AD 2000-15-15
final rule
Applicability
| Type | Manufacturer | Model | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | 717-200 | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-11 | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-12 | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-13 | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-14 | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-15 | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-15F | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-21 | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-31 | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-32 | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-32 (VC-9C) | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-32F | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-32F (C-9A) | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-32F (C-9B) | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-33F | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-34 | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-34F | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-41 | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-51 | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-81 (MD-81) | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-82 (MD-82) | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-83 (MD-83) | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | DC-9-87 (MD-87) | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | MD-88 | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
| aircraft | The Boeing Company | MD-90-30 | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes |
Unsafe Condition
Presence of metallic particles (including slivers, dust, shavings, and flakes) in the jackscrew assembly and surrounding area of the horizontal stabilizer, which could lead to excessive wear and loss of pitch trim capability.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Required Actions
Inspect the jackscrew assembly and surrounding area for metallic particles; perform follow-on actions including repetitive inspections, testing of horizontal shutoff controls, and lubrication; take corrective actions such as removing dirt/grease, performing wear checks, adjusting systems, and replacing the jackscrew assembly if necessary.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Compliance Time
Within 650 flight hours for initial inspection, with subsequent inspections every 2,000 flight hours.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Affected Aircraft
McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 airplanes.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Federal Register Abstract
This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 airplanes, that currently requires inspecting the general condition of the jackscrew assembly and the area around the jackscrew assembly to detect the presence of metal shavings and flakes. This amendment also requires inspecting for metallic particles in the lubrication for the jackscrew assembly of the horizontal stabilizer and surrounding area to detect any discrepancy; follow-on actions; and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by numerous reports from operators that indicate instances of metallic shavings in the vicinity of the jackscrew assembly and gimbal nut of the horizontal stabilizer. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent loss of pitch trim capability due to excessive wear of the jackscrew assembly of the horizontal stabilizer, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
Document Text
Show stored source text (verify against official source)
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 153 (Tuesday, August 8, 2000)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 48355-48358]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 00-19671]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. 2000-NM-89-AD; Amendment 39-11847; AD 2000-15-15]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-
90-30, Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.
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SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive
(AD), applicable to all McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30,
Model 717-200, and Model MD-88 airplanes, that currently requires
inspecting the general condition of the jackscrew assembly and the area
around the jackscrew assembly to detect the presence of metal shavings
and flakes. This amendment also requires inspecting for metallic
particles in the lubrication for the jackscrew assembly of the
horizontal stabilizer and surrounding area to detect any discrepancy;
follow-on actions; and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment
is prompted by numerous reports from operators that indicate instances
of metallic shavings in the vicinity of the jackscrew assembly and
gimbal nut of the horizontal stabilizer. The actions specified in this
AD are intended to prevent loss of pitch trim capability due to
excessive wear of the jackscrew assembly of the horizontal stabilizer,
which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
DATES: Effective August 23, 2000.
The incorporation by reference of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
DC9-27A362, Revision 02, dated March 30, 2000; Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin MD90-27A034, Revision 02, dated March 30, 2000; and Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin 717-27A0002, Revision 02, dated March 30, 2000;
as listed in the regulations; is approved by the Director of the
Federal Register as of August 23, 2000.
The incorporation by reference of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
DC9-27A362, dated February 11, 2000; Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
MD90-27A034, dated February 11, 2000; and Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
717-27A0002, dated February 11, 2000; as listed in the regulations; was
approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of March
6, 2000 (65 FR 10379, February 28, 2000).
Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or
before October 10, 2000.
ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114,
Attention: Rules Docket No. 2000- NM-89-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,
Renton, Washington 98055-4056. Comments sent via the Internet as
attached electronic files must be formatted in Microsoft Word 97 for
Windows or ASCII text.
The service information referenced in this AD may be obtained from
The Boeing Company, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long
Beach, California 90846, Attention: Technical Publications Business
Administration, Dept. C1-L52 (2-60). This information may be examined
at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,
Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los
Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard,
Lakewood, California 90712-4137; or at the Office of the Federal
Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mike Lee, Aerospace Engineer,
Structures Branch, ANM-120L, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los
Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard,
Lakewood, California 90712-4137; telephone (562) 627-5325; fax (562)
627-5210.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On February 17, 2000, the FAA issued AD
2000-03-51, amendment 39-11595 (65 FR 10379, February 28, 2000),
applicable to all McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model
717-200, and Model MD-88 airplanes, to require inspecting the general
condition of the jackscrew assembly and the area around the jackscrew
assembly to detect the presence of metal shavings and flakes. That
action was prompted by a report from an operator that indicated two
instances of metallic shavings in the vicinity of the jackscrew
assembly and gimbal nut of the horizontal stabilizer. The actions
required by that AD are intended to prevent loss of pitch trim
capability due to excessive wear of the jackscrew assembly of the
horizontal stabilizer, which could result in loss of vertical control
of the airplane.
Actions Since Issuance of Previous Rule
Since the issuance of AD 2000-03-51, the FAA has received numerous
reports of incidents in which metallic particles (including slivers and
dust, as well as shavings and flakes) were found imbedded within the
grease on the threaded portion of the jackscrew assembly of the
horizontal stabilizer actuator and on the area directly below the
jackscrew assembly. Findings by the manufacturer indicate that such
metallic particles can be identified as a non-magnetic metallic
substance which is golden in color.
New Service Information
Since the issuance of the previous rule, the FAA has reviewed and
approved the following new Boeing Alert Service Bulletins, which have
been approved as alternative methods of compliance to the requirements
of AD 2000-03-51:
<bullet> DC9-27A362, Revision 02, dated March 30, 2000 (for Model
DC-9 and Model MD-88 airplanes);
<bullet> MD90-27A034, Revision 02, dated March 30, 2000 (for Model
MD-90-30 airplanes); and
<bullet> 717-27A0002, Revision 02, dated March 30, 2000 (for Model
717-200 airplanes).
Revision 02 of the alert service bulletins revises certain
procedures included in the original issue of the alert service
bulletins, which were referenced in AD 2000-03-51 as the appropriate
sources of service information. Revision 02 describes new procedures
for detailed visual inspections to detect the presence of metallic
particles (including slivers and dust, as well as shavings and flakes)
in the lubrication for the jackscrew assembly. In addition, Revision 02
revises certain follow-on and corrective actions. Follow-on actions
include performing repetitive inspections, testing the horizontal
shutoff controls, and lubricating the jackscrew of the horizontal
stabilizer actuator. Corrective actions include removing dirt/grease
from exposed jackscrew threads, performing wear checks of the jackscrew
(endplay and freeplay checks), adjusting the trim system and shutoff
control system of the horizontal stabilizer, and replacing the
jackscrew assembly of the horizontal stabilizer actuator with a new or
serviceable unit.
[[Page 48356]]
Revision 02 also revises certain replacement procedures. For
certain discrepancies, although the original issue of the alert service
bulletins specifies replacement of the jackscrew assembly with a new or
serviceable assembly, Revision 02 specifies such replacement action
only if the wear check results are found to be outside specified
limits.
Revision 02 describes procedures for follow-on and corrective
actions, if necessary, following accomplishment of the inspection of
the horizontal stabilizer actuator jackscrew and nut specified in Phase
2 of the Accomplishment Instructions. The original issue of the alert
service bulletins did not specifically include the follow-on and
corrective actions; however, the original issue referenced certain
airplane maintenance manuals as additional sources of service
information for accomplishing the follow-on and corrective actions, as
well as the inspection.
FAA's Determination
In consideration of new findings by the manufacturer regarding the
types of material found in the jackscrew assembly of the horizontal
stabilizer since issuance of AD 2000-03-51, the FAA has determined that
the required inspections should be expanded to include metallic
particles such as slivers and dust, as well as the metal shavings and
flakes identified in AD 2000-03-51. The inspections, tests, and follow-
on and corrective actions of the applicable alert service bulletins
described previously are intended to minimize the possibility of
failure of the horizontal stabilizer jackscrew assembly to maintain
controllability of the airplane.
In addition, the FAA has determined that it is necessary for
operators to report the results of the endplay checks required by
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD to the manufacturer. These results
are necessary to provide information regarding the wear rates of the
jackscrew assembly. The FAA will use these data to confirm that the
repetitive intervals of 650 flight hours, as specified by paragraph (a)
of this AD, and the repetitive intervals of 2,000 flight hours, as
specified by paragraph (b) of this AD, are appropriate compliance times
for accomplishment of the endplay check and are adequate for ensuring
the safety of the fleet.
Explanation of Requirements of Rule
Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to
exist or develop on other airplanes of this same type design, this AD
supersedes AD 2000-03-51. This AD continues to require inspecting the
general condition of the jackscrew assembly and the area around the
jackscrew assembly to detect the presence of metal shavings and flakes.
This amendment also requires inspecting for metallic particles
(including slivers and dust, as well as shavings and flakes) in the
lubrication for the jackscrew assembly of the horizontal stabilizer and
surrounding area to detect any discrepancy; follow-on actions; and
corrective actions, if necessary. The actions are required to be
accomplished in accordance with the alert service bulletins described
previously. This AD also requires operators to submit the results of
the endplay check to the manufacturer.
Interim Action
This is considered to be interim action until final action is
identified.
Determination of Rule's Effective Date
Since a situation exists that requires the immediate adoption of
this regulation, it is found that notice and opportunity for prior
public comment hereon are impracticable, and that good cause exists for
making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.
Comments Invited
Although this action is in the form of a final rule that involves
requirements affecting flight safety and, thus, was not preceded by
notice and an opportunity for public comment, comments are invited on
this rule. Interested persons are invited to comment on this rule by
submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire.
Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted
in triplicate to the address specified under the caption ADDRESSES. All
communications received on or before the closing date for comments will
be considered, and this rule may be amended in light of the comments
received. Factual information that supports the commenter's ideas and
suggestions is extremely helpful in evaluating the effectiveness of the
AD action and determining whether additional rulemaking action would be
needed.
Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the rule that might
suggest a need to modify the rule. All comments submitted will be
available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the
Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report that
summarizes each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this
AD will be filed in the Rules Docket.
Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments
submitted in response to this rule must submit a self-addressed,
stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: ``Comments
to Docket Number 2000-NM-89-AD.'' The postcard will be date stamped and
returned to the commenter.
Regulatory Impact
The regulations adopted herein will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it
is determined that this final rule does not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132.
The FAA has determined that this regulation is an emergency
regulation that must be issued immediately to correct an unsafe
condition in aircraft, and that it is not a ``significant regulatory
action'' under Executive Order 12866. It has been determined further
that this action involves an emergency regulation under DOT Regulatory
Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979). If it is
determined that this emergency regulation otherwise would be
significant under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures, a final
regulatory evaluation will be prepared and placed in the Rules Docket.
A copy of it, if filed, may be obtained from the Rules Docket at
the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. Section 39.13 is amended by removing amendment 39-11595 (65 FR
10379, March 6, 2000), and by adding a new airworthiness directive
(AD), amendment 39-11847, to read as follows:
[[Page 48357]]
2000-15-15 McDonnell Douglas: Amendment 39-11847. Docket 2000-NM-
89-AD. Supersedes AD 2000-03-51, Amendment 39-11595.
Applicability: All Model DC-9, Model MD-90-30, Model 717-200,
and Model MD-88 airplanes, certificated in any category.
Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the
preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been
modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the
requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified,
altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of
this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an
alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (d) of
this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of
the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition
addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been
eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to
address it.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished
previously.
Note 2: Inspections and follow-on and corrective actions
accomplished prior to the effective date of this AD in accordance
with Revision 1 of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD90-27A034,
Revision 01, DC9-27A362, Revision 01, and 717-27A0002, Revision 01;
all dated February 12, 2000; are considered acceptable for
compliance with the applicable actions required by this AD that are
specified in the original issue of the applicable alert service
bulletin.
To prevent loss of pitch trim capability due to excessive wear
of the jackscrew assembly of the horizontal stabilizer, which could
result in reduced controllability of the airplane, accomplish the
following:
Inspections, Check, and Test (Phase 1)
(a) Prior to the accumulation of 650 hours total time-in-service
(TTIS), or within 72 hours after March 6, 2000 (the effective date
of AD 2000-03-51, amendment 39-11595), whichever occurs later,
accomplish the actions required by paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2),
(a)(3), (a)(4), and (a)(5) of this AD; in accordance with Phase 1 of
the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
DC9-27A362, dated February 11, 2000 (original issue), or Revision
02, dated March 30, 2000 (for Model DC-9 and Model MD-88 airplanes);
MD90-27A034, dated February 11, 2000 (original issue), or Revision
02, dated March 30, 2000 (for Model MD-90-30 airplanes); or 717-
27A0002, dated February 11, 2000 (original issue), or Revision 02,
dated March 30, 2000 (for Model 717-200 airplanes); as applicable.
Repeat the actions required by paragraph (a) of this AD thereafter
at intervals not to exceed 650 flight hours. As of the effective
date of this AD, the repetitive inspections required by this
paragraph must be accomplished as detailed visual inspections in
accordance with Phase 1 of the Accomplishment Instructions of
Revision 02 of the applicable alert service bulletin.
(1) Perform a general visual inspection of the lubricating
grease on the jackscrew assembly and the area directly below the
jackscrew and surrounding areas for the presence of metallic
particles (including slivers, dust, shavings, and flakes) in
accordance with Phase 1 of the Accomplishment Instructions of either
the original issue or Revision 02 of the applicable alert service
bulletin. If the presence of metallic particles is detected, prior
to further flight, remove and replace the jackscrew assembly with a
new or serviceable assembly; or accomplish the detailed visual
inspections, follow-on actions, and corrective actions, as
applicable; in accordance with Phase 1 of the Accomplishment
Instructions of Revision 02 of the applicable alert service
bulletin.
(2) Perform a general visual inspection of the jackscrew
assembly to detect the presence of corrosion, pitting, or distress
in accordance with Phase 1 of the Accomplishment Instructions of
either the original issue or Revision 02 of the applicable alert
service bulletin. If any corrosion, pitting, or distress is
detected, prior to further flight, remove and replace the jackscrew
assembly with a new or serviceable assembly; or accomplish the
detailed visual inspections, follow-on actions, and corrective
actions, as applicable; in accordance with Phase 1 of the
Accomplishment Instructions of Revision 02 of the applicable alert
service bulletin.
(3) During any inspection conducted prior to the effective date
of this AD, check the condition of the jackscrew assembly lubricant
in accordance with Phase 1 of the Accomplishment Instructions of the
original issue of the applicable alert service bulletin. If the
jackscrew assembly is dry, prior to further flight, lubricate the
assembly in accordance with Phase 1 of the Accomplishment
Instructions of Revision 02 of the applicable alert service
bulletin.
Note 3: During other inspections required by this AD,
lubrication of the jackscrew is checked in accordance with Phase 1
of the Accomplishment Instructions of Revision 02 of the applicable
alert service bulletin.
(4) Inspect the horizontal stabilizer jackscrew upper and lower
mechanical stops for general condition in accordance with the Phase
1 of the Accomplishment Instructions of either the original issue or
Revision 02 of the applicable alert service bulletin; and record the
condition.
(5) Perform a test of the horizontal stabilizer shutoff controls
in accordance with Phase 1 of the Accomplishment Instructions of
either the original issue or Revision 02 of the applicable alert
service bulletin. If the mechanical stop on the jackscrew contacts
the mechanical stop on the acme nut prior to limit switch shutoff,
prior to further flight, adjust the horizontal stabilizer trim
system in accordance with operator-approved maintenance
instructions.
Note 4: For the purposes of this AD, a general visual inspection
is defined as: ``A visual examination of an interior or exterior
area, installation or assembly to detect obvious damage, failure, or
irregularity. This level of inspection is made under normally
available lighting conditions such as daylight, hangar lighting,
flashlight, or drop-light and may require removal or opening of
access panels or doors. Stands, ladders, or platforms may be
required to gain proximity to the area being checked.''
Note 5: For the purposes of this AD, a detailed visual
inspection is defined as: ``An intensive visual examination of a
specific structural area, system, installation, or assembly to
detect damage, failure, or irregularity. Available lighting is
normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at
intensity deemed appropriate by the inspector. Inspection aids such
as mirror, magnifying lenses, etc. may be used. Surface cleaning and
elaborate access procedures may be required.''
Note 6: Accomplishment of steps (b) through (e) of BOECOM
message number M-7200-00-00456, dated February 9, 2000, constitutes
compliance with paragraphs (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), and (a)(5) of
this AD.
Wear Checks (Phase 2)
(b) Within 2,000 flight hours since the last endplay check of
the jackscrew and acme nut conducted in accordance with the
McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Maintenance Manual, Chapter 27-40-1;
McDonnell Douglas MD-80 Maintenance Manual, Chapter 27-40-01;
McDonnell Douglas MD-90 Maintenance Manual, Chapter 27-41-10; or
Boeing 717 Maintenance Manual, Chapter 27-41-04; or within 30 days
after March 6, 2000, whichever occurs later: Perform endplay and
freeplay checks of the jackscrew and acme nut in accordance with
Phase 2 of the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin DC9-27A362, dated February 11, 2000, or Revision 02, dated
March 30, 2000 (for Model DC-9 and Model MD-88 airplanes); MD90-
27A034, dated February 11, 2000, or Revision 02, dated March 30,
2000 (for Model MD-90-30 airplanes); or 717-27A0002, dated February
11, 2000, or Revision 02, dated March 30, 2000 (for Model 717-200
airplanes); as applicable. Repeat the endplay and freeplay checks
thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 flight hours. As of the
effective date of this AD, only Phase 2 of the Accomplishment
Instructions of Revision 02 of the applicable alert service bulletin
shall be used to accomplish the requirements of this paragraph
(including the corrective actions specified in Phase 2 of the
Accomplishment Instructions of Revision 02 of the applicable alert
service bulletin).
Note 7: Accomplishment of step (a) of BOECOM message number M-
7200-00-00456, dated February 9, 2000, constitutes compliance with
paragraph (b) of this AD.
Reporting Requirement
(c) At intervals not to exceed 90 days after accomplishing the
endplay checks required by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD, submit
a report of the results of the endplay checks to The Boeing Company,
Long Beach Division, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90801,
Attention: Senior Manager--Systems, Technical and Fleet Support,
Service Engineering D035-0035; fax: (562) 497-5811. Results of the
endplay checks may be accumulated and submitted at the intervals
required by this paragraph. Information collection requirements
contained in this regulation have been
[[Page 48358]]
approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the
provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et
seq.) and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056.
Alternative Methods of Compliance
(d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the
compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification
Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall
submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal
Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the
Manager, Los Angeles ACO.
Note 8: Information concerning the existence of approved
alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be
obtained from the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.
Special Flight Permits
(e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with
sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14
CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where
the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
Incorporation by Reference
(f) Except as provided by paragraph (a)(5) of this AD for
adjusting the horizontal stabilizer trim system, the actions shall
be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC9-27A362,
dated February 11, 2000; Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC9-27A362,
Revision 02, dated March 30, 2000; Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
MD90-27A034, dated February 11, 2000; Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
MD90-27A034, Revision 02, dated March 30, 2000; Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 717-27A0002, dated February 11, 2000; or Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 717-27A0002, Revision 02, dated March 30, 2000.
(1) The incorporation by reference of Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin DC9-27A362, Revision 02, dated March 30, 2000; Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin MD90-27A034, Revision 02, dated March 30, 2000; and
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 717-27A0002, Revision 02, dated March
30, 2000; is approved by the Director of the Federal Register in
accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) The incorporation by reference of Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin DC9-27A362, dated February 11, 2000; Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin MD90-27A034, dated February 11, 2000; and Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 717-27A0002, dated February 11, 2000; was approved
previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of March 6,
2000 (65 FR 10379, February 28, 2000).
(3) Copies may be obtained from The Boeing Company, Long Beach
Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846,
Attention: Technical Publications Business Administration, Dept. C1-
L52 (2-60). Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane
Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the
FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft
Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood,
California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North
Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.
Effective Date
(g) This amendment becomes effective on August 23, 2000.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 28, 2000.
Donald L. Riggin,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 00-19671 Filed 8-7-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
Source: Official FAA Source ↗
Retrieved: Apr 6, 2026
Rights: U.S. Government Public Domain
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