AD 2015-19-02
final rule
Applicability
| Type | Manufacturer | Model | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| aircraft | Boeing | Various | Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes |
Unsafe Condition
Latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement, which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU, leading to an uncontrollable fire that could cause structural failure.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Required Actions
Revise the maintenance or inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. Inspect and replace fuel shutoff valve actuators with part numbers P/N MA20A2027 (S343T003-56) or P/N MA30A1001 (S343T003-66) installed at the engine or APU fuel shutoff valve position.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Compliance Time
Within 10 days of the effective date
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Affected Aircraft
The Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes with fuel shutoff valve actuators P/N MA20A2027 (S343T003-56) or P/N MA30A1001 (S343T003-66) installed at the engine or APU fuel shutoff valve position.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Federal Register Abstract
We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural failure.
Applicability Source Text
Show captured applicability text from the source AD
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 767-200, -300, -
300F, and -400ER series airplanes, certificated in any category.
Document Text
Show stored source text (verify against official source)
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 179 (Wednesday, September 16, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 55512-55521]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2015-23119]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2014-0127; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-237-AD;
Amendment 39-18265; AD 2015-19-02]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The
Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of
latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter
replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection
program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this
AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to
the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which
[[Page 55513]]
could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU
and, in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead
to structural failure.
DATES: This AD is effective October 21, 2015.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a> by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2014-
0127; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-
5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification
Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-
6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#e7958285828bc9898e848f888b94a7818686c9808891"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="a2d0c7c0c7ce8ccccbc1cacdced1e2c4c3c38cc5cdd4">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all The Boeing Company
Model 767 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on
March 5, 2014 (79 FR 12420). The NPRM was prompted by reports of
latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter
replacement. The NPRM proposed to require revising the maintenance or
inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are
issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel
shutoff valve to the engine and APU, which could result in the
inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of
certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural
failure.
Record of Ex Parte Communication
In preparation of AD actions such as NPRMs and immediately adopted
rules, it is the practice of the FAA to obtain technical information
and information on operational and economic impacts from design
approval holders and aircraft operators. We discussed certain comments
addressed in this final rule in a teleconference with Airlines for
America (A4A) and other members of the aviation industry. All of the
comments discussed during this teleconference are addressed in this
final rule in response to comments submitted by other commenters. A
discussion of this contact can be found in the rulemaking docket at
<a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a> by searching for and locating Docket No.
FAA-2014-0127.
Clarification of Certain Terminology
Throughout the preamble of this final rule, commenters may have
used the terms ``fuel shutoff valve'' and ``fuel spar valve''
interchangeably. Both terms refer to the same part. In our responses to
comments, we have used the term ``fuel shutoff valve.'' The term ``fuel
spar valve'' is more commonly used in airplane maintenance
documentation and, therefore, we have used that term in figure 1 and
figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM (79
FR 12420, March 5, 2014) and the FAA's response to each comment.
Requests To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014)
American Airlines (AA) stated that Boeing's internal review found
that the issue addressed by the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) is
not a safety concern, and Boeing has not recommended any interim action
on this issue. In addition, AA stated that Boeing is addressing the
issue in the long term with a design change to the motor-operated valve
(MOV) actuator of the fuel shutoff valve.
All Nippon Airways (ANA) stated it agrees with a statement in
``767-FTD-28-12003 issued by Boeing'' indicating that the combination
of the events (engine fire and spar valve failures) is extremely
improbable. ANA requested clarification of the rationale for the
proposed intervals. ANA stated that it has operated more than 100 Model
767 airplanes for approximately 30 years and has never had such failure
with the MOVs.
We infer that AA and ANA requested that the NPRM (79 FR 12420,
March 5, 2014) be withdrawn.
We disagree with the commenters' request to withdraw the NPRM (79
FR 12420, March 5, 2014). We have determined that an unsafe condition
exists that warrants an interim action until the manufacturer finishes
developing a modification that will address the identified unsafe
condition. Boeing did not formally comment on whether it considers this
issue to be an unsafe condition. We have determined that, without the
required interim actions, a significant number of flights with a fuel
shutoff valve actuator that is failed latently in the open valve
position will occur during the affected fleet life. With a failed fuel
shutoff valve, if certain fire conditions were to occur, or if extreme
engine or APU damage were to occur, or if an engine separation event
were to occur during flight, the crew procedures for such an event
would not stop the fuel flow to the engine strut and nacelle or APU.
The continued flow of fuel could cause an uncontrolled fire or lead to
a fuel exhaustion event.
