AD 2000-02-13
Applicability
| Type | Manufacturer | Model | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| aircraft | de Havilland | DHC-8-100 | Airworthiness Directives; de Havilland Model DHC-8-100, -200, and -300 Series Airplanes |
Unsafe Condition
Operation of the airplane with the power levers positioned below the flight idle stop during flight could cause engine overspeed, possible engine damage or failure, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Required Actions
Install a placard on the instrument panel advising flightcrew that positioning power levers below the flight idle stop during flight is prohibited. Eventually install a system to prevent such power lever positioning, which will terminate the placard requirement.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Compliance Time
Before further flight
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Affected Aircraft
de Havilland Model DHC-8-100, -200, and -300 series airplanes.
AI-generated summary from the source AD text. Verify against the official source before acting.
Federal Register Abstract
This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all de Havilland Model DHC-8-100, -200, and -300 series airplanes, that requires installation of a placard on the instrument panel of the cockpit to advise the flightcrew that positioning of the power levers below the flight idle stop during flight is prohibited. This amendment also requires eventual installation of a system that will prevent such positioning of the power levers during flight. Such installation will terminate the requirement for installation of a placard. This amendment is prompted by reports of operation of the airplane with the power levers positioned below the flight idle stop during flight. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such positioning of the power levers below the flight idle stop during flight, which could cause engine overspeed, possible engine damage or failure, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
Document Text
Show stored source text (verify against official source)
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 17 (Wednesday, January 26, 2000)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 4095-4099]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 00-1772]
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Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents
having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed
to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published
under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.
The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the Superintendent of Documents.
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Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 17 / Wednesday, January 26, 2000 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 4095]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. 98-NM-179-AD; Amendment 39-11531; AD 2000-02-13]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; de Havilland Model DHC-8-100, -200, and
-300 Series Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD),
applicable to all de Havilland Model DHC-8-100, -200, and -300 series
airplanes, that requires installation of a placard on the instrument
panel of the cockpit to advise the flightcrew that positioning of the
power levers below the flight idle stop during flight is prohibited.
This amendment also requires eventual installation of a system that
will prevent such positioning of the power levers during flight. Such
installation will terminate the requirement for installation of a
placard. This amendment is prompted by reports of operation of the
airplane with the power levers positioned below the flight idle stop
during flight. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent
such positioning of the power levers below the flight idle stop during
flight, which could cause engine overspeed, possible engine damage or
failure, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
EFFECTIVE DATE: March 1, 2000.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James E. Delisio, Aerospace Engineer,
Airframe and Propulsion Branch, ANE-171, FAA, Engine and Propeller
Directorate, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 10 Fifth Street,
Third Floor, Valley Stream, New York 11581; telephone (516) 256-7521;
fax (516) 568-2716.
ADDRESSES: Information pertaining to this amendment may be examined at
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane
Directorate, Rules Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington;
or at the FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, New York Aircraft
Certification Office, 10 Fifth Street, Third Floor, Valley Stream, New
York.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness
directive (AD) that is applicable to all de Havilland Model DHC-8-100,
-200, and -300 series airplanes was published in the Federal Register
on July 7, 1998 (63 FR 36619). That action proposed to require
installation of a placard on the instrument panel of the cockpit to
advise the flightcrew that positioning of the power levers below the
flight idle stop during flight is prohibited. Additionally, that action
proposed to require eventual installation of an FAA-approved system
that would prevent such positioning of the power levers during flight.
Installation of that system would eliminate the requirement for
installation of the placard.
Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate
in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to
the comments received.
1. Support for the Proposal
One commenter supports the proposed rule.
2. Request to Withdraw the Proposal: No Unsafe Condition
Several commenters point out the following: No new incidents of
beta during flight have been reported since 1996, and reports were from
foreign operators. Since those previous reports, the AFM has been
revised to prohibit positioning of the power levers below the flight
idle stop (beta) during flight, and the pilot training syllabus on
prohibition of beta during flight has been revised. The commenters
further state that sufficient tactile, visual, and audio cues exist to
advise the flightcrew if the propeller is in beta range. One commenter,
the manufacturer, points out that the power lever triggers cannot be
applied accidentally. Movement of the triggers requires purposeful
``reach and lift'' action to engage beta. Therefore, the manufacturer
asserts that unintentional engagement of beta during flight cannot
occur. Another commenter states that a mechanical system cannot
preclude inappropriate operation; however, proper training of pilots
can. These commenters conclude that, with the previously mentioned
procedures already in place, the unsafe condition specified in the
proposed rule does not exist.
