AD 2015-19-09
final rule
Applicability
| Type | Manufacturer | Model | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | 787-8 | Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes |
Unsafe Condition
Potential latent failure of the fuel shutoff valve actuator circuitry, which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), leading to an uncontrollable fire and structural failure.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Required Actions
Replace certain engine and APU fuel shutoff valve actuators with new actuators. Revise the maintenance or inspection program to include a new airworthiness limitation in the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA).
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Compliance Time
Before further flight
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Affected Aircraft
The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Federal Register Abstract
We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of a potential latent failure of the fuel shutoff valve actuator circuitry, which was not identified during actuator development. This AD requires replacing certain engine and auxiliary power unit (APU) fuel shutoff valve actuators with new actuators, and also requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to include a new airworthiness limitation into the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA). We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural failure.
Applicability Source Text
Show captured applicability text from the source AD
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes,
certificated in any category.
Document Text
Show stored source text (verify against official source)
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 188 (Tuesday, September 29, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 58357-58361]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2015-24145]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2014-0773; Directorate Identifier 2014-NM-068-AD;
Amendment 39-18271; AD 2015-19-09]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The
Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports
of a potential latent failure of the fuel shutoff valve actuator
circuitry, which was not identified during actuator development. This
AD requires replacing certain engine and auxiliary power unit (APU)
fuel shutoff valve actuators with new actuators, and also requires
revising the maintenance or inspection program to include a new
airworthiness limitation into the Airworthiness Limitations Section
(ALS) of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA). We are
issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel
shutoff valve to the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which could
result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in
case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to
structural failure.
DATES: This AD is effective November 3, 2015.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of November 3,
2015.
ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this AD, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management,
P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-
5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; Internet <a href="https://www.myboeingfleet.com">https://www.myboeingfleet.com</a>. You may view this referenced service information
at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,
Renton, WA. For information on the
[[Page 58358]]
availability of this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221. It is also
available on the Internet at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a> by searching
for and locating Docket No. FAA-2014-0773.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a> by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2014-
0773; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-
5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification
Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-
6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#b6e4d3d4d3da98f8dfd5ded9dac5f6d0d7d798d1d9c0"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="d183b4b3b4bdff9fb8b2b9bebda291b7b0b0ffb6bea7">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all The Boeing Company
Model 787-8 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on
November 17, 2014 (79 FR 68384). The NPRM was prompted by reports of a
potential latent failure of the fuel shutoff valve actuator circuitry,
which was not identified during actuator development. The NPRM proposed
to require replacing certain engine and APU fuel shutoff valve
actuators with new actuators, and also proposed revising the
maintenance or inspection program to include a new airworthiness
limitation into the ALS of the ICA. We are issuing this AD to detect
and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine and
APU, which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine
and APU and, in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that
could lead to structural failure.
Record of Ex Parte Communication
In preparation of AD actions such as NPRMs and immediately adopted
rules, it is the practice of the FAA to obtain technical information
and information on operational and economic impacts from design
approval holders and aircraft operators. We discussed certain comments
addressed in this final rule in a teleconference with Airlines for
America (A4A) and other members of the aviation industry. All of the
comments discussed during this teleconference that are relevant to this
final rule are addressed in this final rule in response to comments
submitted by other commenters. A discussion of this contact can be
found in the rulemaking docket at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a> by
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2014-0773.
Clarification of Certain Terminology
Throughout the preamble of this final rule, commenters may have
used the terms ``fuel shutoff valve'' and ``fuel spar valve''
interchangeably. Both terms refer to the same part. In our responses to
comments, we have used the term ``fuel shutoff valve.'' The term ``fuel
spar valve'' is more commonly used in airplane maintenance
documentation and, therefore, we have used that term in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM (79
FR 68384, November 17, 2014) and the FAA's response to each comment.
