AD 2013-08-23

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 79 (Wednesday, April 24, 2013)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 24037-24040]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2013-09432]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2012-0413; Directorate Identifier 2011-NM-257-AD; 
Amendment 39-17441; AD 2013-08-23]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The 
Boeing Company Model DC-10-10, DC-10-10F, DC-10-15, DC-10-30, DC-10-30F 
(KC-10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40, DC-10-40F, MD-10-10F, MD-10-30F, MD-11, 
and MD-11F airplanes. This

[[Page 24038]]

AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. 
This AD requires adding design features to detect electrical faults and 
to detect a pump running in an empty fuel tank. We are issuing this AD 
to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, 
in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank 
explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

DATES: This AD is effective May 29, 2013.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a>; or in person at the Docket Management Facility 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, 
any comments received, and other information. The address for the 
Docket Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is Document Management Facility, 
U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West 
Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 
Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Serj Harutunian, Aerospace Engineer, 
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification 
Office (ACO), 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-
4137; phone: 562-627-5254; fax: 562-627-5210; email: 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#4b382e392165232a393e3f3e25222a250b2d2a2a652c243d"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="91e2f4e3fbbff9f0e3e4e5e4fff8f0ffd1f7f0f0bff6fee7">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 
part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products. 
That NPRM published in the Federal Register on April 18, 2012 (77 FR 
23166). That NPRM proposed to require adding design features to detect 
electrical faults, to detect a pump running in an empty fuel tank, and 
to ensure that a fuel pump's operation is not affected by certain 
conditions.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing 
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the proposal 
(77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) and the FAA's response to each comment.

Support for NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012)

    Airline Pilots Association International (ALPA) supports the 
language and intent of the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012), and 
agreed that the proposed actions will enhance safety.

Request To Delay AD Pending Release of Service Information

    Two commenters requested that we delay issuing the AD until Boeing 
has released service information. (Specific modifications and solutions 
were not included in the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012).)
    Noting that Boeing had planned to issue several service bulletins 
to prevent the identified unsafe condition, FedEx requested that we 
delay issuing the AD until Boeing has released relevant service 
information. FedEx recommended that we coordinate with Boeing on 
recommendations to address the unsafe condition.
    UPS requested that we extend the comment period until a minimum of 
45 days after publication of all associated service bulletins to 
provide operators sufficient information to make the design changes.
    We do not agree to delay issuance of this AD. We have identified a 
potential unsafe condition that needs to be corrected; however, Boeing 
has not finalized service information to address that condition. In 
light of the unsafe condition, we have determined that we cannot delay 
issuance of this AD, and must proceed without service information. We 
find that the 60-month time frame specified in paragraph (g) of this AD 
will provide adequate time for issuance and implementation of service 
information. We have not changed this final rule regarding this issue.

Request To Revise Applicability

    FedEx and Boeing requested that we revise the applicability to 
specifically exclude airplanes on which the auxiliary fuel tanks have 
been removed. FedEx reported that it has modified several MD-11s and 
MD-10s by removing the forward auxiliary tanks or center auxiliary 
tanks, as well as the fuel pumps and related hardware.
    We agree that removal of the auxiliary fuel tank eliminates the 
identified unsafe condition. We have changed paragraph (g) in this 
final rule to exclude airplanes when Boeing-installed auxiliary fuel 
tanks are removed.

Request To Clarify Intent of Proposed Actions

    FedEx stated that certain language in the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 
18, 2012) may be too broad. By way of example, FedEx cited the 
requirement to add design features ``to detect electrical faults.'' 
Inferring that this required detecting all electrical faults, FedEx 
asserted that, even if a device could detect all electrical faults, the 
cost of its installation would be prohibitive. FedEx recommended 
limiting the requirement to specify detecting ``certain'' electrical 
faults.
    We disagree that it is necessary to change the AD. The NPRM (77 FR 
23166, April 18, 2012) intentionally described certain failure 
conditions in broad terms. The intent was to provide operators 
unrestricted options to define design changes based on individual 
safety assessments. Certain electrical faults may be single failures or 
a combination of failures such as phase-to-phase shorts, phase-to-
ground shorts, and over-voltage or over-current electrical failure 
conditions.

Request To Revise Cost Estimate

    FedEx questioned how the FAA determined the estimated cost of the 
modification, since the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) provided no 
information about specific proposed modifications or required parts. 
FedEx suggested that the estimated cost would be different for each 
fleet type. UPS questioned the accuracy of the cost estimates in the 
NPRM, given the lack of technical data.
    Based on current efforts developing service information, Boeing 
estimated that modification labor costs could vary from 111 to 280 
hours depending on the number of pumps on an airplane. Boeing also 
reported that the AD affects about 341 U.S.-registered airplanes (not 
180 airplanes, as stated in the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012)). 
Boeing requested that we revise the costs of compliance accordingly.
    The estimated costs in the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) were 
based on recent design change solutions installed on similar center 
wing tanks on transport category airplanes. We have revised the cost 
estimate in this final rule to reflect Boeing's updated figures, 
including increased work hours (152 hours) and parts costs ($137,500), 
based on an average of 10 pumps per airplane. No single cost figure 
will be accurate for all operators, however, since labor and parts 
costs will vary depending on the type of certified design change 
solutions provided by the operators.

