AD 2020-14-03
Applicability
| Type | Manufacturer | Model | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | 737-300 Series | Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | 737-400 Series | Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | 737-500 Series | Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes |
Unsafe Condition
The potential for undetected cracks in the nacelle support overwing fittings or strut to wing diagonal brace, which could result in the inability of the structure to carry limit load and could adversely affect the structural integrity of the airplane.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Required Actions
A general visual inspection of the strut to wing diagonal brace at a certain location for cracking. For certain airplanes, an ultrasonic inspection of the nacelle support overwing fitting at certain fastener locations for cracking. For certain other airplanes, a magnetic check of the nacelle support overwing fitting at a certain location to determine the material composition. Applicable on-condition actions.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Affected Aircraft
All The Boeing Company Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Federal Register Abstract
The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that a crack indication consistent with fatigue cracking was found on the left nacelle support overwing fitting flange fastener hole during teardown of a Model 737-300 series airplane. This AD requires a general visual inspection of the strut to wing diagonal brace at a certain location for cracking. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires an ultrasonic inspection of the nacelle support overwing fitting at certain fastener locations for cracking. For certain other airplanes, this AD requires a magnetic check of the nacelle support overwing fitting at a certain location to determine the material composition. This AD requires applicable on- condition actions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
Applicability Source Text
Show captured applicability text from the source AD
(c) Applicability
(1) This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 737-300, -
400, and -500 series airplanes, certificated in any category.
(2) Installation of Supplemental Type Certificate (STC)
ST01219SE does not affect the ability to accomplish the actions
required by this AD. Therefore, for airplanes on which STC ST01219SE
is installed, a ``change in product'' alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) approval request is not necessary to comply with
the requirements of 14 CFR 39.17.
Document Text
Show stored source text (verify against official source)
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 142 (Thursday, July 23, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 44456-44459]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2020-15818]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2020-0097; Product Identifier 2019-NM-208-AD; Amendment
39-21157; AD 2020-14-03]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all
The Boeing Company Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This
AD was prompted by a report that a crack indication consistent with
fatigue cracking was found on the left nacelle support overwing fitting
flange fastener hole during teardown of a Model 737-300 series
airplane. This AD requires a general visual inspection of the strut to
wing diagonal brace at a certain location for cracking. For certain
airplanes, this AD also requires an ultrasonic inspection of the
nacelle support overwing fitting at certain fastener locations for
cracking. For certain other airplanes, this AD requires a magnetic
check of the nacelle support overwing fitting at a certain location to
determine the material composition. This AD requires applicable on-
condition actions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe
condition on these products.
DATES: This AD is effective August 27, 2020.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of August 27,
2020.
ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this final rule,
contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data
Services (C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110-SK57, Seal Beach, CA
90740-5600; telephone 562-797-1717; internet <a href="https://www.myboeingfleet.com">https://www.myboeingfleet.com</a>. You may view this service information at the
FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200
South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of
this material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195. It is also available on
the internet at <a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a> by searching for and
locating Docket No. FAA-2020-0097.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the internet at <a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a> by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2020-
0097; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains
this final rule, any comments received, and other information. The
address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wayne Ha, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe
Section, FAA, Los Angeles ACO Branch, 3960 Paramount Boulevard,
Lakewood, CA 90712-4137; phone: 562-627-5238; fax: 562-627-5210; email:
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#e19680988f84cf8980a1878080cf868e97"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="1463756d7a713a7c75547275753a737b62">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14
CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all The Boeing Company
Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. The NPRM published in
the Federal Register on February 18, 2020 (85 FR 8776). The NPRM was
prompted by a report that a crack indication consistent with fatigue
cracking was found on the left nacelle support overwing fitting flange
fastener hole during teardown of a Model 737-300 series airplane. The
NPRM proposed to require a general visual inspection of the strut to
wing diagonal brace at a certain location for cracking. For certain
airplanes, the NPRM also proposed to require an ultrasonic inspection
of the nacelle support overwing fitting at certain fastener locations
for cracking. For certain other airplanes, the NPRM proposed to require
a magnetic check of the nacelle support overwing fitting at a certain
location to determine the material composition. The NPRM also proposed
to require applicable on-condition actions.
The FAA is issuing this AD to address the potential for undetected
cracks in the nacelle support overwing fittings or strut to wing
diagonal brace, which could result in the inability of the structure to
carry limit load and could adversely affect the structural integrity of
the airplane.
Comments
The FAA gave the public the opportunity to participate in
developing this final rule. The following presents the comments
received on the NPRM and the FAA's response to each comment.
Support for the NPRM
Bridget Powell, Herbert Dickens, Terrance Tveit, and an anonymous
commenter expressed support for the NPRM.
