AD 2003-11-19
Applicability
| Type | Manufacturer | Model | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | 727-100 Series | Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 727-100 and 727-200 Series Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | 727-200 Series | Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 727-100 and 727-200 Series Airplanes |
Unsafe Condition
Improper autopilot desensitization rate during coupled ILS approaches can lead to undesirable and potentially dangerous pitch oscillations.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Required Actions
Replace the installed autopilot pitch control computer with a modified computer, test the modified system, and revise the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include data regarding certain limitations, such as autopilot disconnect, inherent in the design of Sperry SP-50 and SP-150 autopilots.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Compliance Time
Before further flight
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Affected Aircraft
Boeing Model 727-100 and 727-200 series airplanes equipped with Sperry SP-50 and SP-150 autopilots, excluding those with radio altimeter-based glideslope gain programming.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Federal Register Abstract
This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 727-100 and 727-200 series airplanes, that requires, under certain conditions, replacement of the installed autopilot pitch control computer with a modified computer, testing of the modified system, and revision of the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent undesirable and potentially dangerous pitch oscillations during coupled instrument landing system (ILS) approaches. This AD is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
Document Text
Show stored source text (verify against official source)
[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 112 (Wednesday, June 11, 2003)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 34781-34786]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 03-13976]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. 2001-NM-41-AD; Amendment 39-13178; AD 2003-11-19]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 727-100 and 727-200 Series
Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD),
applicable to certain Boeing Model 727-100 and 727-200 series
airplanes, that requires, under certain conditions, replacement of the
installed autopilot pitch control computer with a modified computer,
testing of the modified system, and revision of the Airplane Flight
Manual (AFM). The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent
undesirable and potentially dangerous pitch oscillations during coupled
instrument landing system (ILS) approaches. This AD is intended to
address the identified unsafe condition.
DATES: Effective July 16, 2003.
The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in
the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as
of July 16, 2003.
ADDRESSES: The service information referenced in this AD may be
obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, PO Box 3707, Seattle,
Washington 98124-2207. This information may be examined at the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules
Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of
the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700,
Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thanh Truong, Aerospace Engineer,
Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-
4056; telephone (425) 917-6486; fax (425) 917-6590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness
directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 727-100 and
727-200 series airplanes was published in the Federal Register on
September 10, 2001 (66 FR 46968). That action proposed to require
replacement of the installed autopilot pitch control computer with a
modified computer, testing of the modified system, and revision of the
Airplane Flight Manual (AFM).
Comments
Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate
in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to
the comments received.
Support for the Proposed AD
One operator reports that the actions specified in the proposed AD
have been incorporated on all of its airplanes.
Request To Withdraw AD
One operator asserts that accomplishment of the actions specified
in the proposed AD would not eliminate the identified unsafe condition,
and suggests that pilot training and procedures would eliminate
unstable category II approaches by autopilot disconnect. The FAA infers
that the commenter is requesting withdrawal of the proposed AD.
The FAA does not agree. The unsafe condition is related to the
accident described in the proposed AD involving a Model 727 series
airplane during a coupled instrument landing system (ILS) category II
approach. The circumstances surrounding that accident led in part to
the issuance of this AD. The divergent pitch oscillations of the
airplane resulted from an improper autopilot desensitization rate and
contributed to the accident. This AD addresses the improper autopilot
desensitization rate. The AFM revisions required by this AD provide
data to the flightcrew regarding certain limitations, such as autopilot
disconnect, inherent in the design of Sperry SP-50 and SP-150
autopilots. Observing these limitations will help the flightcrew take
the appropriate action necessary for a successful landing or go-around.
Request To Delay AD Issuance Pending Further Study
One operator requests that issuance of the AD be delayed until
further studies, as described in the proposed AD, can be completed. The
proposed AD describes additional studies in process that are intended
to develop appropriate limits for flap settings and airspeeds and to
investigate other aspects such as winds and glideslope angles as
possible contributors to the unsafe condition. The commenter requests
that the studies be completed before the proposed AFM revisions and
modifications are mandated.
The FAA does not agree. If the results of the studies ultimately
suggest the need for additional intervention, or if additional data are
presented that would justify revising any requirements of this AD, the
FAA may consider further rulemaking on this issue. In consideration of
the amount of time that has already elapsed since issuance of the
original notice of proposed rulemaking, the FAA has determined that
further delay of this final rule action is not appropriate.
