AD 2006-08-04

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 71 (Thursday, April 13, 2006)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 19104-19107]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 06-3478]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2004-19680; Directorate Identifier 2003-NM-215-AD; 
Amendment 39-14558; AD 2006-08-04]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 767 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for 
certain Boeing Model 767 airplanes. This AD requires performing a test 
of the bonding resistance between the engine fuel feed tube fitting and 
the front spar, applying sealant on a hex nut inside the dry bay, and 
performing any applicable corrective actions. This AD results from a 
report that the engine fuel feed tubes were found not electrically 
bonded to the front spar. We are issuing this AD to prevent an ignition 
source from entering the fuel tank during a lightning strike event, 
which could cause a fuel tank explosion.

DATES: This AD becomes effective May 18, 2006.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of May 18, 2006.

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <a href="http://dms.dot.gov">http://dms.dot.gov</a> or in person at the Docket Management Facility, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street SW., Nassif Building, 
Room PL-401, Washington, DC.
    Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, 
Washington 98124-2207, for service information identified in this AD.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Vann, Aerospace Engineer, 
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 
FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone 
(425) 917-6513; fax (425) 917-6590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Examining the Docket

    You may examine the airworthiness directive (AD) docket on the 
Internet at <a href="http://dms.dot.gov">http://dms.dot.gov</a> or in person at the Docket Management 
Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays. The Docket Management Facility office

[[Page 19105]]

(telephone (800) 647-5227) is located on the plaza level of the Nassif 
Building at the street address stated in the ADDRESSES section.

Discussion

    The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 
CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to certain Boeing Model 
767 series airplanes. That NPRM was published in the Federal Register 
on November 24, 2004 (69 FR 68272). That NPRM proposed to require 
performing a test of the bonding resistance between the engine fuel 
feed tube fitting and the front spar, applying sealant on a hex nut 
inside the dry bay, and performing any applicable corrective actions.

Comments

    We provided the public the opportunity to participate in the 
development of this AD. We have considered the comments received.

Requests To Revise Surface Preparation Procedures

    Two commenters, Continental Airlines and Britannia Airlines, note 
that the preparation of the mating surface on the dry bay side of the 
front spar for bonding requires the use of a stainless steel brush. The 
commenters recommend that the preparation of the mating surface be 
accomplished using cleaning procedures 1, 2, or 3, described in Section 
20-20-00 of the Boeing Standard Wiring Practices Manual (SWPM), or 
other cleaning procedures; ideally, by the use of fine abrasive 
material (100 grit or finer). One of the commenters states, ``Since the 
objective is to achieve a satisfactory bond, any approved cleaning 
method, which achieves that objective, should be acceptable.'' 
Continental Airlines notes disadvantages to the other two cleaning 
procedures, which involve using a stainless steel brush, or using a 
rotary abrasive disk. Specifically:
    <bullet> There is a high possibility of damaging the mating surface 
when using the stainless steel rotary brush.
    <bullet> Using a stainless steel rotary brush would introduce 
unwelcome contamination in the fuel tank area.
    <bullet> Using a steel rotary brush when attached to an electrical 
motor tool would create a fire hazard in a fuel vapor area.
    <bullet> Current flap or shot peen equipment cannot or is very 
difficult to fit in the area due to access issues.
    <bullet> Current flap or shot peen equipment is also equipped with 
an electrical motor which creates a fire hazard in a fuel vapor area.
    We agree with the use of fine abrasive material as the primary 
method for preparing the mating surface for bonding. Since we issued 
the NPRM, we have reviewed Boeing Service Bulletins 767-28A0071 and 
767-28A0072, both Revision 2, both dated December 8, 2005. These 
service bulletins specify appropriate procedures for preparing the 
mating surface for bonding. We have determined that the use of a rotary 
abrasive disk as described in cleaning procedure 3, in Section 20-20-00 
of the Boeing SWPM, should not be allowed as a cleaning method for this 
AD, for the same reasons/justifications the commenters used against the 
use of a stainless steel rotary brush. This determination is consistent 
with Revision 2 of the service bulletin instructions. We recognize that 
both the stainless steel brush and abrasive disk require the use of an 
electrical motor tool. However, using the stainless steel brush is not 
considered to pose such a significant fire hazard to the degree/point 
that we would not allow it to be used as an alternate procedure to the 
fine abrasive material, as noted in Revision 2 of the service 
bulletins. We have revised paragraph (f) of this AD to reference 
Revision 2 of the service bulletins as the appropriate source of 
service information. We have also revised paragraph (c) of this AD to 
reference Revision 2 of the service bulletins, and added paragraph (h) 
to give credit for actions previously accomplished in accordance with 
Boeing Alert Service Bulletins 767-28A0071 and 767-28A0072, both 
Revision 1, both dated January 22, 2004.

