AD 2012-06-09

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 69 (Tuesday, April 10, 2012)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 21404-21420]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2012-8450]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2007-0109; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-235-AD; 
Amendment 39-16990; AD 2012-06-09]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Lockheed Martin Corporation/Lockheed 
Martin Aeronautics Company Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all 
Lockheed Martin Corporation/Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company Model 
382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G airplanes. This AD was prompted by a 
report of incidents involving fatigue cracking and corrosion in 
transport category airplanes that are approaching or have exceeded 
their design service objective. This AD requires revising the 
maintenance inspection program to include inspections that will give no 
less than the required damage tolerance analysis for each principal 
structural element (PSE), doing repetitive inspections to detect cracks 
of all PSEs, and repairing cracked structure. We are issuing this AD to 
maintain the continued structural integrity of the fleet.

DATES: This AD is effective May 15, 2012.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of May 15, 2012.

ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this AD, contact 
Lockheed Martin Corporation/Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company, 
Airworthiness Office, Dept. 6A0M, Zone 0252, Column P-58, 86 S. Cobb 
Drive, Marietta, Georgia 30063; telephone 770-494-5444; fax 770-494-
5445; email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#8aebe7f9a4fae5f8feebe6cae6e7e9e5a4e9e5e7"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="b1d0dcc29fc1dec3c5d0ddf1dddcd2de9fd2dedc">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>; Internet <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com/ams/tools/TechPubs.html">http://www.lockheedmartin.com/ams/tools/TechPubs.html</a>. You may review copies 
of the referenced service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 
Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. For information 
on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a>; or in person at the Docket Management Facility 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, 
any comments received, and other information. The address for the 
Docket Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is Document Management Facility, 
U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West 
Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 
Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Carl Gray, Aerospace Engineer, 
Airframe Branch, ACE-117A, FAA, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, 
1701 Columbia Avenue, College Park, Georgia 30337; phone: 404-474-5554; 
fax: 404-474-5606; email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#bedddfccd290c990d9ccdfc7fed8dfdf90d9d1c8"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="600301120c4e174e07120119200601014e070f16">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 
part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products. 
That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on November 14, 2007 
(72 FR 64005) (corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)). That NPRM 
proposed to require revising the maintenance inspection program to 
include inspections that will give no less than the required damage 
tolerance rating for each structural significant item (SSI), doing 
repetitive inspections to detect cracks of all SSIs, and repairing 
cracked structure.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing 
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the proposal 
(72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December

[[Page 21405]]

3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) and the FAA's response to each comment.

Support for the Proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; Corrected 
December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998))

    Safair and Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company (LM Aero) concurred 
with the proposed requirement to implement the Lockheed Martin Model 
382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G Series Aircraft Service Manual 
Publication (SMP), Supplemental Structural Inspection Document (SSID), 
SMP 515-C-SSID, Change 1, dated September 10, 2010 (``the SSID'').
    Lynden Air Cargo (Lynden) agreed that the SSID would provide an 
acceptable way to comply with the maintenance program requirements of 
the inspection procedures specified in section 121.370a of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.370a), which was superseded by section 
121.1109 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109).

Request To Extend Comment Period

    The SSID identified eight individual ADs that affect the principal 
structural elements (PSEs) identified in Section 4.0 (Principle 
Structural Elements) of the SSID. (The individual ADs are identified in 
the SSID in Section 2.0, Table 2.1, pages 2-3.) Lynden requested 
additional time to comment on the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 
14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) to compare the 
compliance intervals and standards with those in the proposed AD, the 
individual ADs, and the continuous airworthiness maintenance program 
(CAMP). Lynden was unable to determine how the SSID addresses the 
existing ADs, and added that the proposed AD did not indicate that it 
would supersede the existing rules.
    We reopened the comment period to allow additional time for 
operators to comment on the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 
2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)). We also provide the 
following clarification of the relationship among the various programs. 
The SSID can be used to show compliance for the baseline inspections 
for section 121.1109(c)(1) of the Aging Airplane Safety Rule (section 
121.1109(c)(1) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 
121.1109(c)(1)). This AD adds other more broad and specific inspections 
that supplement but do not conflict with other ADs. The SSID 
inspections should identify safety issues related to the PSEs. When a 
SSID inspection reveals a certain number of positive findings on a PSE, 
that part--and only that part--of the PSE will be removed from the SSID 
and addressed in an individual AD and associated service bulletin. The 
remainder of the PSE will remain in the SSID and will be subject to the 
SSID inspections only. If the problem area is not removed from the 
SSID, the SSID requirements still apply, but at a lower priority until 
the area is removed. We have not changed the final rule regarding this 
issue.

Request To Consider Industry Participation in Lockheed Working Group 
Sessions

    The proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 
3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) stated that members of the airline industry 
participated with Lockheed in working group sessions and developed the 
Supplemental Structural Inspection Program (SSIP) for the affected 
airplanes, but Lynden reported that it was not consulted by the type 
certificate (TC) holder, and it was not aware of or invited to 
participate in any working group on this issue. Further, Lynden stated 
that it understood that the TC holder used military operational and 
design data for the basis of the SSID. Lynden, as the lead carrier for 
the Model L-382 Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) and the largest 
part 121 operator of the affected airplanes, would have provided 
valuable input on the civil operation and maintenance of the affected 
airplanes. Lynden requested that we consult the service difficulty 
report (SDR) database for the operator's submitted data regarding the 
structural inspection findings of the operator's CAMP.
    According to Lynden, the SDRs ensure that the airplane is in an 
airworthy condition because fatigue cracks are found and reported 
before any adverse effect on airworthiness. The existing inspections in 
the CAMP reveal cracks based on existing inspection intervals, which, 
in most cases, are identical to the inspection intervals in the CAMP 
now being used by the operators. The SDRs also prove the accuracy of 
the evaluation by the FAA and design approval holder (DAH) of 
commercial usage (military usage for baseline structure is very similar 
to commercial usage), based on objective criteria and information 
submitted by the operators to the SDR database. Operators may request 
approval of an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) based on the 
existing CAMP.
    The information in the SSID is based on military usage, which 
defined the baseline inspection requirements. Operators may be allowed 
to extend the inspection intervals by completing an operational usage 
evaluation (OUE) as specified in Lockheed Service Bulletin 382-57-84, 
and requesting approval of an AMOC from the FAA. Recent analysis of the 
usage data has shown that typical commercial operations of the affected 
airplanes are at higher payloads than military operations with 
significantly less time in training. Analysis and in-service cracking 
data have also shown that the crack growth rate severity of typical 
commercial usage is very similar to the baseline military usage. 
Therefore, the FAA's evaluation of commercial usage is based on 
objective criteria and information submitted by the operators. We have 
not changed the final rule regarding this issue.

Request To Withdraw the Proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; 
Corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)): No Unsafe Condition

    Lynden noted that the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; 
corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) was prompted by incidents 
involving fatigue cracking and corrosion in transport airplanes that 
are approaching or have exceeded their design service objective. The 
proposed AD was intended to maintain the continued structural integrity 
of the entire fleet of Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G airplanes. 
Lynden reported there have been no accidents involving fatigue cracking 
and corrosion relating to this type design on its airplanes. Lynden 
asserted that the program required by section 121.370a of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.370a) ensures that such accidents will 
not happen. Lynden therefore questioned the conclusion that an unsafe 
condition even exists. Lynden alleged that we have not provided 
objective evidence of the unsafe condition in the affected airplanes, 
but have general concerns regarding aging airplanes. Lynden added that 
continued airworthiness of an airplane is ensured by the development of 
extensive inspection and maintenance programs. In Lynden's case, those 
maintenance requirements are detailed in an extensive CAMP, which has 
been proven to ensure the airworthiness of its fleet for over 97,000 
flight hours.
    We infer that Lynden was requesting that we withdraw the proposed 
AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 
67998)), because no unsafe condition has been identified. We disagree. 
The DAH performed several full-scale fatigue tests on the Model L-382, 
and has developed a large data bank of service history

[[Page 21406]]

(including SDRs) to identify problem areas and PSEs that provide 
objective evidence that an unsafe condition exists. The damage 
tolerance analysis (DTA) assessments established inspection intervals 
after many of the PSEs were identified. Initially the fatigue test and 
service history data were used only to identify the problem areas 
(i.e., PSEs) that were to receive DTA evaluation, and to validate the 
DTA data. Every PSE received a DTA assessment. As part of the 
assessment of each PSE, the DAH found that in some instances the DTA 
did not correlate well with the fatigue test and service life data. In 
these instances, the fatigue test and service life data were used to 
establish the inspection intervals that are specified in the SSID.
    Lynden has developed an FAA-approved, operator-specific CAMP for 
its fleet in accordance with section 121.1109 of the Federal Aviation 
Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109) based upon the latest guidance and 
documents from the DAH. The latest guidance and documents from the DAH 
were provided in the Lockheed Martin Model L382, SMP 515-C-MASTER 
Report, dated November 2010. This document should already be 
incorporated into the operator's CAMP. Therefore, if the operator has 
been performing its CAMP as required, adequate information is available 
to perform the required inspections. The operator should already be in 
compliance with the SSID. If the operator has made changes to the CAMP 
to meet its maintenance schedules that were previously approved by the 
FAA, the subject operator may request approval of an AMOC to the SSID 
based on the existing CAMP, in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph (q) in this final rule. If the AMOC is approved by the FAA, 
the operator will not need to change the CAMP except for minor changes 
provided in the SSID, and would already be in compliance with this AD 
except for the minor changes.
    As discussed previously, the SSID addresses an identified safety 
issue on the affected airplanes and therefore must be mandated by an 
AD. The inspection requirements in the SSID are required for the 
continued safe operation of the aircraft. We have not changed the final 
rule regarding this issue.