Request To Remove Landing Flap Limitation
Two operators request removal of the landing flap limitation
specified in paragraph (d) of the proposed AD. To justify the request,
the commenters state that the difference in the approach speeds between
the 30-degree and 40-degree landing flap configurations is only 5
knots, and the proposed limitation would provide only minimal
improvement in glideslope beam tracking.
[[Page 34782]]
The FAA is aware of the small difference in approach speeds and
agrees with the request to remove the landing flap limitation. In the
preamble of the proposed AD, the FAA indicated that additional studies
were being conducted to develop applicable operating limitations that
would address approach flap settings. The FAA has since obtained
additional analysis indicating that the new gain schedule applies to
both 30-degree and 40-degree landing flap configurations. Therefore,
paragraph (d) of the proposed AD has been removed from the final rule,
and subsequent paragraphs have been reidentified.
Request To Revise Applicability: Exclude Certain Airplanes
Two operators request that the applicability of the proposed AD be
revised to exclude airplanes equipped with single-pitch channels that
use radio altimeter-based glideslope gain programming. One commenter
reports that most of the affected airplanes in its fleet have been
modified to incorporate a dual-pitch computer configuration in
accordance with Sperry Service Bulletin 21-1132-121, dated November 23,
1982 (for SP-50 autopilots); or 21-1132-122, dated February 7, 1983
(for SP-150 autopilots). (Those service bulletins were cited in the
proposed AD as the appropriate source of service information for the
one-time test of the modified autopilot.) This commenter adds that
compliance with paragraphs (b) and (c) of the proposed AD would be
impossible for those airplanes because the proposed AD and Boeing
service bulletin are targeted for airplanes with single-channel
autopilot systems. In addition, this commenter states that paragraph
(a) of the proposed AD imposes an undesirable restriction on modified
airplanes by preventing them from flying category II and category III
approaches into airports with inoperative middle markers. This
commenter asserts that this restriction is unnecessary for the modified
airplanes because their autopilot configurations use radio altimeter
glideslope gain programming (radio altitude-based desensitization), and
are therefore not susceptible to the airworthiness concern associated
with inoperative middle markers addressed by the proposed AD. The
commenter recommends that the applicability of the proposed AD be
revised to exclude those airplanes.
The other commenter notes that affected airplanes with single-pitch
channels on which the actions specified in Boeing Service Bulletin 727-
22-0052 have been incorporated do not use the middle marker in gain
programming. The commenter concludes that these airplanes should not be
prohibited from category II approaches if no middle marker is
available.
The FAA agrees. In this case, where the autopilot has already been
modified with an FAA-approved design that does not normally use time-
based gain programming, the FAA agrees that excluding airplanes
equipped with radio altimeter-based autopilots from the applicability
of the AD will not compromise the safety of the fleet. The
applicability of this AD has been revised accordingly.
Request To Revise Applicability: Clarify Intent
Several commenters request that the applicability of the proposed
AD be revised to clarify that the requirements apply only if operators
desire to maintain the capability of the autopilot coupled ILS
approach. One operator, conducting ``Cat I approach only,'' requests
exclusion from the applicability of the AD.
The FAA partially agrees. The intent of the AD is to ``prevent
dangerous pitch oscillations during coupled (ILS) approaches'';
affected operators could comply with the AD simply by never conducting
coupled approaches. Although the cited wording does not directly
address category I coupled approaches, analysis has shown that, if the
unmodified autopilot is used, potentially unsafe pitch oscillation can
begin at 400 feet above ground level (AGL), which is well above the
typical decision height for category I approaches of 200 feet AGL. As a
result, category I and category II coupled approaches would be
prohibited for airplanes that have unmodified autopilot gains. However,
manually flown approaches using autopilot guidance (glideslope and
localizer needle deviations) or flight director guidance would be
permitted. Because the middle marker signal is typically received at
200 feet AGL and because during typical category I coupled approaches
the pilot disconnects the autopilot at 200 feet AGL (compared to 100
feet AGL, which is typical for category II approaches), no AFM
restriction for category I approaches is discussed in the AD even
though modification of the autopilot is required if it is used for any
coupled approach. The AFM language has been further revised in
paragraph (a) of this final rule to clarify that the autopilot must be
modified if any coupled ILS approach is conducted. To more clearly
identify those airplanes affected by this requirement, new paragraph
(e) has been added to the final rule to require modification of the
autopilot unit only if autopilot coupled ILS approaches are to be used
with that airplane. Subsequent paragraphs that appeared in the proposed
AD have been reidentified in the final rule.