The FAA does not concur that the subject unsafe condition does not
exist in Model DHC-8 series airplanes. The FAA acknowledges that other
safeguards currently in practice, such as AFM revisions and the revised
pilot training syllabus, do provide certain tactile, visual, and audio
cues. (See Comment 7 for related discussion on visual cues.) However,
despite the implementation of those safeguards, the FAA has received
reports of operation of the airplane with the power levers positioned
below the flight idle stop during flight on de Havilland Model DHC-8
series airplanes. One report indicated that such operation resulted in
significant engine damage. Therefore, the FAA considers that sufficient
data exist to demonstrate that an unsafe condition exists on Model DHC-
8 series airplanes. Further, the FAA has determined that positioning of
the power levers below the flight idle stop could result in engine
overspeed, possible engine damage or failure, and consequent reduced
controllability of the airplane.
3. Request to Withdraw the Proposal: Airplane Already Meets Intent
of 14 CFR Part 25.1155
Several commenters state that the current design meets the
requirements of part 25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR
part 25.1155), and one other commenter asserts that the current design
already goes beyond those requirements. One of the commenters points
out that part 25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 25)
only addresses unintentional or uninformed actions, and does not
address intentional acts. Another commenter states that if the FAA is
going beyond its statutory authority and being inconsistent in
application of requirements without
[[Page 4096]]
providing justification, the commenter would view the proposed rule as
arbitrary rulemaking.
The FAA does not concur that the AD should be withdrawn. The
issuance of this AD is based on the finding that an unsafe condition
exists or is likely to develop in this airplane series. The FAA points
out that an airplane's type design is approved only after the FAA makes
a determination that it complies with all applicable part 25 (14 CFR
part 25) airworthiness requirements. In adopting and maintaining those
requirements, the FAA has made the determination that they establish an
appropriate level of safety. However, actual in-service experience (as
well as other factors, such as manufacturers' fatigue testing, etc.)
may reveal problems in an airplane or its components that were not
envisioned or predictable at the time of type certification. When these
problems create an unsafe condition, this means that the intent of the
original level of safety is no longer being achieved. When actions or
procedures have been identified that will positively correct the unsafe
condition and restore the airplane to its original level of safety, an
AD is the appropriate vehicle for mandating that such actions be
accomplished.
4. Request to Withdraw the Proposal: Proposed Installation May
Introduce an Unsafe Condition
Several commenters state that introduction of a beta lockout system
will not provide any added safety benefit, and could actually cause an
unsafe condition if the beta lockout system were to fail during
landing. These commenters point out that failure of the lockout system
to release may prevent the selection of propeller beta pitch angles (on
the ground after landing) could, in fact, cause an over run, loss of
control of the airplane during landing, or an accident. This commenter
also states that with an ``override'' function, the flightcrew is
required to perform an additional task to unlock the power levers so
they can select ``Beta/Disking & Reverse.'' Another commenter states
that installation of a mechanical lockout system would require an
additional cockpit procedure and associated training. That commenter
points out that such an additional cockpit procedure would contribute
to the crew workload during the most critical phase of flight. Further,
the commenter contends that the additional cockpit procedure could
result in delay in placing the airplane in the desired configuration
when required.
The FAA does not concur that the installation of a beta lockout
system may introduce an unsafe condition. The FAA has already required
retrofit of a similar lockout system on three other turbopropeller-
powered airplane models. Further, several turboprop airplanes were
designed and certified with beta lockout systems. Both the retrofit and
the original designed lockout systems have been operating safely for
close to ten years with no adverse landing or rollout service history.
No change is required to the final rule as a result of these comments.
5. Request to Delay Issuance of the Final Rule
Two commenters state that the proposed rule is premature and
inconsistent, and that any rulemaking effort should wait until the
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) submits its findings and
recommendations regarding a change to the Federal Aviation Regulations.
One of those commenters points out that ARAC is not expected to submit
its recommendations to the FAA until July 31, 2001. That commenter
contends that, until changes to part 25 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations have been accomplished, the proposal is premature, and, at
best, shows an inconsistency by the FAA as a result of arbitrary
rulemaking without explanation. Another commenter requests that the FAA
delay issuance of a rule pending a detailed safety study review of the
current design, with the objective of determining if the Bombardier
design proposal for a beta warning horn addresses the unsafe condition.
