AD 2016-22-14
Applicability
| Type | Manufacturer | Model | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | 737-600 Series | Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | 737-700 Series | Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | 737-700C Series | Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | 737-800 Series | Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | 737-900 Series | Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | 737-900ER Series | Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes |
Unsafe Condition
Wire chafing damage causing an electrical arc to an adjacent hydraulic tube, resulting in a hole in the hydraulic tube and consequent loss of system B hydraulic fluid.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Required Actions
Inspect for chafing damage of wire bundles and a hydraulic tube in the right side of the main landing gear wheel well, and take corrective action if necessary. Install clamps between the wire bundles and hydraulic tube.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Compliance Time
Within 24 months of the effective date.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Affected Aircraft
The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Federal Register Abstract
We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of wire chafing damage, which caused an electrical arc to an adjacent hydraulic tube located on the forward bulkhead of the main landing gear (MLG) wheel well, resulting in a hole in a hydraulic tube and consequent total loss of system B hydraulic fluid. This AD requires an inspection for chafing damage of wire bundles and a hydraulic tube in the right side of the MLG wheel well, and corrective action if necessary; and installation of clamps between the wire bundles and hydraulic tube. We are issuing this AD to prevent chafing damage, which could result in electrical arcing that can cause a hole in the hydraulic tube and consequent loss of hydraulic fluid, possibly resulting in a fire in the MLG wheel well.
Applicability Source Text
Show captured applicability text from the source AD
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 737-600, 737-700,
737-700C, 737-800, 737-900, and 737-900ER series airplanes,
certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 737-29A1119, Revision 1, dated June 23, 2016 (``ASB 737-
29A1119 R1'').
Document Text
Show stored source text (verify against official source)
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 217 (Wednesday, November 9, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 78711-78714]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2016-26163]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2016-0462; Directorate Identifier 2015-NM-144-AD;
Amendment 39-18703; AD 2016-22-14]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER
series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of wire chafing
damage, which caused an electrical arc to an adjacent hydraulic tube
located on the forward bulkhead of the main landing gear (MLG) wheel
well, resulting in a hole in a hydraulic tube and consequent total loss
of system B hydraulic fluid. This AD requires an inspection for chafing
damage of wire bundles and a hydraulic tube in the right side of the
MLG wheel well, and corrective action if necessary; and installation of
clamps between the wire bundles and hydraulic tube. We are issuing this
AD to prevent chafing damage, which could result in electrical arcing
that can cause a hole in the hydraulic tube and consequent loss of
hydraulic fluid, possibly resulting in a fire in the MLG wheel well.
DATES: This AD is effective December 14, 2016.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of December 14,
2016.
ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this final rule,
contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data
Services (C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110-SK57, Seal Beach, CA
90740-5600; telephone 562-797-1717; Internet <a href="https://www.myboeingfleet.com">https://www.myboeingfleet.com</a>. You may view this referenced service information
at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,
Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the
FAA, call 425-227-1221. It is also available on the Internet at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a> by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2016-
0462.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a> by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2016-
0462; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-
5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sean J. Schauer, Aerospace Engineer,
Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office (ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. 98057-
3356; phone: 425-917-6479; fax: 425-917-6590; email:
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#4f3c2a2e21613c2c272e3a2a3d0f292e2e61282039"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="2e5d4b4f40005d4d464f5b4b5c6e484f4f00494158">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain The Boeing Company
Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes.
The NPRM published in the Federal Register on February 8, 2016 (81 FR
6475) (``the NPRM''). The NPRM was prompted by a report of wire chafing
damage, which caused an electrical arc to an adjacent hydraulic tube
located on the forward bulkhead of the MLG wheel well, resulting in a
hole in a hydraulic tube and consequent total loss of system B
hydraulic fluid. The NPRM proposed to require an inspection for chafing
damage of wire bundles and a hydraulic tube in the right side of the
MLG wheel well, and corrective action if necessary; and installation of
clamps between the wire bundles and hydraulic tube. We are issuing this
AD to prevent chafing damage, which could result in electrical arcing
that can cause a hole in the hydraulic tube and consequent loss of
hydraulic fluid, possibly resulting in a fire in the MLG wheel well.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM and
the FAA's response to each comment.
Support for the NPRM
The Air Line Pilots Association, International and an anonymous
commenter supported the NPRM.
Request for Clarification
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) requested that we
respond to the following questions.
<bullet> EASA stated that the NPRM looks very similar to AD 2013-
19-03, Amendment 39-17585 (78 FR 59798, September 30, 2013) (``AD 2013-
19-03''). EASA asked if there is a more fundamental problem with wiring
harnesses in the landing gear bay in the Model 737 fleet.
