AD 2013-08-12
Applicability
| Type | Manufacturer | Model | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | 787-8 | Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes |
Unsafe Condition
Lithium ion battery failures resulting in release of flammable electrolytes, heat damage, and smoke on Model 787-8 airplanes.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Required Actions
Install main and auxiliary power unit (APU) battery enclosures and environmental control system (ECS) ducts; replace the main battery, APU battery, and their respective battery chargers; revise the maintenance program to include an airworthiness limitation.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Compliance Time
Within the compliance times specified in the referenced service information.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Affected Aircraft
The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes, as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB500003-00, Issue 001, dated April 19, 2013.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Federal Register Abstract
We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes. That AD currently requires modification of the battery system, or other actions. This AD requires installing main and auxiliary power unit (APU) battery enclosures and environmental control system (ECS) ducts; and replacing the main battery, APU battery, and their respective battery chargers. This AD also requires revising the maintenance program to include an airworthiness limitation. This AD also revises the applicability by removing airplanes on which these changes have been incorporated in production prior to delivery. This AD was prompted by recent incidents involving lithium ion battery failures that resulted in release of flammable electrolytes, heat damage, and smoke on two Model 787-8 airplanes. We are issuing this AD to minimize the occurrence of battery cell failures and propagation of such failures to other cells and to contain any flammable electrolytes, heat, and smoke released during a battery thermal event in order to prevent damage to critical systems and structures and the potential for fire in the electronics equipment bays.
Applicability Source Text
Show captured applicability text from the source AD
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes,
certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin B787-81205-SB500003-00, Issue 001, dated April 19, 2013.
Document Text
Show stored source text (verify against official source)
[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 81 (Friday, April 26, 2013)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 24673-24676]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2013-09990]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2013-0333; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-080-AD;
Amendment 39-17436; AD 2013-08-12]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD)
for The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes. That AD currently
requires modification of the battery system, or other actions. This AD
requires installing main and auxiliary power unit (APU) battery
enclosures and environmental control system (ECS) ducts; and replacing
the main battery, APU battery, and their respective battery chargers.
This AD also requires revising the maintenance program to include an
airworthiness limitation. This AD also revises the applicability by
removing airplanes on which these changes have been incorporated in
production prior to delivery. This AD was prompted by recent incidents
involving lithium ion battery failures that resulted in release of
flammable electrolytes, heat damage, and smoke on two Model 787-8
airplanes. We are issuing this AD to minimize the occurrence of battery
cell failures and propagation of such failures to other cells and to
contain any flammable electrolytes, heat, and smoke released
[[Page 24674]]
during a battery thermal event in order to prevent damage to critical
systems and structures and the potential for fire in the electronics
equipment bays.
DATES: This AD is effective April 26, 2013.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of April 26,
2013.
We must receive any comments on this AD by June 10, 2013.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
<bullet> Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
<bullet> Fax: 202-493-2251.
<bullet> Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
<bullet> Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing
Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box
3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-5000,
extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; Internet <a href="https://www.myboeingfleet.com">https://www.myboeingfleet.com</a>.
You may review copies of the referenced service information at the FAA,
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton,
Washington. For information on the availability of this material at the
FAA, call 425-227-1221.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a>; or in person at the Docket Management Facility
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation,
any comments received, and other information. The street address for
the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES section.
Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Duffer, Manager, Systems and
Equipment Branch, FAA, ANM-130S, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office,
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; phone: (425) 917-
6493; fax: (425) 917-6590; email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#681a070a0d1a1c460c1d0e0e0d1a280e0909460f071e"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="2e5c414c4b5c5a004a5b48484b5c6e484f4f00494158">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
On February 1, 2013, we issued AD 2013-02-51, Amendment 39-17366
(78 FR 12231, February 22, 2013), for all The Boeing Company Model 787-
8 airplanes. That AD requires modification of the battery system, or
other actions. That AD resulted from recent incidents involving lithium
ion battery failures that resulted in release of flammable
electrolytes, heat damage, and smoke on two Model 787-8 airplanes. We
issued that AD to prevent damage to critical systems and structures and
the potential for fire in the electrical compartment.
Actions Since AD 2013-02-51, Amendment 39-17366 (78 FR 12231, February
22, 2013), Was Issued
Since we issued AD 2013-02-51, Amendment 39-17366 (78 FR 12231,
February 22, 2013), the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
released an Interim Factual Report, NTSB Case Number DCA13IA037, on
March 7, 2013, presenting its initial findings concerning a battery
failure on a Model 787-8 airplane operated by Japan Airlines. That
report can be found at: <a href="http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/2013/boeing_787/interim_report_B787_3-7-13.pdf">http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/2013/boeing_787/interim_report_B787_3-7-13.pdf</a>.
That report documents thermal and mechanical damage to the battery
and the battery control units, and a lack of containment of the battery
electrolytes, heat, and smoke from the battery case. The cause(s) of
this battery failure incident has not yet been determined by the NTSB.
