AD 2009-06-12
Applicability
| Type | Manufacturer | Model | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| aircraft | Bombardier Inc. | CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100) | Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) Airplanes |
| aircraft | Bombardier Inc. | CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 440) | Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) Airplanes |
Unsafe Condition
The Bombardier CL-600-2B19 airplanes have had a history of flap failures at various positions, which may result in a significant increase in required landing distances and higher fuel consumption than planned during a diversion.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Required Actions
Revise the airplane flight manual (AFM) to incorporate a temporary revision (TR) into the AFM, adding operational procedures into the AFM, train flight crewmembers and operational control/dispatch personnel on the operational procedures, and perform corrective maintenance actions including a pressure test of the flexible drive-shaft and corrective actions, and a low temperature torque test of the flap actuators and corrective actions. Additionally, require repetitive low temperature torque tests of the flap actuators and corrective actions, revise the AFM to incorporate a new TR (adding maximum flaps operating speed data and clarifying maximum flaps extended speeds), and modify the Operational Limitations. Also, revise the annual simulator training for 'Flap Zero Landing' events and revise the previously required training for flight crewmembers and operational control/dispatch personnel on the operational procedures.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Compliance Time
Within 10 flight cycles following the initial on-ground circuit breaker reset operation, or before further flight if another flap fail event occurs after the initial circuit breaker reset operation.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Affected Aircraft
Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Federal Register Abstract
We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * The Bombardier CL-600-2B19 airplanes have had a history of flap failures at various positions for several years. Flap failure may result in a significant increase in required landing distances and higher fuel consumption than planned during a diversion. * * *
Document Text
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[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 46 (Wednesday, March 11, 2009)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 10457-10469]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: E9-5290]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2008-1318; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-155-AD;
Amendment 39-15848; AD 2009-06-12]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional
Jet Series 100 & 440) Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD)
for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation
authority of another country to identify and correct
[[Page 10458]]
an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the
unsafe condition as:
* * * * *
The Bombardier CL-600-2B19 airplanes have had a history of flap
failures at various positions for several years. Flap failure may
result in a significant increase in required landing distances and
higher fuel consumption than planned during a diversion. * * *
* * * * *
We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe
condition on these products.
DATES: This AD becomes effective April 15, 2009.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of April 15,
2009.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of certain other publications listed in this AD as of
September 5, 2007 (72 FR 46555, August 21, 2007).
ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a> or in person at the U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan Parrillo, Aerospace Engineer,
Systems and Flight Test Branch, ANE-171, FAA, New York Aircraft
Certification Office, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New
York 11590; telephone (516) 228-7305; fax (516) 794-5531.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products.
That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on December 18, 2008
(73 FR 76974) and proposed to supersede AD 2008-01-04, Amendment 39-
15329 (73 FR 1964, January 11, 2008). That NPRM proposed to correct an
unsafe condition for the specified products.
That NPRM proposed to retain the requirements of AD 2008-01-04,
i.e., revising the airplane flight manual (AFM) to incorporate a
temporary revision (TR) into the AFM, adding operational procedures
into the AFM, training flight crewmembers and operational control/
dispatch personnel on the operational procedures, and doing corrective
maintenance actions. The corrective maintenance actions include a
pressure test of the flexible drive-shaft and corrective actions, and a
low temperature torque test of the flap actuators and corrective
actions.
That NPRM also proposed to add repetitive low temperature torque
tests of the flap actuators and corrective actions. In addition, that
NPRM proposed to require revising the AFM to incorporate a new TR
(adding maximum flaps operating speed data and clarifying maximum flaps
extended speeds), and to modify the Operational Limitations. That NPRM
also proposed to require revising the annual simulator training for
``Flap Zero Landing'' events and revising the previously required
training for flight crewmembers and operational control/dispatch
personnel on the operational procedures.
Further, the NPRM proposed to require certain maintenance actions
following a flap fail event and installation of a cockpit placard that
specifies new flap operating limitations. That NPRM also proposed to
allow installing modified flap actuators, which would terminate certain
sections of the operational procedures.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. We considered the comments received.
Request To Revise Wording in Paragraph (h)(6) of the NPRM
Mesa Group requests that we revise the wording in paragraph (h)(6)
of the NPRM. The commenter points out that paragraph (h)(6) of the NPRM
specifies to do maintenance actions ``except if maintenance actions
cannot be done and normal flap system operation can be restored after
an on-ground circuit breaker reset operation, then continued revenue
operation is permitted without further maintenance action for up to 10
flight cycles * * *.'' The commenter states the descriptions of the
actions in paragraphs (h)(6)(i) and (h)(6)(ii) of the NPRM--i.e., to
``do the maintenance actions specified in paragraph (h)(6) of the
AD''--create a ``loop'' and jeopardize safety of flight because
operators can continue flight indefinitely as long as the airplane
lands where maintenance actions cannot be done.
We disagree with the commenter's assertion that the actions
proposed in paragraphs (h)(6)(i) and (h)(6)(ii) of the NPRM create a
loop. Paragraph (h)(6) of this AD provides an exception to doing the
maintenance actions before further flight on airplanes on which a flap
fail message occurs. The exception allows flight without further
maintenance action for up to 10 flight cycles subject to certain
operating limitations and after an on-ground circuit breaker reset
operation, except as provided by the actions described in paragraphs
(h)(6)(i) and (h)(6)(ii) of this AD.
Paragraph (h)(6)(i) of this AD limits the allowable flight cycles
by specifying that the maintenance actions specified in paragraph
(h)(6) of this AD must be done within 10 flight cycles following the
initial on-ground circuit breaker reset operation. Paragraph (h)(6)(ii)
of this AD also limits the allowable flight cycles by specifying that
if another flap fail event occurs any time after the initial circuit
breaker reset operation, then the maintenance actions specified in
paragraph (h)(6) of this AD must be done before further flight.
Once operators have done the on-ground circuit breaker reset
operation, the maintenance actions must be done within the compliance
time specified in paragraph (h)(6)(i) or (h)(6)(ii) of this AD,
depending on whether another flap fail event occurs. Paragraphs
(h)(6)(i) and (h)(6)(ii) of this AD do not allow any exceptions to the
specified compliance times. However, for clarity, we have revised
paragraphs (h)(6)(i) and (h)(6)(ii) to refer to the service information
instead of paragraph (h)(6) of this AD.
Request To Revise or Supersede AD 2006-12-21
Comair requests that we revise or supersede AD 2006-12-21,
amendment 39-14647 (71 FR 34793, June 16, 2006), to add a statement
indicating that the installation of the actuators called out in
paragraph (h)(5) of the NPRM is acceptable for compliance with
paragraph (h) of AD 2006-12-21. The commenter notes that in paragraph
(i) of the NPRM we include such a statement, but there will still be no
cross reference within AD 2006-12-21 itself.
We do not agree that it is necessary to revise or supersede AD
2006-12-21. The intent of paragraph (i) of this AD is simply to specify
that installing certain flap actuators provides a method of compliance
with paragraph (h) of AD 2006-12-21. In addition, a global alternative
method of compliance (AMOC) to AD 2006-12-21 was granted to Bombardier
on November 18, 2008, which allowed installation of actuator part
numbers (P/Ns) 601R93103-23/24 (Vendor P/N 853D100-23/24) in lieu of P/
Ns 601R93103-19/20 (Vendor P/Ns 853D100-19/20) as a way to comply with
paragraph (h) of AD 2006-12-21. The AMOC also allows installation of
actuator P/Ns 601R93104-23/24 (Vendor P/N 854D100-23/24) in lieu of P/
Ns 601R93104-19/20 (Vendor P/N 854D100-19/20) as a way to comply with
paragraph (h) of AD 2006-12-21.
[[Page 10459]]
We have not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Revise AFM Reference
Comair and Air Wisconsin request that we revise an AFM reference in
the quoted material of paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM from ``AFM TR/165''
to ``AFM TR RJ/165-1.'' Both commenters request that we revise the AFM
reference in Note 1 following ``paragraph 1.'' of the quoted material.
Comair also requests that we revise the AFM reference in the Note
following ``paragraph 2.'' of the quoted material.
We agree to revise the AFM reference because AFM TR RJ/165-1 is the
latest AFM TR. We have revised the notes within the quoted material in
paragraph (h)(2) of this AD accordingly.
Request To Remove Training Requirement
Two commenters, Comair and Air Wisconsin, request that we remove
training requirements from the NPRM. Comair states that paragraphs
(f)(3), (g)(1), and (h)(3) of the NPRM contain training requirements
and that an AD is not the proper mechanism to mandate training. Comair
states that 14 CFR 39.3 defines airworthiness directives as ``* * *
legally enforceable rules that apply to the following products:
aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and appliances.'' Comair
further states that these paragraphs requiring training are issued
against people and not against a product. Air Wisconsin also states
that paragraphs (g)(1), (h)(3)(i), and (h)(3)(ii) of the NPRM do not
belong in the AD because those paragraphs apply to flight crewmembers
and operational control/dispatch personnel.
