AD 94-14-02

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AD Number:
94-14-02
Document Type:
AD Final Rules
Docket Number:
93-NM-143-AD
Subject Heading:
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 757 Series Airplanes
Subject:
Thrust Reverser System
Status:
Current
Citation:
(Federal Register: June 30, 1994 (Volume 59, Number 125))
Citation Publish Date:
06/30/1994
Effective Date:
08/01/1994
Make:
The Boeing Company
Model:
757-200 Series | 757-200CB Series | 757-200PF Series | 757-300 Series
Product Type:
Aircraft
Product Subtype:
Large Airplane
Affected AD:
Superseded AD:
Affected By:
Superseded By:
Service/Office:
Office of Primary Responsibility:
CFR Part Reference:
Part 39 (59 FR 33646 NO. 125 06/30/94)
Comments:
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES FINAL RULES: 94-14-02
CITATION:   [Federal Register: June 30, 1994 (Volume 59, Number 125)]

PAGE NUMBER:   [Page 33646]

DOCKET NUMBER:   93-NM-143-AD

AMENDMENT:   39-8954

AD NUMBER:   94-14-02

SUBJECT HEADING:   Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 757 Series Airplanes

ACTION:   Final rule

SUMMARY:  
This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 757 series airplanes, that requires tests of the thrust reverser system, and repair, if necessary; installation of a modification that would terminate those tests; and repetitive operational checks of that installation, and repair, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by results of a safety review, which revealed that in-flight deployment of a thrust reverser could result in a significant reduction in the controllability of the airplane. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent deployment of a thrust reverser in flight and subsequent reduced controllability of the airplane.

DATES:   Effective August 1, 1994. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of August 1, 1994.

ADDRESSES:  
The service information referenced in this AD may be obtained from Boeing
Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; and Rolls-Royce plc, P.O. Box 31, Derby DE24 8BJ, England, ATTN: Technical Publications Department. This information may be examined at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:  
Jeffrey Duven, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion
Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (206) 227-2688; fax (206) 227-1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:  
A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 757 series airplanes was published in the Federal Register on October 4, 1993 (58 FR 51589). That action proposed to require tests of the thrust reverser system, and repair, if necessary; installation of a modification that would terminate those tests; and repetitive operational checks of that installation, and repair, if necessary.

Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to the comments received.

One commenter supports the proposed rule.

Boeing requests that specific references to page numbers and revision dates of the Boeing 757 Airplane Maintenance Manual (AMM) be eliminated from the proposed rule, and that the proposal be amended to include copies of the required test procedures so that reference to the AMM would not be necessary.

Boeing explains that the AMM's are customized for each operator to reflect all of the equipment in that operator's fleet. Therefore, the number of pages for any given procedure is variable, depending on the number of different equipment configurations documented in an operator's AMM. Boeing also indicates that AMM procedures are revised periodically for non- technical reasons. Boeing adds that changes to the structure of the procedures are necessary to accommodate an upgrade of the publishing system that is currently under way, which, in addition to repagination, will necessitate the issuance of revised AMM pages.

Boeing states that the effect of specifying AMM page numbers and revision dates in the AD is that operators may be unable to use the procedure contained in the AMM to perform certain tests required by the AD. Each operator would be required to maintain an obsolete version of the procedure, or to request FAA approval of an alternative method of compliance with the AD that would allow the use of the current version of the AMM.

The FAA concurs partially. In light of the information submitted by the commenter, the FAA finds that specific AMM page numbers and dates should not be specified in the final rule. Therefore, such references have been removed from paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the final rule. However, for those paragraphs, the FAA does not agree that copies of the specific procedures should be included in the final rule. Therefore, paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the final rule have been revised to cite only the appropriate section and task title specified in the AMM for accomplishment of the tests required by those paragraphs.