Likewise, the cause(s) of the battery failure incident on a Model 787-8
airplane operated by All Nippon Airways has not yet been determined by
the Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB), which is the accident
investigative authority for Japan.
The FAA has reviewed the NTSB's interim factual report, as well as
information provided by the JTSB, Boeing, All Nippon Airways, and Japan
Airlines. The main and APU batteries are identical, but perform
different functions on the airplane. The main battery installed on
Model 787-8 airplanes is used to provide power while the engines are
off during ground maintenance operations (e.g., power-up, refueling,
braking, and navigation lights during towing) and backup electrical
power while airborne. The APU battery is required to start and operate
the APU. The APU may be used on the ground, or in flight to generate
backup electrical power. Each of the two engines drives two variable
frequency starter generators (VFSGs) for a total of four VFSGs
providing power to the airplane. Therefore, while in flight, the two
generators driven by the APU provide the 5th and 6th layer of power
generation for the airplane.
On March 12, 2013, the FAA approved a Boeing plan to mitigate the
unsafe condition identified by AD 2013-02-51, Amendment 39-17366 (78 FR
12231, February 22, 2013). The plan resulted from a detailed review by
Boeing and the FAA that considered all potential causal factors of the
two recent battery incidents. The plan provides three layers of
protection to improve the reliability of the battery and to prevent any
hazardous effects on the airplane from a battery failure. Those layers
are (1) measures to minimize the probability of a single battery cell
failure, (2) measures to minimize the probability of any single battery
cell failure from propagating to other cells in the battery, and (3)
measures to preclude hazardous airplane-level safety effects of any
battery failure that might occur. Details of these measures, which are
mandated by this AD, are as follows:
<bullet> Minimize the Probability of a Single Battery Cell
Failure--Each main and APU battery consists of a set of individual
cells within a battery case. Each battery cell will be encapsulated to
isolate the cell electrically. Locking nuts with specific torque values
will be used on every cell terminal to prevent overheating of the
terminal due to a loose electrical connection. Drainage within the
battery case will be improved to remove any condensation within the
battery. The battery monitoring and charging unit will be changed to
reduce the operational voltage range to lessen electrical stress on the
battery cell, and to enhance over-discharge protection. Boeing has also
made mandatory changes to the battery manufacturing and acceptance
testing processes to improve the overall quality of the battery.
<bullet> Minimize the Probability of Multiple Cell Failure
Propagation--Additional insulation will be provided between each
battery cell and between each cell and the battery case to thermally
and electrically isolate the individual battery cells. High temperature
sleeving will also be added to the battery internal wiring harness to
protect against short circuits. In addition, cell venting will be added
to the battery case to allow any cell gasses, including electrolytes,
to escape into the battery enclosure to minimize heat build-up within
the battery case.
<bullet> Preclude Hazardous Airplane-Level Safety Effects of a
Battery Failure That Might Occur--As stated previously, each main and
APU battery consists of a set of individual cells within a battery
[[Page 24675]]
case. The case containing the cells will be secured within a stainless
steel, sealed enclosure. This enclosure will be connected to a titanium
ECS duct that vents to the outside of the airplane. Should a battery
failure occur, and generate significant heat, pressure, and gasses, a
metallic frangible disc (also referred to as a vent burst disc) at the
interface of the enclosure and vent duct will open and allow the heat,
pressure, and gasses to safely vent overboard through the ECS duct.
This will prevent the introduction of any heat, pressure, or gasses in
the electronics equipment bays or any occupied area of the airplane.
Relevant Service Information
We reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB500003-00,
Issue 001, dated April 19, 2013; and Section D, ``Airworthiness
Limitations--Life Limits,'' of the Boeing 787 Airworthiness Limitations
(AWLs) Document D011Z009-03-01, dated April 2013. For information on
the procedures and compliance times, see this service information at
<a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a> by searching for Docket No. FAA-2013-0333.
FAA's Determination
We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all the relevant
information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is
likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design.
AD Requirements
This AD requires accomplishing the actions specified in the service
information identified previously.
Change to Applicability of AD 2013-02-51, Amendment 39-17366 (78 FR
12231, February 22, 2013)
This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes, as
identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB500003-00,
Issue 001, dated April 19, 2013, instead of ``all'' airplanes, as
specified in AD 2013-02-51, Amendment 39-17366 (78 FR 12231, February
22, 2013). The actions required by this AD address the identified
unsafe condition for in-service airplanes. For all future delivered
airplanes, the replacement batteries, their respective chargers, and
enclosure and duct installations will be incorporated at the factory
prior to delivery.
