AD 2008-12-10
Applicability
| Type | Manufacturer | Model | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| aircraft | Bombardier Inc. | CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100) | Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) Airplanes |
| aircraft | Bombardier Inc. | CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 440) | Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) Airplanes |
Unsafe Condition
The electrical harness of the Fuel Quantity Gauging System (FQGS) is installed in the same routing as 28 Volts AC, 28 Volts DC, and 115 Volts AC electrical harnesses, which could lead to chafing and increased surface temperatures of fuel quantity probes and high level sensors inside the fuel tank, creating a potential ignition source and consequent fuel tank explosion.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Required Actions
Inspect the routing of the FQGS electrical harness and the associated electrical harnesses for chafing. If chafing is found, repair or replace the affected harnesses. Revise the maintenance manual to include inspection procedures for the routing of these harnesses.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Compliance Time
Before further flight
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Affected Aircraft
Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Federal Register Abstract
We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * This assessment showed that the electrical harness of the Fuel Quantity Gauging System (FQGS) is installed in the same routing as the 28 Volts AC, 28 Volts DC, and 115 Volts AC electrical harnesses. A chafing condition between these electrical harnesses and the FQGS harness could increase the surface temperatures of fuel quantity probes and high level sensors inside the fuel tank, resulting in potential ignition source[s] and consequent fuel tank explosion. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
Document Text
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[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 113 (Wednesday, June 11, 2008)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 32993-32996]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: E8-12825]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2008-0363; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-020-AD;
Amendment 39-15553; AD 2008-12-10]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional
Jet Series 100 & 440) Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of
another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an
aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:
* * * * *
This assessment showed that the electrical harness of the Fuel
Quantity Gauging System (FQGS) is installed in the same routing as
the 28 Volts AC, 28 Volts DC, and 115 Volts AC electrical harnesses.
A chafing condition between these electrical harnesses and the FQGS
harness could increase the surface temperatures of fuel quantity
probes and high level sensors inside the fuel tank, resulting in
potential ignition source[s] and consequent fuel tank explosion.
* * * * *
We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe
condition on these products.
DATES: This AD becomes effective July 16, 2008.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of July 16,
2008.
[[Page 32994]]
ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a> or in person at the U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Richard Fiesel, Aerospace Engineer,
Airframe and Propulsion Branch, ANE-171, FAA, New York Aircraft
Certification Office, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New
York 11590; telephone (516) 228-7304; fax (516) 794-5531.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products.
That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on March 27, 2008 (73
FR 16221). That NPRM proposed to correct an unsafe condition for the
specified products. The MCAI states:
Bombardier Aerospace has completed a system safety review of the
CL-600-2B19 aircraft fuel system against new fuel tank safety
standards, introduced in Chapter 525 of the Airworthiness Manual
through Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2002-043. The identified
non-compliances were assessed using Transport Canada Policy Letter
No. 525-001, to determine if mandatory corrective action is
required.
This assessment showed that the electrical harness of the Fuel
Quantity Gauging System (FQGS) is installed in the same routing as
the 28 Volts AC, 28 Volts DC, and 115 Volts AC electrical harnesses.
A chafing condition between these electrical harnesses and the FQGS
harness could increase the surface temperatures of fuel quantity
probes and high level sensors inside the fuel tank, resulting in
potential ignition source[s] and consequent fuel tank explosion.
To correct the unsafe condition, this directive mandates the
modification of FQGS electrical harness routing.
You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD
docket.
The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel
tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the
adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes
subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for
fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a
regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review,
Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements''
(66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule
included Special Federal Aviation Regulation Number 88 (``SFAR 88,''
Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).
Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e.,
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders
to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition
sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design
holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for
subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to
perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance
procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety
standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to
adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary
to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address
the failure types under evaluation: single failures, single failures in
combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure
experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included
consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for
further action.
We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are
necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel
tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result
in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. We received no comments on the NPRM or on the determination of
the cost to the public.