The FAA's objective in proposing periodic operational checks of the sync-lock device, as specified in paragraph (c) of this AD, is to ensure the integrity of the locking function. However, subsequent to the issuance of the proposal and the receipt of Boeing's comments to the proposal, Boeing has submitted to the FAA separate procedures for accomplishment of the operational check of the sync-lock integrity. These procedures have been defined in paragraph (c) of the final rule; therefore, the AMM references specified in paragraph (c) of the NPRM have been removed from the final rule. Additionally, the procedures for the operational checks are accomplished independently of the other thrust reverser system tests specified in the proposal. Accordingly, the FAA has revised paragraph (c) of the final rule to require periodic accomplishment of operational checks of the sync-lock integrity only, and has removed the requirement for accomplishment of other tests specified in that paragraph of the proposal.

The Air Transport Association (ATA) of America, on behalf of its members, states that, while ATA members are not opposed to accomplishing the operational checks specified in paragraph (c) of the proposal as part of their maintenance programs, these members are opposed to accomplishing the checks as part of the requirements of an AD. The commenters believe that the adoption of paragraph (c), as proposed, is equivalent to issuing a Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMR) item by means of an AD.

ATA adds that, if the FAA finds sufficient justification to include the requirement for operational checks in the AD, an alternative to accomplishment of the checks should be provided in the final rule. ATA reasons that an alternative is justified because no data exist to show that repetitive checks of a modified thrust reverser cannot be handled adequately through an operator's maintenance program. The suggested alternative follows: Within 3 months after accomplishing the sync-lock installation, revise the FAA-approved maintenance inspection program to include an operational check of the sync-lock. The initial check would be accomplished within 1,000 hours time-in-service after modification. The AD would no longer be applicable for operators that have acceptably revised the maintenance program. Operators choosing this alternative could use an alternative recordkeeping method in lieu of that required by Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 91.417 or 121.380 (14 CFR 91.417 or 121.380). The FAA would be defined as the cognizant Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI) for operators electing this alternative.

One commenter, Boeing, requests that the proposed requirement for operational checks be removed from the AD until the FAA reviews the "more comprehensive" scheduled maintenance recommendations developed by the Model 757/767 Thrust Reverser Working Group, which will be recommended in the next revision to the Maintenance Review Board (MRB) report. Boeing believes that adoption of the maintenance recommendations contained in that forthcoming revision will ensure that an adequate level of safety (with regard to the sync-lock installation) will be maintained by all operators of Model 757 series airplanes.

The FAA recognizes the concerns of these commenters regarding the requirement for periodic operational checks of the sync-lock following its installation. However, the FAA finds that the operational checks are necessary in order to provide an adequate level of safety and to ensure the integrity of the sync-lock installation. The actions required by this AD are consistent with actions that have been identified by an industry-wide task force as necessary to ensure adequate safety of certain thrust reverser systems installed on transport category airplanes. Representatives of the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) of America, Inc., and the FAA comprise that task force. Representatives from other organizations, such as ATA, have participated in various discussions and work activities resulting from the recommendations of the task force.

The FAA acknowledges that the operational checks specified in this AD and CMR items are similar in terms of scheduled maintenance and recordkeeping. This AD addresses an unsafe condition and requires installation of the sync-lock to correct that unsafe condition. The FAA has determined that the requirement for operational checks is necessary in order to ensure the effectiveness of that installation in addressing the unsafe condition. This determination is based on the fact that the sync-lock is a new design whose reliability has not been adequately proven through service experience. In addition, service experience to date has demonstrated that failures can occur within the sync-lock that may not be evident during normal operation of the thrust reverser system and may not result in activation of the sync-lock "unlock" indicator. The ATA's suggested alternative to accomplishment of the operational checks would permit each operator to determine whether and how often these checks should be conducted. In light of the severity of the unsafe condition, however, the FAA has determined that allowing this degree of operator discretion is not appropriate at this time. Therefore, this AD is necessary to ensure that operators accomplish checks of the integrity of the sync-lock installation in a common manner and at common intervals.