Request To Extend the Compliance Time

    The Air Transport Association (ATA), on behalf of U.S. Airways, 
requests that the compliance time be extended from 48 months to 60 
months after the effective date of this AD. The ATA notes that we 
issued AD 2004-10-06, amendment 39-13636 (69 FR 28046, May 18, 2004), 
which addresses a similar unsafe condition in Boeing Model 737 and 747 
airplanes. In AD 2004-10-06, we determined that a 60-month compliance 
time maintained an acceptable level of safety. Further, the AD requires 
fuel tank entry, which involves unique scheduling of facilities and 
resources. Since other initiatives to eliminate potential ignition 
sources will result from the SFAR 88 effort, and since some will also 
require fuel tank entry, flexibility in planning those entries should 
be preserved to the greatest extent that provides an acceptable level 
of safety to avoid unnecessary fuel tank entries.
    We agree to extend the compliance time to 60 months. We have 
determined that a 60-month compliance time is consistent with the 
requirements of existing ADs 2004-10-06 and 2005-04-01, amendment 39-
13973 (70 FR 7841, February 16, 2005) (also an SFAR 88 AD). This new 
compliance time is consistent with Boeing's new recommendation 
specified in Revision 2 of the service bulletins (described 
previously). We have also determined that extending the compliance time 
will not adversely affect safety. We have revised paragraph (g) of this 
AD to require the new compliance time.

Request To Revise Order of Tasks

    ATA, on behalf of United Airlines, requests that we allow 
accomplishment of the sealant application in paragraph 3.B.7. of 
Revision 1 of the service bulletins to be performed after the leak 
checks in paragraph 3.B.8. of Revision 1 of the service bulletins. The 
commenter explains that sealing of the coupling could mask leaks during 
the leak checks of the fuel feed line, and an undetected leak could 
manifest into subsequent related problems. The commenter states that 
Boeing concurred with this re-sequencing.
    We agree. Boeing has revised the service bulletins to re-sequence 
the steps in Revision 2 of the service bulletins. As explained 
previously, we have revised paragraph (g) to require accomplishment of 
actions in accordance with Revision 2 of the service bulletins.

Request To Allow Use of an Alternative Material

    United Airlines requests that we allow the use of CRES lock-wire, 
part number (P/N) MS20995C32, as an option to the Monel lock-wire, P/N 
MS20995NC32, that is defined in the service bulletin. The commenter 
states that the CRES lock-wire is listed as an acceptable standard 
parts substitution for the Monel lock-wire in Boeing Drawing 012W6100--
Materials, Parts and Process Substitution and Equivalents. The 
commenter also states that Boeing did not state any technical objection 
to this substitution.
    We do not agree to allow the use of the CRES stainless-steel lock-
wire. Pieces of the CRES lock-wire could be in the fuel tank due to 
breakage or be left in the tank during the lock-wire installation 
process. These pieces of lock-wire could then be ingested into the fuel 
pump inlets, and contact stainless-steel components in the fuel pump. 
Such contact in the fuel pump between stainless-steel materials could 
produce sparks or excessive heat.

[[Page 19106]]

Neither the commenter nor the manufacturer has provided any data that 
would indicate whether pieces of CRES lock-wires could create sparks 
when ingested by the fuel pump. While Boeing did not state any 
objection to United's substitution, it did not include the CRES wire as 
an option in Revision 2 of the service bulletins either. In light of 
the properties of stainless-steel, and the absence of any sparking 
characteristics data that can be used to show that the level of safety 
with stainless-steel wire is acceptable, we currently cannot determine 
that the potential impact to the level of safety is acceptable. The 
commenter is welcome to submit a request for an alternative method of 
compliance (AMOC) with sparking characteristics data to support the 
request. We have not changed the AD in this regard.