Request To Revise Applicability: Add Certain Airplanes
The applicability of the proposed AD includes only those Model 727-
100 and -200 series airplanes that are listed in Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 727-22A0093, dated December 20, 2000. One operator reports
that some of its airplanes are not listed in the service bulletin but
are equipped with SP-50 and/or SP-150 autopilots. The FAA infers that
the commenter is requesting that the applicability of the proposed AD
be expanded to include any Model 727-100 and -200 series airplane
equipped with a subject autopilot.
The FAA does not agree. Not all Model 727-100 or -200 series
airplanes with the subject autopilots are susceptible to the unsafe
condition identified by this AD. For example, airplanes delivered after
November 1977 are not susceptible because they use radio altimeter gain
scheduling for the SP-150 autopilots instead of the time-based gain
scheduling discussed in the proposed AD. No change to the applicability
of the final rule is necessary in this regard.
Request for Clarification of Test
Two commenters request clarification of the one-time test specified
by paragraph (c) of the proposed AD. The commenters state that this
requirement, as written, is either redundant or subject to
misinterpretation. The Sperry service bulletins, described previously,
were cited in the proposed AD: in paragraph (c) for the one-time test
procedures and in paragraph (d) for the autopilot modification
procedures. (Paragraph (d) has since been removed from the final rule,
as discussed previously.) The proposed AD specified that the test be
done concurrently with the modification, before reinstallation of the
modified autopilot, and before further flight. The commenters suggest
that the wording of the proposed AD could cause operators to perform
unnecessary rework. The commenters suggest that the proposed test
requirement be a one-time test of the autopilot unit, because ``the
timing in relation to the modification is immaterial.''
One operator requests that the proposed test requirement be revised
to distinguish the requirements associated with the autopilot from
those associated with the airplane. This commenter suggests that
paragraph (c) of the
[[Page 34783]]
proposed AD be revised to read as follows: ``Following any * * *
modification, perform a one-time test procedure of the modified
autopilot.'' The wording in the proposed AD suggests that two tests are
to be done at the same time. The commenter requests this change to
clarify the requirements and to avoid unnecessary rework.
The FAA partially agrees. The requirements regarding the autopilot
test may be redundant because the Sperry service bulletins already
specify testing the unit using test information provided in those
service bulletins. However, those same service bulletins note that,
``Test information given in this bulletin shall be disregarded when
revised Component Maintenance Manuals become available.'' This note may
be misinterpreted to mean the test is not required, so the FAA finds it
necessary to clarify the test requirement. The FAA has learned that
many operators have already accomplished the modifications and post-
modification testing specified in the proposed AD. Therefore, paragraph
(c) of the final rule has been revised to clarify this requirement.
Request To Allow Alternative Testing Methods
One operator asserts that a variety of effective methods have been
used to verify the new time constants described in the Sperry service
bulletins for the test. The commenter suggests that the methods of
compliance for paragraph (c) of the proposed AD be broadened to allow
the option of ``other valid methods.'' The commenter reports that some
of its autopilot units were modified and tested in-house in accordance
with established test procedures described in the component maintenance
manual. The commenter adds that other autopilot units were purchased
already modified in accordance with the procedures described in the
Sperry service bulletins. The commenter suggests this change to avoid
unnecessary retesting of autopilot units for which the use of the new
time constants has already been confirmed.
The FAA agrees with the request for the reasons stated by the
commenter. Paragraph (c) of the final rule has been further revised to
provide operators this testing option.
Request To Revise Requirements for Spare Parts
One operator requests that paragraph (e) of the proposed AD be
either removed from the AD or revised to extend the time allowed for
spares modifications and AFM revisions. This commenter asserts that a
minimum of 6 months will be necessary to modify spare parts and revise
the AFM.
The FAA partially agrees. The FAA finds that the AFM limitations
imposed by this AD will sufficiently ensure safety of an affected
airplane until spare parts can be acquired and modified; therefore,
allowing additional time to modify spare parts will not compromise
safety. However, the FAA does not agree that it is necessary to extend
the time by which the AFM revisions must be completed. The basic intent
of an AFM revision may be accomplished by inserting a copy of the AD
into the AFM; operators should be able to complete this action in a
short time. Paragraph (f) of the final rule (paragraph (e) in the
proposed AD) has been revised to extend the time by which the
installation of unmodified spare parts will be prohibited.