Effect of Winglets on Accomplishment of the Proposed Actions
Aviation Partners Boeing stated that accomplishing Supplemental
Type Certificate (STC) ST01219SE does not affect the actions specified
in the proposed AD.
The FAA concurs with the commenter. The FAA has redesignated
paragraph (c) of the proposed AD as paragraph (c)(1) of this AD and
added paragraph (c)(2) to this AD to state that installation of STC
ST01219SE does not affect the ability to accomplish the actions
required by this AD. Therefore, for airplanes on which STC ST01219SE is
installed, a ``change in product'' alternative method of compliance
(AMOC) approval request is not necessary to comply with the
requirements of 14 CFR 39.17.
[[Page 44457]]
Request To Clarify the Focus of the Ultrasonic Inspection
Boeing requested that the FAA clarify the focus of the ultrasonic
inspection in the SUMMARY of the NPRM. Whereas the NPRM described the
ultrasonic inspection of ``certain fasteners of the nacelle support
overwing fitting at a certain location for cracking,'' Boeing stated
that the ultrasonic inspection is ``of the nacelle support overwing
fitting at certain fastener locations for cracking.'' Boeing explained
that the ultrasonic inspections require an inspection of the nacelle
support overwing fitting at certain fastener holes rather than the
fasteners themselves.
The FAA agrees with the commenter's request because the revision
provides more clarification for the inspection of the nacelle support
overwing fitting. The FAA has revised the SUMMARY and Discussion
section of this final rule accordingly.
Requests To Clarify Inspection Opportunities
Boeing requested that the FAA modify the description of the
opportunities for maintenance planning document (MPD) inspections to
detect a failed nacelle support overwing fitting in the Discussion
section of the NPRM. Boeing requested that the FAA change the following
sentence in the Discussion section of the NPRM from ``Existing
maintenance planning document (MPD) inspections do not provide
opportunities to detect a failed nacelle support overwing fitting at
wing buttock line (WBL) 191,'' to ``Existing maintenance planning
document (MPD) inspections do not provide adequate opportunities to
detect a failed nacelle support overwing fitting at wing buttock line
(WBL) 191.'' Boeing explained that the MPD does provide some inspection
opportunities, but Boeing determined they were not adequate to maintain
safety.
The FAA agrees that the description provided by Boeing is more
accurate. However, since that portion of the Discussion section does
not reappear in the final rule, this final rule has not been changed
regarding this issue.
Additionally, Melanie Sturgeon noted that the Discussion section of
the proposed AD stated that existing MPD inspections ``do not provide
opportunities to detect a failed nacelle support overwing fitting at
wing buttock line (WBL) 191.'' Melanie Sturgeon supposed that Boeing
would not have quickly issued Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737-
57A1345 RB, dated December 17, 2019, if the inspection findings were
not important. Melanie Sturgeon went on to cite that, of the 158
airplanes affected by the proposed AD, many of them are at or near 30
years old. Melanie Sturgeon questioned why such a vital part of the
airplane was not properly inspected throughout the course of its
service life, presuming that the unsafe condition could have been
easily detected. Further, Melanie Sturgeon questioned why the FAA
continued to issue airworthiness certificates for this airplane model
when, as she stated, inspection teams seemed to be unaware of the parts
they are charged with approving.
The FAA agrees to clarify. The airplane model was in compliance
with regulatory safety standards when it was designed. The design loads
at the failed nacelle support overwing fitting at WBL 191 might have
been considered low from testing and analysis and was not considered
critical structure. While the airplane model operates in-service, the
loading encountered by in-service conditions could be higher than
designed. Therefore, once aware of the possibility of a failed part,
Boeing reanalyzed the part and collaborated with the FAA to determine
an inspection plan and corrective action to ensure that the failure is
found and repaired before the residual strength capability of the part
is lost. The FAA has not changed this AD in this regard.
Request for Clarification of Accountability
Melanie Sturgeon questioned if Boeing will be held accountable for
not providing the FAA with an accurate MPD, and, by extension, will the
FAA be held responsible for not ensuring that Boeing provided an
accurate MPD.
The FAA agrees to clarify. The MPD provided by Boeing was based on
accurate information available at the time of writing the MPD and was
approved by the FAA under those circumstances. When new information
that necessitated an update to the MPD became available, the MPD was
updated to reflect that new information, which the FAA then reviewed
and approved as appropriate. The FAA has not changed this AD in this
regard.
Request To Clarify Inspection Requirements
Melanie Sturgeon, stated that the proposed AD fails to provide
information about the compliance time that Boeing or operators would
have to comply with the requirements of the proposed AD. Melanie
Sturgeon also inquired if the proposed AD would require an inspection
on only the left nacelle support overwing fitting flange fastener hole,
or would the proposed AD require an inspection on the left and right
sides.