The FAA does not consider that delaying this action until after the
release of the ARAC recommendation is warranted since sufficient
technology currently exists to devise and install a beta lockout
system. The purpose of the ARAC task is to determine whether changes to
existing design standards are appropriate. These standards would be
applicable only to future designs. In tasking ARAC on this subject, the
FAA never intended that ARAC address issues relating to unsafe
conditions found on previously certificated designs. Further, the FAA
has determined that the warning horn is not sufficient to address the
unsafe condition, and does not prevent moving the power lever into the
beta range during flight.
6. Request to Revise Paragraph (b) of the Proposal
Several commenters request that the FAA require installation of a
beta warning horn rather than the beta lockout modification required by
paragraph (b) of the proposal. These commenters also point out that
Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA), which is the airworthiness
authority for Canada, did not determine that a beta lockout system was
necessary. Those commenters question why the FAA has determined that
installation of the beta lockout system is necessary when TCCA has not
mandated such an installation. One commenter, the manufacturer, states
that TCCA is planning to require mandatory installation of the beta
warning horn, which would be substantially less expensive than
installation of a beta lockout system, and would still provide an
equivalent level of safety. Some commenters state that the description
of the installation specified in paragraph (b) of the proposal is not
sufficient to provide actual guidelines for the development of a beta
lockout system. However, another commenter states that paragraph (b) of
the proposal limits how operators can comply with the requirements.
Another commenter requests that specific training for prohibiting
beta during in-flight be required instead of the beta lockout system.
Additionally, another commenter states that the service experience of
the Model DHC-8 series airplane does not distinguish itself in
comparison to other airplane models considering the fact that crews of
other types of airplanes could intentionally position the power lever
in the beta range.
Other commenters state that a beta lockout system still wouldn't
preclude intentional use of beta during flight because of the override
function. The manufacturer states that the proposal implies that
installation of a beta lockout system would preclude the pilot from
being able to position the power lever below flight idle during flight.
However, the manufacturer points out that with an override function,
intentional positioning of the power levers below the flight idle stop
during flight cannot be prevented. The manufacturer concludes,
therefore, that the declared unsafe condition cannot be eliminated by
the installation of a beta lockout system with an override function.
The manufacturer asserts that, if it can be concluded that intentional
positioning of power levers below flight idle stop during flight can
only be deterred, the beta warning horn provides such deterrence. The
manufacturer states that a beta warning horn provides a loud, easily
identifiable aural warning, which would ``sound'' with any movement of
the power levers
[[Page 4097]]
below the flight idle stop. The manufacturer further notes that TCCA
has accepted the beta warning horn modification as an enhanced level of
safety.
The FAA does not concur with the requests to revise the requirement
specified in paragraph (b) of the final rule. The FAA acknowledges that
additional airplane flight manual limitations and additional pilot
training have enhanced the operational safety of the airplane. However,
those actions have not proven to solve the long-term problem involving
unsafe operation of other turbopropeller-powered airplanes with a
similar throttle quadrant design and service histories involving unsafe
operation. Despite the addition of those actions, reports of beta
during flight continued.
Further, the FAA does not concur with the commenters' requests to
require a beta warning horn in lieu of a beta lockout system. The FAA
points out that it appears that certain actions taken by the flightcrew
are reflexive, and, as such, the action of placing the power levers
below flight idle during flight may not always be interrupted by the
horn. Additional data indicate that if beta operation is attempted with
a warning horn as the only safety system, it is possible that in the
time it takes for the flightcrew to react and return the power levers
to the flight range, an overspeed of the propeller could occur that
might cause engine damage or failure, and consequent reduced
controllability of the airplane. Further, the beta horn (even though
distinctive) may be accompanied by an airplane overspeed warning horn,
along with other warnings, which may be confusing to the flightcrew.
The FAA points out that, in at least one previous accident caused by
inflight beta uses on another turbpropeller-powered airplane, the pilot
attempted to decelerate the airplane from an overspeed condition
(airplane speed was initially above Vmo). In that case, the airspeed
aural warning was already sounding at the time the inflight beta event
occurred. The FAA notes that many transport category airplanes powered
by turbopropeller engines are operated at or near Vmo during descent in
order to maintain adequate Air Traffic Control (ATC) separation from
the faster flying turbojet-powered airplanes. Therefore, the FAA
considers that use of a beta warning horn could be preceded or
accompanied by an airplane overspeed aural warning, and could result in
confusion to the flightcrew. Although the FAA acknowledges that a beta
warning horn should deter the pilot from using beta in flight, the horn
does not physically keep the power levers from being placed in the beta
mode during flight. As explained previously, several turbopropeller-
powered airplanes were designed and certified with beta lockout
systems, and the FAA has required retrofit of a similar lockout system
on three other turbopropeller-powered airplane models. Both the
original design lockout systems and the retrofit have been operating
safely for close to ten years with acceptable landing or rollout
service history.
