AD 2016-18-06
final rule
Applicability
| Type | Manufacturer | Model | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | 767-200 Series | Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | 767-300 Series | Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | 767-400ER Series | Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes |
Unsafe Condition
Out-of-tolerance trigger mechanism components (sector and sear) in the escape slide regulator valves can produce insufficient trigger engagement and reduced pull force values, possibly leading to uncommanded deployment of the slide during normal airplane maintenance or operation.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Required Actions
Modify the escape slide regulator valves of the forward-entry door, forward-service door, aft-entry door, and aft-service door, and as applicable, modify the escape slide regulator valves of the mid-entry door and mid-service door.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Compliance Time
Within 42 months of the effective date
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Affected Aircraft
The Boeing Company Model 767-200, -300, and -400ER series airplanes.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Federal Register Abstract
We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 767-200, -300, and -400ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by multiple reports of uncommanded escape slide inflation. This AD requires modifying the escape slide regulator valves of the forward-entry door, forward-service door, aft-entry door, and aft-service door, and as applicable, modifying the escape slide regulator valves of the mid-entry door and mid-service door. We are issuing this AD to prevent out-of-tolerance trigger mechanism components (sector and sear) in the escape slide regulator valves, which can produce insufficient trigger engagement and reduced pull force values, possibly leading to uncommanded deployment of the slide during normal airplane maintenance or operation. This condition could result in injury to passengers and crew, damage to equipment, and the slide becoming unusable in an emergency evacuation.
Applicability Source Text
Show captured applicability text from the source AD
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 767-200, -300, and -
400ER series airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified
in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-25-0548, Revision
1, dated April 23, 2015.
Document Text
Show stored source text (verify against official source)
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 174 (Thursday, September 8, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 61999-62001]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2016-21152]
[[Page 61999]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2015-8135; Directorate Identifier 2015-NM-106-AD;
Amendment 39-18636; AD 2016-18-06]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
The Boeing Company Model 767-200, -300, and -400ER series airplanes.
This AD was prompted by multiple reports of uncommanded escape slide
inflation. This AD requires modifying the escape slide regulator valves
of the forward-entry door, forward-service door, aft-entry door, and
aft-service door, and as applicable, modifying the escape slide
regulator valves of the mid-entry door and mid-service door. We are
issuing this AD to prevent out-of-tolerance trigger mechanism
components (sector and sear) in the escape slide regulator valves,
which can produce insufficient trigger engagement and reduced pull
force values, possibly leading to uncommanded deployment of the slide
during normal airplane maintenance or operation. This condition could
result in injury to passengers and crew, damage to equipment, and the
slide becoming unusable in an emergency evacuation.
DATES: This AD is effective October 13, 2016.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of October 13,
2016.
ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this final rule,
contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services
Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207; telephone:
206-544-5000, extension 1; fax: 206-766-5680; Internet <a href="https://www.myboeingfleet.com">https://www.myboeingfleet.com</a>. You may view this referenced service information
at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,
Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the
FAA, call 425-227-1221. It is also available on the Internet at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a> by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2015-
8135.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a> by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2015-
8135; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-
5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Caspar Wang, Aerospace Engineer, Cabin
Safety and Environmental Systems Branch, ANM-150S, FAA, 1601 Lind
Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6414; fax: 425-917-
6590; email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#db98baa8abbaa9f58cbab5bc9bbdbabaf5bcb4ad"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="7a391b090a1b08542d1b141d3a1c1b1b541d150c">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain The Boeing Company
Model 767-200, -300, and -400ER series airplanes. The NPRM published in
the Federal Register on January 4, 2016 (81 FR 24) (``the NPRM''). The
NPRM was prompted by multiple reports of uncommanded escape slide
inflation. The NPRM proposed to require modifying the escape slide
regulator valves of the forward-entry door, forward-service door, aft-
entry door, and aft-service door, and as applicable, modifying the
escape slide regulator valves of the mid-entry door and mid-service
door. We are issuing this AD to prevent out-of-tolerance trigger
mechanism components (sector and sear) in the escape slide regulator
valves, which can produce insufficient trigger engagement and reduced
pull force values, possibly leading to uncommanded deployment of the
slide during normal airplane maintenance or operation. This condition
could result in injury to passengers and crew, damage to equipment, and
the slide becoming unusable in an emergency evacuation.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM and
the FAA's response to each comment. Air Astana, Air Line Pilots
Association International (ALPA), and United Airlines supported the
NPRM.
Request To Clarify Reference to the Escape Slide Regulator Valve
American Airlines (AAL) and Boeing requested that we clarify that
the NPRM is applicable to the regulator valve associated with the
escape slide assembly and not the slide door. The commenters pointed
out that without clarification, the regulator valve could be
misconstrued to be associated with the door system pressure cylinder
assembly or the emergency power assist system (EPAS).