We disagree with the request to remove training requirements.
Section 39.11 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 39.11)
describes the types of actions that ADs can require, including
``conditions and limitations you must comply with.'' While we agree
that section 39.3 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 39.3)
applies to the products listed in 14 CFR 39.11, we retain broad
authority to require any corrective action that is determined to be
most effective in addressing an identified unsafe condition on any of
the products listed in 14 CFR 39.3.
In this AD, we have found that one of the factors contributing to
the identified unsafe condition is lack of flightcrew training in
operating an airplane when a flap failure occurs in flight (such as in
freezing conditions). Due to the unsafe condition, we determined that
these training requirements, in conjunction with the other requirements
of this AD, are necessary for safe operation of the airplane. We have
not revised this AD in this regard.
Request To Clarify Requirements in Paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and (g)(3)(ii)
of the NPRM
Comair requests that we clarify the requirements specified in
paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and (g)(3)(ii) of the NPRM. Comair states that in
recent years it seems to have become common practice when an AD is
superseded by another AD that the old requirements are restated as they
appeared in the superseded AD. Paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and (g)(3)(ii) of
AD 2008-01-04 refer to ``2,000 flight hours.'' Paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and
(g)(3)(ii) of this NPRM now list ``5,000 flight cycles.'' Comair states
that if there is a new requirement, for consistency, it should fall
under paragraph (h) of the NPRM.
Comair is correct in observing that we generally restate the
requirements of the existing AD in the new AD. We restate the
requirements as a necessity when the requirements of the existing AD
continue in the new AD or when certain requirements of the new AD are
tied to accomplishment of an action or actions in the existing AD, and
as a courtesy to operators for their reference. When there are
compliance changes to the actions in the existing AD, we may keep the
actions in the restatement section; thus, we restated paragraph (g)(3)
of this AD with a change to the accumulated time on the actuators.
In this case, we have extended the accumulated time on the
actuators that are affected by paragraph (g)(3) of this AD. We
explained this in the Discussion section of the NPRM as follows:
This proposed AD also re-identifies the airplanes affected by
paragraph (g)(3) of the existing AD. The accumulated time on the
actuators specified in paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and (g)(3)(ii) of this
AD has been extended from ``2,000 flight hours'' to ``5,000 flight
cycles.''
The re-identification does not affect airplanes that have already
complied with the actions specified in paragraph (g)(3) of this AD and
is relieving for airplanes that have not yet complied with the actions
specified in paragraph (g)(3) of this AD. No change has been made to
paragraph (g)(3) of this AD.
Request To Clarify Requirements of Paragraphs (g)(3) and (h)(4) of the
NPRM
Air Wisconsin requests that we clarify the requirements of
paragraphs (g)(3) and (h)(4) of the NPRM. Air Wisconsin states that
paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and (g)(3)(ii) of the NPRM and paragraphs
(h)(4)(i) and (h)(4)(ii) of the NPRM are confusing because they seem to
duplicate each other. Air Wisconsin suggests that paragraphs (h)(4)(i)
and (h)(4)(ii) be removed and that we refer to paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and
(g)(3)(ii) instead in paragraph (h)(4) of the NPRM.
Air Wisconsin further requests that we clarify whether paragraphs
(g)(3) and (h)(4) of the NPRM apply to actuators that had the pinion
shaft seals replaced since February 15, 2008, and have fewer than 5,000
flight cycles since replacement. In addition, Air Wisconsin also
requests that we clarify whether paragraphs (g)(3) and (h)(4) of the
NPRM do not apply to actuators that are overhauled or that had the
pinion shaft seals replaced.
We agree that the requirements of paragraphs (g)(3) and (h)(4)
should be clarified. Paragraph (g)(3) of this AD applies to airplanes
that have actuators (identified in paragraph (g)(3) of this AD) that
meet the conditions of either paragraph (g)(3)(i) or (g)(3)(ii) of this
AD. Once an actuator accumulates more than 5,000 flight cycles since
new, or a repaired actuator accumulates more than 5,000 flight cycles
on the pinion shaft seals, operators must do the low-temperature torque
test specified in paragraph (g)(3) of this AD. If an actuator has 5,000
or fewer flight cycles since new, or if an actuator that has been
repaired has 5,000 or fewer flight cycles since pinion shaft seal
replacement, then paragraph (g)(3) of this AD does not apply to that
actuator. Therefore, paragraph (g)(3) of this AD also does not apply to
overhauled actuators with 5,000 or fewer flight cycles since the pinion
shaft seals have been replaced.
The intent of paragraph (h)(4) of this AD is to require repetitive
low temperature torque tests to be done for actuators having more than
5,000 flight cycles, and on repaired actuators having more than 5,000
flight cycles on the pinion shaft seals.
If the actuators are replaced with new actuators having 5,000
flight cycles or fewer, or with repaired actuators having 5,000 flight
cycles or fewer on the pinion shaft seals, then the repetitive torque
tests are terminated.
However, the replaced actuators will be affected by the
requirements of paragraph (g)(3) of this AD once the new actuator
accumulates more than 5,000 flight cycles since new, or the repaired
actuator accumulates more than 5,000 flight cycles on the pinion shaft
seals; once these actuators are required to have the low temperature
torque test specified in paragraph (g)(3) of this AD, these actuators
will be affected by the requirements of paragraph (h)(4) of this AD if
they pass the torque test (i.e., the actuators that do not need to be
[[Page 10460]]
replaced). We have revised paragraph (h)(4) of this AD to clarify these
requirements and removed paragraphs (h)(4)(i) and (h)(4)(ii) of this
AD.
Request To Revise Language in the Quoted Material in Paragraph (h)(2)
of the NPRM
Several commenters request that we revise specific language in the
section titled ``4. Dispatch Following a Flap Failed Event'' of the
quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM:
<bullet> Comair requests that we clarify the listing for conditions
a., b., c., and d. specified in paragraph 4. of the quoted material.
We agree to clarify the listing for conditions a., b., c., and d.
specified in paragraph 4. of the quoted material. We have determined
that the current wording is not clear in specifying that conditions
``a. and b., and either c. or d.,'' must be met. Therefore, we have
revised the wording in the section titled ``4. Dispatch Following a
Flap Failed Event'' of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of this
AD as follows:
``If normal flap system operation can be restored after an on-
ground system reset, continued revenue operation of that airplane is
permitted, provided conditions a. and b., and either c. or d., below
are satisfied: * * *.''
<bullet> Air Wisconsin and Pinnacle Airlines request that we
clarify that the maintenance technician/personnel or flight crewmember
can accomplish the operational check specified in paragraph 4.b. of the
quoted material.
We agree with the request to clarify paragraph 4.b. of the quoted
material. The flightcrew has the responsibility for verifying the
operability of the systems called out in paragraph 4.b. of the quoted
material. We have revised paragraph 4.b. of the quoted material in
paragraph (h)(2) of this AD to read:
``Prior to each flight following an on-ground circuit breaker
reset, the thrust reversers, ground spoilers, and brake system are
verified operational by the flightcrew.''
<bullet> Comair requests that we clarify that there is no
requirement to document the results of the flightcrew system tests, and
suggests adding the following statement to paragraph 4. of the quoted
material: ``Note: No maintenance log entry is required for the
following action.''
We disagree with the commenter's request. There must be operator-
controlled documentation that accounts for the 10-flight-cycle
limitation following the initial reset of a circuit breaker. The method
of documentation is up to the discretion of the operator and the
principal operations inspector (POI). We have not revised this AD in
this regard.
<bullet> Comair also requests that we add the following statement
to paragraph 4. of the quoted material: ``Until a maintenance action
can be performed as specified by (h)(3)(6), for each flight following
an on-ground circuit breaker reset, either condition a. or b. [landing
distance available], below, must be satisfied: * * *.''
We disagree with the request to add the statement. We find that the
language suggested by the commenter provides no substantive change from
the meaning of the paragraph as it is written in the NPRM, and that no
clarity would be added with such a change. We have not revised this AD
in this regard.
<bullet> Air Wisconsin and PSA Airlines request that the action
specified in paragraph 4.b. of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2)
of the NPRM be revised to clarify what needs to be accomplished and
what is expected. Air Wisconsin states that the type of check should be
specified. PSA Airlines suggests that the word ``verify'' be removed.
Comair also requests that we clarify paragraph 4.b. by specifying ``For
each flight following an on-ground circuit breaker reset, prior to
take-off, the following checks [thrust reversers, ground spoilers, and
brake system] must be performed: * * *.'' In addition, Comair requests
that additional information on the operational checks be provided.
We clarify that paragraph 4.b. of the quoted material in paragraph
(h)(2) of this AD is intended to apply to all operators. Individual
operators have the option of using more restrictive language. We find
no need to revise this AD in this regard.
<bullet> Pinnacle Airlines requests that we clarify who must
perform the on-ground circuit breaker reset. Pinnacle Airlines infers
that the flightcrew does the reset.
