AD 2001-05-10

[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 55 (Wednesday, March 21, 2001)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 15785-15791]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 01-6282]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 99-NM-108-AD; Amendment 39-12147; AD 2001-05-10]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10 and MD-11 
Series Airplanes, and KC-10A (Military) Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), 
applicable to all McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10 and MD-11 series 
airplanes, and KC-10A (military) airplanes, that requires installation 
of thrust reverser interlocks on certain airplanes, inspections of the 
thrust reverser systems to detect discrepancies on certain other 
airplanes, and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment is 
prompted by a determination that the current thrust reverser systems do 
not adequately preclude unwanted deployment of a thrust reverser. The 
actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent unwanted 
deployment of a thrust reverser, which could result in reduced 
controllability of the airplane.

DATES: Effective April 25, 2001.
    The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in 
the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as 
of April 25, 2001.

ADDRESSES: The service information referenced in this AD may be 
obtained from Boeing Commercial Aircraft Group, Long Beach Division, 
3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: 
Technical Publications Business Administration, Dept. C1-L51 (2-60). 
This information may be examined at the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, 
SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft 
Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California; 
or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, 
NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Philip Kush, Aerospace Engineer, 
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification 
Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137; 
telephone (562) 627-5263; fax (562) 627-5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness 
directive (AD) that is applicable to all McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10 
and MD-11 series airplanes, and KC-10A (military) airplanes, was 
published in the Federal Register on November 30, 1999 (64 FR 66816). 
That action proposed to require installation of thrust reverser 
interlocks on certain airplanes, inspections of the thrust reverser 
systems to detect discrepancies on certain other airplanes, and 
corrective actions, if necessary.

Comments

    Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate 
in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to 
the comments received.
    All commenters agree with the intent of the proposed AD; however, 
some of them request that certain aspects of the proposed AD be 
revised.

Requests to Revise Certain Compliance Times

    Two commenters request that the proposed compliance time (i.e., 
within 1,500 flight hours or 6 months after the effective date of this 
AD, whichever occurs first) specified in paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) 
of the proposed AD be revised. One commenter suggests a compliance time 
of ``6,000 flight hours or 18 months, whichever occurs first.'' This 
commenter states that such an extension will allow the proposed actions 
to be done at a ``Light Check'' where special equipment and trained 
maintenance personnel will be available, if necessary, instead of 
during line maintenance. The second commenter suggests ``3,000 flight 
hours or 12 months after the AD effective date.'' This commenter states 
that such an extension will allow affected operators to do the proposed 
actions during a regularly scheduled maintenance interval, thereby 
preventing service disruptions.
    The FAA does not agree with the first commenter's request to extend 
the compliance time to ``6,000 flight hours or 18 months, whichever 
occurs first.'' However, we agree with the second commenter's request 
to extend the compliance time to ``within 3,000 flight hours or 12 
months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first.'' 
Extending the compliance time by an additional 1,500 flight hours or 6 
months will not adversely affect safety and will allow the actions 
required by paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this AD to be performed at 
a base during regularly scheduled maintenance where special equipment 
and trained maintenance personnel will be available if necessary. 
Extending the compliance time beyond 3,000 flight hours or 12 months 
after the effective date of this AD may affect safety. In addition, no 
information has been provided to justify the extension beyond this 
time. Therefore, we have revised paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of the 
final rule accordingly.
    One commenter requests that the compliance time specified in 
paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2) of the proposed AD be revised to include a 
grace period of ``or at the next scheduled [Certification

[[Page 15786]]

Maintenance Requirements (CMR)] check interval of 17,000 flight hours 
per CMR, Revision N, whichever occurs first.'' The commenter also 
requests that a grace period of ``or at the next scheduled CMR check 
interval of 13,800 flight hours per CMR, Revision N, whichever occurs 
first,'' be included in paragraph (h) of the proposed AD. The commenter 
states that these grace periods would ensure that previous CMR 
inspection intervals (i.e., 17,000 or 13,800 flight hours, as 
applicable) for the General Electric (GE) configuration documented in 
Boeing MD-11 CMR, Report Number MDC-K4174, Revision N, are not exceeded 
with the compliance time for the initial inspection specified in 
paragraphs (d)(1), (d)(2), and (h) of the proposed AD, as applicable.
    The FAA does not agree. The type certificate for these airplanes 
includes a CMR to perform this same inspection at intervals not to 
exceed 17,000 or 13,800 flight hours, respectively. This CMR is still 
in effect and must be complied with. If the CMR requires an inspection 
before the compliance time stated in paragraphs (d)(1), (d)(2) or (h) 
of this AD, as applicable, operators may take credit for doing the CMR, 
and then repeat the inspection at the intervals specified in the 
applicable paragraph. We have included new notes in the final rule to 
clarify this information.