We agree to clarify the references to the escape slide regulator
valve. We have revised the preamble in this final rule and paragraphs
(e) and (g) of this AD to refer to the escape slide regulator valve.
Request To Revise Paragraph (g) of the Proposed AD
Air New Zealand (ANZ) requested that we revise paragraph (g) of the
proposed AD or add an additional paragraph to clarify that operators
are required only to modify escape slide regulator valves that have not
been previously modified as specified in UTC Aerospace Systems Service
Bulletin 130104-25-432 or 4A3939-25-434. ANZ stated that paragraph (g)
of the proposed AD would require all escape slide regulator valves on
affected airplanes to be removed and modified as specified in Boeing
Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-25-0548, Revision 1, dated April
23, 2015. ANZ also pointed out that if before or during the
accomplishment of the actions specified in Boeing Special Attention
Service Bulletin 767-25-0548, Revision 1, dated April 23, 2015, a
determination could be made (by reviewing records or checking the part
markings on the girt bar) that some of the escape slide regulator
valves are already modified, as specified in UTC Aerospace Systems
Service Bulletin 130104-25-432; or Service Bulletin 4A3939-25-434, then
no additional work should be required on the modified escape slide
regulator valves.
We agree that escape slide regulator valves that have already been
modified do not need to be removed and modified again. Boeing Service
Bulletin 767-25-0548, dated November 5, 2014, included in paragraph (h)
of this AD, references UTC Aerospace Systems Service Bulletin 130104-
25-432; and Service Bulletin 4A3939-25-434 for the modification. As
allowed by the phrase, ``unless already done,'' in paragraph (f) of
this AD, if the requirements of this
[[Page 62000]]
AD have already been accomplished, this AD does not require that those
actions be repeated. Therefore, paragraph (g) this AD has not been
changed in this regard.
Request To Reduce the Proposed Compliance Time
ALPA indicated its full support for the intent of the NPRM, but
requested that we reduce the proposed 42-month compliance time for the
modification of the escape slide regulator valves. ALPA pointed out
that the risk of an uncommanded deployment is high and believes that
the compliance time should be reduced in the interest of safety. ALPA
provided no specific new compliance time.
We disagree with the request to reduce the 42-month compliance
time. In developing an appropriate compliance time, we considered the
safety implications, parts availability, and normal maintenance
schedules for timely accomplishment of modification of the escape slide
regulator valves. Further, we arrived at the proposed compliance time
with operator and manufacturer concurrence. Additionally, ALPA did not
provide any additional data to support a shorter compliance time. In
consideration of all of these factors, we determined that the
compliance time, as proposed, represents an appropriate interval in
which the escape slide regulator valves can be modified in a timely
manner within the fleet, while still maintaining an adequate level of
safety. Most ADs, including this one, permit operators to accomplish
the requirements of an AD at a time earlier than the specified
compliance time; therefore, an operator may choose to modify the escape
slide regulator valves before the 42-month compliance time. If
additional data are presented that would justify a shorter compliance
time, we may consider further rulemaking on this issue. We have not
changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Revise References in Certain Service Information
AAL requested that we revise references included in UTC Aerospace
Systems Service Bulletin 130104-25-432, dated August 11, 2014. AAL
stated that UTC Aerospace Systems Service Bulletin 130104-25-432, dated
August 11, 2014, contains internal references to the UTC Aerospace
Systems Component Maintenance Manual (CMM) that are incorrect and
reference an old revision of the UTC Aerospace Systems CMM with
different paragraph references.
We agree that the references included in UTC Aerospace Systems
Service Bulletin 130104-25-432, dated August 11, 2014, are incorrect.
Since the specific references included in UTC Aerospace Systems Service
Bulletin 130104-25-432, dated August 11, 2014, are not required for
compliance with this AD, we have not changed the AD in this regard;
however, we have identified this discrepancy to Boeing and UTC
Aerospace Systems.
Effect of Winglets on Accomplishment of the Proposed Actions
Aviation Partners Boeing stated that the installation of winglets
per STC ST01920SE does not affect the accomplishment of the
manufacturer's service instructions.
We agree with the commenter that STC ST01920SE does not affect the
accomplishment of the manufacturer's service instructions. Therefore,
the installation of STC ST01920SE does not affect the ability to
accomplish the actions required by this AD. We have not changed this AD
in this regard.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial
changes. We have determined that these minor changes:
<bullet> Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
NPRM for correcting the unsafe condition; and
<bullet> Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM.
We also determined that these changes will not increase the
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.
Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51
We reviewed Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-25-0548,
Revision 1, dated April 23, 2015. The service information describes
procedures for modifying the escape slide regulator valves of the
forward-entry door, forward-service door, aft-entry door, aft-service
door, mid-entry door, and mid-service door. The modification includes
replacing the existing trigger mechanism sector and sear of the escape
slide regulator valve with new trigger mechanism sector and sear. This
service information is reasonably available because the interested
parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by
the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 302 airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Replacement of trigger mechanism 15 work-hours x $85 per $2,236 $3,511 $1,060,322
components--forward and aft-entry/ hour = $1,275.
service doors.
Replacement of trigger mechanism 8 work-hours x $85 per 1,118 1,798 542,996
components--mid[dash]entry/ hour = $680.
mid[dash]service doors.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authority for
This
R
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e
m
a
k
i
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g
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
[[Page 62001]]
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
2016-18-06 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-18636; Docket No. FAA-
2015-8135; Directorate Identifier 2015-NM-106-AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective October 13, 2016.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 767-200, -300, and -
400ER series airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified
in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-25-0548, Revision
1, dated April 23, 2015.
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 25, Equipment/
furnishings.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by multiple reports of uncommanded escape
slide inflation. We are issuing this AD to prevent out-of-tolerance
trigger mechanism components (sector and sear) in the escape slide
regulator valves, which can produce insufficient trigger engagement
and reduced pull force values, possibly leading to uncommanded
deployment of the slide during normal airplane maintenance or
operation. This condition could result in injury to passengers and
crew, damage to equipment, and the slide becoming unusable in an
emergency evacuation.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Replacement of the Trigger Mechanism Sector and Sear
Within 42 months after the effective date of this AD, modify the
escape slide regulator valves of the forward-entry door, forward-
service door, aft-entry door, and aft-service door, and as
applicable, modify the escape slide regulator valves of the mid-
entry door and mid-service door, in accordance with the
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service
Bulletin 767-25-0548, Revision 1, dated April 23, 2015.
(h) Credit for Previous Actions
This paragraph provides credit for the modification required by
paragraph (g) of this AD, if the modification was performed before
the effective date of this AD using Boeing Special Attention Service
Bulletin 767-25-0548, dated November 5, 2014.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in paragraph (j)(1) of this AD.
Information may be emailed to: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#3b02167a757616685e5a4f4f575e167a7874167a76747816695e4a4e5e484f487b5d5a5a155c544d"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="645d49252a2949370105101008014925272b4925292b27493601151101171017240205054a030b12">[email protected]</span></a>.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used for any repair required by this AD if it is approved by the
Boeing Commercial Airplanes Organization Designation Authorization
(ODA) that has been authorized by the Manager, Seattle ACO, to make
those findings. For a repair method to be approved, the repair must
meet the certification basis of the airplane, and the approval must
specifically refer to this AD.
(4) For service information that contains steps that are labeled
as Required for Compliance (RC), the provisions of paragraphs
(i)(4)(i) and (i)(4)(ii) apply.
(i) The steps labeled as RC, including substeps under an RC step
and any figures identified in an RC step, must be done to comply
with the AD. An AMOC is required for any deviations to RC steps,
including substeps and identified figures.
(ii) Steps not labeled as RC may be deviated from using accepted
methods in accordance with the operator's maintenance or inspection
program without obtaining approval of an AMOC, provided the RC
steps, including substeps and identified figures, can still be done
as specified, and the airplane can be put back in an airworthy
condition.
(j) Related Information
(1) For more information about this AD, contact Caspar Wang,
Aerospace Engineer, Cabin Safety and Environmental Systems Branch,
ANM-150S, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone:
425-917-6414; fax: 425-917-6590; email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#733012000312015d24121d14331512125d141c05"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="703311030011025e27111e17301611115e171f06">[email protected]</span></a>.
(2) Service information identified in this AD that is not
incorporated by reference is available at the addresses specified in
paragraphs (k)(3) and (k)(4) of this AD.
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-25-0548,
Revision 1, dated April 23, 2015.
(ii) Reserved.
(3) For Boeing service information identified in this AD,
contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services
Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207;
telephone: 206-544-5000, extension 1; fax: 206-766-5680; Internet
<a href="https://www.myboeingfleet.com">https://www.myboeingfleet.com</a>.
(4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Transport
Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356.
For information on the availability of this material at the FAA,
call 425-227-1221.
(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: <a href="http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html">http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html</a>.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 24, 2016.
John P. Piccola, Jr.,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2016-21152 Filed 9-7-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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Retrieved: Apr 6, 2026
Rights: U.S. Government Public Domain
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