The FAA regulations require all transport airplanes to be fail safe
with respect to engine or APU fire events, and the risk due to severe
engine or APU damage events to be minimized. Therefore, we require, for
each flight, sufficiently operative fire safety systems so that fires
can be detected and contained, and fuel to the engine strut and nacelle
or APU can be shut off in the event of an engine or APU fire or severe
damage.
The FAA airworthiness standards require remotely controlled
powerplant valves to provide indications that the valves are in the
commanded position. These indications allow the prompt detection and
correction of valve failures. We do not allow dispatch with a known
inoperative fuel shutoff valve. Therefore, we are proceeding with the
final rule--not because of the higher-than-typical failure rate of the
particular valve actuator involved, but instead because the fuel
shutoff valve actuator can fail in a manner that also defeats the
required valve position indication feature. That failure can lead to a
large number of flights occurring on an airplane with a fuel shutoff
valve actuator failed in the open position without the operator being
aware of the failure. Airworthiness limitations containing required
inspections are intended to limit the number of flights following
latent failure of the fuel shutoff valve. Issuance of an AD is the
appropriate method to correct the unsafe condition. We have not changed
this final rule in this regard.
Request To Revise Applicability of Certain Requirements
Delta Airlines (DAL) and United Airlines (UAL) requested that we
revise the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) to limit the
applicability specified in figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 to
paragraph (g) of the proposed AD
[[Page 55514]]
to airplanes with fuel shutoff valve actuators on which the identified
unsafe condition exists.
DAL stated that it would be feasible to implement configuration
control to ensure that part number (P/N) MA30A1001 is removed, and does
not get installed in the engine or APU fuel shutoff valve positions in
the future. DAL stated it would replace any P/N MA30A1001 actuators
that are currently in those locations with actuators of a different
acceptable part number, which would, in turn, alleviate the unsafe
condition given in the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). DAL stated
that if an operator does not have P/N MA30A1001 installed on any engine
or APU fuel shutoff valve positions, then that operator would not be
required to adhere to airworthiness limitations 28-AWL-ENG, 28-AWL-MOV,
or 28-AWL-APU.
UAL stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) does
not specify which part number of the MOV actuator is applicable to the
proposed AD. UAL stated that proposed ADs were issued for Model 737NG,
757, 767, and 777 airplanes to replace the MOV actuator with P/N
MA30A1001. UAL also stated that there are issues with the MOV actuator
part number, and presumes that the proposed AD is for MOV actuator P/N
MA30A1001.
We agree with the commenters' request. Only two fuel shutoff valve
actuator designs are susceptible to the unsafe condition specified in
this final rule, and it would be unnecessarily burdensome to require
the inspections on airplanes that do not have any of the susceptible
valves installed. We have changed the Applicability column in figure 1,
figure 2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD to clarify that the
limitations apply to Model 767 airplanes having fuel shutoff valve
actuator P/N MA20A2027 (S343T003-56) or P/N MA30A1001 (S343T003-66)
installed at the engine or APU fuel shutoff valve position, as
appropriate.
Request To Change the Initial Compliance Time for the Operational Check
AA requested that the compliance time for the initial
accomplishment of the actions specified in figure 1, figure 2, and
figure 3 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5,
2014) be extended from 7 days to 60 days. AA stated that more time is
needed for publishing the new criteria and for distribution of cards
and manuals/checklists. AA stated that the 7-day compliance time is not
justified by the failure rates for this safety concern.
We partially agree with the commenter's request. We have changed
the initial compliance time to 10 days for accomplishing the actions
specified in figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this
AD. The compliance time of 10 days is consistent with regulatory
actions for other affected models. We have determined that the initial
compliance time for the inspection represents an appropriate time in
which the required actions can be performed in a timely manner within
the affected fleet, while still maintaining an adequate level of
safety.
In developing an appropriate compliance time, we considered the
safety implications, parts availability, and normal maintenance
schedules for timely accomplishment of the operational checks. The
operational check procedures and the access procedures are simple and
already established. The check itself involves a visual inspection of
an existing prominent design feature that is intended to indicate the
position of the fuel shutoff valve actuator and is described in
existing maintenance documentation. The manufacturer does not expect a
large number of latently failed valve actuators to be discovered.
Existing parts stores are expected to be sufficient, and parts can be
repositioned in time to support the initial inspections. However, under
the provisions of paragraph (i)(1) of this AD, we might consider
requests for adjustments to the compliance time if data are submitted
to substantiate that such an adjustment would provide an acceptable
level of safety.