Request To Withdraw the Proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; 
Corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)): Redundant With Existing 
Programs

    Lynden asserted that it is already required to comply with the 
intent and scope of the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; 
corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) through accomplishment of the 
CAMP, which ensures the continued airworthiness of its fleet through 
constant analysis and surveillance. The CAMP and the improvements 
required through the CAMP procedures ensure that fatigue cracks will be 
detected before becoming critical. The CAMP will be used as the basis 
for compliance with section 121.370a of the Federal Aviation 
Regulations (14 CFR 121.370a) (which was superseded by section 
121.1109(c)(1) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 
121.1109(c)(1)). Lynden stated that the proposed requirements of the 
SSID are comparable to the requirements already imposed under section 
121.370a of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.370a), and the 
proposed grace period will provide nearly the same timeline. Lynden 
noted that the proposed AD stated that fatigue cracking may increase as 
a result of transport airplanes reaching or exceeding their design 
service objective (DSO), and as a result of their increased utilization 
and longer operation. Lynden asserted that the proposed AD would be 
redundant with the requirements for the SSIP, which are contained in 
section 121.370a of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.370a). 
Section 121.370a of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.370a) 
already requires incorporation of FAA-approved damage-tolerance-based 
inspections into the maintenance program for aircraft structure 
susceptible to fatigue cracking for the airplane to continue operating 
after December 20, 2010.
    Lynden was concerned that the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 
14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) will not establish 
compliance with section 121.370a of the Federal Aviation Regulations 
(14 CFR 121.370a) and will cause confusion and/or duplicative 
recordkeeping requirements regarding whether a particular inspection is 
acceptable for compliance. If the AD does establish compliance with 
section 121.370a of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.380a), 
then it is unnecessary and redundant, since section 121.370a of the 
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.370a) will ensure the 
aircraft's structural integrity. On the other hand, if the AD does not 
establish complete compliance, section 121.370a of the Federal Aviation 
Regulations (14 CFR 121.370a) needs to be reviewed to ensure that it 
establishes the level of safety originally anticipated by the FAA. In 
either case, both requirements should not be needed to establish 
continuous structural integrity of the affected airplanes.
    We infer that Lynden was requesting that we withdraw the proposed 
AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 
67998)) as unnecessary because it is redundant with the CAMP or the 
requirements of section 121.1109(c)(1) of the Federal Aviation 
Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109(c)(1)). Some inspections were not included 
in the SMP-515-C inspection program, and some operators do not have the 
latest revision to this program, including the changes made by the SSID 
and required by this AD. So an AD is necessary to mandate the 
implementation of the SSID. Further, an AD would be necessary to ensure 
continued operational safety if a related operational rule is changed 
in the future. Except for some minor changes made by the DAH and 
approved by the FAA, any operator with a CAMP already meets the 
requirements of the SSID and this AD; no additional work would be 
required, and no alternative method of compliance would be necessary to 
demonstrate compliance. However, the SSID can also be used as a means 
to show compliance for the baseline inspections for the section 
121.1109(c)(1) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 
121.1109(c)(1)) (which superseded section 121.370a of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR121.370a). That rule requires operators to 
incorporate FAA-approved damage-tolerance-based inspections and 
procedures into the maintenance program for airplane structure 
susceptible to fatigue cracking that could contribute to a catastrophic 
failure on airplanes meeting the following criteria:
    <bullet> Transport category airplanes
    <bullet> Airplanes type certificated after January 1, 1958
    <bullet> Turbine power airplanes
    <bullet> Airplanes having a maximum type-certificated passenger 
seating capacity of 30 or more, or a maximum payload capacity of 7,500 
pounds or more
    Those airplanes must have FAA-approved damage-tolerance-based 
inspections and procedures incorporated into the maintenance program 
for airplane structure susceptible to fatigue cracking that could 
contribute to a catastrophic failure. The SSID meets this requirement 
for the affected airplanes. Therefore, no change to the final rule is 
necessary regarding this issue.

[[Page 21407]]

Requests To Revise Repair Approval

    Safair, Lynden, and LM Aero requested that we change paragraph (n) 
of the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 
3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)), which would have required repair ``using a 
method approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office 
(ACO), FAA.''
    Safair requested that we instead require repair ``in accordance 
with an FAA-approved method'' to alleviate unnecessary burdens on both 
the Atlanta ACO and the operators.
    Lynden noted that the preamble to the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, 
November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) explained 
that the AD would allow the use of FAA-approved methods for the repair, 
but the proposed regulatory language would actually require each repair 
to be specifically approved by the ACO. Lynden requested that the 
preamble and regulatory language agree. Lynden believed that requiring 
approval for each repair is an unworkable and unacceptable regulatory 
burden for operators and the FAA. Lynden added that a typical Boeing 
SSID AD does not contain such an onerous paragraph, but allows cracked 
structure to be repaired in accordance with an FAA-approved method. 
Lynden added that the FAA's Transport Airplane Directorate has 
specifically promised to use the following language: ``Cracked 
structure must be repaired prior to further flight in accordance with 
an FAA-approved method.'' If the suggested language is used, operators 
can perform repairs in accordance with previously acceptable methods, 
techniques, and practices that are based on approved data--whenever 
they find cracked structure, not just when performing inspections 
required by the AD. Lynden asserted that it is extremely important for 
the FAA to understand that an operator with an effective CAMP is 
constantly inspecting for structural integrity, not just when an AD 
requires an inspection. To ensure proper alignment with their 
responsibilities to ensure the continuous airworthiness of the affected 
airplanes, operators must not face conflicting, overlapping, or 
confusing compliance requirements.
    LM Aero interpreted paragraph (n) in the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, 
November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) as a 
requirement to obtain an approval letter from the Atlanta ACO for every 
repair carried out on PSEs with cracks detected by the SSID 
inspections. LM Aero added that, in many cases, cracking detected by 
the SMP-515-C inspection procedures in the SSID can be repaired with 
existing FAA-approved repair procedures. Including the additional 
requirement to obtain specific approval letters for each repair is 
likely to place significant burden on both operators and the FAA. LM 
Aero requested that we revise paragraph (n) of the proposed AD to add 
the following provision:

    Existing FAA approved repair procedures that are applicable to 
repair the damage detected, such as FAA approved Lockheed Model 382 
Series Service Bulletins (when so stated in the Service Bulletin) 
and the Lockheed Service Manual Publication SMP 583 Structural 
Repair Manual [SRM], do not require further approval.

    Lynden concurred with LM Aero's comment.
    We agree with the commenters' rationale. Accordingly, we have 
revised the final rule to add new Note 1 to paragraph (o) of this AD, 
which explains the source of guidance for repairing damage. We also 
added new Note 2 to paragraph (o) of this AD to explain that operators 
may contact the Manager, Atlanta ACO, for information regarding the use 
of published service data approved by the FAA for these repairs, as 
required by paragraph (n) of this AD.

Request To Revise Terminology: ``PSE'' vs. ``SSI''

    LM Aero and Lynden requested that we revise the proposed AD (72 FR 
64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) to 
be consistent with the SSID, which uses the term ``principle structural 
element (PSE)'' instead of ``structural significant item (SSI).''
    We agree to standardize the terminology. The original term was 
``Structural Significant Item (SSI).'' Although the two terms are 
currently used interchangeably, we agree to use the latest terminology 
in this AD. We have revised the final rule to replace ``SSI'' with 
``PSE.''

Request To Revise Terminology: ``DTA Values'' vs. ``Inspection 
Intervals''

    Lynden stated that neither the FAA nor the operators can ensure 
compliance with the AD without a clear understanding of how the DTA was 
conducted and without the required DTA values. If we were to accept LM 
Aero's inspection intervals as ``DTA values,'' Lynden requested that we 
revise the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 
December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) to correspond with the SSID. Lynden 
noted, for example, that paragraph (g) of the proposed AD states, in 
part, ``The required DTA value for each PSE is listed in the SSID.'' 
Lynden asserted that there are no DTA values or ratings listed in the 
subject SSID.
    We partially agree. We agree to accept the DAH's inspection 
intervals (presented in the SSID as ``DTA values''), and we have 
revised the final rule to correspond to the SSID by changing ``DTA 
values'' to ``inspection intervals'' throughout this final rule. We 
disagree that compliance with the AD cannot be ensured without clear 
understanding of how the DTA was conducted and without DTA values. The 
operator is required to set up a tracking system for each inspection 
and maintain that system at all times. The operator and the FAA can 
track the status of the inspections using inspection numbers assigned 
to each inspection requirement by the operator or they can track the 
inspections by the procedure/card number defined by the SSID document 
or any other procedure approved by the FAA. The DAH has given an 
adequate description of its DTA methodology in Section 5.0 (Damage 
Tolerance Analysis Methodology) of the SSID. This methodology should 
provide the operators an understanding of how the DTA was conducted. In 
addition, the FAA is familiar with the DAH's DTA procedures and has a 
good understanding of how the DTA was conducted. The FAA has reviewed 
and approved the DTA analysis and inspection intervals as approved in 
the SSID. This information cannot be released to the operators because 
it is the DAH's proprietary data. In addition, we have determined that 
operators do not need this information to do the SSID inspections.

Request To Revise Applicability: Exclude Airplanes Subject to Section 
121.1109 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109)

    LM Aero and Lynden requested that we revise the applicability of 
the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 
2007 (72 FR 67998)) to include only those airplanes on which the SMP-
515-C inspection program has not been incorporated and the applicable 
service bulletins identified in the SSID have not been accomplished. 
Lynden added that, according to Section 2.0 (Introduction) of the SSID, 
some operators have not updated the SMP-515-C inspection program in 
many years, and some commercially certified aircraft in other countries 
may not have an SMP-515-C inspection program. Lynden noted that the TC 
holder issued the SSID only for those operators without a CAMP or an 
updated one, and the AD should

[[Page 21408]]

therefore apply only to airplanes that are not subject to section 
121.370a of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.370a).
    We disagree to change the applicability. The SSID addresses a 
safety issue on all Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G airplanes as 
the specified unsafe condition is likely to exist on all of these 
products. The inspections in the SSID are necessary for the continued 
safe operation of all applicable aircraft, and must be mandated by an 
AD. If the operator has been performing the CAMP as required, the 
operator is in compliance with the SSID, except for the minor changes. 
We have not changed the final rule regarding this issue.

Request To Revise Applicability: Remove Airplanes With CAMPs

    Lynden alleged that the SDR database is directly related to the 
specific inspections contemplated by the SSID and the proposed AD (72 
FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)), 
and that the required reports are evidence that the FAA-approved part 
121 CAMP is keeping the aircraft in an airworthy condition; i.e., 
defects are found and repaired before there is any adverse impact on 
airworthiness.
    We infer that Lynden was requesting that we revise the 
applicability to remove airplanes with CAMPs. We disagree. The purpose 
of the SDRs is to help the FAA identify and address problem areas in 
the fleet before a catastrophic failure occurs. The SDRs are used to 
justify the inspection intervals in the SSID. The SDRs help maintain 
affected airplanes in an airworthy condition because the reports advise 
of fatigue cracks found before any adverse effect on airworthiness is 
encountered. The existing inspections in the CAMP reveal cracks based 
on existing inspection intervals. The inspection intervals in the SSID 
are in most cases identical to the inspection intervals in the CAMPs 
now being used by operators. The SDRs also verify the accuracy of the 
FAA's and DAH's evaluations of commercial usage and are based on 
objective criteria and information submitted by the operators to the 
SDR database. Not all affected operators use a CAMP or have equal 
maintenance programs. Consequently, and based on the SDRs of Lynden and 
other operators, we have determined that the PSEs on the affected 
airplanes are a potential safety issue that needs to be addressed.
    We have chosen to address this issue with an AD that will mandate 
the inspections provided in the SSID, through an FAA-approved SSIP. We 
intend to reduce the workload for the DAH, operators, and the FAA, and 
still accomplish the intent of the AD. The SSID meets the requirements 
for all Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G airplanes. Except for 
some minor changes made by the DAH and approved by the FAA, any 
operator with a CAMP is already in compliance with the SSID. If the 
inspections per the CAMP have been accomplished, except for the minor 
changes that may be incorporated into the program and accomplished as 
required, no additional work is required by the operator. If the 
operator has changed the CAMP to meet maintenance schedules previously 
approved by the FAA, the operator may request approval of an AMOC to 
the AD based on the existing CAMP. If an AMOC request is approved by 
the Atlanta ACO, the operator would not have to change the CAMP, except 
for minor changes, and would already be in compliance with this AD.
    In summary, airplanes with CAMPs are in compliance because either 
(1) the initial inspection has been done in accordance with the CAMP or 
(2) the inspection is not yet due, in which case the inspection would 
be done in accordance with the SSID. But airplanes with CAMPs are still 
affected by the AD because the repetitive inspection intervals may not 
agree between the SSID and the CAMP. We have not changed the final rule 
regarding this issue.