The FAA also finds that addressing operational checks of the sync-lock integrity in a recommended action, such as an MRB report, will not ensure an acceptable level of safety with regard to the thrust reverser system. However, the FAA recognizes that an operational check interval of 4,000 hours time-in-service, which will be recommended by Boeing for inclusion in the next revision to the MRB report, corresponds more closely to the interval at which most of the affected operators conduct regularly scheduled "C" checks. The FAA has reconsidered the proposed interval of 1,000 hours time-in-service for accomplishment of repetitive operational checks. In light of the safety implications of the unsafe condition addressed and the practical aspects of accomplishing orderly operational checks of the fleet during regularly scheduled maintenance where special equipment and trained maintenance personnel will be readily available, the FAA finds that accomplishment of the checks at intervals of 4,000 hours time-in- service will provide an acceptable level of safety. Paragraph (c) of the final rule has been revised accordingly.

Since the issuance of the proposed rule, Boeing has issued Revision 2 of Service Bulletin 757-78-0035, dated June 23, 1994. The service bulletin revision moves general work instruction Step B from Work Package 2 to Step Q in Work Package 8. In Revision 1 of the service bulletin, Step B of Work Package 2 specified procedures for removal of the ground to the EICAS for the REV ISLN VAL message; however, the ground should not be removed as part of Work Package 2. Rather, the ground should be removed as part of Work Package 8 in order to avoid loss of the REV ISLN VAL message on EICAS. Revision 2 of the service bulletin correctly describes procedures for removal of the ground as part of Work Package 8. Revision 2 of the service bulletin also describes procedures for installation of an additional bracket on the P36 disconnect bracket and to make a cutout on the P37 disconnect bracket on certain airplanes.

The FAA has reviewed and approved this latest revision to the service bulletin and has revised the final rule to reflect it as the appropriate source of service information. The FAA finds that citing this latest revision to the service bulletin will impose no additional burden on any operator.

It should be noted that Revision 2 of Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-0035 references Rolls- Royce Service Bulletins RB.211-78-9725 and RB.211-78-9726 as additional sources of service information for accomplishment of the originally proposed sync-lock installation. However, the Boeing service bulletin does not specify the appropriate revision levels for the Rolls-Royce service bulletins. Therefore, the FAA has added "NOTE 1" to paragraph (b) of this AD to specify that the intent of that paragraph is that the appropriate revision levels for the Rolls-Royce service bulletins that are to be used in conjunction with Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-0035 are as follows: Rolls- Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-78-9725, dated June 23, 1993, or Revision 1, dated January 7, 1994; and Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-78-9726, dated June 23, 1993, or Revision 1, dated October 1, 1993.

In addition, since the issuance of the proposed rule, Rolls-Royce has issued Service Bulletin RB.211-78-9822, dated October 1, 1993. This service bulletin describes procedures for installation of a revised thrust reverser sync-lock. The FAA has determined that accomplishment of the actions described in this service bulletin, in conjunction with Boeing Service Bulletin 757- 78-0035 [which was cited in paragraph (b) of the proposal as the appropriate source of service information for installation of an additional thrust reverser system locking feature], constitutes an acceptable alternative to the sync-lock installation specified in paragraph (b) of the proposal.

In light of this information, paragraph (b) of the final rule has been revised to include paragraph (b)(1), which contains the requirement for installation of an additional thrust reverser system locking feature that was specified in the proposed rule, and paragraph (b)(2), which provides for installation of a revised thrust reverser sync-lock as an acceptable alternative to paragraph (b)(1) of this AD. Accomplishment of the revised installation specified in paragraph (b)(2) requires no additional work hours beyond the 514 work hours specified in the economic impact information, below, for accomplishment of the originally proposed sync-lock installation.

Additionally, it should be noted that Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-78-9822 references Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-78-9726 as an additional source of service information for airplanes equipped with Rolls-Royce RB211-535C engines. Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-78-9726 references Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-78-9725 as an additional source of service information. However, the appropriate revision levels for these service bulletins are not specified in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-0035 or in any of the Rolls-Royce service bulletins. Therefore, the FAA has added "NOTE 2" to paragraph (b) of the final rule to specify that the appropriate revision levels for Rolls-Royce Service Bulletins RB.211-78-9726 and RB.211-78-9725, used in conjunction with Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-78-9822, are as follows: Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-78-9726, dated June 23, 1993, or Revision 1, dated October 1, 1993; and Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-78-9725, dated June 23, 1993, or Revision 1, dated January 7, 1994.

