AD 2000-03-21

[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 35 (Tuesday, February 22, 2000)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 8645-8649]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 00-3795]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 98-NM-193-AD; Amendment 39-11581; AD 2000-03-21]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 767 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), 
applicable to certain Boeing Model 767 series airplanes, that requires 
a one-time detailed visual inspection to detect discrepancies of the 
wire expando sleeve of the wire bundles adjacent to the landing gear 
control lever module; certain follow-on actions and repair, if 
necessary; and wrapping the wire expando sleeve with tape, or with 
zippertubing and tape. This amendment is prompted by reports indicating 
that the landing gear failed to extend on an in-service airplane, and 
that the landing gear control cable was severed on a second in-service 
airplane. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent 
interference between the landing gear control lever and wire bundles 
adjacent to the landing gear control lever module, and to prevent wire 
chafing and arcing between the landing gear control cable and adjacent 
wire bundles, which could result in the inability to extend the landing 
gear prior to landing.

DATES: Effective March 28, 2000.
    The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in 
the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as 
of March 28, 2000.

ADDRESSES: The service information referenced in this AD may be 
obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, 
Washington 98124-2207. This information may be examined at the FAA, 
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol 
Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elias Natsiopoulos, Aerospace 
Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA, Transport 
Airplane Directorate, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind 
Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-1279; 
fax (425) 227-1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness 
directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 767 series 
airplanes was published in the Federal Register on February 17, 1999 
(64 FR 7829). That action proposed to require a one-time inspection to 
detect discrepancies of the wire expando sleeve of the wire bundles 
adjacent to the landing gear control lever module; certain follow-on 
actions and repair, if necessary; and wrapping the wire expando sleeve 
with tape, or with zippertubing and tape.

Comments

    Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate 
in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to 
the comments received.

Support for the Proposal

    Two commenters concur with the proposal. Another commenter states 
that it is not affected by the proposal, as the proposed actions have 
been accomplished for its fleet.

Request to Clarify Wire Bundle Interference

    One commenter, the manufacturer, recommends clarification of the 
description of wire bundle interference in the Summary and Discussion 
sections of the proposed rule. The notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) 
describes two incidents on in-service Model 767 series airplanes. In 
the first incident, the expando sleeve on a wire bundle adjacent to the 
landing gear lever mechanism in the flight deck became caught on the 
lever mechanism such that the lever could not be moved from the UP 
position, and the gear was extended by depressurizing the center 
hydraulic system. The commenter contends that interference of the wire 
bundle expando sleeve with the landing gear control lever did not 
result in the wires for the alternate extension system interfering and 
arcing with the landing gear UP cable. Such interference and arcing are 
unrelated events. The contact with the gear UP cable was solely the 
result of the amount of slack in the wire bundle itself. The only wire 
bundle long enough to reach the gear UP cable is the one that contains 
wires for the alternate extension system.
    In the second incident, which was an unrelated incident, a wire 
bundle containing wires for the alternate extension system chafed on 
the landing gear UP cable, causing arcing and failure of the gear UP 
cable; however, the landing gear was extended at the time and gear 
extension capability was still available through the gear DOWN cable. 
The commenter contends that the inability to extend the landing gear 
also is not an issue if the landing gear had been UP and locked; the 
landing gear will extend. If the landing gear had been retracted when 
the UP cable was severed, and assuming that the alternate extension 
system had been rendered inoperative due to the arcing, the normal 
extension system is available. When gear DOWN is selected, the landing 
gear selector valve will move to

[[Page 8646]]