We agree that the unsafe conditions identified in this AD and in AD
2013-19-03 are similar; however, the reasons for the unsafe conditions,
and the associated corrective actions in these ADs, differ. This
difference is due to the occurrence of wire chafing in different
locations in the landing gear bay. The underlying issue is limited
space for the electrical system routing in the landing gear bay.
<bullet> EASA asked whether there is sufficient accessibility to
inspect the affected area.
We have determined that there is sufficient space to inspect the
landing gear bay.
<bullet> EASA asked why the spacer is only an optional action.
The source of service information that we reference in this AD,
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-29A1119, Revision 1, dated June 23,
2016 (``ASB 737-29A1119 R1''), specifies that the spacer addition is
optional for cases where additional spacing is needed to allow adequate
clearance.
<bullet> EASA asked what measures have been put in place to ensure
the safety of
[[Page 78712]]
the fleet, pending the proposed inspection.
We consider that the standard operational procedures that are in
place regarding loss of system B hydraulic pressure or a wheel well
fire to be adequate to ensure the safety of the fleet, pending the
completion of the actions required in this AD.
<bullet> EASA asked if the wire chafing issue is one of design with
regulations, or non-compliance of the product with the design data.
We have determined that the issue is due to nonconformance to the
design data.
No changes to the final rule are necessary in regard to the
questions asked by EASA.
Requests To Reference New Service Information
All Nippon Airways (ANA), Boeing, Japan Airlines, Qantas Airways,
Southwest Airlines, and United Airlines (UA) requested that we
reference Boeing Service Bulletin Information Notice 737-29A1119 IN 01,
dated August 25, 2015; and Boeing Service Bulletin Information Notice
737-29A1119 IN 02, dated November 02, 2015; and new service information
ASB 737-29A1119 R1. ANA commented that Boeing will not ship the top
kits of needed parts until the release of ASB 737-29A1119 R1. UA
requested that ASB 737-29A1119 R1 incorporate the Required for
Compliance (RC) format.
We agree with the commenters' requests to incorporate ASB 737-
29A1119 R1 as an appropriate source of service information. This
service information incorporates the revisions in the Boeing
information notices referenced by the commenters. In ASB 737-29A1119
R1, the part number of the subject wiring harness clamp has been
corrected, the work instructions have been rewritten to improve
operator usability, and the RC steps have been added. We have revised
paragraphs (c), (g)(1), and (g)(2) of this AD to specify ASB 737-
29A1119 R1. We have added a new paragraph (h) to this AD to give credit
for actions done prior to the effective date of this AD using Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin 737-29A1119, dated August 4, 2015, and
redesignated subsequent paragraphs accordingly. We have also added new
paragraph (i)(4) to this AD to address the RC language specified in ASB
737-29A1119 R1.
Request To Revise Paragraph (g) of the Proposed AD
One commenter, Evki Meto, requested that we revise paragraph (g)(1)
of the proposed AD, which proposed inspecting for chafing damage. The
commenter requested that we expand the inspection to look for any
damage. No reason was provided by the commenter.
We disagree with the commenter's request. We have determined that
the inspection in paragraph (g) of this AD should emphasize chafing
damage, as that damage relates to the unsafe condition being addressed
by this AD. We have not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Revise Compliance Time
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) requested that we revise the 24-
month compliance time to 30 months. KLM stated that it intends to do
the modification during C-check maintenance, but will not be able to
comply without impact to its maintenance program with the 24-month
compliance time due to its C-check maintenance interval, which is 30
months.
We do not agree with the commenter's request. In developing an
appropriate compliance time, we considered the safety implications,
parts availability, and normal maintenance schedules for timely
accomplishment of the required actions. Further, we arrived at the
compliance time with manufacturer concurrence. In consideration of all
of these factors, we determined that the compliance time of 24 months
represents an appropriate interval in which the inspections can be done
in a timely manner within the fleet, while still maintaining an
adequate level of safety. Under the provisions of paragraph (i) of this
AD, however, we will consider requests for approval of an alternative
compliance time if sufficient data are submitted to substantiate that
an alternate compliance time would provide an acceptable level of
safety. We have not changed this AD in this regard.
Effect of Winglets on Accomplishment of the Proposed Actions
Aviation Partners Boeing stated that the installation of winglets
per Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) ST00830SE does not affect the
accomplishment of the manufacturer's service instructions.
We agree with the commenter that STC ST00830SE does not affect the
accomplishment of the manufacturer's service instructions. Therefore,
the installation of STC ST00830SE does not affect the ability to
accomplish the actions required by this AD. We have not changed this AD
in this regard.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial
changes. We have determined that these minor changes:
<bullet> Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
NPRM for correcting the unsafe condition; and
<bullet> Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM.
We also determined that these changes will not increase the
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.
Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51
We reviewed ASB 737-29A1119 R1. The service information describes
procedures for doing an inspection for chafing damage of the wire
bundles and hydraulic tube in the right side of the MLG wheel well,
corrective actions, and installation of clamps and an optional spacer
between the wire bundles and hydraulic tube. This service information
is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to
it through their normal course of business or by the means identified
in the ADDRESSES section.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 1,270 airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspection and Installation.... 2 work-hours x $85 per hour $9 $179 $227,330
= $170.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 78713]]
We have received no definitive data that would enable us to provide
cost estimates for the on-condition actions specified in this AD.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
2016-22-14 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-18703; Docket No. FAA-
2016-0462; Directorate Identifier 2015-NM-144-AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective December 14, 2016.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 737-600, 737-700,
737-700C, 737-800, 737-900, and 737-900ER series airplanes,
certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 737-29A1119, Revision 1, dated June 23, 2016 (``ASB 737-
29A1119 R1'').
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 29, Hydraulic
power.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by a report of wire chafing damage, which
caused an electrical arc to an adjacent hydraulic tube located on
the forward bulkhead of the main landing gear (MLG) wheel well,
resulting in a hole in a hydraulic tube and consequent total loss of
system B hydraulic fluid. We are issuing this AD to prevent chafing
damage, which could result in electrical arcing that can cause a
hole in the hydraulic tube and consequent loss of hydraulic fluid,
possibly resulting in a fire in the MLG wheel well.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Inspection and Corrective Action and Clamp Installation
Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD: Do the
actions specified in paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) of this AD.
(1) Do a detailed inspection for chafing damage of the wire
bundles and hydraulic tube in the right side of the MLG wheel well,
and do all applicable corrective actions, in accordance with the
Accomplishment Instructions of ASB 737-29A1119 R1. Do all applicable
corrective actions before further flight.
(2) Install new clamps and an optional spacer between the wire
bundles and hydraulic tube in the right side of the MLG wheel well,
in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of ASB 737-
29A1119 R1.
(h) Credit for Previous Actions
This paragraph provides credit for the actions specified in
paragraph (g) of this AD, if those actions were performed before the
effective date of this AD using Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-
29A1119, dated August 4, 2015. This service information is not
incorporated by reference in this AD.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in paragraph (j)(1) of this AD.
Information may be emailed to: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#734a5e323d3e5e20161207071f165e32303c5e323e3c305e2116020616000700331512125d141c05"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="9ca5b1ddd2d1b1cff9fde8e8f0f9b1dddfd3b1ddd1d3dfb1cef9ede9f9efe8efdcfafdfdb2fbf3ea">[email protected]</span></a>.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used for any repair, modification, or alteration required by this AD
if it is approved by the Boeing Commercial Airplanes Organization
Designation Authorization (ODA) that has been authorized by the
Manager, Seattle ACO, to make those findings. To be approved, the
repair method, modification deviation, or alteration deviation must
meet the certification basis of the airplane and the approval must
specifically refer to this AD.
(4) For service information that contains steps that are labeled
as Required for Compliance (RC), the provisions of paragraphs
(i)(4)(i) and (i)(4)(ii) of this AD apply.
(i) The steps labeled as RC, including substeps under an RC step
and any figures identified in an RC step, must be done to comply
with the AD. If a step or substep is labeled ``RC Exempt,'' then the
RC requirement is removed from that step or substep. An AMOC is
required for any deviations to RC steps, including substeps and
identified figures.
(ii) Steps not labeled as RC may be deviated from using accepted
methods in accordance with the operator's maintenance or inspection
program without obtaining approval of an AMOC, provided the RC
steps, including substeps and identified figures, can still be done
as specified, and the airplane can be put back in an airworthy
condition.
(j) Related Information
(1) For more information about this AD, contact Sean J. Schauer,
Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA,
Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,
Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6479; fax: 425-917-6590;
email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#e59680848bcb96868d84908097a5838484cb828a93"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="cebdabafa0e0bdada6afbbabbc8ea8afafe0a9a1b8">[email protected]</span></a>.
(2) Service information identified in this AD that is not
incorporated by reference is available at the addresses specified in
paragraphs (k)(3) and (k)(4) of this AD.
[[Page 78714]]
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-29A1119, Revision 1, dated
June 23, 2016.
(ii) Reserved.
(3) For Boeing service information identified in this AD,
contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data
Services (C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110-SK57, Seal Beach, CA
90740-5600; telephone 562-797-1717; Internet <a href="https://www.myboeingfleet.com">https://www.myboeingfleet.com</a>.
(4) You may view this service information at FAA, Transport
Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call
425-227-1221.
(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: <a href="http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html">http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html</a>.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 25, 2016.
Dionne Palermo,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2016-26163 Filed 11-8-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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