Request To Change the Proposed Requirement for the MOV Actuator
Inspection
Boeing requested that the proposed requirement to ``incorporate the
MOV actuator inspection into the Airworthiness Limitations (AWL)
Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness of operator's
maintenance or inspection programs'' be replaced with an AD requirement
to perform the MOV inspection per the specific interval in paragraph
(g) of the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). Boeing stated that
the MOV inspection in paragraph (g) of the proposed AD is an interim
mitigation until a redesigned MOV can be installed in the spar valve
locations. Boeing stated that including the interval requirement as the
required AD action would allow installation of the redesigned MOV to be
approved as an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) to the AD, and
as a terminating action for the repetitive inspections, while avoiding
the need for regulatory approval to remove the AWL from each operator's
maintenance or inspection program. In addition, Boeing stated the AWLs
are permanent actions that affect operators' planning and scheduling,
and that incorporating a temporary AWL into the operators' maintenance
documents or a Boeing maintenance planning data (MPD) document will
cause confusion among operators.
We disagree with the commenter's request. During the development of
the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014), we discussed the impact of an
AWL revision versus a repetitive inspection requirement with Boeing,
who, in turn, discussed it with a sample of operators. At that time,
both Boeing and the operators indicated that the addition of an AWL was
the preferred solution because it would reduce the record keeping
required to document AD compliance. Affected operators who wish to use
a repetitive inspection requirement in place of an AWL revision may
apply for approval of an AMOC in accordance with the provisions
specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD by submitting data
substantiating that the request would provide an acceptable level of
safety. We have not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Extend the Daily Inspection Requirement
UAL asked whether there are any provisions established by the FAA
to extend the daily inspection requirement if the reliability data are
captured. UAL stated that there is no valid justification for this
short time limit that creates a burden on airline operations.
We disagree with the commenter's request. Our unsafe condition
determination is primarily driven by the potential for a common-cause
failure of the valve and its position indication--and not by a lack of
reliability. We are aware that this failure has happened in service,
and we expect that tens of thousands of flights will occur with this
valve failed in the open position without indicating the failure unless
frequent inspections are made. Fortunately, the effort required to
check the valve operation is small for most airplanes. For Model 767-
200 and -300 series airplanes, we expect that most airlines will have
the flightcrew monitor a light near the switch they are using to shut
down the engine. The total time needed should be less than a few
seconds. In addition, new fuel shutoff valve actuators are being
developed that will allow removal of this requirement once they are
installed. Therefore, we have no plans to extend the interval
[[Page 55515]]
based on updated reliability data. We have not changed this AD in this
regard.
Request for Inspection Relief
UAL noted there is no provision in the proposed AD (79 FR 12420,
March 5, 2014) to allow a waiver of the daily inspection requirements
if an airplane is out of service for any reason or in a remote station
where the daily inspection cannot be accomplished. Air Do asked if the
daily check must be done once a day even if the airplane does not have
a flight plan. We infer the commenters are requesting that we revise
the proposed AD to allow exceptions to the daily check specified in
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD.
AA requested that the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) be
clarified to specify that daily checks only apply when the airplane is
in operational revenue service. AA also stated to restart the interval
of 10 days or 100 flight hours/50 cycles, whichever occurs later, once
an APU is returned to service from the minimum equipment list.
We partially agree with the commenters' requests. We agree to limit
inspections to days when the airplane is in revenue service or when the
APU is in operational status because it would be unnecessarily
burdensome to require the inspections on airplanes that are not in
operation. In figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this
AD, we have added a note in the Interval column to clarify that the
operational check is not required on days when the airplane is not used
in revenue service. For figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we also
specify that the check of the engine fuel shutoff valve must be done
before further flight once the airplane is returned to revenue service.
In figure 2 and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have specified
that the check or inspection must be done before further flight if it
has been 10 or more calendar days since last check or inspection.
We disagree with restarting the 10-day cycle once an APU is
returned to service because the APU fuel shutoff valve check should not
be extended because the APU was out of service for a time. For the APU,
it is likely that this test will be done as a matter of course whenever
it is returned to service.
Request To Extend the Repetitive Interval
AA, ANA, DAL, and Japan Airlines (JAL) requested that the
repetitive interval be extended for the actions specified in figure 1,
figure 2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (79 FR
12420, March 5, 2014).
AA requested that the repetitive inspection interval be extended to
``10 days or 100 flight hours/50 flight cycles, whichever occurs
later.'' AA requested that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR 12420,
March 5, 2014) to add the choice of monitoring the disagreement light
to check the indication and physically check the closure of the valve
at ``100 flight hours/50 cycles whichever occurs later'' as an
alternative maintenance task. AA stated that operators of Model 767-400
series airplanes identified in the NPRM are allowed 10 days to inspect
the spar valve actuator arm when it is fully closed and commanded
closed. AA stated that the 10 days equates closely to ``100 flight
hours/50 cycles.'' AA also stated that Model 767-200, -300, and -400
series airplanes have the same actuator valve and indication, except
that Model 767-400 series airplanes do not have a disagreement light.