After careful review of the available data, including the comments noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public interest require the adoption of the rule with the changes previously described. The FAA has determined that these changes will neither increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD.

There are approximately 40 Model 757 series airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. Currently, there are no Model 757 series airplanes of the affected design on the U.S. Register. However, should an affected airplane be imported and placed on the U.S. Register in the future, it will take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to accomplish the required auto restow and integrity tests, 514 work hours per airplane to accomplish either modification specified in paragraph (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this AD, and 1 work hour per airplane to accomplish the required operational checks; at an average labor rate of $55 per work hour. Required parts are currently planned to be supplied by the manufacturer at no cost to operators. Based on these figures, the total cost impact of the AD is estimated to be $28,380 per airplane.

The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a "significant rule" under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption "ADDRESSES."

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows: PART 39 - AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421 and 1423; 49 U.S.C. 106(g); and 14 CFR 11.89. § 39.13 - [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness directive:


REGULATORY TEXT:  
94-14-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-8954. Docket 93-NM-143-AD.

Applicability: Model 757 series airplanes equipped with Rolls Royce RB211-535C engines, as listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-0035, Revision 2, dated June 23, 1994; certificated in any category.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent deployment of a thrust reverser in flight and subsequent reduced controllability of the airplane, accomplish the following:

(a) For airplanes on which the sync-lock feature has not been installed as a modification in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-0035: Within 4,000 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD; and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 4,000 hours time-in-service until the modification required by paragraph (b) of this AD is accomplished; accomplish paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD to verify proper operation of the thrust reverser system. Prior to further flight, repair any discrepancy found, in accordance with the procedures described in the Boeing 757 Maintenance Manual.

(1) Perform a "Thrust Reverser-Auto Restow Test" in accordance with the procedures described in Section 78-31-00 of the Boeing 757 Maintenance Manual.

(2) Perform an "Actuator Lock and Crossover Shaft Integrity Test" in accordance with the procedures described in Section 78-31-00 of the Boeing 757 Maintenance Manual.

(b) For airplanes on which the sync-lock feature has not been installed as a modification in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-0035: Within 5 years after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the requirements of paragraph (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this AD. Accomplishment of either of these installations constitutes terminating action for the tests required by paragraph (a) of this AD.

(1) Install an additional thrust reverser system locking feature (sync-lock installation) in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-0035, Revision 2, dated June 23, 1994.

NOTE 1: Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-0035 references Rolls-Royce Service Bulletins RB.211-78-9725 and RB.211-78-9726 as additional sources of service information. The intent of paragraph (b)(1) of this AD is that the appropriate revision levels for the Rolls-Royce service bulletins that are to be used in conjunction with Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-0035 are as follows: Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-78-9725, dated June 23, 1993, or Revision 1, dated January 7, 1994; and Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-78-9726, dated June 23, 1993, or Revision 1, dated October 1, 1993.

(2) Install a revised thrust reverser sync-lock in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-0035, Revision 2, dated June 23, 1994, and Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211- 78-9822, dated October 1, 1993.

NOTE 2: Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-78-9822 references Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-78-9726 as an additional source of service information for airplanes equipped with Rolls-Royce RB211-535C engines. Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-78-9726 references Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-78-9725 as an additional source of service information. The FAA's intent is that the appropriate revision levels of Rolls-Royce Service Bulletins RB.211-78- 9726 and RB.211-78-9725, used in conjunction with Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-78- 9822, are as follows: Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-78-9726, dated June 23, 1993, or Revision 1, dated October 1, 1993; and Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-78-9725, dated June 23, 1993, or Revision 1, dated January 7, 1994.

(c) Within 4,000 hours time-in-service after accomplishing the modification required by paragraph (b) of this AD, or within 4,000 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later; and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 4,000 hours time-in-service: Accomplish the thrust reverser sync-lock integrity test defined below to verify that the sync-locks have not failed in the "unlocked" state. Prior to further flight, repair any discrepancy found, in accordance with procedures described in the Boeing 757 Maintenance Manual.