Request To Revise Cost Estimate

    American Airlines states that it is accomplishing the actions 
proposed in the NPRM, and estimates that the bonding test of the engine 
fuel feed tube will require approximately 21 work hours. We infer that 
the commenter wants the cost estimate to be revised.
    We disagree with the commenter's request. Our estimate of the work 
hours required is based on information provided by the manufacturer, 
without any follow-on/conditional corrective actions, or access/close-
up actions included. We have not changed the cost estimate of this AD.

Clarification of AMOC Paragraph

    We have revised this action to clarify the appropriate procedure 
for notifying the principal inspector before using any approved AMOC on 
any airplane to which the AMOC applies.

Conclusion

    We have carefully reviewed the available data, including the 
comments received, and determined that air safety and the public 
interest require adopting the AD with the changes described previously. 
We have determined that these changes will neither increase the 
economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD.

Costs of Compliance

    There are about 867 airplanes of the affected design in the 
worldwide fleet. This AD will affect about 400 airplanes of U.S. 
registry. The actions will take about 3 work hours per airplane, at an 
average labor rate of $65 per work hour. Based on these figures, the 
estimated cost of the AD for U.S. operators is $78,000, or $195 per 
airplane.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this AD will not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a 
substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between 
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power 
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866;
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to 
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket. See the ADDRESSES 
section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, 
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:


    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends Sec.  39.13 by 
adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

2006-08-04 Boeing: Amendment 39-14558. Docket No. FAA-2004-19680; 
Directorate Identifier 2003-NM-215-AD.

Effective Date

    (a) This AD becomes effective May 18, 2006.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 767-200, -300, and -300F 
series airplanes, as identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 767-
28A0071, Revision 2, dated December 8, 2005; and Model 767-400ER 
series airplanes, as identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 767-
28A0072, Revision 2, dated December 8, 2005; certificated in any 
category.

Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD was prompted by a report that the engine fuel feed 
tubes were found not electrically bonded to the front spar. We are 
issuing this AD to prevent an ignition source from entering the fuel 
tank during a lightning strike event, which could cause a fuel tank 
explosion.

Compliance

    (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this 
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the 
actions have already been done.

Service Bulletin Definition

    (f) The term ``service bulletin,'' as used in this AD, means the 
Work Instructions of the following service bulletins, as applicable:
    (1) For Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes: Boeing 
Service Bulletin 767-28A0071, Revision 2, dated December 8, 2005; 
and
    (2) For Model 767-400ER series airplanes: Boeing Service 
Bulletin 767-28A0072, Revision 2, dated December 8, 2005.

Investigative and Corrective Actions

    (g) Within 60 months after the effective date of this AD: Do a 
test of the bonding resistance between the engine fuel feed tube 
fitting and the front spar, apply sealant on a hex nut inside the 
dry bay, and do all applicable corrective actions, by accomplishing 
all of the actions in the applicable service bulletin. Do all 
applicable corrective actions before further flight.

Previous Actions

    (h) Actions done before the effective date of this AD in 
accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-28A0071, Revision 
1, dated January 22, 2004; or Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-
28A0072, Revision 1, dated January 22, 2004, are acceptable for 
compliance with the requirements of paragraph (g) of this AD.

[[Page 19107]]

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (i)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in 
accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
    (2) Before using any AMOC approved in accordance with Sec.  
39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify the 
appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards 
Certificate Holding District Office.

Material Incorporated by Reference

    (j) You must use Boeing Service Bulletin 767-28A0071, Revision 
2, dated December 8, 2005; or Boeing Service Bulletin 767-28A0072, 
Revision 2, dated December 8, 2005; as applicable; to perform the 
actions that are required by this AD, unless the AD specifies 
otherwise. The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference of these documents in accordance with 5 
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Contact Boeing Commercial 
Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207, for a copy 
of this service information. You may review copies at the Docket 
Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh 
Street, SW., Room PL-401, Nassif Building, Washington, DC; on the 
Internet at <a href="http://dms.dot.gov">http://dms.dot.gov</a>; or at the National Archives and 
Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability 
of this material at the NARA, call (202) 741-6030, or go to <a href="http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html">http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html</a>.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 4, 2006.
Kevin M. Mullin,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 06-3478 Filed 4-12-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P