Request To Clarify Applicability: Airplanes Identified in SSID AD vs. 
SSID

    Lynden requested that Section 3.0 (Affected Aircraft) be removed 
from the SSID. Lynden asserted that an AD identifies the affected 
airplanes, and conflicting information in the SSID does not aid 
clarity.
    We disagree with the request. Paragraph (c) in this AD identifies 
the affected airplanes, and the service documents identify the 
respective individual affected serial numbers. Where there are 
differences, the AD prevails. We have not changed the final rule 
regarding this issue.

Request To Clarify Applicability: U.S.- vs. Non-U.S.-Registered 
Airplanes

    While the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 
December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) reported there are ``91 airplanes of 
the affected design in the worldwide fleet,'' Lynden stated that the 
proposed AD would affect U.S.-registered airplanes only.
    We agree to provide clarification. Lynden is correct that the AD 
affects U.S.-registered airplanes only. The quoted statement is from 
the Cost of Compliance section of the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, 
November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)). In that 
section, we report the number of affected airplanes operated worldwide, 
but provide the cost estimates for only U.S.-registered airplanes. All 
airplanes are identified in the AD; airplanes that are later added to 
the U.S. registry will also be affected by this AD. We have not changed 
the final rule regarding this issue.

Requests To Revise Compliance Time: Revise the Initial Compliance Time

    LM Aero stated that the compliance times for the initial 
inspections specified in paragraph (h) of the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, 
November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) provide 
operators with considerable time to implement inspection requirements 
that should already be in their inspection programs. LM Aero agreed 
that a grace period to initiate the inspections (36 months as specified 
in the proposed AD) might be necessary, but recommends against 
exceeding the ``initial'' interval plus one ``recurring'' interval by 
more than 12 months. LM Aero added that the compliance times, including 
a grace period exceeding twice the ``initial'' interval on wing PSEs, 
would exceed the crack growth ``Safety Limit'' defined in Section 5.0 
(Damage Tolerance Analysis Methodology) of the SSID, and would 
contravene the intent of section 25.571 of the Federal Aviation 
Regulations (14 CFR 25.571) and FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 91-56B, 
``Continuing Structural Integrity Program for Airplanes,'' dated March 
7, 2008 (http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory--and--Guidance--Library/
rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/c41f92c5f55751a58625740800686473/$FILE/
AC%2091-56B.pdf). LM Aero recommended the initial compliance times in 
the following table.

[[Page 21409]]



                       Recommended Compliance Time
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Commenter's recommended compliance
          Airplane status                           time
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Has not exceeded the initial \1\    Before the initial threshold plus 10
 threshold.                          percent of the specified interval.
Has exceeded the initial threshold  Before reaching the initial plus one
                                     recurring inspection interval, or
                                     within 36 months after the
                                     effective date of the AD, whichever
                                     occurs first.
Has exceeded the initial threshold  Within 12 months after the effective
 plus one recurring inspection       date of the AD, or before reaching
 interval.                           twice the initial threshold,
                                     whichever comes first.
Has exceeded twice the initial      Before the next flight.
 threshold.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The ``initial'' threshold is specified in Section 6.3 of the SSID.

    Lynden concurred with this comment.
    We disagree with the requests to revise the compliance time. Most 
SSIDs provide operators 12 months to incorporate the inspections into 
the maintenance program. Then the compliance time starts for those 
inspections that have exceeded the threshold; otherwise the first 
inspection is due at the threshold. We have not changed the final rule 
regarding this issue.

Request To Revise Compliance Time: Extend Repetitive Interval for 
Sloping Longerons

    LM Aero questioned the repetitive inspection intervals specified in 
paragraph (k) of the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; 
corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) for the ``Special Condition'' 
of the sloping longeron at the fuselage station (FS) 1041 fitting (per 
Special Inspections card (SP) 113). LM Aero stated that the proposed 
12-month interval would be too frequent and would add a significant 
burden on the operator to continually remove the FS 1041 fitting to 
perform the inspection. Furthermore, frequent repeated removal would 
likely result in excessive over-sizing of the holes, which would 
require replacement of the sloping longeron (FS 737 to 1041). The 
intent of this inspection is to provide an opportunity to inspect the 
longeron for stress corrosion cracking that is hidden under the FS 1041 
fitting. Although stress corrosion cracks that have not propagated 
beyond the FS 1041 fitting do not affect the structural integrity of 
the longeron, they will eventually propagate out from under the fitting 
for which the SSID recommends replacement. The need to replace the FS 
1041 fitting depends on crack findings during the task associated with 
SP-109--which will also detect relatively long stress corrosion cracks 
in the sloping longeron by the x-ray primary procedure No. 2. Lynden 
concurred with this comment.
    For the reasons provided by LM Aero, we agree to revise the 
repetitive intervals, specified in paragraph (l) in this final rule, 
from 12 months to an interval that corresponds to the ``Special 
Condition'' inspection interval currently in the SSID, which requires 
the inspection when the FS 1041 fitting is replaced. Paragraph (l) in 
this final rule agrees with the SSID revision for the inspection 
requirements for PSE 53-50-13.

Request To Remove Repetitive Inspection Requirement for ``Special 
Conditions''

    LM Aero asserted that the intent of the SSID ``Special Condition'' 
inspections is to provide an opportunity to perform an enhanced 
inspection of the applicable PSE during another unscheduled maintenance 
action--typically, the removal of a component or structural part. LM 
Aero recommended against mandatory scheduled intervals for these 
inspections, because of the potential for associated damage from 
repetitive part removal and replacement. LM Aero agreed that the 
inspections should be done in accordance with paragraph (j) of the 
proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 
(72 FR 67998)), if none of the ``Special Condition'' inspections are 
part of an operator's maintenance program. Lynden concurred with this 
comment.
    We agree that the subject inspections should be done only when the 
part is removed for scheduled maintenance--not at regular intervals. 
The inspection area is a PSE but not a problem area. The inspection 
requires removing parts, and continually removing the part for 
inspection will result in excessive damage to the airplane structure 
compromising the use and value of the inspection. The current schedule 
is adequate to maintain safety. Because more damage will be done by 
removing the parts to do the inspection, we have changed this final 
rule to refer to the exceptions noted in paragraph (j) of this AD to 
agree with the provisions of the SSID.

Request To Revise Compliance Time: Extend Repetitive Interval for Aft 
Engine Mount

    LM Aero also questioned the repetitive inspection interval 
specified in paragraph (m) of the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 
14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) for the ``Special 
Condition'' inspection of the aft engine mount beam (SP-190). LM Aero 
stated that the proposed 24-month interval would result in a 
significant burden on the operator to remove the aft engine mount to do 
the inspection. This inspection is intended to provide an enhanced 
procedure for detecting cracking of the aft mount beam normally hidden 
by the lord mount. The aft lord mount does not have a scheduled removal 
time, and replacement is based on the condition found (cracks in the 
rubber mounts). The inspections associated with SP-189 performed at 24-
month intervals will detect cracking in the aft mount beam that extends 
beyond the lord mount. Lynden concurred with this comment.
    We agree, for the reasons provided by the LM Aero. The proposed 
compliance time could also result in excessive hole over-sizing, 
requiring replacement of the steel beam. We have revised paragraph (n) 
of this final rule to require the repetitive inspection interval as 
specified in the SSID when the aft lord mount is replaced. Paragraph 
(n) in this final rule agrees with the revision in the SSID for the 
inspection requirements for PSE 71-10-03.

Request To Revise Compliance Time: Allow Changes to Intervals Based on 
Findings and Design Changes

    Lynden stated that Section 5.0 (Damage Tolerance Analysis 
Methodology) of the SSID presents two steps: (1) Incorporating the 
methodology for assessing/analyzing each PSE listed in Section 4.0 
(Principle Structural Elements) that validates the assigned DTA value; 
and (2) implementing inspection intervals established for each PSE 
based on the DTA and the value assigned. During the actual 
accomplishment of the PSE inspections, findings are evaluated to 
determine

[[Page 21410]]

whether the results are within the anticipated safety limits, i.e., 
within assigned values. When implemented, this requirement would 
provide a methodology to allow adjustments to the inspection intervals 
based on findings, changes in design, and implemented repairs and 
alterations.
    We infer that Lynden was requesting that we revise the proposed AD 
(72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 
67998)) to allow for adjustments to the inspection intervals based on 
the suggested criteria. We disagree. Section 5.0 (Damage Tolerance 
Analysis Methodology) of the SSID clearly describes the DTA and 
methodology, and Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection Requirements) of 
the SSID clearly specifies the required inspection intervals for each 
PSE. As previously stated we have evaluated the document and supporting 
data, and have established that the methodology presented in the SSID 
will ensure that the identified unsafe condition will be corrected. All 
the information that the operator needs to incorporate into the 
maintenance inspection program is the inspection procedures and the 
inspection intervals, in Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection 
Requirements) of the SSID. The discrepancy reporting requirements 
specified in Section 7.0 (Discrepancy Reporting) of the SSID must also 
be included. The DTA Methodology in Section 5.0 (Damage Tolerance 
Analysis Methodology) of the SSID provides the basic information needed 
to develop the inspection intervals provided in Section 6.0 (Structural 
Inspection Requirements) of the SSID. The inspection intervals are 
already provided, so operators do not need the detailed analysis. By 
incorporating inspection intervals provided in Section 6.0 (Structural 
Inspection Requirements) of the SSID, the operator is already in 
compliance with Section 5.0 (Damage Tolerance Analysis Methodology) 
because the intervals were based on Section 5.0 (Damage Tolerance 
Analysis Methodology). This AD does not allow adjustments to the 
inspection intervals without FAA approval. Operators may request AMOCs 
for this purpose in accordance with procedures specified in paragraph 
(q) of this AD.

Request To Revise Compliance Time: Require SSID Incorporation by 
Certain Date

    Lynden requested that we revise the proposed compliance time to a 
specific date, such as December 2010--for the pending DTA requirements 
in section 121.370a of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 
121.370a).
    We partially agree. December 20, 2010, is the date by which 
operators must incorporate an inspection program into their maintenance 
program to address the baseline structure inspections required by the 
Aging Aircraft Safety Rule (14 CFR 121.1109, ``Supplemental 
Inspections''). Operators may either use the SSID or incorporate their 
own FAA-approved inspection program for baseline structure. Lockheed 
has agreed, once the AD is issued, to provide operators that have 
incorporated certain inspections into their maintenance program with a 
revision of Lockheed Service Manual SMP-515-C that includes the SSID 
requirements. Therefore, most if not all operators have complied with 
this AD by that date, with no additional work required of operators. We 
have not changed the final rule regarding this issue.