We clarify that the following wording in paragraph (h)(6) of this
AD makes it apparent the flightcrew performs the reset: ``* * * the
circuit breaker reset operation can be performed by the flightcrew when
authorized by the operator's maintenance control organization.'' We
have not revised this AD in this regard.
<bullet> Pinnacle Airlines states that we should clarify that the
flightcrew or maintenance personnel can perform the operation of the
flaps for 5 cycles specified in paragraph 4.a. of the quoted material
in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD. Pinnacle states that allowing only
flightcrews to perform this function, under certain circumstances (such
as crew duty time issues), could have substantial negative logistic
impacts, which could have a negative impact on passenger service.
We disagree with the commenter. The operation of the flaps for 5
cycles, as specified in paragraph 4.a. of the quoted material in
paragraph (h)(2) of this AD, is intended to be a flightcrew function.
Doing this operation is predicated on the condition specified in (h)(6)
of this AD when maintenance resources are not available. If maintenance
personnel are available, operators should be performing the maintenance
procedures in accordance with the fault isolation manual, as specified
in paragraph (h)(6) of this AD. We have not revised this AD in this
regard.
<bullet> Pinnacle Airlines requests that we clearly specify when
the operational checks in paragraph 4.b. of the quoted material
terminate.
We disagree with the request to add a statement for terminating
action for paragraph 4.b. of the quoted material. We have determined
that to mitigate the risk of multiple flap fail events, and until
further rulemaking is considered, the requirements of paragraph 4.b.
must be followed as stipulated in paragraph (h)(6) of this AD. We have
not revised this AD in this regard.
<bullet> Air Wisconsin requests that we add language stating that
``an aircraft can be returned to revenue service after a flap system
reset is accomplished after a Flap Fail event provided that (then list
the conditions).''
We disagree with the request to add language to paragraph 4. of the
quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD to specify when an
aircraft can be returned to service. The requirements of paragraph
(h)(2) of this AD are limitations. However, in paragraph (h)(6) of this
AD, we do specify the criteria for returning the airplane to service
following a flap fail event. We have not revised this AD in this
regard.
<bullet> Regarding paragraph 4.a. of the quoted material in
paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM, Comair requests that, for the flightcrew
system tests, we clarify that the cycling of the flaps through 5 cycles
applies only to the first flight following the flap reset by
specifying, ``For the first flight following an on-ground circuit
breaker reset, prior to dispatch, the flaps must be operated for five
full extension/retraction cycles with no subsequent failures.''
We clarify that the intent is to perform the action of paragraph
4.a. once prior to dispatch following a flap fail event. We have
revised that paragraph to read: ``Prior to the initial dispatch
following an on-ground circuit breaker reset, the flaps must be
operated for five full extension/retractions cycles by the flightcrew
with no subsequent failures.''
[[Page 10461]]
<bullet> Comair requests that, for flightcrew system tests, we
clarify that the term ``take-off,'' instead of ``dispatch,'' should be
used for the following tests to allow the crew to perform them during
taxi-out: thrust reverse, ground spoiler, and brake system. Air
Wisconsin requests that we replace the word ``dispatch'' with the word
``flight'' in paragraphs 4.a. and 4.b. of the quoted material in
paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM.
We disagree with revising the word ``dispatch'' in paragraph 4.a.
of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM. We intend that
these operations are to be performed as part of a pre-taxi checklist.
We do not want these operations to be performed during taxi where, if
discrepancies are noted, corrective actions would impact airport
congestion and ground control services if the airplane has to return to
the gate. However, as stated previously, we have revised paragraph 4.b.
of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD to specify ``each
flight'' instead of ``dispatch.''
Request To Clarify Paragraph (h)(4) of the NPRM
Comair requests that we clarify the intent of paragraph (h)(4) of
the NPRM. Comair states that many of its actuators are in the category
covered by paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and (g)(3)(ii) of the NPRM, for which
no additional action for paragraph (g)(3) of the NPRM is required.
Comair questions whether the intent of the new maintenance action in
paragraph (h)(4) of the NPRM is to require a low-temperature torque
test even for those actuators for which no action was required under
paragraph (g)(3) of the NPRM.
We provide the following clarification. Paragraph (h)(4) of this AD
does not apply to actuators on which no action was required by
paragraph (g)(3) of this AD. The wording in paragraph (h)(4) of this
AD, ``New Maintenance Action,'' is explicit in that it applies to ``* *
* airplanes for which the low temperature torque test of flap actuators
is required by paragraph (g)(3) of this AD * * *'' Paragraph (g)(3) of
this AD applies only to actuators identified in paragraph (g)(3) and
that meet the specifications in paragraph (g)(3)(i) or (g)(3)(ii) of
this AD. Therefore, there is no requirement to perform a repetitive
low-temperature torque test for actuators for which no action was
required under paragraph (g)(3) of this AD. We have not revised this AD
in this regard.
Request To Add Phase-in Period to Paragraph (h)(4) of the NPRM
Comair and Air Wisconsin request that we add a phase-in period to
paragraph (h)(4) of the NPRM. Comair notes that a number of actuators
are compliant with Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-27-150, dated July
12, 2007, from as early as February 15, 2008. Comair states that it is
unlikely this NPRM will supersede AD 2008-01-04 before February 15,
2009, and therefore some actuators will already have exceeded 12 months
since last compliance. Comair concludes that since under AD 2008-01-04,
paragraph (g)(3) was only a one-time compliance, and paragraph (h)(4)
of the NPRM will now make that repetitive, a phase-in is necessary for
actuators having early compliance.
We agree with the commenter's request to add a grace period to the
compliance time of ``within 12 months after doing the low temperature
torque test'' specified in paragraph (h)(4) of this AD. To avoid undue
burden on the operators, adding a grace period is both desirable and
prudent. We have determined that adding a 60-day grace period will not
adversely affect safety. We have revised paragraph (h)(4) of this AD
accordingly.
Request To Revise Reference
Comair, PSA Airlines, and Pinnacle Airlines request that we revise
the reference to the fault isolation manual specified in paragraph
(h)(6) of the NPRM. The commenters state that because the NPRM
specifies Revision 38, dated January 10, 2008, of Section 27-50-00 of
Chapter 27 of the Bombardier Canadair Regional Jet CRJ 100/200/440
Fault Isolation Manual CSP A-009, Volume 1 (the ``FIM''), operators
will not be in compliance when using later revisions of the FIM. Comair
states that operators have no control over Bombardier revisions. PSA
and Pinnacle state that an alternative method of compliance would be
needed to use later Bombardier revisions. PSA recommends we remove the
reference to Revision 38 of the FIM. Pinnacle recommends that we add
``or later revisions'' to the FIM reference.
We cannot agree to revise the reference to the FIM specified in
paragraph (h)(6) of this AD. We must specify a revision and a date to
meet Office of Federal Register (OFR) regulations for publications
incorporated by reference. We also cannot refer to ``later revisions''
of applicable service information according to OFR regulations. We have
not revised this AD in this regard.
Request To Revise Certain ``Part'' References
Comair, Pinnacle Airlines, and Mesa Airlines request that we revise
certain ``Part'' references in the NPRM. (The ``Part'' references
correspond to language in the mandatory continuing airworthiness
information.) Comair states that both paragraphs (h)(6) and (h)(7) of
the NPRM are listed as ``Part V.'' Mesa states that paragraphs (h)(4)
and (h)(5) are labeled as ``Part IV.'' Pinnacle notes that paragraphs
(h)(5), (h)(6), and (h)(7) of the NPRM should refer to Parts V, VI, and
VII, respectively.
Based on the commenters' remarks, we have reconsidered including
``Part'' references in this AD. In the NPRM, we intentionally included
these references to correspond to the Canadian airworthiness directive.
However, we find that referring to a ``Part'' of a Canadian
airworthiness directive in the U.S. AD does not add clarity, is
unnecessary, and may result in confusion for the reader. Therefore, we
have removed these references from this AD.
Request To Limit Reporting Requirement
Comair and Air Wisconsin request that we limit the reporting
requirement specified in paragraph (h)(7) of the NPRM. Comair states
that a 2-year limit should provide enough data. Air Wisconsin also
states that reporting should be limited to 2 years or dropped from the
requirements. Pinnacle also notes that the reporting requirement is
onerous and will require substantial logistics on the operator's part.
We agree to revise the reporting requirement in paragraph (h)(7) of
this AD. The reporting requirement is necessary and must be mandated to
monitor the effectiveness of the AD actions and to assist the
manufacturer and the regulatory authorities in determining if
additional rulemaking action is necessary. However, we agree the
reporting can be limited. We have revised paragraph (h)(7) of this AD
to specify that reporting is required for only 24 months.
Request for Clarification on Inoperable Items
PSA Airlines requests that we clarify whether it is OK to operate
with items that are inoperable per the minimum equipment list (MEL).
The AD takes precedence over other service information. Operating
an airplane that does not comply with the AD violates part 39 of the
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 39).
[[Page 10462]]
According to sections 121.628(b)(2) and 91.213(b)(2) of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.628(b)(2) and 91.213(b)(2)),
instruments and equipment required by an AD to be in operable condition
may not be included in the MEL unless the AD provides otherwise.
