AD 2001-26-15
Applicability
| Type | Manufacturer | Model | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-81 (MD-81) | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81, -82, -83, and -87 Series Airplanes, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-82 (MD-82) | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81, -82, -83, and -87 Series Airplanes, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-83 (MD-83) | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81, -82, -83, and -87 Series Airplanes, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-87 (MD-87) | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81, -82, -83, and -87 Series Airplanes, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | MD-88 | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81, -82, -83, and -87 Series Airplanes, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
Unsafe Condition
Insufficient clearance between wire assemblies and the ice protection airduct and airstair door interlock rod, leading to chafing and consequent arcing of wire assemblies. Such arcing could result in damage to electronic equipment and adjacent structures, or cause the insulation blankets to ignite, leading to smoke and fire in the flight deck and main cabin.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Required Actions
Perform a detailed visual inspection of certain wires to detect chafing and preload. Repair any detected issues as necessary. Modify certain wire assemblies to ensure adequate clearance.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Compliance Time
Before further flight
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Affected Aircraft
McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81, -82, -83, and -87 series airplanes, and Model MD-88 airplanes.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Federal Register Abstract
This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81, -82, -83, and - 87 series airplanes, and Model MD-88 airplanes, that requires a detailed visual inspection of certain wires to detect chafing and preload; repair, if necessary; and modification of certain wire assemblies. This action is necessary to prevent insufficient clearance between wire assemblies and the ice protection airduct and airstair door interlock rod; chafing; and consequent arcing of wire assemblies. Such arcing could result in damage to electronic equipment and adjacent structures, or cause the insulation blankets to ignite, which could result in smoke and fire in the flight deck and main cabin. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
Document Text
Show stored source text (verify against official source)
[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 3 (Friday, January 4, 2002)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 503-505]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 02-144]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. 2000-NM-161-AD; Amendment 39-12581; AD 2001-26-15]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81, -82, -
83, and -87 Series Airplanes, and Model MD-88 Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD),
applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81, -82, -83, and -
87 series airplanes, and Model MD-88 airplanes, that requires a
detailed visual inspection of certain wires to detect chafing and
preload; repair, if necessary; and modification of certain wire
assemblies. This action is necessary to prevent insufficient clearance
between wire assemblies and the ice protection airduct and airstair
door interlock rod; chafing; and consequent arcing of wire assemblies.
Such arcing could result in damage to electronic equipment and adjacent
structures, or cause the insulation blankets to ignite, which could
result in smoke and fire in the flight deck and main cabin. This action
is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
DATES: Effective February 8, 2002.
The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in
the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as
of February 8, 2002.
ADDRESSES: The service information referenced in this AD may be
obtained from Boeing Commercial Aircraft
[[Page 504]]
Group, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach,
California 90846, Attention: Data and Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A
(D800-0024). This information may be examined at the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules Docket,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Los Angeles
Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood,
California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol
Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elvin Wheeler, Aerospace Engineer,
Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft
Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California
90712-4137; telephone (562) 627-5344; fax (562) 627-5210.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness
directive (AD) that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model
DC-9-81, -82, -83, and -87 series airplanes, and Model MD-88 airplanes
was published in the Federal Register on June 5, 2001 (66 FR 30099).
That action proposed to require a detailed visual inspection of certain
wires to detect chafing and preload; repair, if necessary; and
modification of certain wire assemblies.
Comments
Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate
in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to
the comments received.
Request To Use a Previous Revision
One commenter request that the applicability of the proposed AD be
revised to exclude airplanes on which the airstairs have been removed
and the doors have been bolted shut. The commenter states that it is in
compliance with McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin MD80-24-126,
Revision 01, dated May 14, 1998. The commenter notes McDonnell Douglas
Alert Service Bulletin MD80-24A126, Revision 02, dated September 22,
1999 (which is referenced in the proposed AD as the appropriate source
of service information), requires additional work, consisting of moving
the airstair door to the open and closed position to ensure clearance
of wiring. Therefore, the commenter concludes that the additional work
in Revision 02 of the service bulletin is not necessary for its fleet.
The FAA does not agree with this commenter. A door bolted shut
would clearly not allow inspection for wire clearance with the door in
the open position. However, since the inspection required by this AD is
also for clearance when the door is in the full-closed position, that
part of the inspection would still be applicable. Also, additional
wires need to be inspected per Revision 02 of McDonnell Douglas Alert
Service Bulletin MD80-24A126. The fact that airplane structure has been
altered does not necessarily mean that an unsafe condition has been
eliminated or does not exist. Therefore, we find no change to the final
rule is necessary in this regard. However, under the provisions of
paragraph (b) of the final rule, we may consider requests for approval
of an alternative method of compliance if sufficient data are submitted
to substantiate that such a design change would provide an acceptable
level of safety.