the gear DOWN position through the landing gear lever and the DOWN 
cable, and the landing gear will extend. In addition, because the DOWN 
cable is located forward of the UP cable and the wire bundle, the 
landing gear DOWN cable is not susceptible to the same arcing and 
severing as the UP cable.
    For the Summary section of the NPRM, the commenter suggests 
clarifying that only one report prompted the NPRM, the landing gear 
``UP cable'' was severed, and that ``consequent arcing'' was not a 
factor in the interference between the landing gear control lever and 
the wire bundles. In addition, the commenter suggests adding that the 
proposed AD also is intended to prevent chafing and arcing between the 
wire bundle containing wires for the landing gear alternate extension 
system and the landing gear UP cable.
    The FAA concurs partially with the commenter's recommended changes 
to the Summary section of the NPRM and has determined that certain 
changes add technical clarity. However, more than one report was 
received regarding the unsafe condition; therefore, no change to the 
final rule is necessary in that regard.
    Although the Summary does not specify which cable (UP or DOWN) was 
severed, the FAA points out that one of the reports of an in-service 
incident on a Model 767 series airplane does not specify which cable 
was severed, or the condition of the other cable. In one incident, the 
FAA concluded that it was the UP cable that was damaged because the 
flight crew could not retract the landing gear. However, it is not the 
severance of the UP cable that could result in the inability to extend 
the landing gear, but the loss of the alternate extend system due to 
the damaged wires (an undetectable failure) and the inability to move 
the control lever from the UP to the DOWN position, or the loss of the 
center hydraulic system. In light of this, the final rule has not been 
changed to specify which cable was severed.
    The FAA has clarified that the action required by the proposed AD 
is intended to prevent ``interference'' between the landing gear 
control lever module and adjacent wire bundles rather than to prevent 
``interference and consequent arcing.'' However, the FAA has determined 
that this AD also is intended to ``prevent wire chafing and arcing 
between the landing gear control cable and adjacent wire bundles'' 
rather than ``to prevent chafing and arcing between the wire bundle 
containing wires for the landing gear alternate extension system and 
the landing gear UP cable.''
    For the Discussion section of the NPRM, the commenter suggests 
further clarification of what the investigation revealed, and the 
damage caused by interference between the landing gear and wire 
bundles. The commenter contends that the landing gear still would 
extend when the landing gear lever is moved to the DOWN position 
because the DOWN cable would not be affected.
    Although the FAA agrees with some of the commenter's suggested 
changes to the Discussion section of the proposed AD, no changes are 
necessary because that section is not included in the final rule. 
However, as stated earlier in this AD, the inability to extend the 
landing gear is not due to the severance of the UP cable but to a 
number of other factors.
    The FAA also agrees that the wire bundle that contains the wires of 
the landing gear alternate extension system interfered with the landing 
gear cable, and that this interference caused the wires of the 
alternate extension system to arc. In addition, the FAA agrees that 
repeated arcing over a period of time could sever the landing gear 
cable; however, as stated earlier, it is not necessary to specify the 
``UP'' cable. Further, the FAA agrees that the landing gear will extend 
when the landing gear lever is moved to the DOWN position if the 
landing gear DOWN cable is unaffected.

Request To Clarify the Wire Bundle Wrapping Procedure

    The Air Transport Association (ATA) of America, on behalf of one of 
its members, states that this member requests clarification with regard 
to the procedure for wrapping the wire bundles. According to the 
commenter, the proposed rule gives the option to perform the work in 
accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-32A0163, original 
issue, dated March 5, 1998, or Boeing Service Bulletin 767-32A0163, 
Revision 1, dated October 1, 1998. However, the proposed rule requires 
wrapping the wire bundles with ``tape,'' or with ``zippertubing and 
tape,'' and does not include the option to wrap the wire bundle with 
``zippertubing'' only, as permitted in the original issue of the 
service bulletin. (Both versions of the service bulletin are cited in 
the proposal as appropriate sources of service information.) For this 
reason, the commenter contends that this inconsistency could lead to 
confusion and should be clarified.
    The FAA acknowledges that clarification of the wrapping procedure 
is necessary. Although the original issue of the alert service bulletin 
specifies using either ``tape'' or ``zippertubing,'' and the Summary of 
Revision 1 of the service bulletin specifies using either ``tape'' or 
``zippertubing,'' the FAA points out that the Accomplishment 
Instructions of Revision 1 of the service bulletin specify using either 
``tape'' or ``zippertubing and tape.''
    Although the original issue of the alert service bulletin specifies 
wrapping the wire bundles together in a single grouping, Revision 1 of 
the service bulletin specifies separating the wire bundles into two 
separate groups (one group consisting of a small single wire bundle, 
and the other group consisting of the remaining wire bundles that are 
larger in trunk diameter). Revision 1 of the service bulletin was 
issued after reports indicated that, due to limited access, it was 
difficult to wrap all of the wire bundles together in the P31 panel, 
and that grouping the wire bundles in a single wrap resulted in a 
stiff, unmanageable assembly. The FAA was informed by the manufacturer 
that zippertubing small enough for wrapping a single wire bundle is 
unavailable, and using a larger size of zippertubing is not 
recommended. For that reason, Revision 1 of the service bulletin 
includes the preferred procedures for separating the wire bundles into 
two groups for wrapping and provides an easier method for accomplishing 
those actions than the original issue of the alert service bulletin. 
[The FAA has added Note 3 following paragraph (a) of this AD to specify 
this information.] The FAA has determined that if operators have 
accomplished the action required to wrap the expando sleeve with either 
``tape'' or ``zippertubing only'' in accordance with the original issue 
of the alert service bulletin, that action is adequate in addressing 
the identified unsafe condition. References to the type of wrapping 
required have been removed from paragraph (a)(1), (a)(2)(i), 
(a)(2)(ii)(A), or (a)(2)(ii)(B) of the final rule.