ANA stated it has reviewed the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014),
and is disappointed with the intervals of the operational checks
because the intervals are daily for engine fuel spar valves on Boeing
Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes, and 10 days for APU
fuel valves; the proposed intervals will definitely affect its
operations. ANA stated that it does not have Model 767-400 airplanes,
but that the operational effect is the same. ANA suggested a compliance
time of ``6,000 flight hours or 22 months whichever comes first'' for
both engine spar valves and APU fuel valves.
DAL stated that Model 767-300 and -400 series airplanes contain
similar systems with respect to engine fuel shutoff. DAL stated that
Model 767-300 and -400 series airplanes are also equipped with the same
part number for the MOV actuator. DAL stated that, therefore, the
failure modes between the two airplane models should be identical. DAL
stated that since the FAA considers a 10-day interval sufficient for
Model 767-400 series airplanes, and also for the APU fuel shutoff
actuator for all Model 767 airplanes, it proposes to change the
interval in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this proposed AD to 10 days.
We disagree with the commenters' requests. Increasing the check
interval from daily to every 10 days for the AWL task specified in
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD would result in 10 times as many
flights at risk of an uncontrollable engine fire; the daily check has
been deemed practical because in practice it will mean the flightcrew
will need to watch a light just above the FUEL CONTROL switch as they
start or shut down the engine. As AA stated, Model 767-400ER series
airplanes do not have the disagreement light, so the inspection is more
complex. As a result, regardless of how desirable a daily inspection
would be, we determined it is not practical to require that inspection
on a daily basis on Model 767-400ER series airplanes. We have not
changed this AD in this regard.
As we discussed previously, the reason for this final rule is not
simply a high valve failure rate in the open position, but rather a
design error that allows a single failure within a fuel shutoff valve
actuator to affect both the control of the valve and the indication of
the valve's position. Currently these failures are only discovered
during fuel filter changes, which occur every 6,000 flight hours. ANA's
proposal is to check the system every 6,000 flight hours. A dedicated
inspection every 6,000 flight hours would have little impact on the
number of flights at risk. Indication and control of the fuel shutoff
valve are not independent because of the design error in the affected
valve actuators. For a failed fuel shutoff valve, the valve indication
system erroneously reports that the valve is opening and closing. If no
action is taken, we anticipate a significant number of flights to occur
with a failed open fuel shutoff valve. Without this AD, our risk
assessment and the manufacturer's risk assessment predict that tens of
thousands of such flights would occur in the fleet of Model 767
airplanes.
In addition to this fuel shutoff valve design error, the affected
valves have a higher-than-typical rate of failure in several failure
modes. We have received several reports of valves failed open
(discovered only when fuel filters were changed), valves failed closed
(preventing engine start), and valves that spontaneously closed in
flight (causing an engine shutdown). Boeing's long-term solution, a
fuel shutoff valve actuator design change, is intended to address these
issues in addition to restoring the independence of the actuator
control and indication features. The APU, on the other hand, presents a
much lower risk and is needed in flight on a small number of flights.
In addition, normal APU starting procedures include this check on every
start, so it is likely that this check is already being done on a more
frequent basis. We have not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Justify the Proposed Inspection Interval
ANA requested that rationale be provided to justify the proposed
inspection interval, including the interval differences between the
engine
[[Page 55516]]
and the APU, and the interval between Model 767 and Model 777
airplanes.
We agree to provide the requested rationale. While the potential
for the problem is the same for Model 767 and Model 777 airplanes, the
ability to check the system functionality is different. Both types of
airplanes warrant a daily check, but we also consider the practicality
of an inspection. On Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes,
the flightcrew will need to watch the disagreement light located just
above the FUEL CONTROL switch as they start or shut down the engine.
Model 777 airplanes, like Model 767-400ER series airplanes, do not have
a disagreement light so the inspection is more time consuming. As a
result, regardless of how desirable a daily inspection would be for
Model 777 airplanes, we determined it is not practical to require that
inspection on a daily basis.
In regard to the APU, it is not run on every flight, so a properly
functioning fuel shutoff valve is not needed for every flight. We
decided to require the check every 10 days rather than try to monitor
APU usage. Also, it should be noted that this check is part of a normal
APU start, so it will likely be done on every start; this AD requires
that it be done at least every 10 days. We have not changed this AD in
this regard.