Conclusion
We reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and
the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed.
Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information
We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
We might also have required different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow our FAA policies. Any such differences
are highlighted in a NOTE within the AD.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD will affect 709 products of U.S. registry.
We also estimate that it will take about 83 work-hours per product to
comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate
is $80 per work-hour. Required parts will cost about $15,552 per
product. Where the service information lists required parts costs that
are covered under warranty, we have assumed that there will be no
charge for these parts. As we do not control warranty coverage for
affected parties, some parties may incur costs higher than estimated
here. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this AD to the
U.S. operators to be $15,734,128, or $22,192 per product.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
[[Page 32995]]
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a>; or in person at the Docket Operations office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains the NPRM, the regulatory evaluation,
any comments received, and other information. The street address for
the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly
after receipt.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:
2008-12-10 Bombardier, Inc. (Formerly Canadair): Amendment 39-15553.
Docket No. FAA-2008-0363; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-020-AD.
Effective Date
(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective July 16,
2008.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional
Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes; certificated in any category;
serial numbers 7003 through 7067 inclusive, and 7069 through 7982
inclusive.
Subject
(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28: Fuel.
Reason
(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)
states:
Bombardier Aerospace has completed a system safety review of the
CL-600-2B19 aircraft fuel system against new fuel tank safety
standards, introduced in Chapter 525 of the Airworthiness Manual
through Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2002-043. The identified
non-compliances were assessed using Transport Canada Policy Letter
No. 525-001, to determine if mandatory corrective action is
required.
This assessment showed that the electrical harness of the Fuel
Quantity Gauging System (FQGS) is installed in the same routing as
the 28 Volts AC, 28 Volts DC, and 115 Volts AC electrical harnesses.
A chafing condition between these electrical harnesses and the FQGS
harness could increase the surface temperatures of fuel quantity
probes and high level sensors inside the fuel tank, resulting in
potential ignition source[s] and consequent fuel tank explosion.
To correct the unsafe condition, this directive mandates the
modification of FQGS electrical harness routing.
Actions and Compliance
(f) Within 10,000 flight hours after the effective date of this
AD, unless already done, do the following actions.
(1) Modify the FQGS harness routing according to the
Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-28-
059, Revision E, dated October 29, 2007.
(2) Actions done before the effective date of this AD in
accordance with the Bombardier service information specified in
Table 1 of this AD are acceptable for compliance with the
corresponding requirements of this AD.
Table 1.--Service Information
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Service Bulletin Revision Date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
601R-28-059............................. Original....................... October 19, 2004.
601R-28-059............................. A.............................. July 28, 2005.
601R-28-059............................. B.............................. November 17, 2005.
601R-28-059............................. C.............................. March 8, 2007.
601R-28-059............................. D.............................. May 10, 2007.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FAA AD Differences
Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information
as follows: No differences.
Other FAA AD Provisions
(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, New
York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found
in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Richard Fiesel, Aerospace
Engineer, Airframe and Propulsion Branch, ANE-171, FAA, New York
ACO, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York 11590;
telephone (516) 228-7304; fax (516) 794-5531. Before using any
approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your
appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards
District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information
collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-
0056.
Related Information
(h) Refer to MCAI Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF-2007-36,
dated December 21, 2007, and Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-28-
059, Revision E, dated October 29, 2007, for related information.
Material Incorporated by Reference
(i) You must use Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-28-059,
Revision E, dated October 29, 2007, to do the actions required by
this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of this service information under 5
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Bombardier, Inc., Canadair, Aerospace Group, P.O. Box 6087, Station
[[Page 32996]]
Centre-ville, Montreal, Quebec H3C 3G9, Canada.
(3) You may review copies at the FAA, Transport Airplane
Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information
on the availability of this material at NARA, call (202) 741-6030,
or go to: <a href="http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html">http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html</a>.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 29, 2008.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E8-12825 Filed 6-10-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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Retrieved: Apr 4, 2026
Rights: U.S. Government Public Domain
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