Request To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 68384, November 17, 2014)
All Nippon Airways (ANA) stated that the NPRM (79 FR 68384,
November 17, 2014) proposed a revision of the maintenance program or
inspection program that added an inspection every 10 days. ANA
explained that it believes this action is not necessary. ANA stated
that it has used fuel shutoff valve actuators having part number (P/N)
53-0037 on its airplanes since their delivery, and that these fuel
shutoff valve actuators have accumulated 1,607,870 flight hours. ANA
stated that it has removed a total of 9 fuel shutoff valve actuators;
however, it has never experienced a stuck micro-switch issue, and has
experienced only a motor issue. ANA also stated that it has performed a
one-time operational check on 10 airplanes with no findings.
We infer that the commenter requests that we withdraw the NPRM (79
FR 68384, November 17, 2014). We disagree with the commenter's request.
We have determined that an unsafe condition exists that warrants an
interim action until the modified actuator that will address the
identified unsafe condition is installed. Boeing did not formally
comment on whether it considers this issue to be an unsafe condition.
We have determined that, without the required interim action, a
significant number of flights with a fuel shutoff valve actuator that
is failed latently in the open valve position will occur during the
affected fleet life. With a failed fuel shutoff valve, if certain fire
conditions were to occur, or if extreme engine or APU damage were to
occur, or if an engine separation event were to occur during flight,
the crew procedures for such an event would not stop the fuel flow to
the engine strut and nacelle or APU. The continued flow of fuel could
cause an uncontrolled fire or lead to a fuel exhaustion event.
The FAA regulations require all transport airplanes to be fail safe
with respect to engine fire events, and the risk due to severe engine
damage events be minimized. Therefore, we require, for each flight,
sufficiently operative fire safety systems so that fires can be
detected and contained, and fuel to the engine strut and nacelle or APU
can be shut off in the event of an engine or APU fire or severe damage.
The FAA airworthiness standards require remotely controlled
powerplant valves to provide indications that the valves are in the
commanded position. These indications allow the prompt detection and
correction of valve failures. We do not allow dispatch with a known
inoperative fuel shutoff valve. Therefore, we are proceeding with the
final rule, not because of the higher-than-typical failure rate of the
particular valve actuator involved, but instead because the fuel
shutoff valve actuator can fail in a manner that also defeats the
required valve position indication feature. That failure can lead to a
large number of flights occurring on an airplane with a fuel shutoff
valve actuator failed in the open position without the operator being
aware of the failure. Airworthiness limitations containing required
inspections are intended to limit the number of flights following
latent failure of the fuel shutoff valve. Issuance of an AD is the
appropriate method to correct the unsafe condition. We have not changed
this final rule in this regard.
Request To Extend the Test Interval for the Engine and APU Fuel Shutoff
Valve Actuators
ANA requested that we extend the test interval for the engine and
APU fuel shutoff valve actuators from 10 days to 400 flight cycles. ANA
stated it does not understand the reason why we proposed a test
interval of 10 days, which ANA thinks is too short. ANA stated that,
according to its removal data, the
[[Page 58359]]
earliest actuator removal is at 467 flight hours and 442 flight cycles.
ANA explained that the fuel shutoff valve operates only once (open-
close) per one cycle; therefore, ANA proposed a test interval of 400
flight cycles, which would be below 442 flight cycles.
We disagree with the commenter's request to extend the test
interval. An increase in the test interval from 10 days to 400 flight
cycles would result in at least ten times as many flights at risk of an
uncontrollable engine fire. Requiring the test at a 10-day interval has
been deemed practical and is similar to inspections on other models
that require maintenance action to test the actuator function. We have
not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Revise Parts Installation Prohibition Paragraph
ANA requested that we remove the restriction on installing a motor-
operated valve actuator having P/N 53-0037 on crossfeed valve and
defuel/isolation valve positions. ANA stated that actuator failure in
these two positions does not lead to a structural failure or
uncontrollable fire condition that is referenced in the unsafe
condition.
We agree with the commenter's request. The vulnerability of the
crossfeed system is not as significant as that of the engine/APU fuel
feed system. We have revised paragraph (j) of this AD to limit the
prohibition on installing a motor-operated valve actuator having P/N
53-0037 to the engine fuel shutoff valve and APU fuel shutoff valve.