FAA's Justification and Determination of the Effective Date
AD 2013-02-51, Amendment 39-17366 (78 FR 12231, February 22, 2013),
effectively grounded the Model 787-8 fleet and prevented delivery of
new Model 787-8 airplanes because there was no design solution
available. While necessary in the short term to address the unsafe
condition, this caused a significant economic burden on domestic and
international operators of Boeing Model 787-8 airplanes. The purpose of
this AD is to allow the aircraft to return to service as soon as
possible by mandating a modification that will address the unsafe
condition. Therefore, we find that notice and opportunity for prior
public comment are impracticable and would defeat the Agency's
regulatory objective, and that good cause exists for making this
amendment effective in less than 30 days.
Comments Invited
This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight
safety, and we did not provide you with notice and an opportunity to
provide your comments before it becomes effective. However, we invite
you to send any written data, views, or arguments about this AD. Send
your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include
the docket number FAA-2013-0333 and Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-080-
AD at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments
on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects
of this AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date
and may amend this AD because of those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a>, including any personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we
receive about this AD.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 6 airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Installation and replacement.......... 112 work-hours x $85 per $455,158 $464,678 $2,788,068
hour = $9,520.
Revise maintenance program............ 1 work-hour x $85 per None 85 510
hour = $85.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the manufacturer, some of the costs of this AD may be
covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected
individuals. We do not control warranty coverage for affected
individuals. As a result, we have included all costs in our cost
estimate.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
[[Page 24676]]
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by removing airworthiness directive (AD)
2013-02-51, Amendment 39-17366 (78 FR 12231, February 22, 2013), and
adding the following new AD:
2013-08-12 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-17436; Docket No. FAA-
2013-0333; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-080-AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective April 26, 2013.
(b) Affected ADs
This AD supersedes AD 2013-02-51, Amendment 39-17366 (78 FR
12231, February 22, 2013).
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes,
certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin B787-81205-SB500003-00, Issue 001, dated April 19, 2013.
(d) Subject
Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)/Air Transport Association
(ATA) of America Code 24, Electrical Power.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by recent incidents involving lithium ion
battery failures that resulted in release of flammable electrolytes,
heat damage, and smoke on two Model 787-8 airplanes. We are issuing
this AD to minimize the occurrence of battery cell failures and
propagation of such failures to other cells and to contain any
flammable electrolytes, heat, and smoke released during a battery
thermal event in order to prevent damage to critical systems and
structures and the potential for fire in the electronics equipment
bays.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Installation/Replacement
Before further flight: Install main battery and auxiliary power
unit (APU) battery enclosures and environmental control system (ECS)
ducts; and replace the main battery, APU battery, and their
respective battery chargers; in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB500003-
00, Issue 001, dated April 19, 2013.
(h) Maintenance Program Revision
Before further flight: Revise the maintenance program to
incorporate Item No. 1b. in Section D, ``Airworthiness Limitations--
Life Limits,'' of the Boeing 787 Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs)
Document D011Z009-03-01, dated April 2013. This new item is the
Systems Life-Limited Parts requirement for replacement of the main
and APU battery enclosure vent burst discs.
(i) No Alternative Actions and Intervals
After accomplishing the revision required by paragraph (h) of
this AD, no changes may be made to Item No. 1b. in Section D,
``Airworthiness Limitations--Life Limits,'' of the Boeing Model 787
Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) Document D011Z009-03-01, dated
April 2013, unless approved as an alternative method of compliance
(AMOC) in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (j)
of this AD.
(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in the Related Information
section of this AD. Information may be emailed to: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#e2dbcfa3acafcfb1878396968e87cfa3a1adcfa3afada1cfb087939787919691a2848383cc858d94"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="685145292625453b0d091c1c040d45292b27452925272b453a0d191d0d1b1c1b280e0909460f071e">[email protected]</span></a>.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used for any repair required by this AD if it is approved by the
Boeing Commercial Airplanes Organization Designation Authorization
(ODA) that has been authorized by the Manager, Seattle ACO, to make
those findings. For a repair method to be approved, the repair must
meet the certification basis of the airplane, and the approval must
specifically refer to this AD.
(k) Related Information
For more information about this AD, contact Robert Duffer,
Manager, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington
98057-3356; phone: (425) 917-6493; fax: (425) 917-6590; email:
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#21534e434453550f455447474453614740400f464e57"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="afddc0cdcadddb81cbdac9c9caddefc9cece81c8c0d9">[email protected]</span></a>.
(l) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Boeing Alert Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB500003-00, Issue
001, dated April 19, 2013.
(ii) Boeing 787 Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) Document
D011Z009-03-01, dated April 2013.
(3) For Boeing service information identified in this AD,
contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services
Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207; phone:
206-544-5000, extension 1; fax: 206-766-5680; Internet: <a href="https://www.myboeingfleet.com">https://www.myboeingfleet.com</a>.
(4) You may review copies of the referenced service information
at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,
Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this material at
the FAA, call 425-227-1221.
(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: <a href="http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html">http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html</a>.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 22, 2013.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2013-09990 Filed 4-25-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
Source: Official FAA Source ↗
Retrieved: Apr 6, 2026
Rights: U.S. Government Public Domain
This site is not affiliated with or endorsed by the FAA. Always verify with official sources.