Request To Provide Instructions for Compliance With the Extended
Operations (ETOPS) Requirement
UAL requested instructions for compliance with the ETOPS
requirement that would meet the operational check requirements. UAL
requested that we revise the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) to
clarify whether standardized procedures will be established for
inspectors to make approvals for all affected operators. UAL stated
that since the affected airplanes have ETOPS approval, the NPRM should
provide instructions for compliance with the ETOPS requirements. UAL
asked that the FAA provide guidance to the principal operations
inspector (POI) on required procedures that would meet the operational
check requirements.
We agree that clarification is needed. We infer the commenter means
that checks of the left and right engine fuel shutoff valves are done
by different individuals due to ETOPS maintenance requirements. Since
none of the required inspections include actions that could contribute
to an engine shutdown, there is no common-cause engine shutdown
potential and, therefore, no need for different individuals to perform
the inspections on the left and right fuel shutoff valve actuators to
meet ETOPS maintenance requirements. No additional guidance to the POIs
is necessary.
Request To Expand Inspection To Confirm Functionality
DAL requested we expand the inspection at the spar for confirmation
of functionality on Model 767-300 series airplanes using the same
method of inspection and the same auxiliary power unit position as
those for the Boeing Model 767-400 series airplanes. DAL stated that a
check of the actual valve position every 10 days would be a more
effective inspection. DAL stated that ``FTD Article 767-FTD-28-12003''
(Boeing Fleet Team Digest) states that, ``The indication showed the
valve had closed when it had failed in the open position.'' DAL stated
that the flight deck indication may not accurately reflect
functionality.
We partially agree with the commenter's request. We agree to add an
inspection option for Model 767-300 airplanes that is similar to the
inspection for Model 767-400ER series airplanes. Therefore, for Model
767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes, we have added item D. to
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD to specify a fourth option to
perform a daily inspection to verify the fuel shutoff valve is closing.
However, we disagree with extending the inspection interval to 10 days.
As stated previously, increasing the inspection interval from every day
to every 10 days for the AWL task specified in figure 1 to paragraph
(g) of this AD would result in 10 times as many flights at risk of an
uncontrollable engine fire.
Request To Add a Requirement To Provide Electrical Power Before the
Operational Check
UAL requested that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5,
2014) to add a requirement to provide electrical power before
performing the operational check required by figure 3 to paragraph (g)
of the proposed AD. UAL stated that electrical power is required to
perform the check, and other maintenance may be done that could
deactivate required circuits.
We agree with the commenter's request because electrical power is
required. In figure 1 and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have
added a requirement to supply electrical power to the airplane using
standard practices when performing the operational check.
Request To Clarify the Operational Check Requirements
Air Do stated that, if the flightcrew performed the operational
check, the maintenance record is usually not created. The commenter
questioned whether this is acceptable, or whether the flightcrew should
record it in the flight log.
UAL requested clarification on whether the flightcrew will not have
to record compliance for one of the checks and that documentation for
each inspection on every airplane need not be made if relying on
flightcrew compliance with the proposed AD.
JAL requested that the FAA coordinate with Boeing to include an
appropriate check procedure in the Normal Procedure (NP) section of the
flightcrew operating manual (FCOM).
We find that clarification is necessary. This AD requires including
the information specified in figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 of
paragraph (g) of the AD in the maintenance or inspection program;
however, the actions specified in the figures in this AD are
accomplished, and remain enforceable, as part of the Airworthiness
Limitations of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. Section
43.11(a) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 43.11(a)) requires
maintenance record entries for maintenance actions such as this
inspection. If an operator elects to have a flightcrew member do an
inspection in accordance with the applicable airworthiness limitation,
that same action would be considered an operational task--not
maintenance--and therefore 14 CFR 43.11(a) would not apply. Regarding
JAL's comment, an FCOM is a Boeing document that we neither approve nor
control. We have not changed this AD with regard to these issues.
Request To Clarify the Requirements for Certain Disagreement Lights
UAL requested that we clarify the requirements in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). UAL
stated that items C.6.a. and C.7.a. of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the
proposed AD instruct to move the L and R FUEL CONTROL switches,
respectively, to the RUN position, but do not instruct to monitor the
left and right SPAR VALVE disagreement lights, unlike item C.6.c. and
item C.7.c. UAL stated that it presumes it is not required to verify
the left and right SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when the L and R FUEL
CONTROL switches are moved to the RUN position.