Request To Revise Compliance Time: Match CAMP's Inspection Intervals

    Lynden questioned whether operators will be able to comply with the 
proposed requirements in the proper timeframe, adding that several 
proposed inspection intervals would be problematic. Lynden emphasized 
that the CAMP's intervals have ensured the structural integrity of its 
fleet for 97,000 flight hours of civil operation in the most difficult 
civil operating conditions envisioned by the type design. Lynden 
observed that the proposed inspection intervals are slightly shorter 
than those established by Lynden's CAMP, and suggests that changing 
these intervals could introduce the potential for maintenance error, 
with possible harmful results. Lynden stated that the proposed AD must 
correspond with its CAMP to ensure compliance and structural integrity 
without unnecessary duplication and cost.
    We infer that Lynden was requesting that we revise the proposed 
inspection intervals to match those in its CAMP. We disagree. In 
developing an appropriate compliance time for this AD, we considered 
the practical aspect of accomplishing the inspections within intervals 
of time that correspond to typical scheduled maintenance for affected 
operators. But since the various operators have different maintenance 
schedules, we could not provide optimal schedules for each operator in 
the AD. As previously explained, operators who perform the CAMP as 
required should already be in compliance with the SSID, except for the 
differences noted. Operators with FAA-approved revisions to their CAMP 
to meet maintenance schedules may request an AMOC to the AD, in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraph (q) of this AD, based on 
the existing CAMP to adjust the maintenance schedule, provided no 
interval exceeds the DTA-established inspection intervals mandated by 
the AD and presented in the SSID. We have not changed the final rule 
regarding this issue.

Request To Revise Compliance Time: Extend Time To Incorporate SSID

    Lynden was concerned that the compliance times in the SSID and the 
AD do not contain the exact same language. Determining exact compliance 
is essential to an operator's efficient and effective management of 
ADs. Lynden requested additional time to ensure that its current CAMP 
establishes compliance with the AD, which will in turn comply with 
section 121.1109 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109). 
Lynden has already worked with its Principal Aviation Safety Inspector 
(PASI) to ensure that its program can comply with the requirements of 
section 121.1109 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109) 
and the December 2010 deadline. Lynden has followed FAA Advisory 
Circular (AC) 120-93, ``Damage Tolerance Inspections for Repairs and 
Alterations,'' dated November 20, 2007 (http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory--
and--Guidance--Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/
f73fd2a31b353a71862573b000521928/$FILE/AC%20120-93.pdf), regarding the 
actual accomplishment and implementation of the section 121.370a of the 
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.370a) program. The operator's 
PASI has agreed to the carrier's phased approach and will ensure the 
following:
    1. The maintenance program for the airplane includes FAA-approved 
damage-tolerance-based inspections and procedures for airplane 
structure susceptible to fatigue cracking that could contribute to a 
catastrophic failure. These inspections and procedures account for the 
effects of adverse repairs, alterations, and modifications on fatigue 
cracking of airplane structure.
    2. The Atlanta ACO has approved the damage-tolerance-based 
inspections and procedures, including any revisions. Lynden has already 
included the SSID's damage-tolerance-based inspections and procedures 
in its CAMP.
    We agree with the request to revise the compliance time in this AD. 
As stated previously, we have changed the compliance time of paragraph 
(g) of this final rule to 12 months after the effective date of the AD 
for operators to incorporate the requirements of the

[[Page 21411]]

SSID into their maintenance program. Lynden has a CAMP, and the latest 
guidance and documents from the DAH should already be incorporated into 
the operator's CAMP. So operators performing their CAMP as required 
already have the necessary information to perform these inspections. 
The operator should already be in compliance with the SSID so it should 
not be necessary to revise the compliance time. If the operator has 
made changes to the CAMP to meet its maintenance schedules that were 
previously approved by the FAA, the subject operator may request an 
AMOC based on the existing CAMP; if the AMOC is approved by the FAA, 
the operator will not have to change the CAMP, and they would already 
be in compliance with this AD, except for the minor changes.

Request To Clarify Compliance Times (DTA Initial Values)

    Lynden questioned how operators will know how to comply with 
paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; 
corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)), since the SSID provides a 
methodology for accomplishing the DTA but does not assign the initial 
values (compliance times).
    We disagree that the SSID does not assign the initial values. The 
initial and repetitive inspections are provided in Section 6.0 
(Structural Inspection Requirements) of the SSID, along with a 
reference to the inspection procedure for each PSE. Paragraph (g) of 
this AD requires operators to incorporate the information in the SSID 
(inspection intervals and procedures) into their maintenance inspection 
programs within 12 months. Paragraph (i) of this AD specifies the 
compliance time for accomplishing the initial inspections. We have not 
changed the final rule regarding this issue.

Request To Revise Cost Estimate: Cost for SSID Incorporation Is for the 
Fleet, Not per Airplane

    LM Aero noted that the estimated cost of implementing the AD 
applies to operators that do not currently follow the Model 382 SMP-
515-C inspection program. To LM Aero's knowledge, all U.S. operators 
currently use this program (although it is not yet mandated by the 
FAA), and the latest revision includes the intent of the SSID. Revising 
the maintenance program therefore should be considered a one-time 
effort of 600 hours for the entire fleet (not per airplane). Lynden 
concurred with this comment.
    We agree. The proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; 
corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) inadvertently stated that 
revising the maintenance program would take 600 work hours per 
airplane. We have revised the Costs of Compliance section of this final 
rule accordingly.

Request To Revise Cost Estimate: Include Work Hours for Recordkeeping

    Lynden stated that the estimated costs specified in the proposed AD 
(72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 
67998)) do not include the additional recordkeeping requirements 
necessary to comply with the AD. Lynden owns and operates six of the 
affected airplanes, all under part 121 and all under a program 
developed to comply with section 121.370a of the Federal Aviation 
Regulations (14 CFR 121.370a). Lynden noted that operators must report 
structural issues under the SDR rules as well as reporting findings to 
the TC holder in accordance with the AD. This duplicative action must 
take place at the time of the inspections and repairs so that the 
airplane can be approved to return to service and accomplishment with 
the AD requirements can be recorded.
    We infer that Lynden was requesting that we revise the cost 
estimate in the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 
December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) to include additional time for 
recordkeeping. We disagree. Based on the best data available, the 
manufacturer provided the number of work hours necessary to do the 
basic required actions. This number represents the time necessary to 
perform only the actions actually required by this AD. We recognize 
that, in doing the actions required by an AD, operators might incur 
incidental costs in addition to the direct costs. The cost analysis in 
AD rulemaking actions, however, typically does not include incidental 
costs such as the time required for recordkeeping or other 
administrative actions. Those incidental costs, which might vary 
significantly among operators, are almost impossible to calculate.
    Further, the SSID requirements are already part of the maintenance 
program, so if the inspections have been done as specified in the SSID, 
no additional work is required. Most of the information required by the 
SSID will be identical to the SDRs except for some minor changes. To 
simplify the reporting requirements, operators may use one report for 
both the SSID inspections and the SDRs. For these reasons we find that 
there will be very little additional cost for recordkeeping once the 
maintenance program is revised to incorporate the SSID requirements. We 
have not changed the final rule regarding this issue.

Request To Revise Cost Estimate: Account for Duplicate Inspections

    The Cost of Compliance section in the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, 
November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) explained 
the following:

    The number of inspection work hours * * * is presented as if the 
accomplishment of the actions in this proposed AD [(72 FR 64005, 
November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998))] are to 
be conducted as ``stand alone'' actions. However, in actual 
practice, these actions for the most part will be done 
coincidentally or in combination with normally scheduled airplane 
inspections and other maintenance program tasks. Therefore, the 
actual number of necessary additional inspection work hours will be 
minimal in many instances. * * *

    Lynden alleged that this is not true for its current program, and 
that if the AD is issued as proposed, Lynden would be required to 
duplicate inspections to comply with its program and the AD.
    We infer that Lynden was requesting that we revise the cost 
estimates in this AD. We disagree. Each operator's inspection schedule 
will be different, and we cannot account for the individual costs 
incurred by each operator. We have not changed the final rule regarding 
this issue.

Request To Revise Cost Estimate: Account for Discrepancies Between AD 
and SSID

    Lynden contended that the cost estimates specified in the proposed 
AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 
67998)) would be more accurate if we reconcile the differences between 
the AD and the SSID. Lynden asserted that the estimated costs are based 
on the assumption that the proposed inspection intervals were in line 
with the inspection intervals already used by air carriers. Lynden 
stated that these intervals do not align and would add scheduling 
complexities and associated costs for the operators. Lynden requested 
that we revise the proposed AD based on Lynden's estimated costs, since 
Lynden operates the most affected airplanes.
    We disagree with the request to revise the cost estimate. Where 
safety considerations allow, we try to set compliance times that 
generally coincide with operators' maintenance schedules. But since 
schedules vary substantially, we cannot accommodate each operator's 
optimal scheduling in

[[Page 21412]]

each AD. Therefore, we do not consider it appropriate to attribute to 
the AD the costs associated with the type of special scheduling that 
might otherwise be required. Each AD does allow individual operators to 
request approval to adjust the compliance time via an alternative 
method of compliance, based on data showing that the adjustment will 
not adversely affect safety. In any event, any compliance time 
adjustments would have little effect on costs since most of the 
inspections already align with each operator's maintenance program. We 
have not changed the AD regarding this issue.

Request To Address Imprecision in SSID

    Lynden objected to the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; 
corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) incorporating the SSID ``by 
reference'' because the SSID is not precisely written. Lynden alleged 
that other supplemental structural inspection documents adopted through 
ADs clearly delineate the methodology used to develop the requirements 
for determining the structural elements and the inspection intervals. 
Lynden stated that those documents also clearly lay out the damage 
tolerance values for each element. Lynden added that Section 5 (DTA 
Methodology) is not like the sections of other SSIDs referenced in 
other ADs. Those SSIDs clearly establish the DTA methodology and the 
DTA value assigned to each SSI. Lynden added that such clarity is 
necessary for appropriate changes to the maintenance program and for 
the assignment and continued evaluation of the inspection intervals 
implemented under that program.
    Lynden made no specific request to change the proposed AD (72 FR 
64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)), 
but we provide the following explanation to address Lynden's concerns.
    We disagree with the assertion that the SSID is not precisely 
written. As explained previously, an operator's CAMP is based on the 
latest guidance and documents from the DAH, as provided in the Lockheed 
Martin Model L382 SMP 515-C-MASTER Report, dated November 2010.
    We also disagree that the SSID does not clearly delineate the 
methodology used to develop the requirements for determining the PSEs 
and the inspection intervals. Section 4.0 (Principle Structural 
Elements) of the SSID provides enough information for operators to 
determine how the PSEs were developed. Sections 4.0 (Principle 
Structural Elements) and 8.0 (Inspection Zone Description) also provide 
enough information to identify each PSE and its location on the 
aircraft by zones. Section 5.0 (Damage Tolerance Analysis Methodology) 
clearly explains the DTA methodology, and Section 6.0 (Structural 
Inspection Requirements) clearly states the required inspection 
intervals (damage tolerance values) for each of the PSEs. Further, 
operators have already incorporated into the CAMP the inspection 
procedures required to perform the SSID inspections on SP cards 
(special inspection cards) and ST cards (structural inspections cards). 
The operators have not advised of any concerns about these inspections, 
and therefore must be following the procedures to perform the 
inspections without difficulty. The inspection procedure/card number to 
be used for each inspection is clearly identified in the first column 
of the table in Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection Requirements) of the 
SSID. Also, the required inspection intervals (assumed to be the damage 
tolerance values referenced in the comments) are clearly defined in the 
fourth and fifth columns of the table in Section 6.0 (Structural 
Inspection Requirements) of the SSID. Operators are required to set up 
a tracking system for each inspection, and to maintain that system at 
all times. Operators and the FAA can track the status of the 
inspections using inspection numbers assigned by the operator to each 
inspection requirement, or operators can track the inspections by the 
procedure/card number defined by the SSID document or any other 
procedure approved by the FAA.
    We have reviewed and approved the DTA and inspection intervals as 
approved in the SSID. This information is the DAH's proprietary data, 
and we cannot release it to the operators. Further, operators do not 
need this information to accomplish the SSID requirements.
    Each manufacturer's SSID is different, and each DAH has a different 
approach regarding methods for developing the data, information they 
need to provide to accomplish the required inspections, and reporting 
procedures. The different overseeing ACOs also have authority to 
approve whatever data they deem necessary to meet the requirements of 
the AD, provided the data meet the intent of the FAA regulations, 
policies, and guidance materials. We find that the SSID meets those 
requirements.
    We have not changed this final rule regarding these issues.