Request To Clarify Compliance With the FIM
PSA Airlines requests that we clarify how to comply with the FIM
requirements in paragraph (h)(6) of the NPRM. The commenter states that
since the FIM is a multiple-part document covering flight operations,
dispatch, and maintenance, it is difficult to provide documentation for
compliance with each part. The commenter also states that if part of
this AD will require sign-offs for each event, compliance documentation
could be very confusing after a number of sign-offs. The commenter
recommends inserting language that would eliminate the need for
repetitive sign-offs, such as stating that the FIM maintenance
requirements of paragraph (h)(6) must be tracked and completed in a
manner acceptable to the principal maintenance inspector (PMI).
We agree that adding the statement PSA Airlines requests would be
effective. Therefore, we have revised paragraph (h)(6) of this AD to
add the following statement: ``These maintenance requirements must be
tracked in a manner acceptable to the principal maintenance inspector
(PMI).''
Request To Clarify Paragraph (h)(6)(ii) of the NPRM
Several commenters request that we clarify paragraph (h)(6)(ii) of
the NPRM.
Air Wisconsin requests that we clarify whether paragraph (h)(6)(ii)
of the NPRM, which states ``If another flap fail event occurs any time
after the initial circuit breaker reset operation * * *'' is meant to
be within the process of exercising the components/systems specified in
paragraph 4. ``Dispatch Following a Flap Failed Event'' of the quoted
material in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD.
PSA Airlines requests that we clarify paragraph (h)(6)(ii) of the
NPRM by adding, ``another event within the 10 cycle limit'' or
``another event prior to completion of the FIM procedure from the
previous event.'' PSA states that the current wording could be
interpreted to mean either another event within the 10-cycle limit, or
anytime after an initial flap rest, regardless of whether the FIM
procedure has been complied with.
Pinnacle Airlines requests that we add language to paragraph
(h)(6)(ii) of the NPRM that specifies when the requirement to perform
the maintenance actions of paragraph (h)(6) of the NPRM is no longer
relevant. The commenter indicates that the statement requires that the
action be continued in perpetuity.
We agree to clarify paragraph (h)(6)(ii) of this AD. Paragraph
(h)(6)(ii) of this AD is intended to apply to any flap fail event,
whether in flight or during any of the checks required in paragraph
4.a. of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD. However, we
do not intend that paragraph (h)(6)(ii) of this AD apply to any event
regardless of whether the FIM procedure has been complied with. The
paragraph (h)(6)(ii) requirement to perform the maintenance actions is
required only if another flap fail event occurs during the 10-flight-
cycle period following the initial circuit breaker rest authorized in
paragraph (h)(6) of this AD. We have revised paragraph (h)(6)(ii) of
this AD to clarify that if another flap fail event occurs anytime
``within the 10-flight-cycle limit'' after the initial circuit breaker
reset operation, the maintenance actions are required to be done before
further flight.
Request To Clarify Special Flight Permits
PSA Airlines requests that a statement be added to indicate that
aircraft having a second flap event or an aircraft on which the flaps
cannot be reset may be ferried to a location where the FIM procedure
specified in paragraph (h)(6) of this AD can be accomplished.
We do not agree that it is necessary to add a statement to this AD.
This AD does not prohibit ferry flights. Special flight permits, as
described in Section 21.197 and Section 21.199 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199), may be requested to operate the
airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be
accomplished. We have not revised this AD in this regard.
Request To Substantiate Repetitive Low Temperature Torque Test
Mesa Airlines requests data for substantiating the repeat of the
low temperature torque test every 12 months following the initial test.
The necessity for repeat tests and the compliance time interval
were determined by the State of Design authority (Transport Canada
Civil Aviation (TCCA)) based on risk analysis and consultation with the
airplane manufacturer. We have considered TCCA's determination, as well
as the safety implications and the time necessary to do the
inspections, and have determined that requiring the repetitive low
temperature torque tests at 12-month intervals is appropriate. However,
under the provisions of paragraph (j) of the AD, we will consider
requests for adjustments to the compliance time if data are submitted
to substantiate that such an adjustment would provide an acceptable
level of safety. We have not revised this AD in this regard.
Request To Consider an Option to the Existing Actuator System
Cox and Company requests that its ``Flap Actuator Heating System''
be considered as an ``add on'' option to the existing actuator system.
The commenter states that its test data indicate that its ``Flap
Actuator Heating System'' will eliminate nearly all soft jams that
occur on Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 airplanes during cold weather.
We do not concur. We cannot include such an option in an AD when
that option is not yet certificated. When the design has received an
FAA Supplemental Type Certificate (STC), it is the operator's
discretion to consider installation. However, under the provisions of
paragraph (j) of this AD, we will consider requests from operators for
approval of an AMOC if sufficient data are submitted to substantiate
that the installation would provide an acceptable level of safety. We
have not revised this AD in this regard.
Request To Add Calendar Limitation
Pinnacle Airlines requests that we add a calendar limitation to
paragraph 4. of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM
that is similar to the limitation specified in paragraph 3. of the same
quote. Pinnacle is concerned that not having a calendar limitation
would result in significant operational impacts throughout the calendar
year.
We disagree with the request to add a calendar limitation to
paragraph 4. of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD.
Paragraph 3. of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD is
specifically focused on mitigating a cold weather flap fail event.
However, while paragraph 4. applies to cold weather events, it is not
limited to that scenario. Therefore, regardless of weather conditions,
paragraph 4. of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD is
necessary to address the identified unsafe condition. We have not
revised this AD in this regard.
Request To Clarify Compliance
Pinnacle Airlines asks whether non-compliance with the AD would
happen if the flightcrew does the operational check specified in
paragraph 4.a. of the
[[Page 10463]]
quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM and neglects to record
compliance with the check. Pinnacle Airlines also asks whether for
paragraph 4.b. in the quoted material in the same paragraph non-
compliance with the AD would happen if the flightcrew neglects to
record compliance with the requirement for the operational check of the
thrust reversers, ground spoilers, and brake system.
Compliance with paragraphs 4.a. and 4.b. of the quoted material in
paragraph (h)(2) of this AD is predicated on paragraph (h)(6) of this
AD, which invokes the limitation specified in paragraph (h)(2) of this
AD if the maintenance actions cannot be performed. The exception to
doing the maintenance actions was intended for relief only when an
airplane was at a location where maintenance personnel and/or equipment
were not available. Maintenance control authorization is required for
the flightcrew to perform this operation. The method of documentation
is at the discretion of the operator and the principal operations
inspector (POI). We have not revised this AD in this regard.
Request To Clarify the Phrase ``Maintenance Actions Cannot Be Done''
Pinnacle Airlines and Air Wisconsin request that we clarify the
phrase ``maintenance actions cannot be done'' in paragraph (h)(6) of
the NPRM. Pinnacle Airlines requests that we provide specific language
and conditions concerning this statement and questions if maintaining
flight schedule integrity is an adequate reason to establish that
``maintenance actions cannot be done.''
We agree that the statement can be clarified. The intent of this AD
is to prevent an unsafe condition. The only reason for deferring
maintenance is a lack of available maintenance resources. We have
revised paragraph (h)(6) of this AD by replacing ``if maintenance
actions cannot be done'' with ``if maintenance resources are not
available.''
Request To Add Requirement to Paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM
Pinnacle Airlines requests that we include in paragraph 4. of the
quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM the following
statement: ``Circuit breaker reset operation can be performed by the
flight crew when authorized by the operator's maintenance control
organization.'' Pinnacle Airlines notes that this statement is also in
paragraph (h)(6) of the NPRM.
We disagree with the request to add the statement suggested by the
commenter. The reset function stipulated in paragraph 4. of the quoted
material in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD is intended to be done by the
flightcrew. Compliance with this paragraph is predicated on paragraph
(h)(6) of this AD, which invokes the limitation specified in paragraph
(h)(2) of this AD only if maintenance actions in accordance with the
FIM cannot be performed. We have not revised this AD in this regard.
Request To Clarify Compliance With Paragraph (h)(7) of the NPRM
Pinnacle Airlines requests that we clarify compliance with
paragraph (h)(7) of the NPRM. Pinnacle questions whether it would
constitute non-compliance with the AD if the operator does not obtain
all of the flaps electronic control unit (FECU) codes and report them
to Bombardier within 30 days. Pinnacle also would like to know how the
operator brings an airplane back into regulatory compliance if the FAA
considers the aforementioned scenario to be non-compliance with the AD.
Non-compliance with the reporting requirement in paragraph (h)(7)
of this AD is non-compliance with the AD. The operator brings the
aircraft back into compliance by meeting the reporting requirements.
Under the provisions of paragraph (j) of this AD, we will consider
requests from affected persons for approval of an AMOC. We have not
revised this AD in this regard.
Request To Clarify the Phrase ``or 30 Days After the Effective Date of
This AD''
Air Wisconsin requests that we clarify what is meant in paragraph
(h)(7) of the NPRM by the phrase, ``or 30 days after the effective date
* * *.''