We agree to provide clarification. It is not required to verify the
left and right
[[Page 55517]]
SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when the L and R FUEL CONTROL switches
are moved to the RUN position during that portion of the operational
check. We have not changed this AD in this regard.
Request for Clarification on Applying a Minimum Equipment List (MEL)
Maintenance Action
First Air requested clarification of the proposed corrective action
for an inoperative indication--specifically, whether operators could
still apply an MEL maintenance action and meet the intent of the NPRM
(79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). First Air stated that the operational
checks in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD for engine spar
valves are predicated on the SPAR VALVE light being operative. First
Air stated that MEL 28-40-02 provides relief should the indication be
inoperative.
We agree that clarification is needed. We disagree with providing
MEL relief for an inoperative fuel shutoff valve indication because MEL
relief could potentially allow the valve to be inoperative for up to 10
days of revenue operation. However, we do agree to provide flexibility
regarding verification that the fuel shutoff valve actuator is
operational. We have added item D. to figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this
AD to specify a fourth option to perform a daily inspection to verify
the fuel shutoff valve is closing, which can be used when the fuel
shutoff valve indication does not function properly.
Request for Clarification Regarding the FUEL CONTROL Switch
UAL requested that a statement be included in the proposed AD (79
FR 12420, March 5, 2014) to clarify that it is not required to cycle
the L and R FUEL CONTROL switches, as specified in Boeing Airplane
Maintenance Manual (AMM) 28-22-00, for the ALI task specified in figure
2 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD.
We agree with the commenter's request. We have added a note in
figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD stating that it is not necessary
to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do the inspection.
Request To Correct a Typographical Error
UAL requested that a typographical error be corrected in the NPRM
(79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). UAL stated that figure 1 to paragraph (g)
of the NPRM states, ``Item C.4 instructs to make sure Land R ENG START
selector switches on the overhead panel are in the OFF position.'' UAL
stated that this is a typographical error and the selector switches
should be L and R ENG START selector switches.
We agree and have corrected the typographical error in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD accordingly. Paragraph C.4. of figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD, as it appeared in the NPRM (79 FR 12420,
March 5, 2014), has been re-designated as paragraph C.5. of figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD.
Additional Changes Made to This AD
In the Description column of figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD,
we have removed the phrase ``refer to Boeing AMM 28-22-00'' with regard
to performing an inspection of the fuel spar valve MOV actuator
position.
In paragraph C.7.a. in the Description column of figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD, and in paragraph A.5. in the Description
column of figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added wording
specifying to wait ``approximately'' 10 seconds once the FUEL CONTROL
switch is in the RUN position or the APU selector switch on the
overhead panel is in the ON position.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial
changes. We have determined that these minor changes:
<bullet> Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) for correcting the unsafe condition;
and
<bullet> Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014).
We also determined that these changes will not increase the
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.
Interim Action
We consider this AD interim action. The manufacturer is currently
developing a modification that will address the unsafe condition
identified in this AD. Once this modification is developed, approved,
and available, we may consider additional rulemaking.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 450 airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incorporating Airworthiness 1 work-hour x $85 per $0 $85 $38,250
Limitation. hour = $85.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
[[Page 55518]]
(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
2015-19-02 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-18265; Docket No. FAA-
2014-0127; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-237-AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective October 21, 2015.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 767-200, -300, -
300F, and -400ER series airplanes, certificated in any category.
(d) Subject
Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 28, Fuel.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff
valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing
this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff
valve to the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which could
result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and,
in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to
structural failure.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection Program
Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the
maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to add
airworthiness limitation numbers 28-AWL-ENG, 28-AWL-MOV, and 28-AWL-
APU, by incorporating the information specified in Figure 1, Figure
2, and Figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD into the Airworthiness
Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.
The initial compliance time for accomplishing the actions specified
in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD is
within 10 days after accomplishing the maintenance or inspection
program revision required by this paragraph.
Figure 1 to Paragraph (g) of This AD--Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position Indication
Operational Check
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-ENG.................. ALI DAILY............... 767-200, -300, and - Engine Fuel Shutoff
INTERVAL NOTE: The 300F airplanes. Valve (Fuel Spar Valve)
operational check APPLICABILITY NOTE: Position Indication
is not required on Applies to Operational Check.
days when the airplanes with an Concern: The fuel spar
airplane is not actuator installed valve actuator design
used in revenue at the engine fuel can result in airplanes
service.. spar valve operating with a failed
The check must be position having fuel spar valve
done before further part number (P/N) actuator that is not
flight once the MA20A2027 reported. A latently
airplane is (S343T003-56) or P/ failed fuel spar valve
returned to revenue N MA30A1001 actuator could prevent
service. (S343T003-66).. fuel shutoff to an
engine. In the event of
certain engine fires,
the potential exists
for an engine fire to
be uncontrollable.