In response to commenters that questioned why the FAA is requiring
installation of a beta lockout system and TCCA has not, the FAA notes
that, while the United States and Canada observe the provisions of the
bilateral airworthiness agreement, it remains the responsibility of the
FAA to monitor and maintain the continuing airworthiness of U.S-type
certificated and -registered airplanes. The bilateral airworthiness
agreement does not restrict the FAA from issuing AD's based upon its
own finding of an unsafe condition, regardless of the decision relative
to the same subject made by another airworthiness authority. The FAA
has examined the reports of operation of the airplane with the power
levers positioned below the flight idle stop during flight on Model
DHC-8 series airplanes, has examined other available data, and has
determined that an unsafe condition exists. Therefore, the FAA finds
that AD action is necessary for airplanes of this type design that are
certificated for operation in the United States.
In reponse to the commenter's statement that paragraph (b) of the
proposed rule limits the ways operators can comply with the
requirements, the FAA points out that the language specified in that
paragraph is purposefully general in nature to allow for some
flexibility by the operators in complying with the requirements of that
paragraph. Further, the FAA also points out that paragraph (d) of the
final rule also contains a provision for operators to request approval
of an alternative method of compliance.
7. Requests to Revise Paragraph (c) of the Proposal
One commenter requests that the proposed allowance for Minimum
Master Equipment List (MMEL) relief of two days, as specified in
paragraph (c) of the proposal, be extended to three days. Another
commenter, the manufacturer, states that, where a legitimate system
failure has necessitated the use of the override system, operators
should not be penalized with a mandatory maintenance action in order to
dispatch the airplane. The manufacturer considers a lockout system to
be a secondary non-essential system to the existing design, and,
therefore, dispatching the airplane with a failed lockout system for a
limited time would not jeopardize the safety of the airplane. The
manufacturer further states that if a pilot chooses to use the override
system just prior to touchdown during inclement weather (e.g., low
visibility, contaminated runway), those conditions could be considered
emergency situations. Use of an override system in such an emergency
should not require maintenance action to return the airplane to
dispatch configuration. For those reasons, the manufacturer requests
that the proposed MMEL relief of two days be extended in accordance
with criteria to be identified in the DHC-8 MMEL.
The FAA concurs that the MMEL relief specified in paragraph (c) of
the proposal may be extended to three flight days. However, although
use of the override system may be made available as a means to gain
additional stopping performance in the event of a failed beta lockout
system, the FAA does not consider low visibility or contaminated runway
scenarios to constitute an emergency. Further, the override function is
used only when a system failure or potentially inadequate ground/air
logic is indicated while the airplane is on the ground. The FAA has
determined that in those situations a maintenance action must be taken.
8. Request to Require Only the Placard Installation
One commenter contends that the only action that the FAA should
require is the installation of a placard. The commenter asserts that
adding the placard, in combination with the current pilot training
curriculum, provides an adequate level of safety. The commenter further
points out that only a placard is necessary for many other airplane
models.
The FAA does not concur that installation of the placard should be
the only requirement of this AD. The FAA has determined that long-term
continued operational safety will be better assured by design changes
to remove the source of the problem, rather than by reliance upon
visual cues such as placards. Such visual cues may not be providing the
degree of safety assurance necessary for certain transport airplanes.
This, coupled with a better understanding of the human factors
associated with reliance upon visual cues, has led the FAA to consider
placing less emphasis on such visual
[[Page 4098]]
cues and more emphasis on design improvements. The required
installation of a beta lockout system is consistent with these
considerations.
The FAA acknowledges that installing a placard is the only
requirement for some transport airplanes. Those airplanes, however, do
not have the same service experience as Model DHC-8 series airplanes.
As explained in Comment 6, the FAA has required the installation of a
beta lockout system on other airplane models that have similar service
experiences to those of Model DHC-8 series airplanes.
