AD 2008-12-12

final rule

Airworthiness Directives; Viking Air Limited Models DHC-2 Mk. I, DHC-2 Mk. II, and DHC-3 Airplanes

AD Number
2008-12-12
Status
final_rule
Effective Date
Product Category
aircraft
Docket
Docket No. FAA-2008-0444
FR Citation
73 FR 34618
Technical illustration of an aircraft electrical generator and wiring assembly
Problem area Electrical system

Applicability

TypeManufacturerModelDetails
aircraft Viking Air Limited DHC-2 Mk.I Airworthiness Directives; Viking Air Limited Models DHC-2 Mk. I, DHC-2 Mk. II, and DHC-3 Airplanes
aircraft Viking Air Limited DHC-2 Mk.II Airworthiness Directives; Viking Air Limited Models DHC-2 Mk. I, DHC-2 Mk. II, and DHC-3 Airplanes
aircraft Viking Air Limited DHC-3 Airworthiness Directives; Viking Air Limited Models DHC-2 Mk. I, DHC-2 Mk. II, and DHC-3 Airplanes

Unsafe Condition

A complete loss of both ignition systems occurred due to the lock wire hole in the ignition connector plug on the firewall breaking out, allowing the plug to vibrate loose. This resulted in both magneto systems grounding out through a spring-loaded safety pin incorporated into the Cannon plug.

AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.

Required Actions

Inspect the ignition connector plugs for the presence of the spring-loaded safety pin. Replace the existing connectors with a new design that incorporates a 'straight through' type connector to ensure magneto circuit integrity if the connection opens.

AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.

Compliance Time

Before further flight

AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.

Affected Aircraft

Viking Air Limited Models DHC-2 Mk. I, DHC-2 Mk. II, and DHC-3 airplanes with piston engines.

AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.

Federal Register Abstract

We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

Document Text

Show stored source text (verify against official source)
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 118 (Wednesday, June 18, 2008)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 34618-34620]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: E8-13112]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2008-0444; Directorate Identifier 2008-CE-024-AD; 
Amendment 39-15555; AD 2008-12-12]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Viking Air Limited Models DHC-2 Mk. I, 
DHC-2 Mk. II, and DHC-3 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) 
for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory 
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation 
authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe 
condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 
condition as:

    A complete loss of both ignition systems occurred on a DHC-3 
Otter when the lock wire hole in the ignition connector plug on the 
firewall broke out, allowing the plug to vibrate loose. A 
maintenance safety feature grounds out both magneto systems through 
a spring-loaded safety pin incorporated into the Cannon plug. The 
DHC-2 system is similar in design.
    Subsequent to the issuance of AD CF-2001-36 a complete loss of 
both ignition systems occurred on a DHC-2 Beaver resulting in engine 
failure and subsequent forced approach and landing. Investigation by 
the Transportation Safety Board determined the internal failure of 
the magneto firewall connector resulted in both magneto ``P'' leads 
shorting to ground. A maintenance ``safety'' feature through a 
spring-loaded safety pin incorporated in the firewall connector on 
many DHC-2 aircraft grounds out both magneto systems when the 
connector is disconnected. This connector type is readily identified 
when disconnected by the existence of three internal pins on the 
firewall and magneto harness side, one of which is shorted directly 
to ground.

We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe 
condition on these products.

DATES: This AD becomes effective July 23, 2008.
    On July 23, 2008, the Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference of Viking DHC-2 Beaver Service Bulletin 
Number V2/0001, dated June 27, 2007; and Viking DHC-3 Otter Service 
Bulletin Number V3/0001, dated June 27, 2007, listed in this AD.
    As of December 6, 2004 (69 FR 61758, October 21, 2004), the 
Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of deHavilland Beaver Alert Service Bulletin Number A2/53, 
Revision B, dated May 28, 2004; and deHavilland Otter Alert Service 
Bulletin Number A3/53, Revision B, dated May 28, 2004, listed in this 
AD.

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a> or in person at the Docket Management Facility, 
U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West 
Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 
Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Fabio Buttitta, Aerospace Engineer, 
FAA, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 
410, Westbury, New York 11590; telephone: (516) 228-7303; fax: (516) 
794-5531.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 
part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products. 
That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on April 18, 2008 (73 
FR 21074), and proposed to supersede AD 2004-21-06, Amendment 39-13827 
(69 FR 61758, October 21, 2004). That NPRM proposed to correct an 
unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states that:

    A complete loss of both ignition systems occurred on a DHC-3 
Otter when the lock wire hole in the ignition connector plug on the 
firewall broke out, allowing the plug to vibrate loose. A 
maintenance safety feature grounds out both magneto systems through 
a spring-loaded safety pin incorporated into the Cannon plug. The 
DHC-2 system is similar in design.
    Subsequent to the issuance of AD CF-2001-36 a complete loss of 
both ignition systems occurred on a DHC-2 Beaver resulting in engine 
failure and subsequent forced approach and landing. Investigation by 
the Transportation Safety Board determined the internal failure of 
the magneto firewall connector resulted in both magneto ``P'' leads 
shorting to ground. A maintenance ``safety'' feature through a 
spring-loaded safety pin incorporated in the firewall connector on 
many DHC-2 aircraft ground out both magneto systems when the 
connector is disconnected. This connector type is readily identified 
when disconnected by the existence of three internal pins on the 
firewall and magneto harness side, one of which is shorted directly 
to ground.
    These connectors are no longer in production.
    Since no effective Instructions for Continued Airworthiness 
exist to ensure the safety feature of these connectors will operate 
correctly when disconnected, or will ensure the internal integrity 
of the connector while

[[Page 34619]]

in service, this directive is revised to mandate replacement of 
connectors with a different design.
    Viking Air Limited has developed SB V2/0001 to provide for the 
installation of a replacement connector, similar in design to 
magneto systems in service today. This modification incorporates a 
``straight through'' type connector, ensuring magneto circuit 
integrity should the connection open.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing 
this AD. We received no comments on the NPRM or on the determination of 
the cost to the public.

Conclusion

    We reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and 
the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

    We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in 
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it 
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the 
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these 
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information 
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
    We might also have required different actions in this AD from those 
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are 
highlighted in a NOTE within the AD.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD will affect 159 products of U.S. registry. 
We also estimate that it will take about 10 work-hours per product to 
comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate 
is $80 per work-hour. Required parts will cost about $881 per product.
    Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the AD on U.S. 
operators to be $267,279, or $1,681 per product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation 
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's 
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications 
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct 
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national 
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866;
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to 
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD Docket.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a>; or in person at the Docket Management Facility 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains the NPRM, the regulatory evaluation, 
any comments received, and other information. The street address for 
the Docket Office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES 
section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after 
receipt.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, 
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by removing Amendment 39-13827 (69 FR 
61758; October 21, 2004), and adding the following new AD:

2008-12-12 Viking Air Limited: Amendment 39-15555; Docket No. FAA-
2008-0444; Directorate Identifier 2008-CE-024-AD.

Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective July 23, 
2008.

Affected ADs

    (b) This AD supersedes AD 2004-21-06, Amendment 39-13827.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to the following model and serial number 
airplanes certificated in any category:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Model                             Serial No.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHC-2 Mk. I...............................  All.
DHC-2 Mk. II..............................  All.
DHC-3.....................................  All serial numbers with
                                             piston engines.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association of America (ATA) Code 74: Engine 
Ignition.

Reason

    (e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) 
states:

    A complete loss of both ignition systems occurred on a DHC-3 
Otter when the lock wire hole in the ignition connector plug on the 
firewall broke out, allowing the plug to vibrate loose. A 
maintenance safety feature grounds out both magneto systems through 
a spring-loaded safety pin incorporated into the Cannon plug. The 
DHC-2 system is similar in design.
    Subsequent to the issuance of AD CF-2001-36 a complete loss of 
both ignition systems occurred on a DHC-2 Beaver resulting in engine 
failure and subsequent forced approach and landing. Investigation by 
the Transportation Safety Board determined the internal failure of 
the magneto firewall connector resulted in both magneto ``P'' leads 
shorting to ground. A maintenance ``safety'' feature through a 
spring-loaded safety pin incorporated in the firewall connector on 
many DHC-2 aircraft ground out both magneto systems when the 
connector is disconnected. This connector type is readily identified 
when disconnected by the existence of three internal pins on the 
firewall and magneto harness side, one of which is shorted directly 
to ground.
    These connectors are no longer in production.
    Since no effective Instructions for Continued Airworthiness 
exist to ensure the safety feature of these connectors will operate 
correctly when disconnected, or will ensure the internal integrity 
of the connector while in service, this directive is revised to

[[Page 34620]]

mandate replacement of connectors with a different design.
    Viking Air Limited has developed SB V2/0001 to provide for the 
installation of a replacement connector, similar in design to 
magneto systems in service today. This modification incorporates a 
``straight through'' type connector, ensuring magneto circuit 
integrity should the connection open.