Perform one of the
following checks/
inspection of the fuel
spar valve position
(unless checked by the
flightcrew in a manner
approved by the
principal operations
inspector):
A. Operational Check
during engine shutdown.
1. Do an operational
check of the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the L FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved
to the CUTOFF position,
verify the left SPAR
VALVE disagreement
light on the quadrant
control stand
illuminates and then
goes off.
b. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing
airplane maintenance
manual (AMM) 28-22-11).
2. Do an operational
check of the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the R FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved
to the CUTOFF position,
verify the right SPAR
VALVE disagreement
light on the quadrant
control stand
illuminates and then
goes off.
b. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
B. Operational check
during engine start.
1. Do an operational
check of the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
[[Page 55519]]
a. As the L FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved
to the RUN (or RICH)
position, verify the
left SPAR VALVE
disagreement light on
the quadrant control
stand illuminates and
then goes off.
b. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
2. Do an operational
check of the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the R FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved
to the RUN (or RICH)
position, verify the
right SPAR VALVE
disagreement light on
the quadrant control
stand illuminates and
then goes off.
b. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
C. Operational check
without engine
operation.
1. Supply electrical
power to the airplane
using standard
practices.
2. Make sure all fuel
pump switches on the
Overhead Panel are in
the OFF position.
3. If the auxiliary
power unit (APU) is
running, open and
collar the L FWD FUEL
BOOST PUMP (C00372)
circuit breaker on the
Main Power Distribution
Panel.
4. Make sure LEFT and
RIGHT ENG FIRE switches
on the Aft Aisle Stand
are in the NORMAL (IN)
position.
5. Make sure L and R ENG
START Selector Switches
on the Overhead Panel,
are in the OFF
position.
6. Do an operational
check of the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. Move L FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand to the
RUN position and wait
approximately 10
seconds.
NOTE: It is normal under
this test condition for
the ENG VALVE
disagreement light on
the quadrant control
stand to stay
illuminated.
b. Move L FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand to the
CUTOFF position.
c. Verify the left SPAR
VALVE disagreement
light on the quadrant
control stand
illuminates and then
goes off.
d. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
7. Do an operational
check of the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. Move R FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand to the
RUN position and wait
approximately 10
seconds once the FUEL
CONTROL switch is in
the RUN position or the
APU selector switch on
the overhead panel is
in the ON position.
NOTE: It is normal under
this test condition for
the ENG VALVE
disagreement light on
the quadrant control
stand to stay
illuminated.
b. Move R FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand to the
CUTOFF position.
c. Verify the right SPAR
VALVE disagreement
light on the quadrant
control stand
illuminates and then
goes off.
d. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
8. If the L FWD FUEL
BOOST PUMP circuit
breaker was collared in
step 3, remove collar
and close.
D. Perform an inspection
of the fuel spar valve
actuator position.
[[Page 55520]]
NOTE: This inspection
may be most useful
whenever the SPAR VALVE
light does not function
properly.
1. Make sure the L FUEL
CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand
is in the CUTOFF
position.
NOTE: It is not
necessary to cycle the
FUEL CONTROL switch to
do this inspection.
2. Inspect the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator located in the
left rear spar.
NOTE: The Fuel Spar
Valve actuators are
located behind main
gear doors on the rear
spar.
a. Verify the manual
override handle on the
engine fuel spar valve
actuator is in the
CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any
fuel spar valve
actuator that is not in
the CLOSED position
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
3. Make sure the R FUEL
CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand
is in the CUTOFF
position.
NOTE: It is not
necessary to cycle the
FUEL CONTROL switch to
do this inspection.
4. Inspect the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator located in the
right rear spar.
NOTE: The Fuel Spar
Valve actuators are
located behind main
gear doors on the rear
spar.
a. Verify the manual
override handle on the
engine fuel spar valve
actuator is in the
CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any
fuel spar valve
actuator that is not in
the CLOSED position
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 2 to Paragraph (g) of This AD--Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Actuator Inspection
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-MOV.................. ALI 10 DAYS............. 767-400ER series Engine Fuel Shutoff
INTERVAL NOTE: The airplanes. Valve (Fuel Spar Valve)
inspection is not APPLICABILITY NOTE: Actuator Inspection
required on days Applies to Concern: The fuel spar
when the airplane airplanes with an valve actuator design
is not used in actuator installed can result in airplanes
revenue service. at the engine fuel operating with a failed
The inspection must spar valve fuel spar valve
be done before position having actuator that is not
further flight if part number (P/N) reported. A latently
it has been 10 or MA20A2027 failed fuel spar valve
more calendar days (S343T003-56) or P/ actuator would prevent
since last N MA30A1001 fuel shutoff to an
inspection.. (S343T003-66).. engine. In the event of
certain engine fires,
the potential exists
for an engine fire to
be uncontrollable.