The intent of the phrase ``30 days after the effective date'' in
paragraph (h)(7) of the NPRM is to allow additional time for operators
to report if fault data were found before the effective date of this
AD. However, we have revised paragraph (h)(7) of this AD to limit the
need to report to ``as of the effective date of this AD'' and,
therefore, we have removed the phrase ``30 days after the effective
date'' from paragraph (h)(7) of this AD.
Request To Revise Reference
Pinnacle Airlines requests that paragraph (h)(7) of the NPRM be
amended to indicate ``Task 05-51-50-980-801 as introduced in the
Canadair Regional Jet TR 05-035, dated July 13, 2007, to the Canadair
Regional Jet Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), or latest revision.''
Pinnacle Airlines states that when Bombardier incorporates TR 05-035
into the AMM, operators will have to obtain an AMOC to comply with the
AD.
We cannot agree with the commenter's request to add a reference to
the latest revision of the service bulletin. We cannot refer to later
revisions of applicable service information according to OFR
regulations for publications incorporated by reference. We agree that
affected persons will have to obtain an AMOC to comply with the AD if
they plan to use later revisions. We have not revised this AD in this
regard.
Request To Clarify Intent of Paragraph 3.a.(i) in the Quoted Material
of Paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM
Air Wisconsin requests that we verify that the intent of paragraph
3.a.(i) of the quoted material in paragraph (h)(2) of the NPRM was to
include a reference to overhaul.
The text in paragraph 3.a.(i) of the quoted material in paragraph
(h)(2) of this AD is correct. We intended to include a reference to
overhaul. We have not revised this AD in this regard.
Request To Clarify Compliance With Paragraph (g)(3) of the NPRM
Air Wisconsin asks whether paragraph (h)(4) of the NPRM supersedes
paragraph (g)(3) of the NPRM.
Paragraph (h)(4) of this AD does not ``supersede'' paragraph (g)(3)
of this AD. Paragraph (h)(4) of this AD refers to paragraph (g)(3) of
this AD as a means of identification of those actuators to which the
requirements of paragraph (h)(4) apply. In other words, for those
actuators that have had the initial test required by paragraph (g)(3)
of this AD, operators must repeat the test in accordance with the
requirements of paragraph (h)(4) of this AD every 12 months. We have
not revised this AD in this regard.
Request To Revise FIM Reference To Refer to Part Numbers
Air Wisconsin requests that we revise paragraph (h)(6) of the NPRM
to say ``* * * IAW section 27-50-00 of the FIM, CSP A-009 as introduced
in revision 38 dated January 10, 2008 as it applies to the affected
part numbers identified in par (g)(3)(i) and (ii).''
We do not agree to revise paragraph (h)(6) of this AD. The
conditions of paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and (g)(3)(ii) of this AD apply to
the low temperature torque testing requirements of paragraph (g)(3) of
this AD. Those conditions have no
[[Page 10464]]
correlation to the FIM procedures that are to be followed after a flap
fail event. We have not revised this AD in this regard.
Request To Clarify Actions
Air Wisconsin requests that we clarify what to do if the
maintenance actions specified in paragraph (h)(6)(i) of the NPRM cannot
be done.
If an operator cannot comply with an AD, the operator must contact
the FAA for repair instructions. For this AD, operators may request an
AMOC, as specified in paragraph (j)(1) of this AD. We have not revised
this AD in this regard.
Request for an Alternative Method to Paragraph (h)(8) of the NPRM
Air Wisconsin requests that we allow the installation of a placard
that is an alternative to the placard specified in paragraph (h)(8) of
the NPRM. The commenter suggests that, as an alternative to using the
placard identified in Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-11-090, dated
August 15, 2008, operators can use a placard that says ``Do Not Extend
Flaps to 8 or 20 above 200 KIAS.''
We do not agree to revise paragraph (h)(8) of this AD. The
intention of this paragraph is to apply to all operators. Individual
operators have the option of using an alternative placard by requesting
an AMOC in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (j) of
this AD. We have not revised this AD in this regard.
Request To Revise Wording in Paragraphs 1.a. and 1.b. of the Quoted
Material in Paragraph (f)(2) of the NPRM
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) requests that we revise the
wording in paragraphs 1.a. and 1.b. of the quoted material in paragraph
(f)(2) of the NPRM so that the phrase ``and can be reasonably expected
to remain at or above this visibility until after landing'' is replaced
with ``and shall be forecast in the Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) to
remain at or above this visibility until after landing.''
We acknowledge the commenter's request. However, paragraph (f)(2)
of this AD is a restatement of the existing requirements of AD 2008-01-
04. We cannot change the wording, as those who have already complied
with the AFM revision specified in that AD would then be out of
compliance.
However, we infer the commenter intended to request that we revise
the new AFM revision specified in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD. We have
changed the wording in paragraph 1.a. of the quoted material in
paragraph (h)(2) of this AD as follows:
''When conducting a precision approach, the reported visibility
(or RVR) is confirmed to be at or above the visibility associated
with the landing minima for the approach in use, and shall be
forecast in the Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) to remain at or above
this visibility until after landing; or''
We have changed the wording in paragraph 1.b. of the quoted material in
paragraph (h)(2) of this AD as follows:
''When conducting a non-precision approach, the reported ceiling
and visibility (or RVR) are confirmed to be at or above the ceiling
and visibility associated with the landing minima for the approach
in use, and shall be forecast in the Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) to
remain at or above this visibility until after landing; or''
Request To Add Language Calling for a Permanent Solution
ALPA requests that we add language to the NPRM to be similar to
Canadian AD CF-2007-10R1, which calls out the need for a permanent
solution. The commenter states that it appears that a flap actuator
redesign proposal has been accepted by the Canadian Transportation
Safety Board and is being developed by the manufacturer that will
ultimately remove some of the operational and maintenance actions
called out in this AD. The commenter also states that a provision for a
permanent solution that will ultimately remove some of the operational
and maintenance actions called out in this AD must be included in this
AD.
We do not agree to add language specifying that there is a need for
a permanent solution. Such a statement adds no additional risk
mitigation or clarification. The new actuators referred to in paragraph
(h)(5) of this AD are an optional maintenance action that would
terminate the requirements of paragraph 3. of the quoted material in
paragraph (h)(2) of this AD. In addition, the reporting requirement of
paragraph (h)(7) of this AD is being used to monitor the effectiveness
of the AD actions and will enable the manufacturer to obtain better
insight into the nature, cause, and extent of the issue, and eventually
to develop final action to address the unsafe condition. Once final
action has been identified, we might consider further rulemaking. We
have not revised this AD in this regard.
Request To Add Language To Address ``Known Icing Enroute''
ALPA requests that we add language to the NPRM to address ``known
icing enroute.'' ALPA states that diversion operations in icing
conditions could pose a serious icing risk for aircraft operating with
the flaps at some intermediate setting. ALPA concludes that the
unintended consequences of an aircraft's flaps being exposed to icing
conditions for extended periods of time must be addressed in the
operational portion of the NPRM.
We appreciate ALPA's comment for identifying a generic issue in the
AFM. While this comment is not specific to this AD, it has highlighted
a deficiency in the Abnormal Procedures section of the AFM. Flap
failure in an extended position while in icing conditions is a generic
issue. A TR to the AFM may be issued to address this deficiency. Once
this TR has been issued and approved, we might consider further
rulemaking. We have not revised this AD in this regard.
Conclusion
We reviewed the available data, including the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
the AD with the changes described previously. We determined that these
changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or
increase the scope of the AD.
Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information
We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
We might also have required different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow our FAA policies. Any such differences
are highlighted in a NOTE within the AD.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD will affect 684 products of U.S. registry.
We also estimate that it will take about 18 work-hours per product to
comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate
is $80 per work-hour. Required parts will cost a negligible amount per
product. Where the service information lists required parts costs that
are covered under warranty, we have assumed that there will be no
charge for these parts. As we do not control warranty coverage for
affected parties, some parties may incur costs higher than estimated
here. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of
[[Page 10465]]
this AD to the U.S. operators to be $984,960, or $1,440 per product.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a>; or in person at the Docket Operations office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains the NPRM, the regulatory evaluation,
any comments received, and other information. The street address for
the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly
after receipt.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by removing Amendment 39-15329 (73 FR
1964, January 11, 2008) and adding the following new AD:
2009-06-12 Bombardier, Inc. (Formerly Canadair): Amendment 39-15848.
Docket No. FAA-2008-1318; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-155-AD.
Effective Date
(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective April
15, 2009.
Affected ADs
(b) This AD supersedes AD 2008-01-04, Amendment 39-15329.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional
Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes, certificated in any category,
serial numbers 7003 through 7990 and 8000 and subsequent.
Subject
(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 27: Flight
controls.