9. Request to Extend the Compliance Time
One commenter, the manufacturer, requests that the compliance time
for the installation of the beta lockout system be revised from one
year to 2\1/2\ years. The manufacturer explains that a beta lockout
design could be available within one year of being mandated, but
cautions that a compliance time of 18 months after the design approval
is necessary.
Two other commenters request that the compliance time be changed to
two years to allow time for design approval and actual installation.
One other commenter states that one year is not enough time, but does
not suggest an alternative compliance time.
The FAA concurs that the compliance time to install the beta
lockout system may be extended somewhat. The FAA has taken into
consideration the complexity of accomplishing the installation of a
beta lockout system and the time that will be needed to develop and
approve a service bulletin, and has concluded that a two-year
compliance time to install the beta lockout system may be established
without adversely affecting safety. Paragraph (b) of the final rule has
been revised accordingly.
10. Requests to Revise the Cost Estimate
One commenter, the manufacturer, considers the cost estimate
provided in the proposal to be significantly lower than actual costs.
The manufacturer states that it has information indicating that the
lockout implementation on another airplane model is estimated at an
average of $24,000 per airplane ($12,000 for parts and $12,000 for
labor). The manufacturer points out that the proposal does not account
for the potential loss of revenue incurred by airplane downtime for
incorporation of the change. The manufacturer is concerned that the
lower cost estimate of $17,800 in the proposal may be misleading to
operators.
One commenter considers that the requirements of the proposal go
beyond the current requirements for continued airworthiness; therefore,
the costs that were disregarded in the proposal as necessary for
``maintaining a safe airplane'' should be attributed solely as a direct
result of the AD and should be addressed as such. Another commenter
requests an explanation as to why a complete cost-benefit analysis is
unnecessary and redundant. That same commenter requests that the FAA
provide a cost-benefit analysis before a determination is made to
require actions that may be unnecessary for an airplane that is already
safe.
Based on information provided by the manufacturer, the FAA concurs
that the estimated cost for the installation of the beta lockout system
should be adjusted, and has revised the final rule accordingly.
However, the FAA does not concur that a cost-benefit analysis should be
accomplished for this AD. As stated in the proposal, as a matter of
law, in order to be airworthy, an aircraft must conform to its type
design and be in a condition for safe operation. The type design is
approved only after the FAA makes a determination that it complies with
all applicable airworthiness requirements. In adopting and maintaining
those requirements, the FAA has already made the determination that
they establish a level of safety that is cost-beneficial. When the FAA,
as in this AD, makes a finding of an unsafe condition, this means that
the original cost-beneficial level of safety is no longer being
achieved and that the actions are necessary to restore that level of
safety. Because this level of safety has already been determined to be
cost-beneficial, a full cost-benefit analysis for this AD would be
redundant and unnecessary.
11. Request to Clarify Intent of the Proposed Rule
Several commenters request that an accurate description of the
unsafe condition be provided. Other commenters request clarification as
to whether the FAA is trying to prevent an unsafe condition that could
be caused by unintentional pilot actions or by intentional pilot
actions.
The FAA considers that an adequate description of the unsafe
condition has already been presented in the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM). The FAA has determined that operation of the
airplane with power levers positioned below the flight idle stop during
flight could result in engine overspeed, possible engine damage or
failure, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane. Since
the FAA has received reports of those types of incidents occurring on
Model DHC-8 series airplanes, the FAA has determined that such an
unsafe condition exists in those models.
Regardless of whether in-flight operation in beta resulted from
intentional or unintentional pilot actions, the purpose of this AD is
to prevent such operation. The FAA considers a requirement to install
beta lockout to be the most effective means to achieve that objective.
12. Request to Ensure Consistent Requirements
One commenter points out that the design of the power lever system
on Model DHC-8 series airplanes is different than that of other
turbopropeller-powered airplanes that are addressed by AD's similar to
the proposal. Several commenters assert that there seems to be
different requirements for certain similar airplanes and similar
requirements for different airplanes. The commenters request that the
FAA ``level the playing field'' to ensure requirements are consistent
for all airplane models.
The FAA acknowledges that there are different requirements for
certain airplane models. As discussed previously, the requirements for
different airplanes are based on certain aspects of design and service
history of each different airplane model. Therefore, the FAA considers
that the ``playing field is level'' in that the basic requirements for
airplanes with similar design and service histories are equivalent.