Request To Extend the Compliance Time and Change Inspection 
Requirements

    The ATA, on behalf of one of its members, requests that the 
proposed compliance threshold for the initial inspection be extended to 
1 year after the effective date of the AD, so that the required 
inspections can be conducted in a controlled hangar environment. 
According to the commenter, with a fleet of 79 Model 767 series 
airplanes affected by this proposed rule, the 90-day compliance time 
would pose a significant operational burden; whereas,

[[Page 8647]]

an extension of the compliance time to 1 year would allow sufficient 
flexibility to perform the inspection at the next scheduled 
maintenance.
    The FAA does not concur with the request to extend the compliance 
time. In developing an appropriate compliance time for this action, the 
FAA considered not only the safety implications but the normal 
maintenance schedules for timely accomplishment of the required 
inspection and corrective actions. In consideration of these items and 
reports of the identified unsafe condition, the FAA has determined that 
a 90-day compliance time represents an appropriate interval of time 
allowable wherein the corrective actions can be accomplished during 
scheduled maintenance intervals for the majority of affected operators, 
and an adequate level of safety can be maintained. The FAA points out 
this AD does not require that inspections be performed in a controlled 
hangar environment. In addition, other operators with large fleets of 
Model 767 series airplanes have already complied with those 
requirements. No change to paragraph (a) of the final rule is necessary 
in this regard.

Request for an Additional Modification of the Landing Gear

    One commenter states that the accomplishment of an additional 
modification of the control lever module, in accordance with Boeing 
Service Bulletin 757-32-0179, dated December 22, 1998, is necessary to 
provide a newly designed left-side plate of the landing gear control 
lever module. Although the actions required by the proposed AD are 
intended to detect and prevent possible interference between the wire 
bundle and landing gear control lever module, such action does not 
completely remove the possibility that such interference could occur in 
the specific area of the landing gear control lever module behind the 
instrument panel. Such a modification would effectively prevent 
interference between the wire bundle and the control lever module and 
also prevent a subsequent ``blocked'' lever.
    The FAA does not concur that the final rule should include a 
requirement for installing a newly designed left-side plate of the 
landing gear control lever module in accordance with Service Bulletin 
767-32-0179. Accomplishment of the actions specified by either the 
original issue or Revision 1 of Service Bulletin 767-32A0163 is 
intended to adequately address the identified unsafe condition by 
preventing interference between the landing gear control lever and wire 
bundles adjacent to the landing gear control lever module and by 
preventing wire chafing and arcing between the landing gear control 
cable and adjacent wire bundles. The FAA points out that, although the 
new left-side plate specified by Service Bulletin 767-32-0179 provides 
a barrier between the wire bundles and landing gear control lever 
module, such a plate does not protect the wires from chafing.

Request for Issuance of an Interim Flight Crew Procedure

    One commenter states that it considers issuance of a flight crew 
operating procedure by an operational bulletin to be essential in 
providing instructions on how to shut down the center hydraulic system 
for Model 767 series airplanes and subsequently extend the landing 
gear. The commenter contends that this procedure is necessary until a 
hydraulic bypass valve is installed (as described in the following 
paragraphs).
    Although the FAA acknowledges the concerns of the commenter 
regarding issuance of a flight crew operating procedure for shutting 
down the center hydraulic system, it does not concur that this AD 
should include such a procedure. The FAA has determined that, because 
of the complexity of the hydraulic system, issuance of such an 
operating procedure could introduce other unforeseeable problems. At 
the present time, shutting down the center hydraulic system is only 
used in an emergency situation, and such a decision is determined by 
the flight crew. The FAA considers that such a provision is adequate in 
addressing the identified unsafe condition and ensuring the continued 
safety of the affected fleet. No change to this final rule is necessary 
in this regard.