Request To Revise Service Information Identification
Boeing requested that we correct a reference to unrelated service
information specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD.
We disagree with the commenter's request because the NPRM (79 FR
68384, November 17, 2014) identified the correct service information,
i.e., Boeing Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB280015-00, Issue 002, dated
June 19, 2014. We have not changed this AD in this regard.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
this AD with the changes described previously, and minor editorial
changes. We have determined that these minor changes:
<bullet> Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
NPRM (79 FR 68384, November 17, 2014) for correcting the unsafe
condition; and
<bullet> Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 68384, November 17, 2014).
We also determined that these changes will not increase the
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.
Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51
We reviewed Boeing Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB280015-00, Issue
002, dated June 19, 2014. The service information describes procedures
for replacing the engine and APU fuel shutoff valve actuators. This
service information is reasonably available because the interested
parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by
the means identified in the ADDRESSES section of this AD.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 6 airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maintenance program revision....... 1 work-hour x $85 per hour $0 $85 $510
= $85.
Engine and APU fuel shutoff valve 10 work-hours x $85 per 0 850 5,100
actuator replacement. hour = $850.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the manufacturer, some of the costs of this AD may be
covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected
individuals. We do not control warranty coverage for affected
individuals. As a result, we have included all available costs in our
cost estimate.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
[[Page 58360]]
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
2015-19-09 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-18271; Docket No. FAA-
2014-0773; Directorate Identifier 2014-NM-068-AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective November 3, 2015.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes,
certificated in any category.
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28, Fuel.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by reports of a potential latent failure of
the fuel shutoff valve actuator circuitry, which was not identified
during actuator development. We are issuing this AD to detect and
correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine and
auxiliary power unit (APU), which could result in the inability to
shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of certain fires,
an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural failure.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Maintenance or Inspection Program Revision
Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the
maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to add
Airworthiness Limitation (AWL) Number 28-AWL-ACT, ``Engine and APU
Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Actuator Test,'' by
incorporating the information specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g)
of this AD into the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. This may be accomplished
by inserting a copy of Airworthiness Limitation Number 28-AWL-ACT,
``Engine and APU Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Actuator
Test,'' into the maintenance or inspection program, as applicable.
For the airplanes identified in the applicability note of
Airworthiness Limitation Number 28-AWL-ACT, ``Engine and APU Fuel
Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Actuator Test,'' the initial
compliance time for accomplishing the actions specified in figure 1
to paragraph (g) of this AD is within 10 days after accomplishment
of the maintenance or inspection program revision, as applicable,
required by this paragraph. When the engine and APU fuel shutoff
valve actuators have been replaced as required by paragraph (i) of
this AD, the Airworthiness Limitation Number 28-AWL-ACT, ``Engine
and APU Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Actuator Test,''
required by this paragraph may be removed from the maintenance or
inspection program, as applicable.
Figure 1 to Paragraph (g) of This AD: Engine and APU Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Actuator Test
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-ACT................ ALI.......... 10 DAYS............. ALL................. Engine and APU Fuel
Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar
Valve) Actuator Test
INTERVAL NOTE: Not APPLICABILITY NOTE: Concern: The fuel spar
required on days This AWL applies to valve actuator design
when the airplane airplanes with can result in airplanes
is not operated. Eaton Aerospace operating with a failed
The test must be Ltd. fuel spar fuel spar valve actuator
done before further valve actuators that is not reported. A
flight if it has having part number latently failed fuel
been 10 or more 53-0037 installed spar valve actuator
calendar days since at the engine or would prevent fuel
the last inspection. APU fuel shutoff shutoff to an engine or
valve location. APU. In the event of
certain engine or APU
fires, the potential
exists for an engine or
APU fire to be
uncontrollable.
Perform the following
tests in accordance with
Boeing Service Bulletin
B787-81205-SB280015-00,
Issue 002, dated June
19, 2014.