13. Request for a Public Meeting
One commenter requests that a public meeting be held to discuss the
proposed rule. The commenter states that the proposed beta lockout
system will not improve safety. The commenter contends that since the
manufacturer, operators, and TCCA do not support the proposal, a public
meeting should be held to determine the most appropriate action.
The FAA does not concur that a public meeting is necessary to
discuss the final rule. A Notice of Proposed Public Meeting was
published in the Federal Register, and that meeting took place on June
11 and 12, 1996. Draft design criteria that the FAA was considering for
use in evaluating a beta lockout system were included in that notice.
The public meeting was held for the purpose of soliciting and reviewing
information from the public on what type of FAA action would be
appropriate to prevent future occurrences of inflight beta operation on
all turbopropeller-powered airplanes. Further, a 90-day comment period
was
[[Page 4099]]
specified in the NPRM to allow an adequate period of time for
commenters to respond. The fact that the final rule has been revised in
response to certain information supplied by the commenters demonstrates
the success of this process. For those issues on which commenters
continue to disagree with the FAA's conclusions, given the extensive
public participation to date, it is unlikely that yet another public
meeting would resolve the issues. Therefore, further delay of this AD
is inappropriate.
Conclusion
After careful review of the available data, including the comments
noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public
interest require the adoption of the rule with the changes described
previously. The FAA has determined that these changes will neither
increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of
the AD.
Cost Impact
The FAA estimates that 185 de Havilland Model DHC-8-100, and -200,
and -300 series airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected by this AD,
that it will take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to accomplish
the installation of the placard, and that the average labor rate is $60
per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the placard
installation on U.S. operators is estimated to be $11,100, or $60 per
airplane.
Since the manufacturer has not yet developed a specific system
commensurate with the requirements of this AD, the FAA is unable to
provide specific information as to the number of work hours or cost of
parts that will be required to accomplish the installation. However,
based on similar installations of such systems accomplished previously
on other airplane models, the FAA can reasonably estimate that
approximately 200 work hours per airplane will be necessary to
accomplish the system installation. The FAA also estimates that
required parts will cost approximately $12,000 per airplane. Based on
these figures, the cost impact of the required system installation on
U.S. operators is estimated to be $4,440,000, or $24,000 per airplane.
The cost impact figures discussed above are based on assumptions
that no operator has yet accomplished any of the requirements of this
AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the
future if this AD were not adopted.
Regulatory Impact
The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct
effects on the States, on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in
accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final
rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the
preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866;
(2) is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a
significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial
number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action
and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained
from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption
ADDRESSES.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new
airworthiness directive:
2000-02-13 de Havilland: Amendment 39-11531. Docket 98-NM-179-AD.
Applicability: All Model DHC-8-100, -200, and -300 series
airplanes, certificated in any category.
Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the
preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been
modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the
requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified,
altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of
this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an
alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (d) of
this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of
the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition
addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been
eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to
address it.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished
previously.
To prevent positioning of the power levers below the flight idle
stop during flight, which could cause engine overspeed, possible
engine damage or failure, and consequent reduced controllability of
the airplane, accomplish the following:
(a) Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, install
a placard in a prominent location on the instrument panel of the
cockpit that states: ``Positioning of the power levers below the
flight idle stop during flight is prohibited. Such positioning may
lead to loss of airplane control, or may result in an engine
overspeed condition and consequent loss of engine power.''
(b) Within 2 years after the effective date of this AD, install
a system that would prevent positioning the power levers below the
flight idle stop during flight, in accordance with a method approved
by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA,
Engine and Propeller Directorate. Following accomplishment of that
installation, the placard required by paragraph (a) of this AD may
be removed.
(c) In the event that the system required by paragraph (b) of
this AD malfunctions, or if the use of an override (if installed) is
necessary, the airplane may be operated for three days to a location
where required maintenance/repair can be performed, provided the
system required by paragraph (b) of this AD has been properly
deactivated and placarded for flightcrew awareness, in accordance
with the FAA-approved Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL).
(d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the
compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used if approved by the Manager, New York ACO. Operators shall
submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal
Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the
Manager, New York ACO.
Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved
alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be
obtained from the New York ACO.
(e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with
sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14
CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where
the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
(f) This amendment becomes effective on March 1, 2000.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 20, 2000.
Donald L. Riggin,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 00-1772 Filed 1-21-00; 11:20 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
Source: Official FAA Source ↗
Retrieved: Apr 6, 2026
Rights: U.S. Government Public Domain
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