Actions and Compliance

    (f) Inspect the connector plugs on the fore side of the firewall 
for security and the connector plug lockwire to assure it is intact 
and the holes in the plugs are not broken out or cracked. Initially 
inspect within the next 100 hours time-in-service (TIS) after 
December 6, 2004 (the compliance date retained from AD 2004-21-06). 
Repetitively inspect thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours 
TIS until the modification required in paragraph (h) of this AD is 
done. Do the inspections following deHavilland Beaver Alert Service 
Bulletin Number A2/53, Revision B, dated May 28, 2004; and 
deHavilland Otter Alert Service Bulletin Number A3/53, Revision B, 
dated May 28, 2004, as applicable.
    (g) During any inspection required in paragraph (f) of this AD, 
if the lockwire holes or the lockwire is found damaged, install 
Modification Kit Number C2VMK0001-1 or Modification Kit Number 
C3VMK0001-1, as applicable. Install the modification kit before 
further flight following the Accomplishment Instructions in Viking 
DHC-2 Beaver Service Bulletin Number V2/0001, dated June 27, 2007; 
and Viking DHC-3 Otter Service Bulletin Number V3/0001, dated June 
27, 2007, as applicable. Installing the modification kit terminates 
the repetitive inspections required in paragraph (f) of this AD.
    (h) Unless already done, replace the magneto firewall connector 
by installing Modification Kit Number C2VMK0001-1 or Modification 
Kit Number C3VMK0001-1, as applicable. Install the modification kit 
within the next 6 months after July 23, 2008 (the effective date of 
this AD) following the Accomplishment Instructions in Viking DHC-2 
Beaver Service Bulletin Number V2/0001, dated June 27, 2007; and 
Viking DHC-3 Otter Service Bulletin Number V3/0001, dated June 27, 
2007, as applicable. Installing the modification kit terminates the 
repetitive inspections required in paragraph (f) of this AD.

FAA AD Differences

    Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information 
as follows: AD 2004-21-06 required incorporating repetitive 
inspections of the connector plugs and the connector plug lockwire 
on the fore side of the firewall into the maintenance program while 
the MCAI required incorporating Temporary Revision No. 14, dated 
August 24, 2001, into the applicable maintenance manual in order to 
incorporate the repetitive inspections into the maintenance program.

Other FAA AD Provisions

    (i) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, New 
York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to 
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found 
in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Fabio Buttitta, Aerospace 
Engineer, FAA, New York ACO, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, 
Westbury, New York 11590; telephone: (516) 228-7303; fax: (516) 794-
5531. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the 
AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in 
the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, 
your local FSDO.
    (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain 
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these 
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered 
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority 
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product 
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
    (3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in 
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 
U.S.C. 3501 et.seq.), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has 
approved the information collection requirements and has assigned 
OMB Control Number 2120-0056.

Related Information

    (j) Refer to MCAI Transport Canada AD No. CF-2001-36R1, dated 
January 21, 2008; Transport Canada AD No. CF-2001-37R, dated January 
21, 2008; deHavilland Beaver Alert Service Bulletin Number A2/53, 
Revision B, dated May 28, 2004; deHavilland Otter Alert Service 
Bulletin Number A3/53, Revision B, dated May 28, 2004; Viking DHC-2 
Beaver Service Bulletin Number V2/0001, dated June 27, 2007; and 
Viking DHC-3 Otter Service Bulletin Number V3/0001, dated June 27, 
2007, for related information.

Material Incorporated by Reference

    (k) You must use deHavilland Beaver Alert Service Bulletin 
Number A2/53, Revision B, dated May 28, 2004; deHavilland Otter 
Alert Service Bulletin Number A3/53, Revision B, dated May 28, 2004; 
Viking DHC-2 Beaver Service Bulletin Number V2/0001, dated June 27, 
2007; and Viking DHC-3 Otter Service Bulletin Number V3/0001, dated 
June 27, 2007, to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD 
specifies otherwise.
    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference of Viking DHC-2 Beaver Service Bulletin 
Number V2/0001, dated June 27, 2007; and Viking DHC-3 Otter Service 
Bulletin Number V3/0001, dated June 27, 2007, under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) 
and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) On December 6, 2004 (69 FR 61758, October 21, 2004), the 
Director of the Federal Register previously approved the 
incorporation by reference of deHavilland Beaver Alert Service 
Bulletin Number A2/53, Revision B, dated May 28, 2004; and 
deHavilland Otter Alert Service Bulletin Number A3/53, Revision B, 
dated May 28, 2004.
    (3) For service information identified in this AD, contact 
Viking, 9574 Hampden Road, Sidney, British Columbia, Canada V8L 5V5.
    (4) You may review copies at the FAA, Central Region, Office of 
the Regional Counsel, 901 Locust, Room 506, Kansas City, Missouri 
64106; or at the National Archives and Records Administration 
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at 
NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: <a href="http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html">http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html</a>.

    Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on June 5, 2008.
David R. Showers,
Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
 [FR Doc. E8-13112 Filed 6-17-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

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