Request To Address General Differences Between AD and SSID

    Lynden was concerned about differences noted between the proposed 
AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 
67998)) and the SSID, and made several assertions based on these 
alleged differences.
    1. The SSID's stated purpose is to capture a point in time to help 
civil operators establish compliance with section 121.1109(c)(1) of the 
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109(c)(1)).
    We partially agree with Lynden's position. The SSID inspections are 
necessary for the continued safe operation of the affected airplanes, 
and therefore must be mandated by an AD. However, the SSID can also be 
used to show compliance for the baseline inspections for the Aging 
Airplanes Safety Rule (14 CFR 121.1109(c)(1)). That rule requires 
operators to incorporate FAA-approved damage-tolerance-based 
inspections and procedures into the maintenance program for airplane 
structure susceptible to fatigue cracking that could contribute to a 
catastrophic failure on airplanes meeting the following criteria:
    <bullet> Transport category airplanes.
    <bullet> Airplanes type certificated after January 1, 1958.
    <bullet> Turbine power airplanes.
    <bullet> Airplanes having a maximum type-certificated passenger 
seating capacity of 30 or more, or a maximum payload capacity of 7,500 
pounds or more.
    The SSID meets the requirements for the affected airplanes.
    2. Section 121.1109 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 
121.1109) is tied to the operator's CAMP, which can be continually 
adjusted, with FAA approval, to accommodate improvements in design, 
production, maintenance, and operations. Lynden added that an AD is 
``carved in stone'' and may be changed only through an AMOC or a 
superseding AD, which require expenditures of time and money by the 
operator, the DAH, and the FAA.
    We partially agree with Lynden. Because the subject regulation is 
tied to each operator's CAMP, which may be adjusted to accommodate such 
improvements, we required the DAH to develop a separate document--the 
SSID--and have mandated its incorporation by this AD, so that the 
inspection requirements in the SSID cannot be revised by the operator 
without approval by the Atlanta ACO. The inspection program may be 
incorporated into operators'

[[Page 21413]]

maintenance programs in one of two ways: (1) By developing a separate 
maintenance inspection document that stands alone and requires that 
only those instructions in the SSID be accomplished in accordance with 
the AD, or (2) by incorporating the SSID inspections into the existing 
maintenance program. Either method is approved for the SSID AD, because 
they are both considered part of an operator's maintenance program. As 
Lynden noted, those inspections can then be changed only by an AMOC 
approved by the FAA, or by a revision to the SSID followed by a new or 
superseding AD that mandates the new requirements.
    3. The SSID is adequate for its stated purpose, but it does not 
provide the certainty and objectivity required to be incorporated into 
a rule.
    We disagree that the SSID lacks certainty and objectivity. As 
previously explained, the inspection intervals and procedures are 
clearly identified in Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection Requirements) 
of the SSID, and the PSEs are identified in Section 4.0 (Principle 
Structural Elements). And, if the operator has been performing the CAMP 
as required, adequate information is available to perform the required 
inspections, and the operator should already be in compliance with the 
SSID except for the noted changes.
    No change is necessary in this final rule to address these 
assertions.

Request To Address Additional Differences Between AD and SSID

    Lynden asserted that the SSID is inadequate, and will need 
considerable revision and additions to satisfy the intent and purpose 
of FAA Advisory Circular (AC) No. 91-56, ``Supplemental Structural 
Inspection Program for Large Transport Category Airplanes,'' dated May 
6, 1981 (now 91-56B, dated March 7, 2008). Lynden was concerned that it 
will need an AMOC immediately to establish compliance with the intent 
of the AD. Further, the AD changes the SSID in significant portions. 
Lynden stated that, to ensure proper compliance, the SSID must align 
properly with the proposed requirements of paragraphs (k) through (m) 
of the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 
3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)).
    Lynden also requested that we ensure that Section 6.0 (Structural 
Inspection Requirements) of the SSID and paragraphs (h) through (m) of 
the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 
2007 (72 FR 67998)) match exactly. Reconciling these differences would 
(1) ensure that any changes to the SSID can be quickly reconciled with 
the final rule and any unique air carrier requirements; (2) ensure that 
an appropriate AMOC can be approved by the FAA without unnecessary 
explanation or confusion; (3) allow the original equipment manufacturer 
itself to apply for an AMOC to change the DTA and/or assigned values 
based on design changes; and (4) enhance compliance.
    We agree with the request and made the requested revisions (in 
paragraphs (j) through (n) in this final rule) to ensure that the 
requirements of the AD align with the SSID accordingly. We agree that 
the SSID must align with the AD, but the AD is the prevailing source 
and we have determined these intervals to be appropriate.

Request To Clarify Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection Requirements) of 
SSID

    Lynden requested that we account for conflicts and confusing 
information in Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection Requirements) of the 
SSID:

    The inspection intervals provided in this Section should be 
taken as the minimum required intervals for a typical cargo 
transport operational usage with average payloads not exceeding 
20,000 lbs. For routine carriage of cargo in excess of 30,000 lbs, 
the inspection intervals for wing lower surface PSEs should be 
reduced by a factor of 2. * * * In no circumstances should the 
operator extend these inspection intervals without having completed 
an LM Aero Operational Usage Evaluation and obtaining FAA approval 
for an updated SMP 515-C inspection program.

    Lynden asserted that there is no definition of the term 
``routine,'' and no requirement for deviations if the operator has 
obtained an OUE. Lynden questioned whether an operator with an FAA-
approved program developed to comply with section 121.370a of the 
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.370a) would need an AMOC to 
comply with the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 
December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)). Lynden further questioned whether an 
operator would have an automatic AMOC if it completed an OUE and 
obtained FAA-approval of the updated inspection program through its 
local Flight Standard District Office (FSDO). Lynden was concerned 
about potential conflicts and confusion between the SSID and the 
proposed AD, and notes a specific example of confusing information, 
where Section 6.3 of the SSID includes the caveat of ``later than +10% 
of the specified interval.'' Lynden questioned whether this indicates 
that the proposed AD would allow the addition of 10% to all intervals 
without additional approval.
    We agree to provide clarification. In this AD, ``routine'' refers 
to typical cargo transport operational usage with an average payload of 
30,000 pounds, rather than the defined typical usage of 20,000 pounds; 
in that case the inspection intervals should be reduced by a factor of 
2.
    AMOCs are never automatically approved. The operator must 
substantiate, and we must approve, any AMOC for a different compliance 
method or compliance time not specifically identified in the AD. The 
OUE and the +10% extension have not been evaluated or approved by the 
FAA, so these may not be approved as AMOCs to this AD without further 
substantiation that these methods provide an equivalent level of 
safety. Further, the OUE will vary from operator to operator, so we 
must review each AMOC on a case-by-case basis in lieu of including this 
information in this AD. We have not changed the final rule regarding 
this issue.

Request To Address Errors in SSID and Clarify Use of References in AD

    Lynden noted certain errors and omissions throughout the SSID, 
including references to certain documents.
    We infer that Lynden was requesting that we revise the proposed AD 
(72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 
67998)) to explain and correct the noted errors in the SSID. We 
disagree with the request, and we disagree that the SSID contains 
errors that would affect compliance with the requirements of this AD. 
In the SSID, the PSEs are clearly identified in Section 4.0 (Principle 
Structural Elements), and the locations and inspection requirements are 
clearly identified in Sections 6.0 (Structural Inspection Requirements) 
and 8.0 (Inspection Zone Description), and these cannot be changed 
without FAA approval. All the information necessary to accomplish the 
AD is in Sections 4.0 (Principle Structural Elements), 6.0 (Structural 
Inspection Requirements), 7.0 (Discrepancy Reporting), and 8.0 
(Inspection Zone Description) of the SSID, a stand-alone document. 
Lynden notes that Section 4.0 (Principle Structural Elements) omits 
Chapter 52, the PSEs, which are required to comply with Section 6.0 
(Structural Inspection Requirements), but there are no SSID PSEs for 
the doors in Chapter 52. The two PSEs identified in Section 6.0 
(Structural Inspection Requirements) in Chapter 52 are actually located 
on the fuselage and not on the doors, so those

[[Page 21414]]

PSEs are listed under Chapter 53 in Section 4.0 (Principle Structural 
Elements). Those PSEs are referenced in Chapter 52 in Section 6.0 
(Structural Inspection Requirements), because they are part of the door 
surround structure. We have not changed the final rule regarding this 
issue.

Request To Verify Compliance With Section 121.1109 of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109)

    Lynden suggested that the SSID was based on a menagerie of 
methodologies to determine the inspection intervals, and that the 
proposed changes to these intervals are based on an unclear 
understanding of the original analysis. Neither the intervals proposed 
by the SSID nor the changes proposed in paragraphs (i) through (m) of 
the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 
2007 (72 FR 67998)) can be tracked to a clear, concise, objective DTA 
evaluation--as required by paragraph (g) of the proposed AD. The 
proposed AD stated that compliance with the AD including the SSID 
establishes compliance with section 121.1109 of the Federal Aviation 
Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109). Lynden requested that we restate this in 
the final rule.
    We partially agree with Lynden. We agree to restate that compliance 
with the AD establishes compliance with section 121.1109(c)(1) of the 
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109(c)(1)). We have revised 
this final rule accordingly by adding this information in new Note 3 to 
paragraphs (g) through (p) of this AD. But we disagree that changes to 
the inspection interval are based on an unclear understanding of the 
original analysis. We have previously described the different bases for 
the SSID, and have explained that all the inspection intervals were 
originally established using a DTA. We might consider different 
intervals through requests for AMOCs if the service history data, 
fatigue test results, or risk analysis does not correlate well with the 
DTA, or if service history shows no discrepancies in the PSE inspection 
area following inspections as directed by the SSID. And we might 
consider different intervals to a calendar schedule if discrepancies 
exist within a given time period regardless of the aircraft usage, or 
to fit the operator's maintenance program schedule (although that 
interval cannot exceed the interval established by a DTA). Changes in 
inspection intervals must be substantiated by fatigue testing and 
extensive service history. We might consider a different DTA-based 
inspection, based on existing data. Or we might consider a different 
DTA-based inspection interval if a risk analysis shows an extremely low 
probability of fatigue damage occurring.