Reason
(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)
states:
* * * * *
The Bombardier CL-600-2B19 airplanes have had a history of flap
failures at various positions for several years. Flap failure may
result in a significant increase in required landing distances and
higher fuel consumption than planned during a diversion. * * *
* * * * *
Requirements of AD 2007-17-07, Amendment 39-15165: Actions and
Compliance
(f) Unless already done, do the following actions.
(1) Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Change: Within 30 days after
September 5, 2007 (the effective date of AD 2007-17-07), revise the
Canadair Regional Jet Airplane Flight Manual CSP A-012, by
incorporating the information in Canadair Regional Jet Temporary
Revision (TR) RJ/165, dated July 6, 2007, into the AFM.
Accomplishing the requirements of paragraph (h)(1) of this AD
terminates the requirements of this paragraph and the AFM revision
required by this paragraph may be removed from the AFM.
Note 1: The actions required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD may
be done by inserting a copy of Canadair Regional Jet TR RJ/165,
dated July 6, 2007, into the Canadair Regional Jet Airplane Flight
Manual CSP A-012. When this TR has been included in general
revisions of the AFM, the general revisions may be inserted in the
AFM.
(2) Operational Procedures: Within 30 days after September 5,
2007, revise the Limitations Section of the Canadair Regional Jet
Airplane Flight Manual CSP A-012, to include the following
statement. This may be done by inserting a copy of paragraph (f)(2)
of this AD in the AFM. Accomplishing the requirements of paragraph
(h)(2) of this AD terminates the requirements of this paragraph and
the AFM revision required by this paragraph may be removed from the
AFM.
``1. Flap Extended Diversion
Upon arrival at the destination airport, an approach shall not
be commenced, nor shall the flaps be extended beyond the 0 degree
position, unless one of the following conditions exists:
a. When conducting a precision approach, the reported visibility
(or RVR) is confirmed to be at or above the visibility associated
with the landing minima for the approach in use, and can be
reasonably expected to remain at or above this visibility until
after landing; or
b. When conducting a non-precision approach, the reported
ceiling and visibility (or RVR) are confirmed to be at or above the
ceiling and visibility associated with the landing minima for the
approach in use, and can be reasonably expected to remain at or
above this ceiling and visibility until after landing; or
c. An emergency or abnormal situation occurs that requires
landing at the nearest suitable airport; or
d. The fuel remaining is sufficient to conduct the approach,
execute a missed approach, divert to a suitable airport with the
flaps extended to the landing position, conduct an approach at the
airport and land with 1000 lb (454 kg) of fuel remaining.
Note 1: The fuel burn factor (as per AFM TR/165) shall be
applied to the normal fuel consumption for calculation of the flaps
extended missed approach, climb, diversion and approach fuel
consumption.
Note 2: Terrain and weather must allow a minimum flight altitude
not exceeding 15,000 feet along the diversion route.
Note 3: For the purpose of this AD, a ``suitable airport'' is an
airport that has at least one usable runway, served by an instrument
approach if operating under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), and the
airport is equipped as per the applicable regulations and standards
for marking and lighting. The existing and forecast weather for this
airport shall be at or above landing minima for the approach in use.
2. Flap Failure After Takeoff
When a takeoff alternate is filed, terrain and weather must
allow a minimum flight
[[Page 10466]]
altitude not exceeding 15,000 feet along the diversion route to that
alternate, or other suitable airport. The fuel at departure shall be
sufficient to divert to the takeoff alternate or other suitable
airport with the flaps extended to the takeoff position, conduct and
approach and land with 1000 lb (454 kg) of fuel remaining.
Note: The fuel burn factor (as per AFM TR/165) shall be applied
to the normal fuel consumption for calculation of the flaps
extended, climb, diversion and approach fuel consumption.
3. Flap Zero Landing
Operations where all useable runways at the destination and
alternate airports are forecast to be wet or contaminated (as
defined in the AFM) are prohibited during the cold weather season
(December to March inclusive in the northern hemisphere) unless one
of the following conditions exists:
a. The flap actuators have been verified serviceable in
accordance with Part C (Low Temperature Torque Test of the Flap
Actuators) of SB 601R-27-150, July 12, 2007, or
b. The flight is conducted at a cruise altitude where the SAT is
-60 deg C or warmer. If the SAT in flight is colder than -60 deg C,
descent to warmer air shall be initiated within 10 minutes, or
c. The Landing Distance Available on a useable runway at the
destination airport is at least equal to the actual landing distance
required for flaps zero. This distance shall be based on Bombardier
performance data, and shall take into account forecast weather and
anticipated runway conditions, or
d. The Landing Distance Available on a useable runway at the
filed alternate airport, or other suitable airport is at least equal
to the actual landing distance for flaps zero. This distance shall
be based on Bombardier performance data, and shall take into account
forecast weather and anticipated runway conditions.
Note 1: If the forecast destination weather is less than 200
feet above DH or MDA, or less than 1 mile (1500 meters) above the
authorized landing visibility (or equivalent RVR), as applied to the
usable runway at the destination airport, condition 3.a., 3.b., or
3.d. above must be satisfied.
Note 2: When conducting No Alternate IFR (NAIFR) operations,
condition 3.a., 3.b., or 3.c. above must be satisfied.''
(3) Training: As of 30 days after September 5, 2007, no affected
airplane may be operated unless the flight crewmembers of that
airplane and the operational control/dispatch personnel for that
airplane have received training that is acceptable to the principal
operations inspector (POI) on the operational procedures required by
paragraph (f)(2) of this AD. Accomplishing the requirements of
paragraph (h)(3)(i) of this AD terminates the requirements of this
paragraph.
(4) Maintenance Actions: Within 120 days after September 5,
2007, do the cleaning and lubrication of the flexible shafts,
installation of metallic seals in the flexible drive-shafts, and all
applicable related investigative and corrective actions by doing all
the applicable actions specified in ``PART A'' of the Accomplishment
Instructions of Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-27-150, dated July
12, 2007; except if torque test results are not satisfactory, before
further flight, install a serviceable actuator in accordance with
the service bulletin or, if no serviceable actuators are available,
contact the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA,
for corrective action. Do all applicable related investigative and
corrective actions before further flight.
Requirements of AD 2008-01-04: Actions and Compliance With Revised
Affected Airplanes for Paragraph (g)(3)
(g) Unless already done, do the following actions.
(1) As of November 30, 2008, no affected airplane may be
operated unless the flight crewmembers of that airplane have
received simulator training on reduced or zero flap landing that is
acceptable to the POI. Thereafter, this training must be done during
the normal simulator training cycle, at intervals not to exceed 12
months. Accomplishing the requirements of paragraph (h)(3)(ii) of
this AD terminates the requirements of this paragraph.
(2) Within 24 months or 4,000 flight hours after February 15,
2008 (the effective date of AD 2008-01-04), whichever occurs first:
Do a pressure test of the flexible drive-shaft, and do all
applicable corrective actions, by doing all the applicable actions
specified in ``PART B'' of the Accomplishment Instructions of
Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-27-150, dated July 12, 2007. Do all
applicable corrective actions before further flight.
(3) For airplanes having flap actuators, part numbers (P/Ns),
852D100-19/-21, 853D100-19/-20, and 854D100-19/-20 (Bombardier P/Ns
601R93101-19/-21, 601R93103-19/-20, and 601R93104-19/-20), specified
in paragraphs (g)(3)(i) and (g)(3)(ii) of this AD: Within 24 months
after February 15, 2008, do a low temperature torque test of the
flap actuators, and do all applicable corrective actions, by doing
all the applicable actions specified in ``PART C'' of the
Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-27-
150, dated July 12, 2007. Do all applicable corrective actions
before further flight.
(i) Airplanes having actuators that have not been repaired and
that have accumulated more than 5,000 flight cycles since new.
(ii) Airplanes having actuators that have been repaired and that
have accumulated more than 5,000 flight cycles on the inboard pinion
shaft seals, P/Ns 853SC177-1/-2.
New Requirements of This AD: Actions and Compliance
(h) Unless already done, do the following actions.
(1) New AFM Change: Within 30 days after the effective date of
this AD, revise the Canadair Regional Jet Airplane Flight Manual
(AFM) CSP A-012, by incorporating the information in Canadair
Regional Jet Temporary Revision (TR) RJ/165-1, dated August 7, 2008,
into the AFM. Accomplishing this action terminates the requirements
of paragraph (f)(1) of this AD and after this action has been done,
the AFM revision required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD may be
removed from the AFM.
Note 2: The actions required by paragraph (h)(1) of this AD may
be done by inserting a copy of Canadair Regional Jet TR RJ/165-1,
dated August 7, 2008, into the Canadair Regional Jet AFM CSP A-012.
When this TR has been included in general revisions of the AFM, the
general revisions may be inserted in the AFM.
(2) New Operational Procedures: Within 30 days after the
effective date of this AD, revise the Limitations Section of the
Canadair Regional Jet AFM CSP A-012, to include the following
statement. This may be done by inserting a copy of paragraph (h)(2)
of this AD into the AFM. Accomplishing this action terminates the
requirements of paragraph (f)(2) of this AD and after this action
has been done, the AFM revision required by paragraph (f)(2) of this
AD may be removed from the AFM.
