AD 2020-21-08
final rule
Applicability
| Type | Manufacturer | Model | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| aircraft | Airbus SAS | A350-941 | Airworthiness Directives; Airbus SAS Airplanes |
Unsafe Condition
The latches for the forward and aft pressure relief doors could be opened during exposure to fire, leading to a breach in the engine core firewall.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Required Actions
Modification and re-identification of the affected thrust reversers (TRs) and latch access doors (LADs), as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Compliance Time
Within 2 years after the effective date of the AD.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Affected Aircraft
All Airbus SAS Model A350-941 airplanes.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Federal Register Abstract
The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A350-941 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that the latches for the forward and aft pressure relief doors could be opened during exposure to fire, leading to a breach in the engine core firewall. This AD requires modification and re-identification of the affected thrust reversers (TRs) and latch access doors (LADs), as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
Applicability Source Text
Show captured applicability text from the source AD
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to all Airbus SAS Model A350-941 airplanes,
certificated in any category.
Document Text
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[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 199 (Wednesday, October 14, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 64952-64955]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2020-22623]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2020-0339; Product Identifier 2020-NM-046-AD; Amendment
39-21281; AD 2020-21-08]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus SAS Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all
Airbus SAS Model A350-941 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports
that the latches for the forward and aft pressure relief doors could be
opened during exposure to fire, leading to a breach in the engine core
firewall. This AD requires modification and re-identification of the
affected thrust reversers (TRs) and latch access doors (LADs), as
specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which
is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the
unsafe condition on these products.
DATES: This AD is effective November 18, 2020. The Director of the
Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain
publication listed in this AD as of November 18, 2020.
ADDRESSES: For material incorporated by reference (IBR) in this AD,
contact the EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany;
telephone +49 221 8999 000; email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#9adbdee9dafffbe9fbb4ffefe8f5eafbb4ffef"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="fdbcb98ebd989c8e9cd398888f928d9cd39888">[email protected]</span></a>; internet
www.easa.europa.eu. You may find this IBR material on the EASA website
at <a href="https://ad.easa.europa.eu">https://ad.easa.europa.eu</a>. You may view this IBR material at the
FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200
South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of
this material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195. It is also available in
the AD docket on the internet at <a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a> by
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2020-0339.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the internet at <a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a> by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2020-
0339; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains
this final rule, any comments received, and other information. The
address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kathleen Arrigotti, Aerospace
Engineer, Large Aircraft Section, International Validation Branch, FAA,
2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone and fax 206-231-
3218; email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#147f75607c7871717a3a7566667d737b60607d547275753a737b62"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="92f9f3e6fafef7f7fcbcf3e0e0fbf5fde6e6fbd2f4f3f3bcf5fde4">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
The EASA, which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the
European Union, has issued EASA AD 2020-0060, dated March 16, 2020
(``EASA AD 2020-0060'') (also referred to as the Mandatory Continuing
Airworthiness Information, or ``the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe
condition for all Airbus SAS Model A350-941 airplanes.
The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14
CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all Airbus SAS Model
A350-941 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on April
27, 2020 (85 FR 23252). The NPRM was prompted by reports that the
latches for the forward and aft pressure relief doors could be opened
during exposure to fire, leading to a breach in the engine core
firewall. The NPRM proposed to require modification and re-
identification of the affected thrust TRs and LADs, as specified in
EASA AD 2020-0060. The FAA is issuing this AD to address a possible
breach in the engine core firewall. This condition, if not corrected,
could lead to an uncontained engine fire, possibly resulting in reduced
control of the airplane. See the
[[Page 64953]]
MCAI for additional background information.
Comments
The FAA gave the public the opportunity to participate in
developing this final rule. The following presents the comments
received on the NPRM and the FAA's response to each comment.
Support for the NPRM
Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA), stated its
support for the NPRM.
Request To Clarify Marking Requirement
Delta Air Lines (DAL) requested that the word ``it'' in paragraph
(h)(2) of the proposed AD be replaced with ``the LAD'' to indicate the
latch access door. The commenter asserted that the meaning of the word
``it'' in that paragraph is vague and should be clarified.