Request To Address Differences Between This (SSID) AD and Individual 
ADs

    Lynden was concerned that Table 2.1 on page 2-3 of the SSID might 
conflict with the various requirements of the individual ADs identified 
in the SSID and the proposed inspection intervals of the proposed AD 
(72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 
67998)) or the requirements of section 121.1109 of the Federal Aviation 
Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109). Lynden stated that the individual ADs 
must be reconciled appropriately, superseded as appropriate, to ensure 
continued compliance.
    We disagree that it is necessary to revise this final rule. This AD 
adds inspections that supplement but do not conflict with other ADs. 
The SSID inspections will identify safety issues related to the PSEs. 
When a SSID inspection has a certain number of positive findings on a 
PSE, then that part of the PSEs will be removed from the SSID and 
addressed in an individual service bulletin and associated AD. The rest 
of the PSEs will remain in the SSID and will be subject to the SSID 
inspections only. We have not changed the final rule regarding this 
issue.

Request To Address Differences in PSEs Identified in SSID and Customer-
Specific Programs

    Lynden stated that the last sentence of the second paragraph of 
Section 4.0 (Principle Structural Elements) of the SSID clearly 
indicates that the inspection intervals derived from the analysis for 
the United States Air Force have already been incorporated into 
operator-specific ``SMP-515-C-X Hercules Series Inspection Programs.'' 
Lynden requested that we revise the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 
14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) to reconcile the 
PSEs identified in Section V of the customer-specific SMP-515-C-X 
inspection programs that have been ``superseded'' by the PSEs 
identified in the SSID. In further support of its request, Lynden has 
provided the FAA with its analysis of the SSID against its FAA-approved 
program (SMP-515-C-113). The analysis revealed few, but significant, 
differences.
    We agree that the information in the SSID is based on military 
usage, which was used to define the baseline inspection requirements. 
As explained previously, analysis and in-service cracking data have 
shown that the crack growth rate severity of typical commercial usage 
is very similar to the baseline military usage. Our evaluation of 
commercial usage is therefore based on objective criteria and 
information submitted by the operators. As stated previously, we accept 
the DAH's inspection intervals presented in the SSID as ``DTA values,'' 
and have revised this final rule to change ``DTA values'' to 
``inspection intervals'' to correspond to the SSID.
    But we disagree that the differences are significant. The DAH 
carefully reviewed and evaluated the operator's maintenance program, 
and considered the civilian usage of the affected airplanes. Our intent 
is to reduce the workload of the DAH, operators, and the FAA, and still 
accomplish the intent of the AD. The SSID meets the requirements for 
the affected airplanes. Except for some minor changes made by the DAH 
and approved by the FAA, any operator with a CAMP is already in 
compliance with the SSID, except for the minor changes. The SSID 
requirements are already a part of the operators' maintenance programs. 
If the operator has made changes to the CAMP to meet its maintenance 
schedules that were previously approved by the FAA, the subject 
operator may request an AMOC to the SSID based on the existing CAMP. If 
this is approved by the FAA, the operator will not have to change the 
CAMP, and would already be in compliance with this AD except for the 
minor changes in the SSID.

Request To Address Differences Between This AD and AD 92-10-14, 
Amendment 39-8249 (57 FR 21727, May 22, 1992), and AD 75-17-04, 
Amendment 39-3185 (43 FR 16151, April 17, 1978)

    Lynden suggested that we revise the proposed compliance times in 
the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 
2007 (72 FR 67998)), in light of two related existing ADs, to avoid 
duplicative or contradictory results.
    AD 92-10-14, Amendment 39-8249 (57 FR 21727, April 22, 1992), 
affects certain Lockheed Model 382 airplanes and addresses fatigue 
cracking. That AD requires inspections at intervals not to exceed 3,600 
flight hours, in accordance with SP-126 and SP-224. Lynden reported 
being in compliance with that AD at its scheduled C check interval of 
2,800 flight hours. The initial compliance times in the SSID are 1,800 
flight hours for SP-126 and 3,600 flight hours for SP-224.

[[Page 21415]]

    AD 75-17-04, Amendment 39-2300 (40 FR 32827, August 5, 1975), as 
revised by Amendment 39-3185 (43 FR 16151, April 17, 1978), affects 
certain Lockheed Model 382 series airplanes and addresses cracking on 
main frames. That AD requires inspections at intervals not to exceed 
the ``C check'' (which corresponds to 2,800 flight hours for Lynden), 
in accordance with SP-95, which is required at intervals not to exceed 
1,200 flight hours in accordance with the SSID. Lynden reported being 
in compliance with AD 75-17-04 at 1,400-flight-hour intervals, at B-2 
and C checks.
    We disagree that it is necessary to change the compliance times in 
this AD. The inspection requirements of AD 92-10-14, Amendment 39-8249 
(57 FR 21727, May 22, 1992); and AD 75-17-04, Amendment 39-3185 (43 FR 
16151, April 17, 1978); as well as the other ADs identified in the 
SSID, do not conflict with this AD. We have not changed the final rule 
regarding this issue.

Request To Clarify Basis for SSID Inspections

    Lynden found no objective evidence that the inspections are based 
on clear objective damage tolerance evaluations. Lynden noted that the 
SSID was drawn from existing programs and the inspection areas were 
validated by ``full scale fatigue test and service corrosion and 
cracking data.'' Lynden added that the DAH understands that the 
maintenance program must be based on FAA-approved DT-based structural 
inspection procedures, but the fourth paragraph of Section 2.0 
(Introduction) of the SSID reveals that the information is based only 
in part on damage tolerance assessments.
    We infer that Lynden was requesting clarification of the basis for 
the inspection procedures. The information in the SSID comes from 
several sources. On affected airplanes, the DAH performed several full-
scale tests and has developed a large data bank of service history 
(including SDRs) to identify problem areas and PSEs. A DTA was 
performed to establish the inspection intervals after many of the PSEs 
had already been identified. Initially, the fatigue test and service 
history data were used only to identify the problem area PSEs to 
receive DTA evaluation, and to validate the DTA data. Every PSE 
received a DTA. As part of the assessment of each PSE, the DAH found 
that in some instances the DTA did not correlate well with the fatigue 
test and service life data. In those instances, the fatigue test and 
service life data were used to establish the inspection intervals that 
are presented in the SSID. We have not changed the final rule regarding 
this issue.

Request To Clarify Use of Military Data as Basis for the SSID

    According to Sections 1.0 (Purpose) and 2.0 (Introduction) of the 
SSID, data used by the DAH were based on information from military 
usage. Lynden concluded that the FAA's evaluation of commercial usage 
does not appear to be based on objective criteria or on information 
submitted to the SDR database sufficient to determine whether the 
``crack growth rate severity of typical commercial usage is similar to 
the baseline military usage, particularly in wing lower surface 
structure.'' Lynden found nothing in the AD docket indicating whether 
the DAH or the FAA evaluated the findings of commercial operators.
    We agree that the SSID is based in part on military usage, which 
was used to define the baseline inspection requirements. Recent 
analysis of the usage data has shown that typical commercial operation 
of the affected airplanes is at higher payloads than that of military 
operations with significantly less time in training. Analysis and in-
service cracking data have also shown that the crack growth rate 
severity of typical commercial usage is very similar to the baseline 
military usage. Our evaluation of commercial usage is therefore based 
on objective criteria and information submitted by operators. We have 
not changed this final rule regarding this issue. The DAH has advised 
that the recommended inspection intervals might be extended if 
operators complete an OUE and request AMOC approval.

Request To Clarify SSID Basis

    Paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; 
corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) would require incorporation 
of a revision into the maintenance inspection program that provides no 
less than the required damage-tolerance rating for each PSE listed in 
the SSID. Lynden noted however that the SSID does not provide damage-
tolerance ratings (as published in Boeing SSIDs), and provides only 
inspection intervals for SPs that are already part of the CAMP. And the 
required reports have not been incorporated into the findings or 
reassessment by the TC holder or FAA.
    We agree to provide clarification. Each manufacturer's SSID is 
different. And each DAH has a different approach regarding collecting 
the data, implementing the required inspection, and reporting the 
results. Boeing used a damage tolerance rating procedure for its SSID 
program; Lockheed chose a different method. We accept both methods. The 
different oversight ACOs also have authority to approve whatever data 
they deem necessary to meet the requirements of the AD, as long as the 
data meet the intent of the FAA regulations, policies, and guidance 
materials. We have determined that the SSID meets those requirements. 
We have not changed the final rule regarding this issue.

Request To Clarify Purpose of Section 4.0 (Principle Structural 
Elements) of the SSID

    Lynden stated that Section 4.0 (Principal Structural Elements) of 
the SSID seems to be the list of PSEs required by the proposed AD (72 
FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)), 
yet there is no specific reference to that section, and that section 
does not contain the required DTA values.
    We agree to provide clarification. Section 4.0 (Principle 
Structural Elements) of the SSID simply links the PSE number with a 
description of the PSE. Section 4.0 (Principle Structural Elements) 
identifies and defines the individual PSEs by zones of the airplane. 
The required DTA values or inspection intervals are presented in 
Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection Requirements) of the SSID. We have 
not changed the final rule regarding this issue.

Request To Require Inspections in Service Bulletins Instead of SSID

    Lynden stated that the actions proposed in the proposed AD (72 FR 
64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) 
would increase recordkeeping complexity without equally enhancing 
safety. Since the SP cards listed in the SSID are already a mandatory 
part of the CAMP, Lynden requested that we issue an AD that requires 
accomplishment of the specific structural service bulletins already 
issued by the TC holder and incorporated into Lynden's inspection 
program, instead of the SSID inspections. Lynden suggested this as a 
better, less complex method of ensuring continued structural integrity.
    We disagree with the request. Any operator with a CAMP is already 
in compliance with the SSID, except for the minor changes noted 
previously. Furthermore, mandating accomplishment of those service 
bulletins would necessitate issuing a supplemental NPRM to provide the 
opportunity for the public to comment on the merits of this change, and 
would further delay issuance of this AD,

[[Page 21416]]

without increasing safety. Operators doing the inspection program are 
required to set up a tracking system for each inspection and maintain 
that system at all times, so very little additional work for 
recordkeeping should be required. The operator and the FAA can track 
the status of the inspections by inspection numbers assigned to each 
inspection requirement by the operator, or by the procedure and card 
number defined by the SSID, or by any other procedure approved by the 
FAA. We have not changed the final rule regarding this issue.