The FAA agrees to clarify. Paragraph (g) of the proposed AD
references Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737-57A1345 RB, dated
December 17, 2019, in which the inspections shown in Tables 1 through 8
in Section 3., Compliance, provide inspection requirements and
compliance times for both left and right side nacelle support overwing
fittings. The FAA has not changed this AD in this regard.
Request for More Frequent Inspections as an Airplane Ages
Melanie Sturgeon requested that the FAA put the airplanes within
the applicability of this AD on a rotating, graduated safety inspection
schedule, meaning that the plane would be inspected more often as it
got closer to its limit of validity (LOV). Melanie Sturgeon argued
that, if safety is the FAA's top priority, then the FAA should take
control of its responsibilities and rely less on the manufacturer's
ability to classify airplanes as safe.
The FAA does not agree with the request because the inquiry mixes
technical criteria that are not compatible. The inspections required by
this final rule were developed using principles of damage tolerance.
Damage tolerance has been a regulatory requirement and the accepted
method of ensuring structural integrity for the last 42 years. The FAA
has a long track record of successfully managing similar structural
service difficulties by mandating inspections based on damage tolerance
principles. It is technically incorrect to associate repetitive
inspections based on damage tolerance principles with the airplane LOV.
The airplane LOV (which is measured in flight cycles, flight hours, or
both) ensures that the airplane is retired before many cracks initiate
concurrently which are not inspectable. The crack growth rate is tied
more closely to airplane usage than to the age of the airplane, and
thus changing the inspection interval as the airplane ages will not
contribute to safety. The FAA has not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Share Information With Another Governing Body
Melanie Sturgeon requested that the FAA share the information from
the proposed rule with the governing bodies of other countries or the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Melanie Sturgeon
pointed out that countries around the world use this airplane model,
and in an effort to promote worldwide aviation safety, the
[[Page 44458]]
FAA should ensure that the information in the proposed AD is
distributed to other countries that operate these airplanes.
The FAA agrees to clarify. The FAA does share the information from
the proposed rule with the governing bodies of other countries as
identified in ICAO Annex 8 (<a href="https://www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/Pages/nationality.aspx">https://www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/Pages/nationality.aspx</a>). Furthermore, ICAO Annex 8, Airworthiness of
Aircraft requires that civil aviation authorities of other countries
take appropriate action in response to FAA ADs. Based on the FAA's
determination of the unsafe condition addressed by this AD, we expect
foreign authorities to adopt similar requirements. Typically, those
agencies post FAA ADs with no changes and notify their operators. The
operators will then comply with this AD per their CAA's requirements.
The FAA has not changed this AD in this regard.
Conclusion
The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments
received, and determined that air safety and the public interest
require adopting this final rule with the changes described previously
and minor editorial changes. The FAA has determined that these minor
changes:
<bullet> Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
NPRM for addressing the unsafe condition; and
<bullet> Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM.
The FAA also determined that these changes will not increase the
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this final
rule.
Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51
The FAA reviewed Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737-57A1345 RB,
dated December 17, 2019. This service information describes procedures
for a magnetic check to determine material composition of the nacelle
support overwing fitting at WBL 191; ultrasonic inspections of the
nacelle support overwing fitting at WBL 191 for cracking; general
visual inspections of the strut to wing diagonal brace at nacelle
station (STA) 278 for cracking; and applicable on-condition actions.
On-condition actions include repetitive ultrasonic inspections of the
nacelle support overwing fitting at WBL 191 for cracking, repetitive
general visual inspections of the strut to wing diagonal brace at
nacelle STA 278 for cracking, and repair. This service information is
reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it
through their normal course of business or by the means identified in
the ADDRESSES section.
Costs of Compliance
The FAA estimates that this AD affects 158 airplanes of U.S.
registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs for Required Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Magnetic Check........................ 1 work-hour x $85 per $0 $85 $13,430
hour = $85.
Ultrasonic Inspection................. 5 work-hours x $85 per 0 425 67,150
hour = $425.
General Visual Inspection............. 1 work-hour x $85 per 0 85 13,430
hour = $85.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA estimates the following costs to do any necessary on-
condition inspections that would be required. The FAA has no way of
determining the number of aircraft that might need these on-condition
inspections:
Estimated Costs of On-Condition Inspections
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ultrasonic Inspections........... 5 work-hours x $85 $0 $425 per inspection $67,150 per
per hour = $425 cycle. inspection cycle.
per inspection
cycle.