``1. Flap Extended Diversion
Upon arrival at the destination airport, an approach shall not
be commenced, nor shall the flaps be extended beyond the 0 degree
position, unless one of the following conditions exists:
a. When conducting a precision approach, the reported visibility
(or RVR) is confirmed to be at or above the visibility associated
with the landing minima for the approach in use, and shall be
forecast in the Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) to remain at or above
this visibility until after landing; or
b. When conducting a non-precision approach, the reported
ceiling and visibility (or RVR) are confirmed to be at or above the
ceiling and visibility associated with the landing minima for the
approach in use, and shall be forecast in the Terminal Area Forecast
(TAF) to remain at or above this visibility until after landing; or
c. An emergency or abnormal situation occurs that requires
landing at the nearest suitable airport; or
d. The fuel remaining is sufficient to conduct the approach,
execute a missed approach, divert to a suitable airport with the
flaps extended to the landing position, conduct an approach at the
airport and land with 1000 lb (454 kg) of fuel remaining.
Note 1: The fuel burn factor (as per AFM TR RJ/165-1) shall be
applied to the normal fuel consumption for calculation of the flaps
extended missed approach, climb, diversion and approach fuel
consumption.
Note 2: Terrain and weather must allow a minimum flight altitude
not exceeding 15,000 feet along the diversion route.
Note 3: For the purpose of this AD, a ``suitable airport'' is an
airport that has at least one usable runway, served by an instrument
approach if operating under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), and the
airport is equipped as per the applicable regulations and standards
for marking and lighting. The existing and forecast weather for this
airport shall be at or above landing minima for the approach in use.
2. Flap Failure After Takeoff
When a takeoff alternate is filed, terrain and weather must
allow a minimum flight altitude not exceeding 15,000 feet along the
diversion route to that alternate, or other
[[Page 10467]]
suitable airport. The fuel at departure shall be sufficient to
divert to the takeoff alternate or other suitable airport with the
flaps extended to the takeoff position, conduct an approach and land
with 1000 lb (454 kg) of fuel remaining.
Note: The fuel burn factor (as per AFM TR RJ/165-1) shall be
applied to the normal fuel consumption for calculation of the flaps
extended, climb, diversion and approach fuel consumption.
3. Flap Zero Landing
Operations where all useable runways at the destination and
alternate airports are forecast to be wet or contaminated (as
defined in the AFM) are prohibited during the cold weather season
(December to March inclusive in the northern hemisphere) unless one
of the following four conditions (a. through d.) exists:
a. Each installed flap actuator meets one of the following three
conditions:
(i) Actuators have less than 5000 flight cycles (FC) since new
or overhaul and/or the actuators have been verified serviceable in
accordance with Part C (Low Temperature Torque Test of the Flap
Actuators) of Bombardier Service Bulletin (SB) 601R-27-150, issued
July 12, 2007, or
(ii) Actuators have P/N 601R93101-19/-21 (Vendor P/N 852D100-19/
-21), P/N 601R93103-19/-20 (Vendor P/N 853D100-19/-20), or P/N
601R93104-19/-20 (Vendor P/N 854D100-19/-20), and have less than
5000 FC since repair (where it can be shown that the actuator
inboard pinion seals, Eaton P/Ns 853SC177-1 and -2, were replaced),
or
(iii) Actuators have P/N 601R93101-23/-25 (Vendor P/N 852D100-
23/-25) installed at all inboard flap positions, P/N 601R93103-23/-
24 (Vendor P/N 853D100-23/-24) installed at outboard flap No. 3
position, and P/N 601R93104-23/-24 (Vendor P/N 854D100-23/-24)
installed at outboard flap No. 4 position.
b. Pre-dispatch forecast ground temperature at the time of
arrival at destination airport is above -25 deg C, utilizing a
reliable weather forecast service acceptable to the principal
operations inspector (POI).
c.The Landing Distance Available on a useable runway at the
destination airport is at least equal to the actual landing distance
required for flaps zero. This distance shall be based on Bombardier
performance data, and shall take into account forecast weather and
anticipated runway conditions.
d.The Landing Distance Available on a useable runway at the
filed alternate airport, or other suitable airport is at least equal
to the actual landing distance for flaps zero. This distance shall
be based on Bombardier performance data, and shall take into account
forecast weather and anticipated runway conditions.
Note 1: If the forecast destination weather is less than 200
feet above DH or MDA, or less than 1 mile (1500 meters) above the
authorized landing visibility (or equivalent RVR), as applied to the
usable runway at the destination airport, condition 3.a., 3.b., or
3.d. above must be satisfied.
Note 2: When conducting No Alternate IFR (NAIFR) operations,
condition 3.a., 3.b., or 3.c. above must be satisfied.
4. Dispatch Following a Flap Failed Event
If normal flap system operation can be restored after an on-
ground system reset, continued revenue operation of that airplane is
permitted, provided conditions a. and b., and either c. or d., below
are satisfied:
a. Prior to the initial dispatch following an on-ground circuit
breaker reset, the flaps must be operated for five full extension/
retractions cycles by the flightcrew with no subsequent failures.
b. Prior to each flight following an on-ground circuit breaker
reset, the thrust reversers, ground spoilers, and brake system are
verified operational by the flightcrew.
c. The Landing Distance Available on a useable runway at the
destination airport is at least equal to the actual landing distance
required for flaps zero. This distance shall be based on Bombardier
performance data, and shall take into account forecast weather and
anticipated runway conditions.
d. The Landing Distance Available on a useable runway at the
filed alternate airport, or other suitable airport is at least equal
to the actual landing distance for flaps zero. This distance shall
be based on Bombardier performance data, and shall take into account
forecast weather and anticipated runway conditions.
Note 1: If the forecast destination weather is less than 200
feet above DH or MDA, or less than 1 mile (1500 meters) above the
authorized landing visibility (or equivalent RVR), as applied to the
usable runway at the destination airport, condition 4.d. above must
be satisfied.
Note 2: When conducting No Alternate IFR (NAIFR) operations,
condition 4.c. above must be satisfied.''
(3) New Training: Do the requirements specified in paragraphs
(h)(3)(i) and (h)(3)(ii) of this AD.
(i) As of 30 days after the effective date of this AD, no
affected airplane may be operated unless the flight crewmembers of
that airplane and the operational control/dispatch personnel for
that airplane have received training that is acceptable to the POI
on the operational procedures required by paragraph (h)(2) of this
AD. Accomplishing this action terminates the requirements specified
in paragraph (f)(3) of this AD.
(ii) As of September 30, 2009, no affected airplane may be
operated unless the flight crewmembers of that airplane have
received simulator training on reduced or zero flap landing that is
acceptable to the POI. Thereafter, this training must be done during
the normal simulator training cycle, at intervals not to exceed 12
months. Accomplishing this action terminates the requirements
specified in paragraph (g)(1) of this AD.
(4) New Maintenance Action: For airplanes on which the low
temperature torque test of the flap actuators is required by
paragraph (g)(3) of this AD and on which the actuators have not been
replaced: Within 12 months after doing the low temperature torque
test specified in paragraph (g)(3) of this AD, or within 60 days
after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, and
thereafter at intervals not to exceed 12 months, do a low
temperature torque test of the flap actuators, and do all applicable
corrective actions specified in Part C of the Accomplishment
Instructions of Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-27-150, dated July
12, 2007. Do all applicable corrective actions before further
flight. Replacing the actuators terminates the repetitive torque
tests required by this paragraph for those actuators; however, the
replacement actuators are still affected by the requirements of
paragraph (g)(3) of this AD, and after passing the initial low
temperature torque test required by paragraph (g)(3) of this AD, the
repetitive torque tests of paragraph (h)(4) of this AD apply again.
(5) New Optional Maintenance Action: Installation of actuators
having P/N 601R93101-23/-25 (Vendor P/N 852D100-23/-25), P/N
601R93103-23/-24 (Vendor P/N 853D100-23/-24), and P/N 601R93104-23/-
24 (Vendor P/N 854D100-23/-24) in accordance with Bombardier Service
Bulletin 601R-27-151, Revision B, dated June 12, 2008, terminates
the requirements of paragraph ``3. Flap Zero Landing,'' of the
statement required by paragraph (h)(2) of this AD. After doing the
installation specified in this paragraph, paragraph ``3. Flap Zero
Landing,'' specified in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD, may be removed
from the limitations section of the AFM.
(6) Dispatch Following a Flap Fail Event: For airplanes on which
a flap fail message occurs, prior to further flight, do all
applicable maintenance actions in accordance with Section 27-50-00
of Chapter 27 of the Bombardier Canadair Regional Jet CRJ100/200/440
Fault Isolation Manual CSP A-009, Volume 1, Revision 38, dated
January 10, 2008; except if maintenance resources are not available
and normal flap system operation can be restored after an on-ground
circuit breaker reset operation, then continued revenue operation is
permitted without further maintenance action for up to 10 flight
cycles, subject to the operating limitations specified by the
procedure titled ``4. Dispatch Following a Flap Failed Event,''
specified in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD; except as provided by
paragraphs (h)(6)(i) and (h)(6)(ii) of this AD. The circuit breaker
reset operation can be performed by the flightcrew when authorized
by the operator's maintenance control organization. These
maintenance requirements must be tracked in a manner acceptable to
the principal maintenance inspector (PMI).