Request To Revise Reporting Requirement

    Lynden asserted that the proposed reporting requirement of the 
proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 
(72 FR 67998)) (as specified in Section 7.0 (Discrepancy Reporting) of 
the SSID) is unnecessary and burdensome, because operators must also 
file SDRs for all structural defects. Lynden stated that submitting the 
SDRs to the TC holder would comply with the proposed reporting 
requirements of the proposed AD, since the TC holder could simply query 
the FAA's SDR database and obtain the same information. To eliminate 
the need to develop two different reporting systems to comply with both 
reporting requirements, Lynden requested that we revise the proposed AD 
to either (1) specify that operators do not need to report to the TC 
holder if the report is made under the SDR requirements, or (2) match 
the proposed AD language to the specifications of the SDR.
    We partially agree. Most of the information required by the SSID 
will be identical to the SDRs except for some minor changes. The 
results reported for the SSID inspections may be used for the SDRs (if 
the reports include all the information required as specified in the 
SDR reporting procedures), and the SDRs may be used for the SSID 
inspections. But to simplify the reporting requirements, one report may 
be used for both the SDR and the AD. We have revised paragraph (g) in 
this final rule to include this provision.

Request To Address Cracking Found During Non-SSID Inspections

    Lynden requested that we clarify whether cracks found in SSID-
specific PSEs fall under the scope of the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, 
November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)), including 
repairing and reporting cracks found in SSID-specific PSEs during a 
non-SSID inspection.
    We agree that clarification is necessary. All cracks found during a 
SSID inspection are covered by the SSIP reporting procedures. Cracks in 
a PSE found outside a SSID inspection are not part of the SSID 
reporting but do fall under the Aging Airplane Safety Rule (70 FR 5518, 
February 2, 2005) (Docket FAA-1999-5401) reporting so they will still 
need to be reported. The reporting procedures should be the same. We 
have not changed the final rule regarding this issue.

Request To Allow Future SSID Changes in AD

    Lynden stated that, according to Section 1.0 (Purpose) of the SSID, 
Lockheed Martin will provide operators with a method to comply with 
section 121.1109 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109), 
which allows for continual adjustments to (1) account for changes in 
the product materials, parts, and processes; and (2) issue new or 
improved repairs and revisions of the structural repair manual and 
service bulletins. Lynden noted that changing an AD requires additional 
time and resources of the operator, the DAH, and the FAA.
    We infer that Lynden was requesting that we revise the proposed AD 
(72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 
67998)) to allow for unspecified adjustments to the requirements. We 
disagree. All changes to the SSID must be approved by the Atlanta ACO. 
We would consider superseding the AD only when significant changes to 
the SSID affect the airworthiness of the affected airplanes. The only 
requirements are those specified in the AD--in this case, the specific 
revision to the SSID. An operator wishing to use any changes in a 
future revision to the SSID (not mandated by the AD) must request AMOC 
approval in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (q) of this AD. 
We have not changed this final rule regarding this issue.

Request for Access to ``Reference <greek-i>2''

    Lynden alleged that the ``initial flaw criteria'' specified in 
Section 5.2 of the SSID are based on assumptions unknown to Lynden. The 
SSID states that the initial flaw size and flaw shape assumptions as 
well as the structural flaw configuration used in the DTA of crack 
growth are based on the assumptions determined in ``Reference 2,'' as 
specified in that paragraph. Because ``Reference 2'' is reserved and 
therefore unidentified, Lynden asserted that it could not review or 
confirm the methodology. Lynden requested access to all information 
used to establish compliance with the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, 
November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) to make 
substantive comment to the docket.
    We disagree that access to ``Reference 2'' is necessary. We have 
reviewed ``Reference 2'' and approved the ``initial flaw criteria.'' 
The information in ``Reference 2'' is the DAH's proprietary data, and 
the FAA cannot release this information to operators. We have 
determined that operators do not need this information to accomplish 
the SSID requirements. We accept the DAH's initial flaw size and flaw 
shape assumptions as well as the structural flow configuration used in 
the DTA of crack growth presented in ``Reference 2.'' We have not 
changed the final rule regarding this issue.

Request To Clarify DAH's Involvement in SSID

    Lynden interpreted Section 1.0 (Purpose) of the SSID as suggesting 
that the DAH anticipated an AD but did not expect it to be based on its 
ever-changing SSID document. Lynden added that the DAH did not 
understand that, after the AD is issued, the SSID requirements cannot 
be changed unless the operator obtains an AMOC or the FAA supersedes 
the AD. Lynden also asserted that the first paragraph of Section 2.0 
(Introduction) of the SSID clearly establishes that the DAH did not 
understand or appreciate how its SSID document would be used as the 
basis for an AD.
    We disagree with Lynden's assertions. The DAH understands how its 
SSID will be used as the basis for the AD. The DAH also understands 
that the FAA must either supersede the AD to incorporate any 
significant changes to the SSID, or approve AMOCs to make any changes 
to SSID procedures or compliance times that are not specifically 
required by the AD. We have not changed the final rule regarding this 
issue.

Request To Identify Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection Requirements) of 
SSID

    The proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 
3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) proposed implementing the requirements of 
Section 5.0 (Damage Tolerance Analysis Methodology) and Section 7.0 
(Discrepancy Reporting) of the SSID, but LM Aero suggested that the 
most important requirements are in Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection 
Requirements). Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection Requirements) 
contains the references for the required inspection

[[Page 21417]]

procedures as well as the compliance times for the initial and 
repetitive inspections. LM Aero stated that implementing the Section 
6.0 (Structural Inspection Requirements) requirements will meet the DTA 
methodology requirements contained in Section 5.0 (Damage Tolerance 
Analysis Methodology). LM Aero agreed with the proposed requirement to 
comply with Section 7.0 (Discrepancy Reporting). Lynden concurred with 
this comment.
    We agree with LM Aero's position. We have revised paragraph (g) in 
this final rule to include Sections 5.0 (Damage Tolerance Analysis 
Methodology), 6.0 (Structural Inspection Requirements), and 7.0 
(Discrepancy Reporting) of the SSID.

Request To Provide Terminating Action

    Lynden noted that the SSID, on page 6-12 in Section 6.0 (Structural 
Inspection Requirements), requires accomplishment of a certain 
inspection initially by 12,000 total flight hours, with recurring 
inspections due at intervals not to exceed 2,400 flight hours 
thereafter. Lynden requested that the SSID or the proposed AD (72 FR 
64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) be 
revised to state that accomplishment of Lockheed Service Bulletin 382-
71-24, dated January 21, 2010, eliminates the need for this recurring 
inspection requirement.
    We disagree with the request to allow accomplishment of Lockheed 
Service Bulletin 382-71-24, dated January 21, 2010, as terminating 
action for the specified inspection requirement. Lockheed Service 
Bulletin 382-71-24, dated January 21, 2010, was never approved by the 
Atlanta ACO as terminating action. But replacing the bushing and 
repairing existing damage per Lockheed Service Bulletin 382-71-24, 
dated January 21, 2010, will allow operators to zero out the time for 
the inspection. Operators may request an AMOC for relief from this 
requirement in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (q) of this 
AD, provided data are provided that show that accomplishment of 
Lockheed Service Bulletin 382-71-24, dated January 21, 2010, would 
provide an acceptable level of safety allowing for this terminating 
action. Since not all operators have accomplished the actions specified 
in Lockheed Service Bulletin 382-71-24, dated January 21, 2010, the 
inspections must remain in the SSID. We have not changed the final rule 
regarding this issue.

Request To Clarify Impact on Alaska Operations

    Lynden interpreted the Regulatory Evaluation for this action as 
stating that the AD would have no impact on intrastate aviation in the 
state of Alaska. Lynden reported that it moves over 82 million pounds 
of cargo per year in Alaska, so the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 
14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) would definitely 
have an impact on those operations.
    We agree to provide clarification. The Regulatory Evaluation states 
that the AD ``could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska,'' but adds 
that it is not ``appropriate to include specific requirements for 
aircraft operated in Alaska.'' This AD applies only to airplanes when 
operated outside the territorial boundaries of Alaska. We have not 
changed the final rule regarding this issue. Because of the nature of 
the unsafe condition, we cannot justify a regulatory distinction 
between aviation only in Alaska and other aviation.

Request To Account for Widespread Fatigue Damage (WFD) Rulemaking

    Lynden was concerned about the pending rulemaking related to WFD to 
propose certain changes to the requirements for evaluating structure, 
assigning inspections, and doing other maintenance or alteration tasks.
    Lynden made no specific request. The SSIP does not account for the 
effects of WFD. We have not changed the final rule regarding this 
issue.

Additional Changes Made to This AD

    We have revised this final rule to identify the legal name of the 
manufacturer as published in the most recent type certificate data 
sheet for the affected airplane models.
    We have added new paragraph (e) in this final rule to provide ATA 
subject code 51: Standard practices/structures. This code is added to 
make this final rule parallel with other new AD actions. We have re-
identified subsequent paragraphs accordingly.
    We have revised paragraph (g) of this AD to remove the phrase 
``FAA-approved'' from ``FAA-approved maintenance inspection program,'' 
because we do not approve operators' maintenance programs.
    We have removed the ``Service Information'' paragraph from this 
final rule. (That paragraph was identified as paragraph (f) in the 
proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 
(72 FR 67998)).) Instead, we have provided the full document citations 
throughout this final rule.
    Since we issued the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; 
corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)), we have increased the labor 
rate used in the Costs of Compliance from $80 per work-hour to $85 per 
work-hour. The Costs of Compliance information, below, reflects this 
increase in the specified labor rate.
    We have re-identified Note 3 of the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, 
November 14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) as Note 1 
of this final rule, and relocated that note to follow paragraph (g) of 
this AD. We have reidentified subsequent notes accordingly.

Conclusion

    We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, 
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting 
the AD with the changes described previously. We also determined that 
these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or 
increase the scope of the AD.

Costs of Compliance

    There are about 91 airplanes of the affected design in the 
worldwide fleet. The following table provides the estimated costs for 
the 14 U.S. airplanes to comply with this AD.

                                                 Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     Average labor
               Action                          Work hours            rate per hour            Fleet cost
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Revision of maintenance inspection    600 for the fleet...........              $85  $51,000.
 program.
Inspections.........................  2,724 per airplane..........               85  $3,241,560, per inspection
                                                                                      cycle.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 21418]]

    The number of inspection work hours, as indicated above, is 
presented as if the accomplishment of the actions in this AD are to be 
conducted as ``stand-alone'' actions. However, in actual practice, 
these actions for the most part will be done coincidentally or in 
combination with normally scheduled airplane inspections and other 
maintenance program tasks. Therefore, the actual number of necessary 
additional inspection work hours will be minimal in many instances. 
Additionally, any costs associated with special airplane scheduling 
will be minimal.
    Further, compliance with this AD is a means of compliance with the 
aging airplane safety final rule (AASFR) for the baseline structure of 
Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G series airplanes. The AASFR 
requires certain operators to incorporate damage tolerance inspections 
into their maintenance inspection programs. These requirements are 
described in 14 CFR 121.370(a) and 129.16. Accomplishment of the 
actions required by this AD will meet the requirements of these CFR 
sections for the baseline structure. The costs for accomplishing the 
inspection portion of this AD were accounted for in the regulatory 
evaluation of the AASFR.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866,
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
    (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive (AD):

2012-06-09 Lockheed Martin Corporation/Lockheed Martin Aeronautics 
Company: Amendment 39-16990. Docket No. FAA-2007-0109; Directorate 
Identifier 2007-NM-235-AD.