Request To Install a Hydraulic Bypass Valve for the Landing Gear

    One commenter recommends installing a hydraulic bypass valve in the 
landing gear hydraulic system on Model 767 series airplanes. Because of 
an incident that occurred in the 1980's on a Model 757 series airplane 
in which the flight crew was unable to extend the landing gear when a 
blocked system occurred while the landing gear was in the UP position, 
the manufacturer issued Boeing Service Bulletin 757-32-0053, which 
specifies installation of a hydraulic bypass valve. Such a valve 
bypasses the hydraulic pressure from the UP position when using the 
alternate gear extension system, and allows the gear to be extended 
with the extension system, even with the gear UP pressure still applied 
when the extension system is blocked in its UP position. The hydraulic 
bypass valve, specified by Service Bulletin 757-32-0053 and installed 
in Model 757 series airplanes in accordance with that service bulletin, 
also is available for Model 767 series airplanes as a masterchange for 
retrofit, and has been installed on one operator's fleet of Model 767 
series airplanes.
    However, the commenter contends that accomplishment of the actions 
specified by Service Bulletin 767-32-0179 and those specified by the 
original issue and Revision 1 of Service Bulletin 767-32A0163 would 
only prevent an incident in which the flight crew would be unable to 
extend the landing gear if the cause is related to the landing gear 
control lever module or its adjacent wire bundles. The flight crew 
would still be unable to extend the landing gear when a blocked system 
in the UP position is caused by a different component of the landing 
gear extension system. That this possibility exists is indicated by the 
fact that this condition occurred on Model 757 series airplanes in the 
1980's (as described previously).
    The commenter also states that one operator of a Model 767 series 
airplane experienced an inflight event when the landing gear lever 
failed to move from the UP to the OFF position. Following this event, 
extensive troubleshooting revealed the anomaly of the wire bundle and 
the associated landing gear lever module, as described in the proposed 
rule. Based on those findings and the immediate action taken to prevent 
such an incident in the future, the commenter has investigated and 
reviewed the entire design of the landing gear extension system, and 
has concluded that a design deficiency exists in the Model 767 landing 
gear extension system.
    The FAA acknowledges the concerns of the commenter, and may 
consider additional rulemaking to address that concern in the future on 
certain airplanes. However, while there may be merit to the commenter's 
suggestion regarding installation of a hydraulic bypass valve, this AD 
is not the appropriate context in which to evaluate that suggestion. 
The FAA finds that to delay this action would be inappropriate in light 
of the identified unsafe condition. In addition, at the present time, 
the FAA has not determined all of the failure modes of the hydraulic 
bypass valve and the effects of such failures on the landing gear 
hydraulic system for Model 767 series airplanes. Therefore, no change 
to the final rule is deemed necessary.

[[Page 8648]]

Request To Add a Phrase to the Proposed AD

    One commenter states that it has reviewed the proposed NPRM and, 
having already commenced embodiment of Boeing Service Bulletin 767-
32A0163, would like to see the words ``unless previously accomplished'' 
inserted before paragraph (a) of the proposed NPRM.
    The FAA points out that operators are always given credit for work 
accomplished previously, and that the compliance statement of an AD 
includes the phrase ``Required as indicated, unless accomplished 
previously.'' Therefore, no change to the final rule is necessary.

Explanation of Changes Made to the Proposal

    The FAA has clarified the inspection requirements by specifying a 
``detailed visual inspection'' rather than an ``inspection,'' which was 
cited in the Summary of the NPRM, or a ``visual inspection,'' which was 
cited in paragraphs (a), (a)(2), and (a)(2)(ii) of the proposed AD. In 
addition, in the final rule Note 2 has been added to clarify the 
definition of a detailed visual inspection. The final rule has been 
changed accordingly.

Conclusion

    After careful review of the available data, including the comments 
noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public 
interest require the adoption of the rule with the changes previously 
described. The FAA has determined that these changes will neither 
increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of 
the AD.

Cost Impact

    There are approximately 666 Model 767 series airplanes of the 
affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 268 
airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected by this AD, that it will 
take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to accomplish the required 
actions, and that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. The cost 
of required parts are nominal. Based on these figures, the cost impact 
of the AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $16,080, or $60 per 
airplane.
    The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that 
no operator has yet accomplished any of the requirements of this AD 
action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the 
future if this AD were not adopted.