The FAA partially agrees with the request to modify paragraph
(h)(2) of this AD. The agency agrees that the word ``it'' in that
paragraph can be interpreted in more than one way, and not only as a
reference to the LAD. Since paragraph (h)(2) references the TR and the
LAD, to avoid confusion over the meaning, the FAA has removed the word
``it'' from paragraph (h)(2) of this AD.
Request To Allow Alternative Marking Method
Delta requested that an exception be added to the proposed AD
stating that operators may apply markings to the LAD composite
substrate by any convenient means, as long as the markings remain
within 1 inch of the identification decal. The commenter expressed
concern that the use of the term ``stamp,'' as specified in the service
information referenced in EASA AD 2020-0060, could suggest that a
stamping tool is required.
The FAA partially agrees with the request. The FAA agrees to
clarify the use of the word ``stamp'' in this AD. The terms ``marked''
and ``stamped'' as used in this AD refer to any method of permanent
marking, including stamping or ink marking as acceptable. The FAA has
revised paragraph (h)(2) of this AD to clarify that any permanent
marking method is acceptable.
Request To Explain Why an AD Is Appropriate
Delta requested a change to the wording of paragraph (e) of the
proposed AD. Delta argued that the current paragraph is not descriptive
enough to fully explain airworthiness shortcomings and why an AD is
appropriate. Delta provided suggested additional wording for paragraph
(e) of the proposed AD.
The FAA disagrees with this request. Based on the risk assessment
performed by EASA and Airbus, the FAA determined that an unsafe
condition exists, and provided relevant background information in the
NPRM. The wording of paragraph (e) has not been changed with regard to
this request.
Request To Eliminate Adhesive Cure Time Requirement
Delta requested that the cure time of the placard adhesive not be
required for compliance because it has nothing to do with the unsafe
condition being addressed by the proposed AD. Delta noted that the
service information referenced in EASA AD 2020-0060 includes a
requirement to allow curing the adhesive, and requested that the FAA
add an exception to exclude this requirement.
The FAA does not agree with this request. Because placards contain
vital information, proper adhesive curing times are essential and
should not be removed from the requirements of this AD, although
requests for alternative methods of compliance (AMOCs) remain an option
for all operators. This AD has not been changed in this regard.
Request To Change Compliance Time
The FAA infers a request by DAL to extend the compliance time
indicated in the proposed AD. The commenter asserted that the 3-month
compliance time is too short and that no evidence has been given for
this urgency.
The FAA disagrees with the request to increase the compliance time
of this AD. Prior to publication of EASA AD 2020-0060, the manufacturer
offered 2 years to address the unsafe condition as part of a monitored
retrofit campaign. In developing an appropriate compliance time for
this action, EASA considered the urgency associated with the subject
unsafe condition, and the encouraged voluntarily compliance through the
monitored retrofit campaign as that would be most convenient for the
operator's normal scheduled maintenance. The FAA's NPRM provided
additional time for U.S. operators to plan and execute corrective
actions beyond EASA's compliance time. The FAA believes the 2-year
campaign, followed by publication of the EASA AD, followed by the
intervening time for the FAA to publish the NPRM and this AD, has
allowed sufficient notice and planning opportunities for the U.S.
fleet. This AD has not been changed with regard to this request.
Conclusion
The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments
received, and determined that air safety and the public interest
require adopting this final rule with the changes described previously
and minor editorial changes. The FAA has determined that these minor
changes:
<bullet> Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
NPRM for addressing the unsafe condition; and
<bullet> Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM.
The FAA also determined that these changes will not increase the
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this final
rule.
Related IBR Material Under 1 CFR Part 51
EASA AD 2020-0060 describes procedures for modification and re-
identification of the affected TRs and LADs. This material is
reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it
through their normal course of business or by the means identified in
the ADDRESSES section.
Costs of Compliance
The FAA estimates that this AD affects 3 airplanes of U.S.
registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs for Required Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
18 work-hours x $85 per hour = $1,530........................ * $0 $1,530 $4,590
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The FAA has received no definitive data that would enable the agency to provide a parts cost estimate for the
required actions.
[[Page 64954]]
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
2020-21-08 Airbus SAS: Amendment 39-21281; Docket No. FAA-2020-0339;
Product Identifier 2020-NM-046-AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective November 18, 2020.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to all Airbus SAS Model A350-941 airplanes,
certificated in any category.
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 78, Exhaust.