(a) Effective Date

    This AD is effective May 15, 2012.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to all Lockheed Martin Corporation/Lockheed 
Martin Aeronautics Company Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G 
airplanes, certificated in any category.

(d) Unsafe Condition

    This AD results from a report of incidents involving fatigue 
cracking and corrosion in transport category airplanes that are 
approaching or have exceeded their design service objective. We are 
issuing this AD to maintain the continued structural integrity of 
the fleet.

(e) Subject

    Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 51: Standard 
Practices/Structures.

(f) Compliance

    You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD 
performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions 
have already been done.

(g) Revision of the Maintenance Inspection Program

    Within 12 months after the effective date of this AD, 
incorporate a revision into the maintenance inspection program that 
provides no less than the required damage tolerance assessment/
analysis (DTA) for each structural significant item (SSI) listed in 
Lockheed Martin Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G Series 
Aircraft Service Manual Publication (SMP), Supplemental Structural 
Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 515-C-SSID, Change 1, dated 
September 10, 2007. (The required inspection interval for each 
principal structural element (PSE) is listed in Lockheed Martin 
Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G Series Aircraft Service Manual 
Publication (SMP), Supplemental Structural Inspection Document 
(SSID), SMP 515-C-SSID, Change 1, dated September 10, 2007.) The 
revision to the maintenance inspection program must include and must 
be implemented in accordance with the procedures in Section 5.0 
(Damage Tolerance Analysis Methodology), Section 6.0 (Structural 
Inspection Requirements), and Section 7.0 (Discrepancy Reporting) of 
Lockheed Martin Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G Series 
Aircraft Service Manual Publication (SMP), Supplemental Structural 
Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 515-C-SSID, Change 1, dated 
September 10, 2007. One report may be used to report findings for 
both the service difficulty report and this AD, provided the report 
refers to this AD and the PSE number for the inspection being 
accomplished when the discrepancy was found.
    Note 1 to paragraphs (g) through (p) of this AD: Compliance with 
the requirements of this AD establishes compliance with section 
121.1109(c)(1) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 
121.1109(c)(1)).

 (h) Paperwork Reduction Act Burden Statement

    A federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not 
required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty 
for failure to comply with a collection of information subject to 
the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that 
collection of information displays a current valid OMB Control 
Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 
2120-0056. Public reporting for this collection of information is 
estimated to be approximately 5 minutes per response, including the 
time for reviewing instructions, completing and reviewing the 
collection of information. All responses to this collection of 
information are mandatory. Comments concerning the accuracy of this 
burden and suggestions for reducing the burden should be directed to 
the FAA at: 800 Independence Ave. SW., Washington, DC 20591, Attn: 
Information Collection Clearance Officer, AES-200.

[[Page 21419]]

(i) Initial and Repetitive Inspections

    At the later of the times specified in paragraphs (i)(1) and 
(i)(2) of this AD, except as provided by paragraphs (j) through (n) 
of this AD: Do the applicable initial inspections to detect cracks 
of all SSIs, in accordance with Lockheed Martin Model 382, 382B, 
382E, 382F, and 382G Series Aircraft Service Manual Publication 
(SMP), Supplemental Structural Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 515-
C-SSID, Change 1, dated September 10, 2007. Repeat the applicable 
inspections thereafter at intervals not to exceed the ``Recurring'' 
intervals specified in Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection 
Requirements) of Lockheed Martin Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 
382G Series Aircraft Service Manual Publication (SMP), Supplemental 
Structural Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 515-C-SSID, Change 1, 
dated September 10, 2007, except as provided by paragraphs (l) 
through (n) of this AD.
    (1) Before the applicable ``Initial'' threshold specified in 
Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection Requirements) of Lockheed Martin 
Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G Series Aircraft Service Manual 
Publication (SMP), Supplemental Structural Inspection Document 
(SSID), SMP 515-C-SSID, Change 1, dated September 10, 2007.
    (2) Within 36 months after the effective date of this AD, or 
within one ``Recurring'' interval measured from 12 months after the 
effective date of the AD, whichever comes first.

(j) Exception to Service Information Compliance Time (Threshold Since 
New)

    Where Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection Requirements) of 
Lockheed Martin Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G Series 
Aircraft Service Manual Publication (SMP), Supplemental Structural 
Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 515-C-SSID, Change 1, dated 
September 10, 2007, specifies the ``Initial'' threshold in years 
(since new), this AD requires compliance within the specified year 
since the date of issuance of the original standard airworthiness 
certificate or the date of issuance of the original export 
certificate of airworthiness.

(k) Exception to Service Information Compliance Time (Special 
Condition)

    Where Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection Requirements) of 
Lockheed Martin Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G Series 
Aircraft Service Manual Publication (SMP), Supplemental Structural 
Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 515-C-SSID, Change 1, dated 
September 10, 2007, specifies the ``Initial'' threshold as ``Special 
Condition,'' this AD requires compliance within 24 months after the 
effective date of this AD.

(l) Exception to Service Information Compliance Time (Fuselage Station 
(FS) 1041 Fitting Replacement)

    Where Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection Requirements) of 
Lockheed Martin Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G Series 
Aircraft Service Manual Publication (SMP), Supplemental Structural 
Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 515-C-SSID, Change 1, dated 
September 10, 2007, specifies the ``Initial'' threshold and 
``Recurring'' interval as ``FS 1041 Fitting Replacement,'' this AD 
requires compliance within 24 months after the effective date of 
this AD and thereafter at intervals not to exceed those specified in 
Lockheed Martin Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G Series 
Aircraft Service Manual Publication (SMP), Supplemental Structural 
Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 515-C-SSID, Change 1, dated 
September 10, 2007, concurrently with any FS 1041 fitting 
replacement.

(m) Exception to Service Information Compliance Time (Engine Change)

    Where Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection Requirements) of 
Lockheed Martin Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G Series 
Aircraft Service Manual Publication (SMP), Supplemental Structural 
Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 515-C-SSID, Change 1, dated 
September 10, 2007, specifies the ``Initial'' threshold and 
``Recurring'' interval as ``Engine Change,'' this AD requires 
compliance before further flight after the next engine change, and 
thereafter before further flight whenever the engines are changed.

(n) Exception to Service Information Compliance Time (Aft Lord Mount 
Change)

    Where Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection Requirements) of 
Lockheed Martin Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G Series 
Aircraft Service Manual Publication (SMP), Supplemental Structural 
Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 515-C-SSID, Change 1, dated 
September 10, 2007, specifies the ``Initial'' threshold and 
``Recurring'' interval as ``Aft Lord Mount Change,'' this AD 
requires compliance before further flight after the next aft lord 
mount change (FS 1041 fitting change), and thereafter at intervals 
not to exceed those specified in Lockheed Martin Model 382, 382B, 
382E, 382F, and 382G Series Aircraft Service Manual Publication 
(SMP), Supplemental Structural Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 515-
C-SSID, Change 1, dated September 10, 2007, concurrently with any FS 
1041 fitting replacement.

(o) Repair

    If any cracked structure is found during the inspections 
required by paragraph (i) of this AD, before further flight, repair 
the cracked structure using a method approved by the Manager, 
Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA. For a repair 
method to be approved by the Manager, Atlanta ACO, as required by 
this paragraph, the Manager's approval letter must specifically 
refer to this AD.
    Note 2 to paragraph (o) of this AD: Applicable existing FAA-
approved repair procedures do not require further approval provided 
they have DTA-established inspection procedures and intervals 
previously approved by the FAA.
    Note 3 to paragraph (o) of this AD: Operators may contact the 
Manager, Atlanta ACO, for information regarding the use of published 
service data approved by the FAA associated with the repairs 
specified in paragraph (o) of this AD.

(p) Inspection Program for Transferred Airplanes

    Before any airplane that is subject to this AD and that has 
exceeded the applicable compliance times specified in paragraph (i) 
of this AD can be added to an air carrier's operations 
specifications, a program for the accomplishment of the inspections 
required by this AD must be established in accordance with paragraph 
(p)(1) or (p)(2) of this AD, as applicable.
    (1) For airplanes that have been inspected in accordance with 
this AD: The inspection of each PSE must be done by the new operator 
in accordance with the previous operator's schedule and inspection 
method, or the new operator's schedule and inspection method, at 
whichever time would result in the earlier accomplishment for that 
PSE inspection. The compliance time for accomplishment of this 
inspection must be measured from the last inspection accomplished by 
the previous operator. After each inspection has been done once, 
each subsequent inspection must be performed in accordance with the 
new operator's schedule and inspection method.
    (2) For airplanes that have not been inspected in accordance 
with this AD: The inspection of each PSE required by this AD must be 
done either before adding the airplane to the air carrier's 
operations specification, or in accordance with a schedule and an 
inspection method approved by the Manager, Atlanta ACO. After each 
inspection has been done once, each subsequent inspection must be 
done in accordance with the new operator's schedule.

 (q) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, Atlanta ACO, has the authority to approve AMOCs 
for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 
14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to 
your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, 
as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of 
the ACO, send it to the attention of the person identified in the 
Related Information section of this AD.
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding 
district office.

(r) Related Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Carl Gray, Aerospace 
Engineer, Airframe Branch, ACE-117A, FAA, Atlanta Aircraft 
Certification Office, 1701 Columbia Avenue, College Park, Atlanta, 
Georgia 30337; phone: 404-474-5554; fax: 404-474-5606; email: 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#7f1c1e0d13510851180d1e063f191e1e51181009"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="482b293a24663f662f3a2931082e2929662f273e">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>.

(s) Material Incorporated by Reference

    (1) You must use the following service information to do the 
actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. The 
Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference (IBR) of the following service information under 5 U.S.C. 
552(a) and 1 CFR part 51:
    (i) Lockheed Martin Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G Series 
Aircraft Service Manual Publication (SMP), Supplemental Structural 
Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 515-C-SSID, Change 1, dated 
September 10, 2007.

[[Page 21420]]

    (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact 
Lockheed Martin Corporation/Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company, 
Airworthiness Office, Dept. 6A0M, Zone 0252, Column P-58, 86 S. Cobb 
Drive, Marietta, Georgia 30063; telephone 770-494-5444; fax 770-494-
5445; email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#e2838f91cc928d9096838ea28e8f818dcc818d8f"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="3d5c504e134d524f495c517d51505e52135e5250">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>; Internet <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com/ams/tools/TechPubs.html">http://www.lockheedmartin.com/ams/tools/TechPubs.html</a>.
    (3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA, 
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 
Washington. For information on the availability of this material at 
the FAA, call 425-227-1221.
    (4) You may also review copies of the service information that 
is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this 
material at an NARA facility, call 202-741-6030, or go to <a href="http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html">http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html</a>.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 12, 2012.
John P. Piccola,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2012-8450 Filed 4-9-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P