Request for Terminating Action

    UPS stated that overall safety would be better met if protective 
devices (fault current detectors) were installed for all 17 pumps on 
its Model MD-11 airplanes--regardless of tank location. UPS requested 
that we revise the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) to specify that 
installing fault current detectors

[[Page 24039]]

terminates the 18-month repetitive inspection requirement on the 
``epocast'' fuel pump connector, part number (P/N) 60-84351, as 
mandated by AD 2002-13-10, Amendment 39-12798 (67 FR 45053, July 8, 
2002), or AD 2011-11-05, Amendment 39-16704 (76 FR 31462, June 1, 
2011). (Those ADs address the same unsafe condition identified in this 
AD, on the same affected airplanes.)
    We agree that compliance with the requirements of this AD is 
considered terminating action for the two referenced ADs. Physical 
inspection of all pumps every 18 months would be labor intensive and 
time consuming. Further, Boeing has not provided service information to 
otherwise preclude use of any other pumps during flight. We have 
changed paragraph (g)(1) in this final rule to require protective 
devices on electrically powered alternate current (AC) fuel pumps 
installed in fuel tanks that normally empty during flight. (This 
proposed requirement in the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) extended 
to any electrically powered fuel pump in those tanks.) We have added 
new paragraph (h) in this final rule to terminate the 18-month 
repetitive inspections for all pumps, regardless whether they are 
installed in a tank that normally empties, affected by AD 2002-13-10, 
Amendment 39-12798 (67 FR 45053, July 8, 2002), or AD 2011-11-05, 
Amendment 39-16704 (76 FR 31462, June 1, 2011), after accomplishment of 
paragraph (g)(1) of this AD.

Request To Expand or Remove Automatic Shutoff Limits

    Paragraph (g)(2) of the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) would 
require additional design features that will automatically shut off a 
dry-running pump in an empty tank within 60 seconds if the flight crew 
does not shut it off. FedEx and UPS stated that their Model MD-11 and 
MD-10 airplanes already have design features installed by the original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM) that shut off the affected pumps 
automatically, but will not meet the prescribed 60-second time limit. 
The commenters asserted that a system design change is not necessary.
    We agree. Model MD-11 and MD-10 airplanes with two-person flight 
crews already have OEM-installed equipment designed to shut off the 
fuel pumps automatically. We agree that the automatic shut-off time for 
two-person flight-crew airplanes, which have design features that were 
originally installed by the airplane manufacturer, may exceed 60 
seconds. But for airplanes with three-person flight crews, such as 
Model DC-10 airplanes that do not have OEM-installed equipment, any 
fuel pump running in an empty tank must be manually shut off by a 
flight crew within 60 seconds. In either case, regardless of the number 
of flight crew, all airplanes must be in compliance with the 
requirements of paragraph (g)(4) of this AD.

Request To Require Airworthiness Limitations

    Boeing commented that the proposed rule does not mandate any 
airworthiness limitations instructions (ALIs) or critical design 
configuration control limitations (CDCCLs) regarding repetitive 
inspections or functional checks applicable to the proposed changes. 
Boeing recommended that we add a requirement to ``incorporate and 
comply with any related Airworthiness Limitations.''
    We agree to provide clarification. Paragraph (g) in this final rule 
requires that the design changes be compliant with 14 CFR Section 
25.981(a) and (b) at amendment level 25-125. These design changes 
including any associated ALIs or CDCCLs must be approved by the Manager 
of the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office.

Additional Changes to NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012)

    In response to requests by Boeing, we have revised paragraphs 
(g)(2) and (g)(3) in this final rule to clarify the requirements 
associated with the airplane flight manual supplement (AFMS), and we 
have revised paragraph (g)(4) in this final rule to clarify that the 
requirement is limited to airplanes with tanks that normally empty 
during flight.
    We have revised the description of the required actions in the 
preamble of this final rule to remove the requirement to ``ensure that 
a fuel pump's operation is not affected by certain conditions,'' 
because those requirements will be incorporated by compliance to 14 CFR 
Section 25.981(a) and (b) at amendment level 25-125. We disagree with 
the request to define certain conditions because the AD must allow for 
a broader interpretation for all airplanes affected by this AD. We have 
not changed the final rule regarding this issue.