General Visual Inspections....... 1 work-hour x $85 0 $85 per inspection $13,430 per
per hour = $85 per cycle. inspection cycle.
inspection cycle.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA has received no definitive data that would enable us to
provide cost estimates for the on-condition repairs specified in this
AD.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
[[Page 44459]]
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
2020-14-03 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-21157; Docket No. FAA-
2020-0097; Product Identifier 2019-NM-208-AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective August 27, 2020.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
(1) This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 737-300, -
400, and -500 series airplanes, certificated in any category.
(2) Installation of Supplemental Type Certificate (STC)
ST01219SE does not affect the ability to accomplish the actions
required by this AD. Therefore, for airplanes on which STC ST01219SE
is installed, a ``change in product'' alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) approval request is not necessary to comply with
the requirements of 14 CFR 39.17.
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 57, Wings.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by a report that a crack indication
consistent with fatigue cracking was found on the left nacelle
support overwing fitting flange fastener hole during teardown of a
Model 737-300 series airplane. The FAA is issuing this AD to address
the potential for undetected cracks in the nacelle support overwing
fittings or strut to wing diagonal brace, which could result in the
inability of the structure to carry limit load and could adversely
affect the structural integrity of the airplane.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Required Actions
Except as specified by paragraph (h) of this AD: At the
applicable times specified in the ``Compliance'' paragraph of Boeing
Alert Requirements Bulletin 737-57A1345 RB, dated December 17, 2019,
do all applicable actions identified in, and in accordance with, the
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin
737-57A1345 RB, dated December 17, 2019. Actions identified as
terminating actions in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737-
57A1345 RB, dated December 17, 2019, terminate the applicable
required actions of this AD, provided the terminating action is done
in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert
Requirements Bulletin 737-57A1345 RB, dated December 17, 2019.
Note 1 to paragraph (g): Guidance for accomplishing the actions
required by this AD can be found in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
737-57A1345, dated December 17, 2019, which is referred to in Boeing
Alert Requirements Bulletin 737-57A1345 RB, dated December 17, 2019.
(h) Exceptions to Service Information Specifications
(1) Where Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737-57A1345 RB,
dated December 17, 2019, uses the phrase ``the original issue date
of Requirements Bulletin (RB) 737-57A1345 RB,'' this AD requires
using ``the effective date of this AD.''
(2) Where Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737-57A1345 RB,
dated December 17, 2019, specifies contacting Boeing for repair
instructions, this AD requires doing the repair before further
flight using a method approved in accordance with the procedures
specified in paragraph (i) of this AD.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Los Angeles ACO Branch, FAA, has the authority
to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures
found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your
request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards
District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to
the manager of the certification office, send it to the attention of
the person identified in paragraph (j)(1) of this AD. Information
may be emailed to: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#cef7e38f8083e3828f8f8d81e38f83818de39cabbfbbabbdbabd8ea8afafe0a9a1b8"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="794054383734543538383a36543834363a542b1c080c1c0a0d0a391f1818571e160f">[email protected]</span></a>.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used for any repair, modification, or alteration required by this AD
if it is approved by The Boeing Company Organization Designation
Authorization (ODA) that has been authorized by the Manager, Los
Angeles ACO Branch, FAA, to make those findings. To be approved, the
repair method, modification deviation, or alteration deviation must
meet the certification basis of the airplane, and the approval must
specifically refer to this AD.
(j) Related Information
(1) For more information about this AD, contact Wayne Ha,
Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Section, FAA, Los Angeles ACO Branch,
3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, CA 90712-4137; phone: 562-627-
5238; fax: 562-627-5210; email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#592e3820373c773138193f3838773e362f"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="9cebfde5f2f9b2f4fddcfafdfdb2fbf3ea">[email protected]</span></a>.
(2) Service information identified in this AD that is not
incorporated by reference is available at the addresses specified in
paragraphs (k)(3) and (4) of this AD.
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737-57A1345 RB, dated
December 17, 2019.
(ii) [Reserved]
(3) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data Services
(C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110-SK57, Seal Beach, CA 90740-
5600; telephone 562-797-1717; internet <a href="https://www.myboeingfleet.com">https://www.myboeingfleet.com</a>.
(4) You may view this service information at the FAA,
Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200
South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability
of this material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195.
(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#7e181b1a0c1b1950121b191f123e101f0c1f50191108"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="3e585b5a4c5b5910525b595f527e505f4c5f10595148">[email protected]</span></a>, or go to: <a href="https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html">https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html</a>.
Issued on July 6, 2020.
Gaetano A. Sciortino,
Deputy Director for Strategic Initiatives, Compliance & Airworthiness
Division, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2020-15818 Filed 7-22-20; 8:45 am]
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