Request to Revise Repetitive Inspection Intervals

    One commenter requests that a second interval of ``450 flight 
cycles, whichever occurs later,'' be added to the repetitive inspection 
intervals in paragraphs (d)(1), (e), (g)(1), and (g)(2) of the proposed 
AD. The commenter states that the deterioration of the entire thrust 
reverser system is mainly based on flight cycles rather than flight 
hours. The commenter states that this second interval would allow 
operators to fit the initial inspections interval into their A-check 
schedule.
    The FAA does not agree. Compliance times for AD's are normally 
based on a parameter related to failure of a particular component. In 
this case, latent (hidden) failures and consequent unwanted deployment 
of a thrust reverser in flight are undoubtedly related to the number of 
flight hours. Flight cycles do not take into account the wear and tear 
that the thrust reverser and associated wiring receive during the 
entire flight envelope. In addition, the safety analysis tools, 
supporting reliability data, and safety criteria to establish 
inspection intervals are based on flight hours. Furthermore, the FAA 
has not been provided with the necessary information to determine that 
there is an apparent direct relationship between flight-hour inspection 
intervals and flight-cycle inspection intervals.

Request to Reference Revision Q of Boeing MD-11 CMR

    One commenter requests that the proposed AD be revised to reference 
Revision Q of the Boeing MD-11 CMR. The commenter states that changes 
have been made recently to two MD-11 Airplane Maintenance Manual (AMM) 
references in the Boeing MD-11 CMR, Revision P, for the GE CF6-80C2D1F 
thrust reverser system. The commenter further described the exact 
changes. The commenter also states that it will release Revision Q of 
the Boeing MD-11 CMR to reflect the AMM changes.
    The FAA agrees. We have reviewed and approved pages 17 and 18 of 
Boeing MD-11 CMR, Report Number MDC-K4174, Revision Q, dated December 
22, 1999. The inspection and test procedures are identical to those 
described in Revision P of the Boeing MD-11 CMR [which was referenced 
in paragraph (d) of the NPRM as an appropriate source of service 
information]. The only change effected by Revision Q is to reference 
recently relocated sections of the McDonnell Douglas MD-11 AMM. 
Therefore, we have revised paragraph (d) of the final rule to include 
Revision Q of the Boeing MD-11 CMR as an additional source of service 
information.

Request to Delete Reference to a Certain Chapter of the MD-11 AMM

    One commenter requests that, in the bulleted list of documents 
under the heading ``Explanation of Relevant Service Information'' and 
paragraph (i)(1) of the proposed AD, the reference to Chapter 71 of 
McDonnell Douglas MD-11 AMM be deleted. The commenter states that all 
check procedures for the thrust reverser system now reside only in 
Chapter 78 of McDonnell Douglas MD-11 AMM.
    The FAA agrees. The FAA acknowledges that the corrective actions, 
if necessary, required by this AD are now only specified in Chapter 78 
of McDonnell Douglas MD-11 AMM. Therefore, we have deleted the 
reference to Chapter 71 in the bulleted list in paragraph (i)(1) of the 
final rule. The ``Explanation of Relevant Service Information'' section 
of the proposed AD does not reappear in the final rule. Operators 
should note that Boeing MD-11 CMR, Report Number MDC-K4174, Revision P, 
dated April 5, 1999, which is referenced in this AD as an appropriate 
source of service information for accomplishing the various inspections 
and checks required by this AD, does reference Chapter 71 of McDonnell 
Douglas MD-11 AMM as an additional source of service information for 
accomplishing those specific actions.

Request to Exclude Certain Part Numbers (P/N)

    One commenter requests that the phrase ``or subsequent'' be 
inserted after ``part number 1519M91P06'' in the applicability of 
paragraph (e) of the proposed AD. The FAA does not agree. The phrase 
``or subsequent'' will exclude affected Model MD-11 airplanes on which 
future electronic control units (ECU) in production would be installed 
from being subject to the requirements of paragraph (e) of this AD. 
Since the issuance of the NPRM, we have approved the following ECU P/
N's, which, if any one of them (including P/N 1519M91P06) is installed 
on an affected Model MD-11 airplane, would exclude that airplane from 
being subject to the requirements of paragraph (e) of this AD:
    <bullet> 1519M91P07
    <bullet> 1519M91P09
    <bullet> 1820M34P01
    <bullet> 1820M34P02
    <bullet> 1820M34P04
    Operators should note that the revision level and date on the above 
P/N's do not matter with regard to the applicability of paragraph (e) 
of this AD. Therefore, we have revised the applicability of paragraph 
(e) of this AD to exclude certain affected Model MD-11 airplanes 
equipped with the ECU's listed above installed. Operators of affected 
Model MD-11 airplanes equipped with a future ECU in production 
(approved after the publication of the AD) may request an alternative 
method of compliance with this AD under the provisions of paragraph (j) 
of the final rule.