Request for Change of Level of Inspection
The same commenter also requests that the term ``detailed visual
inspection'' be changed to ``visual inspection,'' because the Common
Support Data Dictionary (CSDD) has a specific definition of ``detailed
visual inspection'' and McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin MD80-24A126,
Revision 02, does not call for this level of inspection.
The FAA does not concur. The definition of the ``detailed visual
inspection'' specified in Note 2 of this AD is a standard definition
that is used in all ADs that require a detailed visual inspection. We
have determined that a detailed visual inspection is the appropriate
level of inspection to be carried out for the unsafe condition being
addressed.
Conclusion
After careful review of the available data, including the comments
noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public
interest require the adoption of the rule as proposed.
Cost Impact
There are approximately 1,037 Model DC-9-81, -82, -83, and -87
series airplanes, and Model MD-88 airplanes of the affected design in
the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 830 airplanes of U.S.
registry will be affected by this AD, that it will take approximately 1
work hour per airplane to accomplish the required detailed visual
inspection, and that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Based
on these figures, the cost impact of the inspection required by this AD
on U.S. operators is estimated to be $49,800, or $60 per airplane.
The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that
no operator has yet accomplished any of the requirements of this AD
action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the
future if this AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed
in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform
the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures
typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to
gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other
administrative actions.
Regulatory Impact
The regulations adopted herein will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it
is determined that this final rule does not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866;
(2) is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a
significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial
number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action
and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained
from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption
ADDRESSES.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
[[Page 505]]
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new
airworthiness directive:
2001-26-15 McDonnell Douglas: Amendment 39-12581. Docket 2000-NM-
161-AD.
Applicability: Model DC-9-81, -82, -83, and -87 series
airplanes, and Model MD-88 airplanes, as listed in McDonnell Douglas
Alert Service Bulletin MD80-24A126, Revision 02, dated September 22,
1999; certificated in any category.
Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the
preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been
modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the
requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified,
altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of
this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an
alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (b) of
this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of
the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition
addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been
eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to
address it.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished
previously.
To prevent smoke and fire in the flight deck and main cabin due
to insufficient clearance between wire assemblies and the ice
protection airduct and airstair door interlock rod; chafing; and
consequent arcing of wire assemblies, accomplish the following:
Inspection and Modification
(a) Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, perform
a detailed visual inspection of wire runs in the electrical/
equipment compartment to detect chafing and preload against the
airduct shroud assembly of the strake ice protection system and/or
airstair door interlock rod between stations Y=148.00 and Y=160.000,
in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin MD80-
24A126, Revision 02, dated September 22, 1999.
Note 2: For the purposes of this AD, a detailed visual
inspection is defined as: ``An intensive visual examination of a
specific structural area, system, installation, or assembly to
detect damage, failure, or irregularity. Available lighting is
normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at
intensity deemed appropriate by the inspector. Inspection aids such
as mirror, magnifying lenses, etc., may be used. Surface cleaning
and elaborate access procedures may be required.''
(1) If no chafed or preloaded wire is found, prior to further
flight, install spacers, sta-straps, and tie-back wire bundles, in
accordance with the service bulletin.
(2) If any chafed or preloaded wire is found, prior to further
flight, repair, and install spacers, sta-straps, and tie-back wire
bundles, in accordance with the service bulletin.
Alternative Methods of Compliance
(b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the
compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification
Office (ACO), FAA. Operators shall submit their requests through an
appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add
comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.
Note 3: Information concerning the existence of approved
alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be
obtained from the Los Angles ACO.
Special Flight Permit
(c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with
sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14
CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where
the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
Incorporation by Reference
(d) The actions shall be done in accordance with McDonnell
Douglas Alert Service Bulletin MD80-24A126, Revision 02, dated
September 22, 1999. This incorporation by reference was approved by
the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing
Commercial Aircraft Group, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood
Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and Service
Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024). Copies may be inspected at the
FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington; or at the FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification
Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California; or at the
Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite
700, Washington, DC.
Effective Date
(e) This amendment becomes effective on February 8, 2002.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on December 21, 2001.
Ali Bahrami,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 02-144 Filed 1-3-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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Retrieved: Apr 6, 2026
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