Request To Revise Cost Estimate
Two operators request a revision of the proposed cost estimates.
One operator notes that the proposed AD does not address the costs
associated with obtaining a master change from Boeing to eliminate the
need for a middle marker to begin second-stage gain programming. One
operator notes that the proposed AD does not address the costs
associated with airplane diversions that would result if category II
approaches are prohibited at airports without middle markers.
The FAA partially agrees. Since category II approaches are
prohibited at airports that do not have middle markers, an operator may
elect to fly category I or manual approaches, divert to another
airport, or modify the autopilot to operate with radio-altimeter-based
gain schedule with control law that does not depend on the middle
marker signal. However, the middle marker signal has always been and
remains a necessary part of the autopilot that is programmed with a
time-based gain schedule. This AD in part is intended to ensure the
safe operation of an airplane--within the original autopilot design
constraints associated with use of middle markers--by way of
operational requirements. No change to the final rule is necessary in
this regard.
Request To Revise Parts Cost Estimate
One operator asserts that the parts cost to modify each SP-150
autopilot is $641--not $168 as stated in the proposed AD.
According to updated information provided by Boeing to the FAA, the
parts cost is $522 for the SP-50 autopilot and $620 for the SP-150
autopilot. The Cost Impact section of the final rule has been revised
accordingly.
Request To Reactivate Middle Markers
The proposed AFM revision requirement would prohibit a category II
autopilot coupled ILS approach when the middle marker is inoperative.
One operator suggests that the FAA reactivate middle markers as an
alternative to the AFM revision requirement. The commenter claims that
the FAA has deactivated ground-based middle marker beacons, and some
operators have maintained their airborne marker beacon systems.
The FAA does not agree with the request. The use of the middle
marker is an original design feature of the subject autopilots. If the
middle marker is inoperative or nonexistent, these autopilots--which
are time-based--will not work properly. The FAA has approved autopilots
that do not rely on marker beacons. Furthermore, the FAA currently is
not considering reactivating the marker beacon system due to the
International Civil Aviation Organization's September 1984 revision to
Annex 10, which expanded the use of ILS/distance measuring equipment
(DME) as a substitute for all or part of the marker beacon system. No
change to the final rule is necessary in this regard.
Request To Revise Cause of Unsafe Condition
Boeing requests a change to the second sentence of the Discussion
section of the proposed AD. Specifically, this commenter requests that
the revised sentence read as follows: ``The approach was normal until
the airplane passed through 200 feet above ground level, where the
airplane, responding to a [glideslope] beam anomaly, started a pitch
oscillation that continued to increase.'' The FAA infers that the
commenter is suggesting that the glideslope beam anomaly contributes to
the pitch oscillation problem.
The FAA does not agree with the request, but agrees that the
glideslope beam anomaly can contribute to the pitch oscillation
problem, and may have been a contributing factor to the accident
described in the proposed AD. However, there were no indications that a
glideslope anomaly contributed directly to the accident. Numerous
runway 14R records dating from a time prior to the accident indicate no
glideslope deviations or other ILS-related problems. The results of
normal and special flight checks of the ILS were also within normal
limits. Furthermore, results of simulator testing using typical
glideslope profiles have indicated that
[[Page 34784]]
the autopilot with the 150-second desensitization period responded to
the disturbances (induced turbulence and vertical wind gusts) by
commanding oscillatory pitch changes or changes in pitch that are
oscillatory in nature, which increased over time and resulted in
significant deviations from the desired flight path. No change to the
final rule is necessary in this regard.
Request To Expand AFM Requirements
Boeing suggests that the proposed AFM revisions include additional
indicators for approach performance, such as flightcrew monitoring for
allowable ILS deviations and horizontal stabilizer activity that
indicate an out-of-trim nonstabilized approach. The commenter provides
no justification for this request.
In consideration of the amount of time that has already elapsed
since the issuance of the original notice, the FAA has determined that
further delay of this final rule is not appropriate. However, if
additional data are presented that would justify revising the
requirements of this AD, the FAA may consider further rulemaking to
require AFM revisions that would include the specific requested
performance indicators. No change to the final rule is necessary in
this regard.
Request To Revise Special Flight Permit Specifications
Boeing requests that, instead of issuing a special flight permit to
allow operation of the airplane to a location where the requirements of
the AD can be accomplished, the FAA impose operational restrictions on
autopilot coupled ILS approaches for that flight.