Perform an inspection of
the fuel spar valve
actuator position.
NOTE: The fuel spar
valve actuators are
located behind main
gear doors on the rear
spar.
1. Make sure the L FUEL
CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand
is in the CUTOFF
position.
NOTE: It is not
necessary to cycle the
FUEL CONTROL switch to
do this inspection.
2. Inspect the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator located in the
left rear spar.
a. Verify the manual
override handle on the
engine fuel spar valve
actuator is in the
CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any
fuel spar valve
actuator that is not in
the CLOSED position
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
3. Make sure the R FUEL
CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand
is in the CUTOFF
position.
NOTE: It is not
necessary to cycle the
FUEL CONTROL switch to
do this inspection.
4. Inspect the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator located in the
right rear spar.
a. Verify the manual
override handle on the
engine fuel spar valve
actuator is in the
CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any
fuel spar valve
actuator that is not in
the CLOSED position
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 55521]]
Figure 3 to Paragraph (g) of This AD--Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) Fuel Shutoff Valve Position Indication
Operational Check
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-APU.................. ALI 10 DAYS............. ALL................ APU Fuel Shutoff Valve
INTERVAL NOTE: The APPLICABILITY NOTE: Position Indication
operational check Applies to Operational Check
is not required on airplanes with an Concern: The APU fuel
days when the actuator installed shutoff valve actuator
airplane is not at the APU fuel design can result in
used in revenue shutoff valve airplanes operating
service. The position having with a failed APU fuel
operational check part number (P/N) shutoff valve actuator
must be done before MA20A2027 that is not reported. A
further flight with (S343T003-56) or latently failed APU
an operational APU MA30A1001 fuel shutoff valve
if it has been 10 (S343T003-66).. actuator could prevent
or more calendar fuel shutoff to the
days since last APU. In the event of
check.. certain APU fires, the
potential exists for an
APU fire to be
uncontrollable.
Perform the operational
check of the APU fuel
shutoff valve position
indication (unless
checked by the
flightcrew in a manner
approved by the
principal operations
inspector).
A. Do an operational
check of the APU fuel
shutoff valve position
indication.
1. If the APU is
running, unload and
shut down the APU using
standard practices.
2. Supply electrical
power to the airplane
using standard
practices.
3. Make sure the APU
FIRE switch on the Aft
Aisle Stand is in the
NORMAL (IN) position.
4. Make sure there is at
least 1,000 lbs (500
kgs) of fuel in the
Left Main Tank.
5. Move APU Selector
switch on the Overhead
Panel to the ON
position and wait
approximately 10
seconds once the FUEL
CONTROL switch is in
the RUN position or the
APU selector switch on
the overhead panel is
in the ON position.
6. Move the APU Selector
switch on the Overhead
Panel to the OFF
position.
7. Verify the APU FAULT
light on the Overhead
Panel illuminates and
then goes off.
8. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight
requiring APU
availability, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
25-02).
NOTE: Dispatch may be
permitted per MMEL 28-
25-02 if APU is not
required for flight.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals
After accomplishment of the maintenance or inspection program
revision required by paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative
actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be used unless the
actions or intervals are approved as an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the procedures specified in
paragraph (i)(1) of this AD.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO)
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD.
Information may be emailed to: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#bd8490fcf3f090eed8dcc9c9d1d890fcfef290fcf0f2fe90efd8ccc8d8cec9cefddbdcdc93dad2cb"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="ba8397fbf4f797e9dfdbceced6df97fbf9f597fbf7f5f997e8dfcbcfdfc9cec9fadcdbdb94ddd5cc">[email protected]</span></a>.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(j) Related Information
For more information about this AD, contact Rebel Nichols,
Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA
98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email:
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#5c2e393e39307232353f3433302f1c3a3d3d723b332a"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="e7958285828bc9898e848f888b94a7818686c9808891">[email protected]</span></a>.
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
None.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 7, 2015.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2015-23119 Filed 9-15-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
Source: Official FAA Source ↗
Retrieved: Apr 6, 2026
Rights: U.S. Government Public Domain
This site is not affiliated with or endorsed by the FAA. Always verify with official sources.