1. Do PART 1: ENGINE FUEL
SPAR VALVE ACTUATOR TEST
as described in Boeing
Service Bulletin B787-
81205-SB280015-00, Issue
002, dated June 19,
2014.
a. If the left engine
fuel spar valve
actuator has part
number 53-0037,
perform the left
engine fuel spar
valve actuator test.
b. If the right engine
fuel spar valve
actuator has part
number 53-0037,
perform the right
engine fuel spar
valve actuator test.
c. If either test
fails, repair faults
as required (refer to
Boeing Airplane
Maintenance Manual 28-
22-02).
2. Do PART 2: APU FUEL
SPAR VALVE ACTUATOR TEST
as described in Boeing
Service Bulletin B787-
81205-SB280015-00, Issue
002, dated June 19,
2014.
a. If the APU fuel
spar valve actuator
has part number 53-
0037, perform the APU
fuel spar valve
actuator test.
b. If the test fails,
before further flight
requiring APU
availability, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing
Airplane Maintenance
Manual 28-25-03).
NOTE: Dispatch may be
permitted per MMEL 28-25-
03 if the APU is not
required for flight.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 58361]]
(h) No Alternative Actions and Intervals
Except as specified in paragraph (i) of this AD: After
accomplishment of the maintenance or inspection program revision
required by paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative actions (e.g.,
inspections) or intervals may be used unless the actions or
intervals are approved as an alternative method of compliance (AMOC)
in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (k) of this
AD.
(i) Replacement
Within 36 months after the effective date of this AD, replace
the engine and APU fuel shutoff valve actuators having part number
(P/N) 53-0037 with P/N 53-0049, in accordance with Part 5 or Part 6,
as applicable, of the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service
Bulletin B787-81205-SB280015-00, Issue 002, dated June 19, 2014.
When all the engine and APU fuel shutoff valve actuators have been
replaced as required by this paragraph, Airworthiness Limitation
Number 28-AWL-ACT, ``Engine and APU Spar Valve Actuator Test,''
required by paragraph (g) of this AD may be removed from the
maintenance or inspection program, as applicable.
(j) Parts Installation Prohibition
As of the effective date of this AD, no person may install on
any airplane a motor-operated valve actuator having P/N 53-0037 in
the engine or APU fuel shutoff valve location.
(k) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in paragraph (l) of this AD.
Information may be emailed to: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#142d39555a5939477175606078713955575b3955595b57394671656171676067547275753a737b62"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="3e07137f7073136d5b5f4a4a525b137f7d71137f73717d136c5b4f4b5b4d4a4d7e585f5f10595148">[email protected]</span></a>.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(3) For service information that contains steps that are labeled
as Required for Compliance (RC), the provisions of paragraphs
(k)(3)(i) and (k)(3)(ii) apply.
(i) The steps labeled as RC, including substeps under an RC step
and any figures identified in an RC step, must be done to comply
with the AD. An AMOC is required for any deviations to RC steps,
including substeps and identified figures.
(ii) Steps not labeled as RC may be deviated from using accepted
methods in accordance with the operator's maintenance or inspection
program without obtaining approval of an AMOC, provided the RC
steps, including substeps and identified figures, can still be done
as specified, and the airplane can be put back in an airworthy
condition.
(l) Related Information
For more information about this AD, contact Rebel Nichols,
Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA
98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email:
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#91c3f4f3f4fdbfdff8f2f9fefde2d1f7f0f0bff6fee7"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="0d5f686f68612343646e6562617e4d6b6c6c236a627b">[email protected]</span></a>.
(m) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Boeing Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB280015-00, Issue 002,
dated June 19, 2014.
(ii) Reserved.
(3) For Boeing service information identified in this AD,
contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services
Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207;
telephone 206-544-5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; Internet
<a href="https://www.myboeingfleet.com">https://www.myboeingfleet.com</a>.
(4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Transport
Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call
425-227-1221.
(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: <a href="http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html">http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html</a>.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 15, 2015.
Michael Kaszycki,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2015-24145 Filed 9-28-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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