The FAA partially concurs. The FAA finds that such operational
restrictions are acceptable but not necessary in this case because
another method is available to operate the airplane; i.e., the airplane
can be manually operated during approaches. No change to the final rule
regarding this issue is necessary.
Request To Clarify Airplanes Affected by Certain Requirements
One operator requests that paragraph (e) (``Spare Parts'') of the
proposed AD be revised to more clearly identify those airplanes that
would be affected by that proposed requirement. The commenter suggests
that the term ``any airplane,'' as it is used in that paragraph, be
clarified to explain that not all Model 727-100 and -200 series
airplanes are subject to this requirement.
The FAA agrees that not all existing Model 727-100 and -200 series
airplanes are subject to the identified unsafe condition; however, the
FAA does not agree that revision of this paragraph is necessary. As
stated earlier, the applicability of the final rule has been revised to
exclude airplanes equipped with radio altimeter-based autopilots. Any
qualifier (including ``any'' and ``all'') used to identify airplanes
subject to a particular requirement of an AD is relative to the overall
applicability of the AD.
Request To Revise Description of the Unsafe Condition
Boeing requests a revision of one sentence in the third paragraph
of the Discussion section of the proposed AD. That sentence reads as
follows:
Because glideslope deviations close to the runway require
smaller pitch corrections than those required far from the runway,
the autopilot sensitivity has to be reduced as the airplane nears
the runway.
The commenter requests that the sentence be replaced with the
following:
The autopilot sensitivity has to be reduced as the airplane
nears the runway because the glideslope beam converges as the
distance to the glideslope transmitter is decreased (and the same
vertical displacement from the beam centerline results in a larger
glideslope deviation signal).
This commenter provides no justification for this requested change.
The FAA does not agree with this request. Although the requested
language is technically correct, the FAA finds that the simpler
explanation in the Discussion section of the proposed AD is adequate to
explain the conditions that require autopilot sensitivity changes. No
change to the final rule is necessary in this regard.
Request To Revise Description of Accident Cause
Boeing requests a change to one sentence of the final paragraph of
the Discussion section of the proposed AD. That sentence reads as
follows:
Based on the NTSB's studies and FAA findings, the improper
desensitization schedule is considered a contributing factor in the
destabilized approach of the accident flight and in the reported
pitch event that occurred in 1997.
This commenter requests that the word ``improper'' be changed to ``150-
second.''
The FAA partially concurs. The requested wording is specific;
however, the Discussion section is not repeated in a final rule, so no
change is necessary in this regard.
Explanation of Additional Changes to AFM
Some minor additional changes have been made to paragraph (a) of
this final rule. First, the prohibition of coupled ILS approaches,
specified in the proposed AD only for ``inoperative'' middle markers,
has been changed in this final rule to ``inoperative or nonexistent''
middle markers. Second, the second sentence of the revised AFM language
has been changed from ``* * * during Cat II autopilot coupled ILS
approaches'' to ``* * * during coupled ILS CAT II approaches.''
Conclusion
After careful review of the available data, including the comments
noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public
interest require the adoption of the rule with the changes previously
described. The FAA has determined that these changes will neither
increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of
the AD.
Cost Impact
There are approximately 750 airplanes of the affected design in the
worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 162 airplanes of U.S. registry
will be affected by this AD.
It will take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to revise the
AFM, at an average labor rate of $60 per work hour. Based on this
figure, the cost impact of the required AFM revisions on U.S. operators
is estimated to be $9,720, or $60 per airplane.
It will take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to modify and
test the SP-50 autopilot and 2 work hours per airplane to modify and
test the SP-150 autopilot. Required parts will cost approximately $522
for the SP-50 autopilot and $620 for the SP-150 autopilot. Based on
these figures, the cost impact of the modification and test is
estimated to be $582 (SP-50) or $740 (SP-150) per airplane.
The overall cost to the affected fleet could range from $104,004 to
$301,320.
The cost impact figures discussed above are based on assumptions
that no operator has yet accomplished any of the requirements of this
AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the
future if this AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed
in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform
the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures
typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to
gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other
administrative actions.
[[Page 34785]]
Regulatory Impact
The regulations adopted herein will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it
is determined that this final rule does not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866;
(2) is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a
significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial
number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action
and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained
from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption
ADDRESSES.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
0
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness
directive:
2003-11-19 Boeing: Amendment 39-13178. Docket 2001-NM-41-AD.