(e) Reason
This AD was prompted by reports that the latches for the forward
and aft pressure relief doors could be opened during exposure to
fire, leading to a breach in the engine core firewall. The FAA is
issuing this AD to address this condition, which if not corrected,
could lead to an uncontained engine fire, possibly resulting in
reduced control of the airplane.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Requirements
Except as specified in paragraph (h) of this AD: Comply with all
required actions and compliance times specified in, and in
accordance with, European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD
2020-0060, dated March 16, 2020 (``EASA AD 2020-0060'').
(h) Exceptions to EASA AD 2020-0060
(1) Where EASA AD 2020-0060 refers to its effective date, this
AD requires using the effective date of this AD.
(2) Where paragraph (1.3) of EASA AD 2020-0060 requires marking
the service bulletin reference on the identification plate of the
affected thrust reverser (TR) or latch access door (LAD), this AD
allows marking on or within an inch of the identification plate or
decal. For this AD, any method of permanent marking, including
stamping or ink marking, is acceptable.
(3) The ``Remarks'' section of EASA AD 2020-0060 does not apply
to this AD.
(i) Other FAA AD Provisions
The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
Large Aircraft Section, International Validation Branch, FAA, has
the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19,
send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight
Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information
directly to the Large Aircraft Section, International Validation
Branch, send it to the attention of the person identified in
paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be emailed to: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#d9e0f4988f8af498908bf4eeeae9f49894969a99bfb8b8f7beb6af"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="c8f1e5899e9be589819ae5fffbf8e58985878b88aea9a9e6afa7be">[email protected]</span></a>. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your
appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector,
the manager of the local flight standards district office/
certificate holding district office.
(2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any requirement in this AD
to obtain instructions from a manufacturer, the instructions must be
accomplished using a method approved by the Manager, Large Aircraft
Section, International Validation Branch, FAA; or EASA; or Airbus
SAS's EASA Design Organization Approval (DOA). If approved by the
DOA, the approval must include the DOA-authorized signature.
(3) Required for Compliance (RC): For any service information
referenced in EASA AD 2020-0060 that contains RC procedures and
tests: Except as required by paragraph (i)(2) of this AD, RC
procedures and tests must be done to comply with this AD; any
procedures or tests that are not identified as RC are recommended.
Those procedures and tests that are not identified as RC may be
deviated from using accepted methods in accordance with the
operator's maintenance or inspection program without obtaining
approval of an AMOC, provided the procedures and tests identified as
RC can be done and the airplane can be put back in an airworthy
condition. Any substitutions or changes to procedures or tests
identified as RC require approval of an AMOC.
(j) Related Information
For more information about this AD, contact Kathleen Arrigotti,
Aerospace Engineer, Large Aircraft Section, International Validation
Branch, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone
and fax 206-231-3218; email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#6803091c00040d0d0646091a1a010f071c1c01280e0909460f071e"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="a8c3c9dcc0c4cdcdc686c9dadac1cfc7dcdcc1e8cec9c986cfc7de">[email protected]</span></a>.
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise.
(i) European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2020-0060,
dated March 16, 2020.
(ii) [Reserved]
(3) For EASA AD 2020-0060, contact the EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-
Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 8999 000; email
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#da9b9ea99abfbba9bbf4bfafa8b5aabbf4bfaf"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="6322271023060210024d0616110c13024d0616">[email protected]</span></a>; internet www.easa.europa.eu. You may find this
EASA AD on the EASA website at <a href="https://ad.easa.europa.eu">https://ad.easa.europa.eu</a>.
(4) You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St.,
Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material
at the FAA, call 206-231-3195. This material may be found in the AD
docket on the internet at <a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a> by searching
for and locating Docket No. FAA-2020-0339.
(5) You may view this material that is incorporated by reference
at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For
information on the availability
[[Page 64955]]
of this material at NARA, email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#f0969594829597de9c9597919cb09e918291de979f86"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="294f4c4d5b4c4e07454c4e48456947485b48074e465f">[email protected]</span></a>, or go to:
<a href="https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html">https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html</a>.
Issued on October 1, 2020.
Lance T. Gant,
Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2020-22623 Filed 10-13-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
Source: Official FAA Source ↗
Retrieved: Apr 4, 2026
Rights: U.S. Government Public Domain
This site is not affiliated with or endorsed by the FAA. Always verify with official sources.
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