(i) Within 10 flight cycles following the initial on-ground
circuit breaker reset operation, do all applicable maintenance
actions in accordance with Section 27-50-00 of Chapter 27 of the
Bombardier Canadair Regional Jet CRJ100/200/440 Fault Isolation
Manual CSP A-009, Volume 1, Revision 38, dated January 10, 2008.
(ii) If another flap fail event occurs anytime within the 10-
flight-cycle limit after the initial circuit breaker reset
operation, before further flight, do all applicable maintenance
actions in accordance with Section 27-50-00 of Chapter 27 of the
Bombardier Canadair Regional Jet CRJ100/200/440 Fault Isolation
[[Page 10468]]
Manual CSP A-009, Volume 1, Revision 38, dated January 10, 2008.
(7) As of the effective date of this AD, operators are required
to report all fault data, including flaps electronic control unit
(FECU) codes, to Bombardier within 30 days after each failure
occurrence, in accordance with Task 05-51-50-980-801 as introduced
in the Canadair Regional Jet TR 05-035, dated July 13, 2007, to the
Canadair Regional Jet Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM). As of 24
months after the effective date of this AD, the actions specified in
this paragraph are no longer required.
(8) Cockpit Placard: Within 120 days after the effective date of
this AD, install a flight compartment placard in accordance with
Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-11-090, dated August 15, 2008.
Method of Compliance With AD 2006-12-21
(i) Installing flap actuators in accordance with paragraph
(h)(5) of this AD is acceptable for compliance with the installation
of Number 3 and Number 4 flap actuators required by paragraph (h) of
AD 2006-12-21, Amendment 39-14647. All other requirements of
paragraph (h) of AD 2006-12-21 are still applicable and must be
complied with.
FAA AD Differences
Note 3: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information
as follows:
(1) The maintenance tasks specified in the first row of the
table in ``Part IV. Maintenance Actions'' of the MCAI do not specify
a corrective action if an actuator is not serviceable (i.e., torque
test results are not satisfactory). However, this AD requires
contacting the FAA or installing a serviceable actuator before
further flight if torque test results are not satisfactory.
(Reference paragraph (f)(4) of this AD.)
(2) Although paragraph 2. of ``Part III. Training'' of the MCAI
recommends accomplishing the new training within 1 year, this AD
requires accomplishing the training before September 30, 2009, in
order to ensure that the actions are completed prior to the onset of
cold weather operations.
(3) For the Flaps Zero Landing requirements in paragraph 3.a (i)
of ``Part II. Operational Procedures,'' the MCAI refers to actuators
with less than 5,000 flight cycles. We have clarified sub-paragraph
3.a.(i) of paragraph ``3. Flap Zero Landing,'' of the statement
specified in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD that the 5,000 flight
cycles is since new or overhauled.
(4) For the Flaps Zero Landing requirements in paragraph 3.c. of
``Part II. Operational Procedures,'' the MCAI requires a pre-
dispatch forecast ground temperature at the time of arrival at the
destination airport to be above -25 deg C. This AD clarifies sub-
paragraph 3.b. of paragraph ``3. Flap Zero Landing,'' of the
statement specified in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD that the source
of the forecast is to be a reliable weather forecast service
acceptable to the POI.
Other FAA AD Provisions
(j) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1)(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
New York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority
to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures
found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Dan Parrillo,
Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Flight Test Branch, ANE-171, FAA,
New York ACO, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York
11590; telephone (516) 228-7305; fax (516) 794-5531. Before using
any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify
your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or principal avionics
inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a principal inspector,
your local Flight Standards District Office.
(ii) AMOCs approved previously in accordance with AD 2008-01-04
are approved as AMOCs for the corresponding provisions of this AD.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information
collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-
0056.
Related Information
(k) Refer to MCAI Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF-2007-10R1,
dated August 18, 2008, and the service information identified in
Table 1 of this AD for related information.
Table 1--Related Service Information
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Service information Revision level Date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-27- Original............................. July 12, 2007.
150.
Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-27- B.................................... June 12, 2008.
151.
Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-11- Original............................. August 15, 2008.
090.
Canadair Regional Jet TR RJ/165 to Original............................. July 6, 2007.
the Canadair Regional Jet AFM CSP
A-012.
Canadair Regional Jet TR RJ/165-1 Original............................. August 7, 2008.
to the Canadair Regional Jet AFM
CSP A-012.
Canadair Regional Jet TR 05-035 to Original............................. July 13, 2007.
the Canadair Regional Jet AMM.
Section 27-50-00 of Chapter 27 of 38................................... January 10, 2008.
the Bombardier Canadair Regional
Jet CRJ100/200/440 Fault Isolation
Manual CSP A-009, Volume 1.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Material Incorporated by Reference
(l) You must use the service information contained in Table 2 of
this AD to do the actions required by this AD, as applicable, unless
the AD specifies otherwise.
Table 2--All Material Incorporated by Reference
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Service information Revision level Date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-27- Original............................. July 12, 2007.
150, including Appendix A.
Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-27- B.................................... June 12, 2008.
151.
Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-11- Original............................. August 15, 2008.
090.
Canadair Regional Jet Temporary Original............................. July 6, 2007.
Revision RJ/165 to the Canadair
Regional Jet Airplane Flight
Manual CSP A-012.
Canadair Regional Jet TR RJ/165-1, Original............................. August 7, 2008.
including pages 05-11-5 through 05-
11-14, to the Canadair Regional
Jet AFM CSP A-012.
Canadair Regional Jet TR 05-035 to Original............................. July 13, 2007.
the Canadair Regional Jet AMM.
Section 27-50-00 of Chapter 27 of 38................................... January 10, 2008.
the Bombardier Canadair Regional
Jet CRJ100/200/440 Fault Isolation
Manual CSP A-009, Volume 1.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 10469]]
Bombardier Canadair Regional Jet CRJ100/200/440 Fault Isolation
Manual CSP A-009, Volume 1, Revision 38, dated January 10, 2008,
contains the following effective pages:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
List of Effective Pages
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Revision
Page title/description Page number(s) number Date shown on page(s)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIM Title Page........................... None shown................. 38 January 10, 2008.
Transmittal Letter....................... 1.......................... 38 January 10, 2008.
Record of Revisions...................... 1.......................... ........... January 10, 2008.
FIM Volume 1 Title Page.................. None shown................. 38 January 10, 2008.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter 27 Effective Pages
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1-3........................ 38 January 10, 2008.
4.......................... 37 January 10, 2007.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 27-50-00
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
101........................ 28 August 26, 2003.
102-153.................... 38 January 10, 2008.
154, 156................... 30 March 17, 2004.
155........................ 34 April 10, 2005.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of the service information contained in
Table 3 of this AD under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
Table 3--New Material Incorporated by Reference
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Service information Revision level Date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-27- B.................................... June 12, 2008.
151.
Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-11- Original............................. August 15, 2008.
090.
Canadair Regional Jet TR RJ/165-1, Original............................. August 7, 2008.
including pages 05-11-5 through 05-
11-14, to the Canadair Regional
Jet AFM CSP A-012.
Canadair Regional Jet TR 05-035 to Original............................. July 13, 2007.
the Canadair Regional Jet AMM.
Section 27-50-00 of Chapter 27 of 38................................... January 10, 2008.
the Bombardier Canadair Regional
Jet CRJ100/200/440 Fault Isolation
Manual CSP A-009, Volume 1.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) The Director of the Federal Register previously approved the
incorporation by reference of Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-27-
150, including Appendix A, dated July 12, 2007; and Canadair
Regional Jet Temporary Revision RJ/165, dated July 6, 2007, to the
Canadair Regional Jet Airplane Flight Manual CSP A-012; on September
5, 2007 (72 FR 46555, August 21, 2007).
(3) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Bombardier, Inc., 400 C[ocirc]te-Vertu Road West, Dorval,
Qu[eacute]bec H4S 1Y9, Canada; telephone 514-855-5000; fax 514-855-
7401; e-mail <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#a0d4c8c48ec3d2cae0c1c5d2cf8ec2cfcdc2c1d2c4c9c5d28ec3cfcd"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="baced2de94d9c8d0fadbdfc8d594d8d5d7d8dbc8ded3dfc894d9d5d7">[email protected]</span></a>; Internet <a href="http://www.bombardier.com">http://www.bombardier.com</a>.
(4) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA,
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington. For information on the availability of this material at
the FAA, call 425-227-1221 or 425-227-1152.
(5) You may also review copies of the service information that
is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this
material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: <a href="http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html">http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html</a>.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 26, 2009.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E9-5290 Filed 3-10-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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Retrieved: Apr 4, 2026
Rights: U.S. Government Public Domain
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