Applicability: Model 727-100 and 727-200 series airplanes,
certificated in any category, as listed in Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 727-22A0093, dated December 20, 2000; excluding airplanes
equipped with radio altimeter-based autopilots.
Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the
preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been
modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the
requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified,
altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of
this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an
alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (g) of
this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of
the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition
addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been
eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to
address it.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished
previously.
To prevent undesirable and potentially dangerous pitch
oscillations during coupled instrument landing system (ILS)
approaches, accomplish the following:
Revision of Airplane Flight Manual (AFM)
(a) For any airplane on which autopilot coupled ILS approaches
with time-based glideslope gain programming are used: Within 6
months after the effective date of this AD, revise the Limitations
Section, under AUTOPILOT/FLIGHT DIRECTOR SYSTEM, of the FAA-approved
AFM by adding the following (this may be accomplished by inserting a
copy of this AD into the AFM):
``Coupled ILS approaches are prohibited unless the autopilot has
been modified in accordance with AD 2003-11-19, amendment 39-13178.
CAT II autopilot coupled ILS approach shall not be performed if
the Middle Marker (ground or airborne system) is inoperative or
nonexistent.
Disconnect the autopilot at, or prior to, 80 ft. (above the
runway's touchdown-zone elevation) during coupled ILS CAT II
approaches.''
Modification and Testing of Autopilot
(b) Except as provided by paragraph (d) of this AD: Within 18
months after the effective date of this AD, modify the existing SP-
50 or SP-150 single-channel autopilot in accordance with Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin 727-22A0093, dated December 20, 2000.
(c) Except as provided by paragraphs (d) and (e) of this AD:
After modification of the autopilot unit required by paragraph (b)
of this AD, and before reinstallation of the modified autopilot and
further flight, perform a one-time test procedure of the modified
autopilot, in accordance with Sperry Service Bulletin 21-1132-121,
dated November 23, 1982 (for SP-50 autopilots); or 21-1132-122,
dated February 7, 1983 (for SP-150 autopilots); as applicable.
Testing done before the effective date of this AD in accordance with
Component Maintenance Manual (CMM) test procedures is also
acceptable, provided that the procedures implement all the CMM
changes and test steps described in the applicable Sperry service
bulletin. For autopilot units manufactured with the actions of the
applicable Sperry service bulletin already incorporated, testing is
not required.
Exempt Conditions
(d) For airplanes with autopilots already modified prior to the
effective date of this AD in accordance with Sperry Service Bulletin
21-1132-121 or 21-1132-122: Only the AFM limitation specified in
paragraph (a) of this AD is required.
(e) For any airplane on which coupled approaches are not used:
Only the AFM limitation specified in paragraph (a) of this AD is
required, provided a flight deck placard is installed that states,
``Autopilot coupled ILS approach prohibited'' or equivalent, in
accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office (ACO), FAA. For a repair method to be approved
by the Manager, Seattle ACO, as required by this paragraph, the
Manager's approval letter must specifically reference this AD.
However, for any airplane placed into service that uses autopilot
coupled ILS approaches, the requirements of this AD must be
accomplished before the first flight when a coupled approach is
used.
Part Installation
(f) As of 6 months after the effective date of this AD, no
person may install on any airplane an autopilot pitch control
computer unless it has been modified in accordance with this AD.
Alternative Methods of Compliance
(g) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the
compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used if approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO, FAA. Operators shall
submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal
Operations or Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then
send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.
Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved
alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be
obtained from the Seattle ACO.
Special Flight Permits
(h) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with
sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14
CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where
the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
Incorporation by Reference
(i) Unless otherwise specified in this AD, the actions must be
done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-22A0093,
dated December 20, 2000; Sperry Service Bulletin 21-1132-121, dated
November 23, 1982; and Sperry Service Bulletin 21-1132-122, dated
February 7, 1983; as applicable. Only the first page of Sperry
Service Bulletins 21-1132-121 and 21-1132-122 contain the document
number; no other page of the documents contain this information.
This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the
Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part
51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, PO
Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. Copies may be inspected at
the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,
Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800
North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.
Effective Date
(j) This amendment becomes effective on July 16, 2003.
[[Page 34786]]
Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 28, 2003.
Vi L. Lipski,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 03-13976 Filed 6-10-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
Source: Official FAA Source ↗
Retrieved: Apr 6, 2026
Rights: U.S. Government Public Domain
This site is not affiliated with or endorsed by the FAA. Always verify with official sources.