Regulatory Impact

    The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct 
effects on the States, on the relationship between the national 
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in 
accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final 
rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the 
preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is 
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866; 
(2) is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a 
significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial 
number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action 
and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained 
from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption 
``ADDRESSES.''

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of 
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec. 39.13  [Amended]

    2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new 
airworthiness directive:

2000-03-21  Boeing: Amendment 39-11581. Docket 98-NM-193-AD.

    Applicability: Model 767 airplanes, as listed in Boeing Service 
Bulletin 767-32A0163, Revision 1, dated October 1, 1998; 
certificated in any category.

    Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the 
preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been 
modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the 
requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, 
altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of 
this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an 
alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (b) of 
this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of 
the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition 
addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been 
eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to 
address it.

    Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished 
previously.
    To prevent interference between the landing gear control lever 
and wire bundles adjacent to the landing gear control lever module, 
and to prevent wire chafing and arcing between the landing gear 
control cable and adjacent wire bundles, which could result in the 
inability to extend the landing gear prior to landing, accomplish 
the following:

Detailed Visual Inspection

    (a) Within 90 days after the effective date of this AD, perform 
a one-time detailed visual inspection to detect discrepancies (i.e., 
cut, abrasion, fraying, and arcing) of the wire expando sleeve of 
the wire bundles adjacent to the landing gear control lever module, 
in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-32A0163, dated 
March 5, 1998, or Boeing Service Bulletin 767-32A0163, Revision 1, 
dated October 1, 1998.

    Note 2: For the purposes of this AD, a detailed visual 
inspection is defined as: ``An intensive examination of a specific 
structural area, system, installation, or assembly to detect damage, 
failure, or irregularity. Available lighting is normally 
supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at an intensity 
deemed appropriate by the inspector. Inspection aids such as 
mirrors, magnifying lenses, etc. may be used. Surface cleaning and 
elaborate access procedures may be required.''


    Note 3: Boeing Service Bulletin 767-32A0163, Revision 1, dated 
October 1, 1998, specifies the preferred procedures for separating 
the wire bundles into two groups for wrapping, which is an easier 
method for accomplishing those actions.

Follow-On Actions, Repair, and Wire Wrapping

    (1) If no discrepancy of the wire expando sleeve is detected, 
prior to further flight, wrap the wire expando sleeve in accordance 
with the alert service bulletin or Revision 1.
    (2) If any discrepancy of the wire expando sleeve is detected, 
prior to further flight, perform a detailed visual inspection to 
detect discrepancies of the varglas layer, in accordance with the 
alert service bulletin or Revision 1.
    (i) If no discrepancy of the varglas layer is detected, prior to 
further flight, repair and wrap the wire expando sleeve in 
accordance with the alert service bulletin or Revision 1.
    (ii) If any discrepancy of the varglas layer is detected, prior 
to further flight, perform a detailed visual inspection to detect 
discrepancies of the wire bundles, in accordance with the alert 
service bulletin or Revision 1.
    (A) If no discrepancy of the wire bundles is detected, prior to 
further flight, rewrap the

[[Page 8649]]

wires with new varglas layer, and repair and wrap the wire expando 
sleeve in accordance with the alert service bulletin or Revision 1.
    (B) If any discrepancy of the wire bundles is detected, prior to 
further flight, repair the wires, rewrap the wire bundles with new 
varglas layer, and repair and wrap the wire expando sleeve in 
accordance with the alert service bulletin or Revision 1.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

    (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the 
compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be 
used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification 
Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall 
submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal 
Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the 
Manager, Seattle ACO.

    Note 4: Information concerning the existence of approved 
alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be 
obtained from the Seattle ACO.

Special Flight Permits

    (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with 
sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 
CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where 
the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Incorporation by Reference

    (d) The actions shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert 
Service Bulletin 767-32A0163, dated March 5, 1998, or Boeing Service 
Bulletin 767-32A0163, Revision 1, dated October 1, 1998. This 
incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the 
Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 
51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 
P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. Copies may be 
inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind 
Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal 
Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.
    (e) This amendment becomes effective on March 28, 2000.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 11, 2000.
Donald L. Riggin,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 00-3795 Filed 2-18-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-U