Request to Include An Optional Terminating Action

    One commenter requests that the proposed AD be revised to include 
an optional terminating action for the repetitive detailed visual 
inspection and functional checks to detect failed open pressure 
switches on the hydraulic control unit required by paragraph (h) of the 
proposed AD. The commenter states that the procedures identified in 
Boeing MD-11 CMR, Report Number MDC-K4174, Revision P, dated April 5, 
1999; McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin MD11-31-085, Revision 01, 
dated April 9, 1998; and McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin MD11-78-
007, dated January 31, 2000; eliminate the need for the repetitive 
inspections and functional

[[Page 15787]]

checks of the pressure switch and wiring of the hydraulic control unit.
    The FAA does not agree. No technical justification, criteria, or 
data were submitted to support the commenter's request. At this time, 
the FAA cannot determine whether the commenter's request is applicable. 
However, the FAA may approve requests for an alternative method of 
compliance under the provisions of paragraph (j) of this AD if 
sufficient data are submitted to substantiate that such a design change 
would provide an acceptable level of safety.

Request to Revise Descriptive Language

    One commenter notes that a sentence under the heading ``Explanation 
of Relevant Service Information'' reads ``These procedures also include 
inspections to detect failed open pressure switches on the hydraulic 
control unit, failed stow position microswitches, or failed locking 
mechanisms.'' The commenter also notes that paragraph (h) of the 
proposed AD reads ``* * * to detect failed stow position 
microswitches.'' The commenter requests that the phrase ``and their 
associated wiring'' be inserted after the word ``microswitches'' in 
both places in the proposed AD.
    The FAA agrees that the commenter's suggestion is a more accurate 
description of the inspection area. We have revised paragraph (h) of 
the final rule accordingly. The ``Explanation of Relevant Service 
Information'' section of the proposed AD does not reappear in the final 
rule.

Request to Mandate Reporting

    One commenter requests that the proposed AD require operators to 
submit to Boeing the inspection record (i.e., Attachment A) in 
McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin DC10-78A056, Revision 02, 
dated February 18, 1999, and McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin 
DC10-78A057, Revision 01, dated February 18, 1999, for the applicable 
initial inspections required by the proposed AD. Reports from 
subsequent inspections should be at an operator's discretion. The 
commenter states that the data obtained from the reports would enhance 
the reliability database for the DC-10 thrust reverser system.
    The FAA does not agree. The FAA finds it appropriate to leave it to 
the operators' discretion to report inspection findings to Boeing. 
Since the suggested change would alter the actions currently required 
by this AD, additional rulemaking would be required. The FAA finds that 
to delay this action would be inappropriate in light of the identified 
unsafe condition. No change to this final rule is necessary.

Requests to Revise Cost Impact

    One commenter notes that, under the heading ``Cost Impact,'' the 
proposed AD states that, for McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-10, -15, -
30, and -40 series airplanes and KC-10A (military) airplanes that are 
listed in McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin DC10-78A056, 
Revision 02, dated February 18, 1999, it would take approximately 5 
work hours per airplane to accomplish the required actions related to 
this service bulletin. The commenter states that the proposed actions 
will take approximately 16 work hours per engine or 48 work hours per 
airplane. The commenter also states that maintenance access for the No. 
2 engine on the subject airplanes requires specific stand access. 
Another commenter states that these proposed actions will take 
approximately 26 work hours per airplane to accomplish and five hours 
to do the actions specified in McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin 
DC10-78A056, Revision 02, and 21 work hours to do the actions specified 
in Middle River Aircraft Systems (MRAS) CF606 Service Bulletin S/B 78-
2004, Revision 1, dated December 18, 1997, or MRAS CF6-50 Service 
Bulletin S/B 78-3001, Revision 2, dated December 18, 1997.
    One commenter states that, for Model MD-11 airplanes equipped with 
General Electric (GE) or Pratt & Whitney (P&W) engines, the proposed 
actions will take approximately 10 work hours per airplane. Under the 
heading ``Cost Impact,'' the proposed AD indicates 6 work hours per 
airplane equipped with GE engines and 31 work hours per airplane 
equipped with P&W engines.
    After considering the information presented by commenters, the FAA 
agrees that the subject work hours in the cost impact information, 
below, should be revised. We have revised the work hours in the final 
rule as suggested by the commenters. The economic analysis, however, is 
limited only to the cost of actions actually required by the rule. It 
does not consider the costs of ``on condition actions, e.g., repair, if 
necessary,'' since those actions would be required to be accomplished, 
regardless of AD direction, in order to correct an unsafe condition 
identified in an airplane and to ensure operation of that airplane in 
an airworthy condition, as required by the Federal Aviation 
Regulations.
    One commenter states that, for Model DC-10-40 series airplanes that 
are listed in McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin DC10-78A057, 
Revision 01, dated February 18, 1999, the proposed actions will take 48 
work hours per airplane, rather than the 31 work hours specified under 
the heading ``Cost Impact.''
    The FAA does not agree. The cost impact information, below, 
describes only the ``direct'' costs of the specific actions required by 
this AD. The number of work hours necessary to accomplish the required 
actions, specified as 31 in the cost impact information, below, was 
provided by the manufacturer in McDonnell Douglas Alert Service 
Bulletin DC10-78A057, Revision 01, as the best data available to date. 
This number represents the time necessary to perform only the actions 
actually required by this AD. The FAA recognizes that, in accomplishing 
the requirements of any AD, operators may incur ``incidental'' costs in 
addition to the ``direct'' costs. The cost analysis in AD rulemaking 
actions, however, typically does not include incidental costs, such as 
the time required to gain access and close up; planning time; or time 
necessitated by other administrative actions. Because incidental costs 
may vary significantly from operator to operator, they are almost 
impossible to calculate.
    One commenter notes that, under the heading ``Cost Impact,'' the 
proposed AD states that five McDonnell Model MD-11 airplanes equipped 
with P&W engines of U.S. registry would be affected by the proposed AD. 
The commenter states that it has 15 affected airplanes. Another 
commenter states that the number of McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 
airplanes equipped with GE engines of U.S. Registry that would be 
affected by the proposed AD is also incorrect; the correct number is 
approximately 81 (not including hull losses). From these comments, the 
FAA infers that the commenters are requesting that the number of 
airplanes be revised in the appropriate sentence under the heading 
``Cost Impact.''
    The FAA agrees with the commenters to update the number of affected 
airplanes. However, we have confirmed with operators that there are 110 
Model MD-11 airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet 
that are equipped with GE engines, of which, 85 are on the U.S. 
registry. There are 81 Model MD-11 airplanes of the affected design in 
the worldwide fleet that are equipped with P&W engines, of which, 29 
are on the U.S. registry. Therefore, we have revised the final rule 
accordingly.
    One commenter requests that, in the second paragraph under the 
heading ``Cost Impact'' and paragraph (b), ``-40'' be deleted in the 
first sentence. The commenter states that McDonnell Douglas Alert 
Service Bulletin DC10-

[[Page 15788]]

78A056, Revision 02, dated February 18, 1999 (which is referenced in 
that paragraph as the appropriate source of service information for 
determining the affected airplanes), is only applicable to those 
affected models equipped with GE engines. Model DC-10-40 series 
airplanes are powered by P&W engines. The FAA agrees and has revised 
the final rule accordingly.

Explanation of Changes Made to Proposed AD

    For clarification purposes, the FAA has revised the reference to 
the Boeing MD-11 CMR to include its associated Report Number MDC-K4174. 
The proposed AD referenced the incorrect date of the original version 
of McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin DC10-78A056. We have 
revised the date of that service bulletin from January 1, 1998, to 
January 19, 1998, in the final rule. In addition, we have made some 
minor editorial changes to the body of the AD to incorporate the use of 
plain language.

Conclusion

    After careful review of the available data, including the comments 
noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public 
interest require the adoption of the rule with the changes previously 
described. The FAA has determined that these changes will neither 
increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of 
the AD.

Interim Action

    For all Model DC-10 series airplanes, this is considered to be 
interim action. The manufacturer has advised that it currently is 
developing a modification that will positively address the unsafe 
condition addressed by this AD. Once this modification is developed, 
approved, and available, the FAA may consider additional rulemaking.

Cost Impact

    There are approximately 259 Model DC-10-10, -30, and -40 series 
airplanes and KC-10A (military) airplanes of the affected design in the 
worldwide fleet that are listed in McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service 
Bulletin 78-40, Revision 1, dated July 24, 1979. The FAA estimates that 
135 airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected by this AD, that it 
will take approximately 10 work hours per airplane to accomplish the 
required actions related to this service bulletin, and that the average 
labor rate is $60 per work hour. The required parts will be obtained 
from the operator's stock. Based on these figures, the cost impact of 
this portion of the AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $81,000, or 
$600 per airplane.
    There are approximately 359 Model DC-10-10, -15, and -30 series 
airplanes and KC-10A (military) airplanes of the affected design in the 
worldwide fleet that are listed in McDonnell Douglas Alert Service 
Bulletin DC10-78A056, Revision 02, dated February 18, 1999. The FAA 
estimates that 187 airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected by this 
AD, that it will take approximately 26 work hours per airplane to 
accomplish the required actions related to this service bulletin, and 
that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Based on these 
figures, the cost impact of this portion of the AD on U.S. operators is 
estimated to be $291,720, or $1,560 per airplane, per inspection cycle.
    There are approximately 41 Model DC-10-40 series airplanes of the 
affected design in the worldwide fleet that are listed in McDonnell 
Douglas Alert Service Bulletin DC10-78A057, Revision 01, dated February 
18, 1999. The FAA estimates that 22 airplanes of U.S. registry will be 
affected by this AD, that it will take approximately 31 work hours per 
airplane to accomplish the required actions related to this service 
bulletin, and that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Based 
on these figures, the cost impact of this portion of the AD on U.S. 
operators is estimated to be $40,920, or $1,860 per airplane, per 
inspection cycle.
    There are approximately 110 Model MD-11 airplanes of the affected 
design in the worldwide fleet that are equipped with GE engines. The 
FAA estimates that 85 airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected by 
this AD, that it will take approximately 10 work hours per airplane to 
accomplish the required actions, and that the average labor rate is $60 
per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of this portion 
of the AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $51,000, or $600 per 
airplane, per inspection cycle.
    There are approximately 81 Model MD-11 airplanes of the affected 
design in the worldwide fleet that are equipped with P&W engines. The 
FAA estimates that 29 airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected by 
this AD, that it will take approximately 10 work hours per airplane to 
accomplish the required actions, and that the average labor rate is $60 
per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of this portion 
of the AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $17,400, or $600 per 
airplane, per inspection cycle.
    The cost impact figures discussed above are based on assumptions 
that no operator has yet accomplished any of the requirements of this 
AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the 
future if this AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed 
in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform 
the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures 
typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to 
gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other 
administrative actions.

Regulatory Impact

    The regulations adopted herein will not have a substantial direct 
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national 
Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it 
is determined that this final rule does not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is 
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866; 
(2) is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a 
significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial 
number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action 
and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained 
from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption 
ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of 
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec. 39.13  [Amended]

    2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new 
airworthiness directive:

2001-05-10  McDonnell Douglas: Amendment 39-12147. Docket 99-NM-108-
AD.


[[Page 15789]]


    Applicability: All Model DC-10 series airplanes, MD-11 series 
airplanes, and KC-10A (military) airplanes; certificated in any 
category.

    Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the 
preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been 
modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the 
requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, 
altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of 
this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an 
alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (j) of 
this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of 
the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition 
addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been 
eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to 
address it.

    Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished 
previously.
    To prevent unwanted deployment of the thrust reverser, which 
could result in reduced controllability of the airplane, accomplish 
the following:

Modification of Certain Model DC-10 Series Airplanes

    (a) For Model DC-10-10, -30, and -40 series airplanes listed in 
McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 78-40, Revision 1, dated 
July 24, 1979: Within 3,000 flight hours or 12 months after the 
effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, install a thrust 
reverser interlock (in-flight lockout) by installing two relays on 
the forward relay panel and revising the associated wiring, per the 
service bulletin. The requirements of this paragraph must be done 
before or with the requirements of paragraph (b) or (c) of this AD, 
as applicable.

Inspection of Model DC-10 Airplanes Powered by General Electric Engines

    (b) For DC-10-10, -15, and -30 series airplanes listed in 
McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin DC10-78A056, Revision 02, 
dated February 18, 1999: Within 3,000 flight hours or 12 months 
after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, do a 
detailed visual inspection, functional check, and torque checks of 
the thrust reverser system and the thrust reverser interlocks to 
detect discrepancies [i.e., below minimum torque required to 
overcome the pneumatic drive motor (PDM) disc brake; cuts, tears, or 
missing sections of the translating cowl seals; dents, cracks, 
holes, or loose fasteners on the Dagmar fairing or aft frame; 
improper alignment of the feedback rod; hidden faults in the 
translating cowl auto re-stow system; a failed over pressure shutoff 
valve (OPSOV); and improper operation of the fan reverser actuation 
system], per the service bulletin. Repeat the inspections thereafter 
every 6,000 flight hours or 18 months, whichever occurs first.

    Note 2: For the purposes of this AD, a detailed visual 
inspection is defined as: ``An intensive visual examination of a 
specific structural area, system, installation, or assembly to 
detect damage, failure, or irregularity. Available lighting is 
normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at 
intensity deemed appropriate by the inspector. Inspection aids such 
as mirror, magnifying lenses, etc., may be used. Surface cleaning 
and elaborate access procedures may be required.''


    Note 3: Inspection of the thrust reverser system accomplished 
before the effective date of this AD per McDonnell Douglas Alert 
Service Bulletin DC10-78A056, dated January 19, 1998, or Revision 
01, dated June 4, 1998, is considered acceptable for compliance with 
the initial inspections required by paragraph (b) of this AD.


    Note 4: McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin DC10-78A056, 
Revision 02, dated February 18, 1999, references Middle River 
Aircraft Systems (MRAS) Service Bulletin 78-3001, Revision 2, dated 
December 18, 1997, and MRAS Service Bulletin 78-2004, Revision 1, 
dated December 18, 1997, as additional sources of service 
information for accomplishment of the inspections and corrective 
actions.

Inspection of Model DC-10-40 Series Airplanes Powered by Pratt & 
Whitney Engines

    (c) For Model DC-10-40 series airplanes listed in McDonnell 
Douglas Alert Service Bulletin DC10-78A057, Revision 01, dated 
February 18, 1999: Within 3,000 flight hours or 12 months after the 
effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, do a detailed 
visual inspection, functional check, and torque checks of the thrust 
reverser system to detect discrepancies [i.e. damaged or improperly 
functioning stow latch hooks; cuts, gouges, and holes in the 
pneumatic seal/bullnose seal; improper functioning of the pneumatic 
drive unit (PDU) position locking retention feature; improper 
installation or improper operation of the system wiring, switches, 
or indicator lights; damage to the fan reverser flexshafts, 
actuators, translating sleeve tracks, or sliders; improper function 
of the in-flight interlock system; and improper operation of the 
thrust reverser power source, translating sleeve, throttle 
interlocks, or cockpit indicators], per the service bulletin. Repeat 
the inspections thereafter every 6,000 flight hours or 18 months, 
whichever occurs first.

    Note 5: Inspection of the thrust reverser system per McDonnell 
Douglas Alert Service Bulletin DC10-78A057, dated November 30, 1998, 
accomplished before the effective date of this AD, is considered 
acceptable for initial compliance with the applicable action 
specified in paragraph (c) of this AD.

Inspection of Model MD-11 Series Airplanes Powered by General Electric 
Engines

    (d) For Model MD-11 series airplanes equipped with General 
Electric engines: Do a detailed visual inspection and functional 
check of the two position microswitches on the Center Drive Unit 
(CDU) and their associated wiring to detect failed open switches or 
open wire runs, and the aerodynamic seal between the reverser 
translating sleeves and the main reverser structure to detect damage 
to the aerodynamic seal or its interface surface on the reverser 
structure; and do an inspection to determine the torque value of the 
cone brake within the CDU to detect slipping or a failed CDU brake. 
These inspections and the functional check shall be done per pages 
17 and 18 of the Boeing MD-11 Certification Maintenance Requirements 
(CMR), Report Number MDC-K4174, Revision P, dated April 5, 1999, or 
Revision Q, dated December 22, 1999; at the times specified in 
paragraph (d)(1) or (d)(2) of this AD, as applicable.
    (1) For airplanes on which the modification (i.e., translating 
cowl double P-seal configuration) specified in MRAS CF6-80C2D1F 
Alert Service Bulletin 78A1005, dated March 29, 1995; Revision 1, 
dated June 6, 1996; Revision 2, dated October 18, 1996; Revision 3, 
dated August 18, 1997; or Revision 4, dated December 21, 1998; has 
been accomplished: Inspect within 7,000 flight hours after the 
effective date of this AD. Repeat the inspections thereafter every 
7,000 flight hours.
    (2) For airplanes on which the modification (i.e., translating 
cowl double P-seal configuration) specified in MRAS Service Bulletin 
78A1005, dated March 29, 1995; Revision 1, dated June 6, 1996; 
Revision 2, dated October 18, 1996; Revision 3, dated August 18, 
1997; or Revision 4, dated December 21, 1998; has not been 
accomplished: Inspect within 2,000 flight hours after the effective 
date of this AD. Repeat the inspections thereafter every 2,000 
flight hours.

    Note 6: The type certificate for these airplanes includes a CMR 
to perform this same inspection at intervals not to exceed 17,000 
flight hours. This CMR is still in effect and must be complied with. 
If the CMR requires an inspection before the compliance time stated 
in paragraph (d)(1) or (d)(2) of the AD, as applicable, operators 
may take credit for doing the CMR, and then repeat the inspection at 
the intervals specified in that applicable paragraph.

    (e) For Model MD-11 series airplanes equipped with General 
Electric engines, without an electronic control unit (ECU) listed in 
Table 1 installed: Within 2,000 flight hours after the effective 
date of this AD, test the thrust reverser pressurization system to 
detect an uncommanded pressurized thrust reverser system and/or a 
failed thrust reverser pressure switch, as applicable, per pages 52 
and 53 of the Boeing MD-11 CMR, Report Number MDC-K4174, Revision P, 
dated April 5, 1999. Repeat the inspections thereafter every 2,000 
flight hours. Table 1 is as follows:

                                 Table 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 ECU P/N
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1519M91P06
1519M91P07
1519M91P09
1820M34P01
1820M34P02
1820M34P04
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (f) For Model MD-11 series airplanes equipped with General 
Electric engines: Within 7,000 flight hours after the effective date 
of this AD, inspect the thrust reverser in-flight lockout system 
(IFLS) to detect failure

[[Page 15790]]

of the flight control computer (FCC), radio altimeter input to the 
FCC, main landing gear wheel speed input to the FCC, ground sensing 
system, or wiring that causes an on-ground status in the IFLS while 
the airplane is airborne, per page 54 of the Boeing MD-11 CMR, 
Report Number MDC-K4174, Revision P, dated April 5, 1999. Repeat the 
inspections thereafter every 7,000 flight hours.
    (g) For Model MD-11 series airplanes equipped with General 
Electric engines: Within 600 flight hours after the effective date 
of this AD, accomplish the actions specified in paragraph (g)(1), 
(g)(2), or (g)(3) of this AD per MRAS CF6-80C2D1F Alert Service 
Bulletin 78A1082, dated August 25, 1999.
    (1) Perform a pressure differential inspection of the 
directional pilot valves (DPV) to detect a partially open solenoid 
or failed O-ring. If any partially open solenoid or failed O-ring is 
detected, before further flight, replace the discrepant DPV with a 
DPV that has been inspected per this paragraph. Repeat the 
inspection thereafter every 2,000 flight hours. Or
    (2) Replace the DPV with a DPV that has been inspected per 
paragraph (g)(1) of this AD. Repeat the replacement thereafter every 
2,000 flight hours. Or
    (3) Deactivate the thrust reverser per the MD-11 Master Minimum 
Equipment List, and reactivate the thrust reverser only after 
accomplishing the actions specified in paragraph (g)(1) or (g)(2) of 
this AD.

Inspection of Model MD-11 Series Airplanes Powered by Pratt & Whitney 
Engines

    (h) For MD-11 series airplanes equipped with Pratt & Whitney 
engines: Within 7,000 flight hours after the effective date of this 
AD, do a detailed visual inspection and functional checks, as 
applicable, of the thrust reverser system and the thrust reverser 
IFLS to detect failed open pressure switches on the hydraulic 
control unit, to detect failed stow position microswitches and 
associated wiring, or failed locking mechanisms; and failure of the 
FCC, radio altimeter input to the FCC, main landing gear wheel speed 
input to the FCC, ground sensing system, or wiring that causes an 
on-ground status in the IFLS while the aircraft is airborne, per 
pages 19, 20, and 54 of the Boeing MD-11 CMR, Report Number MDC-
K4174, Revision P, dated April 5, 1999. Repeat the inspections 
thereafter every 7,000 flight hours.

    Note 7: The type certificate for these airplanes includes a CMR 
to perform this same inspection at intervals not to exceed 13,800 
flight hours. This CMR is still in effect and must be complied with. 
If the CMR requires an inspection before the compliance time stated 
in paragraph (h) of the AD, operators may take credit for doing the 
CMR, and then repeat the inspection at the intervals specified in 
that paragraph.

Corrective Actions

    (i) If any discrepancy is detected during any inspection 
required by this AD, before further flight, do the actions specified 
in either paragraph (i)(1) or (i)(2) of this AD.
    (1) Do the applicable corrective action per the following 
service documents:
    (i) Chapter 78 of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Aircraft Maintenance 
Manual;
    (ii) Chapter 78 of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Turn Around Fault 
Isolation Manual; Chapter 78 of General Electric Shop Manual;
    (iii) MRAS CF6-6 Service Bulletin 78-2004, Revision 1, dated 
December 18, 1997;
    (iv) MRAS CF6-50 Service Bulletin 78-3001 Revision 2, dated 
December 18, 1997;
    (v) McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin DC10-78A056, dated 
January 19, 1998, Revision 01, dated June 4, 1998, or Revision 02, 
dated February 18, 1999;
    (vi) McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin DC10-78A057, dated 
November 30, 1998, or Revision 01, dated February 18, 1999;
    (vii) Chapter 78 of McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Aircraft Maintenance 
Manual;
    (viii) Chapter 78 of McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Fault Isolation 
Manual; or
    (ix) A method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft 
Certification Office (ACO), FAA.
    (2) Deactivate the thrust reverser in accordance with the DC-10 
Master Minimum Equipment List or the MD-11 Master Minimum Equipment 
List, as applicable.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

    (j) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the 
compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be 
used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO, FAA. Operators 
shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal 
Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the 
Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

    Note 8: Information concerning the existence of approved 
alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be 
obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.

Special Flight Permits

    (k) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with 
sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 
CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where 
the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Incorporation by Reference

    (l) Except as provided by paragraphs (i)(1) and (i)(2) of this 
AD, the actions shall be done per the applicable service bulletins 
identified in Table 2, which contain the specified list of effective 
pages. Table 2 is as follows:

                                                     Table 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Revision level shown on
          Document and date                  Page numbers                 page              Date shown on page
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service        1-20...................  1......................  July 24, 1979.
 Bulletin 78-40, Revision 1, July 24,
 1979.
McDonnell Douglas Alert Service        1-15...................  02.....................  February 18, 1999.
 Bulletin DC10-78A056, Revision 02,
 February 18, 1999.
Attachment A.........................  1-4....................  02.....................  February 18, 1999.
McDonnell Douglas Alert Service        1-42...................  01.....................  February 18, 1999.
 Bulletin DC10-78A057, Revision 01,
 February 18, 1999.
Attachment A.........................  1-4....................  01.....................  February 18, 1999.
Boeing MD-11 Certification             List of Effective Pages  P (Only indicated on     April 5, 1999 (Only
 Maintenance Requirements, Report       Pages LIST-1 through     the cover page; no       indicated on the cover
 Number MDC-K4174, Revision P, April    LIST-2.                  other page contains      page; no other page of
 5, 1999.                                                        this information).       the document is
                                                                                          dated).
Boeing MD-11 Certification             List of Effective Pages  Q (Only indicated on     December 22, 1999 (Only
 Maintenance Requirements, Report       Pages LIST-1 through     the cover page; no       indicated on the cover
 Number MDC-K4174, Revision Q,          LIST-2.                  other page contains      page; no other page of
 December 22, 1999.                                              this information).       the document is
                                                                                          dated).
Middle River Aircraft Systems CF6-     1-15...................  Original...............  August 25, 1999.
 80C2D1F Alert Service Bulletin
 78A1082, August 25, 1999.

[[Page 15791]]

 
Middle River Aircraft Systems CF6-6    1-36...................  1......................  December 18, 1997.
 Service Bulletin 78-2004, Revision
 1, December 18, 1997.
Middle River Aircraft Systems CF6-50   1-43...................  2......................  December 18, 1997.
 Service Bulletin 78-3001, Revision
 2, December 18, 1997.
McDonnell Douglas Alert Service        1-15...................  Original...............  January 19, 1998.
 Bulletin DC10-78A056, January 19,
 1998.
Attachment A.........................  1-4....................  Original...............  December 17, 1997.
McDonnell Douglas Alert Service        1-15...................  01.....................  June 4, 1998.
 Bulletin DC10-78A056, Revision 01,
 June 4, 1998.
McDonnell Douglas Alert Service        1-41...................  Original...............  November 30, 1998.
 Bulletin DC10-78A057, November 30,
 1998.
Attachment A.........................  1-4....................  Original...............  November 30, 1998.
McDonnell Douglas Alert Service        1-42...................  01.....................  February 18, 1999.
 Bulletin DC10-78A057, Revision 01,
 February 18, 1999.
Attachment A.........................  1-4....................  01.....................  February 18, 1999.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of 
the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 
part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Aircraft 
Group, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, 
California 90846, Attention: Technical Publications Business 
Administration, Dept. C1-L51 (2-60). Copies may be inspected at the 
FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Los 
Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, 
Lakewood, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 
North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

Effective Date

    (m) This amendment becomes effective on April 25, 2001.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 7, 2001.
Vi L. Lipski,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 01-6282 Filed 3-20-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-U