primary Responsibility: CFR Part Reference: Part 39 Comments: AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES FINAL RULES: 67-29-03 CITATION: This information is not available. PAGE NUMBER: DOCKET NUMBER: Unknown AMENDMENT: 39-499 AD NUMBER: 67-29-03 SUBJECT HEADING: Airworthiness Directives; Fairchild-Hiller Models F-27J and FH-227 Aircraft ACTION: SUMMARY: DATES: Effective October 27, 1967. ADDRESSES: FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: REGULATORY TEXT: 67-29-03 FAIRCHILD-HILLER: Amdt. 39-499 Part 39 Federal Register October 25, 1967. Applies to all F-27J and FH-227 aircraft with installed Solar Auxiliary Power Unit Model T-62T-25, Serial Nos. S-408000 to S-408099 inclusive. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished, or unless APU is rendered electrically inoperative and APU controls are placarded to prohibit operation. To provide adequate APU fire detection system reliability and sensitivity, accomplish the following modifications: (a) Within the next 100 operational APU hours following the effective date of this AD, install an additional fire detector, Solar P/N 7447-2, (set at 400 25 degrees F) in accordance with Fairchild-Hiller Service Bulletin Nos. F-27-49-4 Revision 3, dated Sept. 25, 1967 or FH-227-49-4 Revision 3 dated Sept. 25, 1967 as applicable, or later FAA approved revision, or an equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. (b) Within the next 100 operational APU hours following the effective date of this AD, install MIL-W-25038B fire resistant wire in the fire detection circuit in accordance with Fairchild-Hiller Service Bulletin Nos. F27-49-6 dated July 10, 1967 or FH227-49-6 dated July 10, 1967 as applicable, or later FAA-approved revision, or an equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. (c) Within the next 200 operational APU hours following the effective date of this AD, replace the two existing 700 degree fire detectors, Solar P/N 7447-1 with two 400 + 25 degree F Fire detectors Solar P/N 7447-2. NOTE. - Compliance with paragraph (c) may be accomplished by arranging for the detector manufacturer, Fenwal, Inc. of 900 Main Street, Ashland, Massachusetts 01721, Solar P/N 7447-1 with two 400+25 degree F fire and reidentify the detector by P/N 7447-2. (d) Upon the effective date of this AD, APU operational hours will be logged until such time as the entire AD has been complied with. This amendment effective October 27, 1967. FOOTER:
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Retrieved: Apr 8, 2026
Rights: U.S. Government Public Domain
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