THRUST REVERSER SYNC-LOCK INTEGRITY TEST

1. General

A. Use this procedure to test the integrity of the thrust reverser sync locks. The procedure must be performed on each engine.

2. Thrust Reverser Sync Lock Test

A. Prepare for the thrust reverser sync lock test.
(1) Open the AUTO SPEEDBRAKE circuit breaker on the overhead circuit breaker panel, P11.
(2) Do the steps that follow to supply power to the thrust reverser system:
(a) Make sure the thrust levers are in the idle position.
(b) Make sure the thrust reversers are retracted and locked.
(c) Make sure these circuit breakers on the main power distribution panel, P6, are closed:
1) L ENG SYNC LOCK
2) R ENG SYNC LOCK-ALTN
(d) Make sure these circuit breakers on the overhead circuit
breaker panel, P11, are closed:
1) LANDING GEAR POS SYS 1
2) T/R IND R
3) T/R CONT-ALTN-R
4) T/R IND L
5) T/R CONT L
6) R ENG SYNC LOCK
7) T/R CONT R
8) EICAS CMPTR LEFT
9) EICAS UPPER IND
10) EICAS CMPTR RIGHT
11) EICAS LOWER IND
12) EICAS DISPLAY SW
13) EICAS PILOTS DSP
14) AIR/GND SYS 1
15) AIR/GND SYS 2
16) LANDING GEAR POS SYS 2
17) PROX SW TEST
(e) Supply electrical power.
(f) Supply pressure to the left (for the left engine) or right (for the right engine) hydraulic system.

B. Do the thrust reverser sync lock test.

(1) Use the SENSOR CHANNEL SELECT thumb switches to set the PSEU code for the auto-restow proximity sensor.
(a) On PSEU (-17), The left engine code is 433.
(b) On PSEU (-16), The left engine code is 105.
(c) The right engine PSEU code is 099.

NOTE: The following step will cause the Hydraulic Isolation Valve (HIV) to open for approximately 5 seconds. The next 3 steps must be done during this 5 second time. These 4 steps may be repeated if required.

(2) Push the TARGET TEST switch on the PSEU and hold for one second.
(3) Make sure the TARGET NEAR light on the PSEU comes on after approximately four seconds.
(4) Make sure that the EICAS Advisory message L(R) REV ISLN VAL shows for approximately 3 seconds and then does not show.
(5) Make sure the sync lock manual unlock lever on the right sleeve of the reverser does not extend.
(6) Push and release the RESET switch on the PSEU.
(7) Open the applicable circuit breaker(s):
(a) For the left engine;
L ENG SYNC LOCK (Panel P6)
(b) For the right engine;
R ENG SYNC LOCK (Panel P11)
R ENG SYNC LOCK-ALTN (Panel P6)
(8) Move the left (right) reverse thrust lever up and rearward to the reverse
thrust position.
(9) Make sure that the thrust reverser does not extend.
(10) Move the left (right) reverse thrust lever to the forward and down position.
C. Put the airplane back to its usual condition.
(1) Remove hydraulic pressure.
(2) Close the applicable circuit breaker(s).
(a) For the left engine;
L ENG SYNC LOCK (Panel P6)
(b) For the right engine;
R ENG SYNC LOCK (Panel P11)
R ENG SYNC LOCK-ALTN (Panel P6)
(3) Close the AUTO SPEEDBRAKE circuit breaker on the overhead circuit
breaker panel, P11.
(4) Remove electrical power.
D. Repeat the thrust reverser sync lock test on the other engine.

(d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.

NOTE 3: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO.

(e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

(f) The installation shall be done in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78- 0035, Revision 2, dated June 23, 1994; and Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-78-9822, dated October 1, 1993. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; and Rolls- Royce plc, P.O. Box 31, Derby DE24 8BJ, England, ATTN: Technical Publications Department. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

(g) This amendment becomes effective on August 1, 1994.

FOOTER: