AD 2000-13-03
Applicability
| Type | Manufacturer | Model | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| aircraft | McDonnell Douglas | DC-8 | Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8 Series Airplanes |
Unsafe Condition
The main deck cargo door systems do not provide an adequate level of safety, and there is no means to prevent pressurization to an unsafe level if the door is not closed, latched, and locked.
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Required Actions
Revise the Airplane Flight Manual Supplement to ensure the main deck cargo door is closed, latched, and locked; inspect the door wire bundle to detect discrepancies and repair or replace discrepant parts; modify the hydraulic and indication systems of the door and install a means to prevent unsafe pressurization.
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Compliance Time
Before further flight
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Affected Aircraft
McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8 series airplanes converted from passenger to freighter configuration.
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Federal Register Abstract
This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8 series airplanes that have been converted from a passenger to a cargo-carrying ("freighter") configuration, that requires a revision to the Airplane Flight Manual Supplement to ensure that the main deck cargo door is closed, latched, and locked; inspection of the door wire bundle to detect discrepancies and repair or replacement of discrepant parts. This amendment also requires, among other actions, modification of the hydraulic and indication systems of the main deck cargo door, and installation of a means to prevent pressurization to an unsafe level if the main deck cargo door is not closed, latched, and locked. This amendment is prompted by the FAA's determination that certain main deck cargo door systems do not provide an adequate level of safety, and that there is no means to prevent pressurization to an unsafe level if the main deck cargo door is not closed, latched, and locked. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent opening of the cargo door while the airplane is in flight, and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane including possible loss of flight control or severe structural damage.
Document Text
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[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 124 (Tuesday, June 27, 2000)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 39539-39540]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 00-16234]
[[Page 39539]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. 2000-NM-49-AD; Amendment 39-11802; AD 2000-13-03]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8 Series
Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD),
applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8 series airplanes
that have been converted from a passenger to a cargo-carrying
(``freighter'') configuration, that requires a revision to the Airplane
Flight Manual Supplement to ensure that the main deck cargo door is
closed, latched, and locked; inspection of the door wire bundle to
detect discrepancies and repair or replacement of discrepant parts.
This amendment also requires, among other actions, modification of the
hydraulic and indication systems of the main deck cargo door, and
installation of a means to prevent pressurization to an unsafe level if
the main deck cargo door is not closed, latched, and locked. This
amendment is prompted by the FAA's determination that certain main deck
cargo door systems do not provide an adequate level of safety, and that
there is no means to prevent pressurization to an unsafe level if the
main deck cargo door is not closed, latched, and locked. The actions
specified by this AD are intended to prevent opening of the cargo door
while the airplane is in flight, and consequent rapid decompression of
the airplane including possible loss of flight control or severe
structural damage.
EFFECTIVE DATE: August 1, 2000.
ADDRESSES: Information pertaining to this amendment may be examined at
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane
Directorate, Rules Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington;
or at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft
Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael E. O'Neil, Aerospace Engineer,
Airframe Branch, ANM-120L, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los
Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard,
Lakewood, California 90712-4137; telephone (562) 627-5320; fax (562)
627-5210.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness
directive (AD) that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model
DC-8 series airplanes that have been converted from a passenger to a
cargo-carrying (``freighter'') configuration, was published in the
Federal Register on April 17, 2000 (65 FR 20390). That action proposed
to require a revision to the Airplane Flight Manual Supplement (AFMS)
to ensure that the main deck cargo door is closed, latched, and locked;
inspection of the door wire bundle to detect discrepancies and repair
or replacement of discrepant parts. That action also proposed to
require, among other actions, modification of the hydraulic and
indication systems of the main deck cargo door, and installation of a
means to prevent pressurization to an unsafe level if the main deck
cargo door is not closed, latched, and locked.
Comments
Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate
in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to
the single comment received.
The commenter supports the proposed rule.
Conclusion
After careful review of the available data, including the comment
noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public
interest require the adoption of the rule as proposed.
Cost Impact
There are approximately 15 Model DC-8 series airplanes of the
affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 11
airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected by this AD.
It will take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to accomplish
the general visual inspections, at an average labor rate of $60 per
work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the general
visual inspections required by this AD on U.S. operators is estimated
to be $660, or $60 per airplane, per inspection cycle.
It will take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to accomplish
the AFMS revision and installation of associated placards, at an
average labor rate of $60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the
cost impact of the AFMS revision and installation of associated
placards required by this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $660,
or $60 per airplane.
The FAA estimates that it will take approximately 210 work hours
per airplane to accomplish the modification required by paragraph (c)
of the AD, at an average labor rate of $60 per work hour. The FAA also
estimates that required parts will cost approximately $45,000 per
airplane. Based on these figures, the cost impact of this modification
required by this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $633,600, or
$57,600 per airplane.
The cost impact figures discussed above are based on assumptions
that no operator has yet accomplished any of the requirements of this
AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the
future if this AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed
in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform
the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures
typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to
gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other
administrative actions.
Regulatory Impact
The regulations adopted herein will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it
is determined that this final rule does not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866;
(2) is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a
significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial
number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action
and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained
from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption
ADDRESSES.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of
the
[[Page 39540]]
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new
airworthiness directive:
2000-13-03 McDonnell Douglas: Amendment 39-11802. Docket 2000-NM-49-
AD.
Applicability: Model DC-8 series airplanes that have been
converted from a passenger to a cargo-carrying (``freighter'')
configuration in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC)
SA1063SO; certificated in any category.
Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the
preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been
otherwise modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the
requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified,
altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of
this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an
alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (e) of
this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of
the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition
addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been
eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to
address it.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished
previously.
To prevent opening of the cargo door while the airplane is in
flight, and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane including
possible loss of flight control or severe structural damage,
accomplish the following:
Actions Addressing the Main Deck Cargo Door
(a) Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD,
accomplish a general visual inspection of the wire bundle of the
main deck cargo door between the exit point of the cargo liner and
the attachment point on the main deck cargo door to detect crimped,
frayed, or chafed wires; and perform a general visual inspection for
damaged, loose, or missing hardware mounting components. If any
crimped, frayed, or chafed wire, or damaged, loose, or missing
hardware mounting component is detected, prior to further flight,
repair in accordance with FAA-approved maintenance procedures.
Note 2: For the purposes of this AD, a general visual inspection
is defined as ``A visual examination of an interior or exterior
area, installation, or assembly to detect obvious damage, failure,
or irregularity. This level of inspection is made under normally
available lighting conditions such as daylight, hangar lighting,
flashlight, or drop-light, and may require removal or opening of
access panels or doors. Stands, ladders, or platforms may be
required to gain proximity to the area being checked.''
(b) Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, revise
the Limitations Section of the appropriate FAA-approved Airplane
Flight Manual Supplement (AFMS) for STC SA1063SO by inserting
therein procedures to ensure that the main deck cargo door is fully
closed, latched, and locked prior to dispatch of the airplane, and
install any associated placards. The AFMS revision procedures and
installation of any associated placards shall be accomplished in
accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles
Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane
Directorate.
Actions Addressing the Main Deck Cargo Door Systems
(c) Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD,
accomplish the actions specified in paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(2),
(c)(3), (c)(4), and (c)(5) of this AD in accordance with a method
approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.
(1) Modify the indication system of the main deck cargo door to
indicate to the pilots whether the main deck cargo door is fully
closed, latched, and locked;
(2) Modify the mechanical and hydraulic systems of the main deck
cargo door to eliminate detrimental deformation of elements of the
door latching and locking mechanism;
(3) Install a means to visually inspect the locking mechanism of
the main deck cargo door;
(4) Install a means to remove power to the door while the
airplane is in flight;
(5) Install a means to prevent pressurization to an unsafe level
if the main deck cargo door is not fully closed, latched, and
locked.
(d) Compliance with paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(4),
and (c)(5) of this AD constitutes terminating action for the
requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD, and the AFMS
revision and placards may be removed.
Alternative Methods of Compliance
(e) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the
compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. Operators shall
submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal
Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the
Manager, Los Angeles ACO.
Note 3: Information concerning the existence of approved
alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be
obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.
Special Flight Permit
(f) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with
sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14
CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where
the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
Effective Date
(g) This amendment becomes effective on August 1, 2000.
Appendix 1
Excerpt from an FAA Memorandum to Director-Airworthiness and Technical
Standards of ATA, dated March 20, 1992
``(1) Indication System:
(a) The indication system must monitor the closed, latched, and
locked positions, directly.
(b) The indicator should be amber unless it concerns an outward
opening door whose opening during takeoff could present an immediate
hazard to the airplane. In that case the indicator must be red and
located in plain view in front of the pilots. An aural warning is
also advisable. A display on the master caution/warning system is
also acceptable as an indicator. For the purpose of complying with
this paragraph, an immediate hazard is defined as significant
reduction in controllability, structural damage, or impact with
other structures, engines, or controls.
(c) Loss of indication or a false indication of a closed,
latched, and locked condition must be improbable.
(d) A warning indication must be provided at the door operators
station that monitors the door latched and locked conditions
directly, unless the operator has a visual indication that the door
is fully closed and locked. For example, a vent door that monitors
the door locks and can be seen from the operators station would meet
this requirement.
(2) Means to Visually Inspect the Locking Mechanism: There must
be a visual means of directly inspecting the locks. Where all locks
are tied to a common lock shaft, a means of inspecting the locks at
each end may be sufficient to meet this requirement provided no
failure condition in the lock shaft would go undetected when viewing
the end locks. Viewing latches may be used as an alternate to
viewing locks on some installations where there are other
compensating features.
(3) Means to Prevent Pressurization: All doors must have
provisions to prevent initiation of pressurization of the airplane
to an unsafe level, if the door is not fully closed, latched and
locked.
(4) Lock Strength: Locks must be designed to withstand the
maximum output power of the actuators and maximum expected manual
operating forces treated as a limit load. Under these conditions,
the door must remain closed, latched and locked.
(5) Power Availability: All power to the door must be removed in
flight and it must not be possible for the flight crew to restore
power to the door while in flight.
(6) Powered Lock Systems: For doors that have powered lock
systems, it must be shown by safety analysis that inadvertent
opening of the door after it is fully closed, latched and locked, is
extremely improbable.''
Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 21, 2000.
Donald L. Riggin,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 00-16234 Filed 6-26-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
Source: Official FAA Source ↗
Retrieved: Apr 6, 2026
Rights: U.S. Government Public Domain
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