Conclusion

    We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, 
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting 
the AD with the changes described previously. We also determined that 
these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or 
increase the scope of the AD.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD affects 341 airplanes of U.S. registry. We 
estimate the following costs to comply with this AD, based on the costs 
of similar supplemental type certificate (STC) installations, and 
considering an average of 10 pumps per airplane:

                                                 Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                    Cost per       Cost on U.S.
               Action                        Labor cost           Parts cost        product         operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Installing design features..........  152 work-hours x $85           $137,500         $150,420      $51,293,220
                                       per hour = $12,920.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for this Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national

[[Page 24040]]

government and the States, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866,
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
    (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive (AD):

2013-08-23 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-17441; Docket No. FAA-
2012-0413; Directorate Identifier 2011-NM-257-AD.

(a) Effective Date

    This AD is effective May 29, 2013.

(b) Affected ADs

    Accomplishment of the requirements of this AD terminates certain 
requirements of AD 2002-13-10, Amendment 39-12798 (67 FR 45053, July 
8, 2002), and AD 2011-11-05, Amendment 39-16704 (76 FR 31462, June 
1, 2011).

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model DC-10-10, DC-10-
10F, DC-10-15, DC-10-30, DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40, 
DC-10-40F, MD-10-10F, MD-10-30F, MD-11, and MD-11F airplanes; 
certificated in any category.

(d) Subject

    Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)/Air Transport Association 
(ATA) of America Code 28, Fuel.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the 
manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to reduce the potential of 
ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with 
flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and 
consequent loss of the airplane.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

(g) Criteria for Operation

    As of 60 months after the effective date of this AD, no person 
may operate any airplane affected by this AD unless an amended type 
certificate or supplemental type certificate that incorporates the 
design features and requirements described in paragraphs (g)(1) 
through (g)(4) of this AD has been approved by the Manager, Los 
Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, and those design 
features are installed on the airplane to meet the criteria 
specified in 14 CFR Section 25.981(a) and (d), at amendment level 
25-125. For airplanes on which Boeing-installed auxiliary fuel tanks 
are removed, the actions specified in this AD are not required.
    (1) For all airplanes: Each electrically powered alternate 
current (AC) fuel pump installed in any fuel tank that normally 
empties during flight--such as center wing tanks, auxiliary fuel 
tanks installed by the airplane manufacturer, and tail tanks--must 
have a protective device installed to detect electrical faults that 
can cause arcing and burn through of the fuel pump housing and pump 
electrical connector. The same device must shut off the pump by 
automatically removing electrical power from the pump when such 
faults are detected. When a fuel pump is shut off resulting from 
detection of an electrical fault, the device must stay latched off, 
until the fault is cleared through maintenance action and the pump 
is verified safe for operation.
    (2) For airplanes with a 2-person flight crew: Additional design 
features, if not originally installed by the airplane manufacturer, 
must be installed to meet 3 criteria: To detect a running fuel pump 
in a tank that is normally emptied during flight, to provide an 
indication to the flight crew that the tank is empty, and to 
automatically shut off that fuel pump. The prospective pump 
indication and shutoff system must automatically shut off each pump 
in case the flight crew does not shut off a pump running dry in an 
empty tank within 60 seconds after each fuel tank is emptied. An 
airplane flight manual supplement (AFMS) that includes flight crew 
manual pump shutoff procedures in the Limitations Section of the 
AFMS must be submitted to the Los Angeles ACO, FAA, for approval.
    (3) For airplanes with a 3-person flight crew: Additional design 
features, if not originally installed by the airplane manufacturer, 
must be installed to detect when a fuel pump in a tank that is 
normally emptied during flight is running in an empty fuel tank, and 
provide an indication to the flight crew that the tank is empty. The 
flight engineer must manually shut off each pump running dry in an 
empty tank within 60 seconds after the tank is emptied. The AFMS 
Limitations section must be revised to specify that this pump 
shutoff must be done by the flight engineer.
    (4) For all airplanes with tanks that normally empty during 
flight: Separate means must be provided to detect and shut off a 
pump that was previously commanded to be shut off automatically or 
manually but remained running in an empty tank during flight.

(h) Terminating Action in Related ADs

    Accomplishment of the actions required by paragraph (g)(1) of 
this AD terminates the 18-month repetitive inspections and tests 
required by paragraph (a) of AD 2002-13-10, Amendment 39-12798 (67 
FR 45053, July 8, 2002), and the 18-month repetitive inspections 
required by paragraph (j) of AD 2011-11-05, Amendment 39-16704 (76 
FR 31462, June 1, 2011), for pumps affected by those ADs, regardless 
whether the pump is installed in a tank that normally empties, 
provided the remaining actions required by those two ADs have been 
accomplished.

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office 
(ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 
requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance 
with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or 
local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending 
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 
attention of the person identified in the Related Information 
section of this AD.
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding 
district office.

(j) Related Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Serj Harutunian, 
Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140L, FAA, Los Angeles 
ACO, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137; 
phone: 562-627-5254; fax: 562-627-5210; email: 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#2c5f495e4602444d5e59585942454d426c4a4d4d024b435a"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="b6c5d3c4dc98ded7c4c3c2c3d8dfd7d8f6d0d7d798d1d9c0">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>.

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference

    None.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 10, 2013.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2013-09432 Filed 4-23-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P